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We completed this book during the lonely days of the pandem-
ic, sending each letter twice to ensure that each writer had the 
chance to revise and reconsider, while retaining the back-and-
forth flow of responsive correspondence, in which each writer 
takes the other’s ideas to heart. This strange, slow, and surpris-
ingly effective method of composition meant that our book 
could dissolve at any moment, might never be completed, and 
could risk crashing our friendship where our ideas clashed, yet 
none of these things happened. In writing about contemporary 
cinema and religion in the form of a book of letters, we selected 
three filmmakers whose movies got to us. Yes, we see an ongoing 
critique of secular modernity and Weberian disenchantment in 
these pictures, one that unrolled alongside our own lives. No, we 
still don’t agree about what any of it might mean, but the trust 
involved in listening to one another at length feels valuable. The 
lyric subjectivity of the “I,” we hope, might be useful in uncover-
ing something of our encounters with art, and with one another, 
both together and alone, and with a small audience in mind, of 
readers that might be wondering what they really believe right 
now. We thank Eileen A. Fradenburg Joy and Vincent W.J. van 
Gerven Oei at punctum books for their faith in (and patience 
with) this outlier project, off the map of conventional criticism. 
We dedicate this work to our respective spouses, the writers Ste-








Dec 7, 2019, 11:47 PM
Dear Morgan,
With his new film A Hidden Life set for release over the holidays, 
I have been thinking once again about all of our good conversa-
tions and arguments about movies — in particular about Ter-
rence Malick and To the Wonder. Especially about the images 
of Mont-Saint-Michel in the movie. I wanted to send you this 
photograph (in P.S. below) that I took from the vantage point 
of the road bridge they’ve built across to the holy tidal island. 
I remember seeing pilgrims crossing in the mud, up to their 
knees in the water, while tourists from all over the world milled 
around waiting for the bus back to the parking lot.
What was your experience of the place when you visited so long 
ago? I remember thinking, when I was there (and, later, at Char-
tres), that it would have been good to walk through these pil-
grimage sites with you and ask you all sorts of questions about 
your religious conversion to Catholicism in Sri Lanka. My frame 
of reference for these places is so different. For me it all started 
with my own hidden life in the movies — Malick’s Mont-Saint-
Michel and Orson Welles’s description of Chartres as an un-
signed anonymous masterwork in F for Fake. Do the movies 
make us credulous or cynical? Is the moving image designed to 
reveal the world or to fool the spectator? Does the cinema carry 
something essential of reality in it or is it more like a conjuring 
trick? Do films help us see everything more clearly or do they 
divert our gaze and beguile the time?
After arriving home to America from several long stretches in 
Europe over the past five years, I feel like these places are now 
part of me even if it was watching movies that got me there to 
begin with. The same is true of Château du Haut-Koenigsbourg 
in the Rhineland, which served as the castle prison location 
setting in Renoir’s Grand Illusion. These three very differently 
toned pictures now have autobiographical resonances for me 
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that I cannot dissociate from the movies in which I glimpsed 
them first in Renoir’s, Welles’s, and Malick’s films. The way I 
remember it, the local congregation in Chartres held their ser-
vice in the basement, ceding the splendor of the cathedral itself 
to the tourist hordes. The Virgin’s Veil held a meditative alcove 
of sorts but if you sat there, people would take photographs of 
you while you prayed or wept or stood by skeptically ponder-
ing — F for Fake? At Renoir’s castle, the fog was so thick on the 
day of our visit that the view commanding the Rhine Valley was 
spoiled, and I kept thinking of the scene from Grand Illusion 
where the North African officer imprisoned by Erich von Stro-
heim with Jean Gabin is explaining his great love of translating 
Pindar, a little island of profoundly moving humanism amidst 
the storm of war, and ascribed to one of the minor and margin-
alized characters.
I’m surprised by how little I hear anybody I know talking about 
To the Wonder. It seems to me that all of the attention of the 
Malick-crazed went to The Tree of Life, but I liked To the Wonder 
a lot more for some reason, perhaps because it is so “minor” in 
comparison with the “major” ambition of The Tree of Life? It’s 
quieter, less thundering, less rhetorical, more intimate, smaller 
scale, more human, less cymbal- (and symbol-)crashingly pro-
found but all the more appealing to me for those reasons. Re-
peated viewings of The Tree of Life have deepened my apprecia-
tion of the film as a visual poem. But in that culminating scene 
where everyone in hanging out on the beach in the afterlife, I 
always feel a kind of rhetorical phoniness creeping in… To the 
Wonder feels warm, modest, troubled, mixed up, and unwieldy 
in a way that I enjoy — it’s an experiment and has the feel of a 
cast-off. It’s almost a delightful failure.
I remember being a little bit shocked at how banal a lot of the 
stuff at the real Mont-Saint-Michel appeared to me on my own 
visit in comparison with the film. You can buy a toy samurai 
sword up there, for example. That felt more Chris Marker than 
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Terrence Malick! Malick’s Mont-Saint-Michel, for me, was far 
more moving than the real thing. What I take to be Malick’s 
belief moves his images of the place into a personal and fervent 
zone of expression. For me, the film seems to visualize belief 
and to reveal how the world can look different, more alive and 
more remarkable — more wonder-filled — when seen through 
the eyes of a conviction of some kind, aesthetic, moral, or re-
ligious. Kierkegaard’s Stages on Life’s Way springs to mind here, 
not that I’m any expert on Kierkegaard! The artistic, the ethi-
cal, and the spiritual temperaments experience exactly the same 
empirical reality on three different planes that diverge greatly 
but also overlap, like alternate dimensions converging on some 
special location of powerful magnetic resonance.
Some fragment of me still resides up there in the abbey windows 
overlooking the water through ancient green-colored glass and 
another scrap of my ghost floats through the images of the holy 
mountain in the film. I’m in the penitent’s maze at Chartres and 
I’m clipping a flower from a potted plant to lay on a dead enemy/
friend in a fogged-in castle from a war that ended over half a 
century before my birth, and some thirty years before my grand-
father trudged through France behind a cannon, finding Calva-
dos, ladies of the town, and starved Russian POWs along his way 
from Normandy to Trier. Maybe I never returned home after 
all, from those foreigner’s journeys, or from those trips to the 
cinema. Something like this conception of how space and time 
are expressed through different inner states — and seen, heard, 
and felt through his characters’ inner monologues — strikes me 
as one possible key to unlocking Malick’s films — or maybe to 
the movies more generally?
Surely I am not saying anything new here? From your friend 
JMT





December 19, 2019, 12:09 PM
Josh,
It is interesting that you asked me about my first experiences at 
Mont-Saint-Michel and then immediately about my conversion 
to Catholicism in Sri Lanka. As if the two were directly related. 
In fact, my first trip to Mont-Saint-Michel happened when I was 
eleven years old. As you know, I wasn’t raised in the Church. My 
baptism in Sri Lanka happened at thirty-nine years old. So, the 
two things, going to Mont-Saint-Michel and being baptized in 
Sri Lanka, couldn’t be more unrelated in my life… . 
And yet, I think you have a point. Experiences like being in 
Mont-Saint-Michel WERE actually like tiny time bombs in my 
consciousness, the way I look at it now. What happened to me 
when I was eleven ended up bearing its strange fruit twenty-five 
or so years later. This is something I think Malick captures in 
To the Wonder. On one hand, you can look at the experiences in 
your life in a pretty flat way. I could just list different things that 
happened to me. You know, “August 13th, 1983: saw an amazing 
medieval fortress and church on an island off the coast of Nor-
mandy. Ate trout on the bone for the first time ever. Slept well.” 
This would be an accurate portrayal of what actually happened. 
And it would also miss everything that is of any importance. 
Because what happened to me at Mont-Saint-Michel, and what 
happened to me that entire summer I spent with my aunt in 
Paris and traveling around Europe, was that I was continually 
shocked and astounded by experiencing the world in new and 
surprising and destabilizing ways. I was opened up. My heart 
softened. I’m not sure exactly why it happened for me that sum-
mer, the summer of Mont-Saint-Michel. Probably, a number of 
forces and accidents in my life all came together at once, the 
way those things happen. I was a smart and already pretty cyni-
cal eleven-year-old kid. But wandering around Europe with 
my aunt knocked the cynicism out of me, for a time. Later, of 
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course, it came back, the coldness, the hardness. And then I had 
to fight it off again. 
All of life, in a sense, has been like that for me. Learning vari-
ous ways to protect myself from the empty deadness and disap-
pointment of the world… and then realizing that it is the self-
protection, the putting-on-armor, that contributes to that very 
sense of deadness. In fact, when I’m opened up, when I’m si-
multaneously moist and brittle, snapped in two and knocked on 
my ass by the otherwise insignificant beauty of the world, that’s 
when I see the world as more like a mystical hovering than like 
a flat and dead list of events and… I don’t know, mute causality. 
I see Malick’s films over the last few years as an attempt to put 
that specific way of being-in-the-world, the Mont-Saint-Michel 
way of being-in-the-world, into a film. Whether this is suc-
cessful or not is another question, something we can talk more 
about. But I will say it is an incredibly bold and moving thing 
to try to do. Crazy perhaps. Parts of The Tree of Life, as you say, 
fail probably exactly because he tries too hard. And many of the 
scenes in most of his recent movies with all the fucking muslin 
floating in the breeze and people wandering around meaning-
fully on the beach… I don’t know, they probably aren’t the right 
images for the feeling he’s trying to get. Maybe he already got 
it all back in Days of Heaven with some of those late evening 
shots, the magic hour out in the fields. Maybe everything else 
is just piling on. 
But I think he wants to try, at least. I think he wants to show 
me, on film, what it felt like for me to be eleven years old and 
wandering around at the top of Mont-Saint-Michel utterly as-
tounded and utterly convinced, finally, that something in my 
heart has been right all along, that life is not simply a cruel trick, 
that the throwing myself headlong into experience does provide 
real-world confirmation that something very strange is going 
on here, being alive, and that it matters very much indeed how 
we go about it.
 21
wonder
That’s what the movie is “about” for me. But I wonder what it is 
about for you. I wonder why you see it as worth talking about 
and as more successful than his previous offerings. I mean, you 
suggest that the world must be transformed for people like Mal-
ick and me who come at it through “conviction.” I know what 
you mean. I’ve tried to describe what that’s like for me above. 
But I also wouldn’t call it conviction. Since my conversion, I’d 
say I’m less convicted than I ever was. I used to know the world 
was meaningless. Really know it. Now I have no idea what the 
fuck the world really is. But I see it as huge and pulsating and 
real as I did, for a brief period, when I was a little kid. That’s what 
belief is for me, opening myself up to that. Opening up to the 
wonder, I guess… though that sounds terribly corny.
But I’m not sure, then, that I fully understand what watching 
a Terrence Malick film is like for you. I mean, I think it is in-
teresting that you bring up F Is for Fake in contrast to To the 
Wonder. You’re on to something interesting there. The way that 
film brings attention to the very way that it constructs reality, to 
its own lies. Orson Welles was, of course, fascinated, especially 
in his later years, with art as the long con or something like that. 
But then again, Welles was also the great hero of Andre Bazin 
and the idea that film actually penetrates reality rather than sim-
ply playing wonderful games with the fact that reality itself is a 
series of games. I guess we are somewhere at the core of belief 
here. Do we believe in the world or not? I think that where a 
person comes down on believing in the world is probably also 
where they come down on what the movies are, what they do. 
Funnily enough, I didn’t really love movies when I was younger. 
I really came to love them, to believe in them, once I became a 
practicing Christian. I started to have patience for the slow and 
difficult movies that used to bore the crap out of me. I started to 
see movie makers as, at least sometimes, the artists who believe 
in the world, its wonder, its strangeness, its intense reality, more 
than anyone. Someone asked Alice Rohrwacher (whose films 
are incredible to me) whether she is a person of faith, given all 
the kooky Catholic themes in her films. She said something like, 
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“I make movies, so obviously I’m a very religious person.” I as-
sume she said that with a sly smile on her face. It’s a cleverly 
ambiguous answer. Something you’d like, I think. Because, in a 
sense, she’s saying that making movies is enough. That’s a reli-
gion in itself. Maybe that’s closer to the form of skeptical belief 
that you take to the world. But I don’t want to put words into 





Dec 19, 2019, 2:50 PM
Dear Morgan,
Rohrwacher’s splendid The Wonders would make for a fascinat-
ing double bill with To the Wonder. I just came across this quote 
from Godard that might interest you as well: “I started from the 
imaginary and discovered reality; but behind reality, there is 
again imagination.” (And behind that?)
I can relate to feeling opened up by Malick’s art. The images you 
mentioned from Days of Heaven, of magic hour out in the fields, 
the insects among the plants, or the men in combat encounter-
ing jungle creatures in The Thin Red Line, or the waving grasses 
of The New World, or that momentary glimpse of something 
small being covered and buried in The Tree of Life (do we ever 
see what it is?)… these moments form points of continuity be-
tween his films. It’s about the act of noticing or seeing, obvi-
ously, but I think there is much more to it than that. I think 
Shklovsky’s words from “Art as Technique” ring true for Malick, 
who also wants to avoid the way in which “life becomes noth-
ing” and our automatized processing of mundane perception 
“eats up things, clothes, furniture, your wife and the fear of war.” 
This beautiful notion suggests that art restores our eyes and 
gives us more to attend to. The passage also suggests the pain in-
volved in To the Wonder when love fades between Neil (Affleck) 
and Marina (Kurylenko) and lovers stop paying attention to one 
another. Sometimes all the dancing couples in Malick’s films get 
exhausting to watch but when movement is no longer dancing 
it is ordinary and invisible again. Habitual modes of perception 
have devoured “your wife.” Anyway, I like his films better when 
they hurt. In To the Wonder, it hurts to see them gain and lose 
their wonder, to glimpse it again with another lover, to circle 
back in their lives from France to America and to be cast adrift 
in their home countries where they feel like strangers after so 
much time away. I feel the presence of the angel with the flam-
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ing sword barring the return of Adam and Eve to Eden. Malick’s 
films always have this exilic quality.
We share this “map of tenderness,” as Giuliana Bruno calls it 
in her book Atlas of Emotion, centered on Mont-Saint-Michel, 
with Malick’s film, and with millions of other pilgrims. Recently 
I fished a little ceramic bowl out of a storage box that had an 
image of Mont-Saint-Michel hand-painted on it, and my wife’s 
name painted on the bottom. The bowl was cracked and Emily 
wanted to throw it away but I spent some time gluing the thing 
back together and now it serves to hold some odds and ends. 
Seeing the image on the bowl reminded me that when I visited 
Mont-Saint-Michel with my uncle I had the uncanny feeling 
that I had been there before, when I had not. I must have seen 
the image of the place a hundred times in movies, on postcards, 
in books… I had a powerful false memory of the place that I 
cannot account for except to say that it activated or reactivated 
something in me. So did the bowl. And the movie. I would be 
hard pressed to say what that something was because I do not 
know.
Which brings me back to your words about conviction. You 
say that, after your conversion, you feel less convicted but more 
open. That is my experience of art in general and Malick’s films 
in particular. I suppose we’re ultimately resting on “French ter-
ritory” indeed if we follow Montaigne’s example of using your 
expression of faith as an instrument of skepticism rather than 
certainty, and linking arms with his great maxim, “What do I 
know?” After all, the opposite of The Tree of Life was The Tree 
of Knowledge, and it seems to be one of the themes of Malick’s 
films to ask where all of our knowledge has taken humanity, if 
anywhere. The serpent promised us life “as gods” but our instru-
mental, exploitative approach to knowledge seems to be repre-
sented by Malick in terms of our ugly flat modern office build-
ings (in The Tree of Life) and by the environmental degradation 
that is investigated by Affleck’s character for his job in To the 
Wonder. These very settings display a certain kind of ugliness 
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that marks them as anti-cathedrals, perhaps, places that are the 
opposite of Mont-Saint-Michel. (Although one of the reasons I 
like To the Wonder is that it reveals how Paris can be just as drab 
as anywhere else when it is experienced through a perceptual 
depression… and how America holds its fair share of wonders.) 
The wonder isn’t any particular place but rather a way of see-
ing everything through the lens of love. It’s not that Mont-
Saint-Michel, or anywhere else in particular, is the only place 
of revelation, but rather how you see everything around you, 
and, indeed, the person with whom you share your life. Perhaps 
we “see” life through our partner, in a rough analogy to the way 
we see Malick’s vision through his camera or even as refracted 
and changed by the vision of his cinematographer, Emmanuel 
Lubezki. Lubezki is brilliant at seeing what the director wants 
to have revealed, although, ultimately I have a suspicion that 
Lubezki and Malick don’t hold the same worldview, and some of 
their films together, like Knight of Cups, don’t work so well. Both 
The Tree of Life and To the Wonder are meditations on marriage 
and how the agony of fusion and separation works to alter one’s 
vision of everything else.
You’re right to challenge or complicate this whole notion of con-
viction. While I am not a believer in any particular religion, my 
way of seeing things is probably shaped in some fundamental 
way by my readings in Buddhism over the years. There is some-
thing somewhat similar to Shklovsky’s theory of defamiliariza-
tion, I believe, in the Buddhist texts on emptiness and Buddha-
nature. How the same thing/place/person can be seen/viewed/
experienced/encountered either as suffering or as intensely 
filled with life. 
Maybe I have read too much film theory but I get nervous when 
the word “reality” appears in any account of the movies. Are 
we sure we know what reality is or means? I take it to mean 
something like what the filmmakers wish to convey, or what an 
artist hopes we’ll see. We take something of a good film with us 
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out into the streets after the screening and feel that the world is 
remarkably strange and seems new. The effect, however, strikes 
me as feeling more like a drug than anything I would normally 
associate with conventional ideas of religion. It is a temporary 
state of reorienting our encounter with the world. This goes be-
yond a merely ocular effect but it is one that’s embodied and 
physical, and suffused with emotion. It’s not just mental or per-
ceptual. It’s four-dimensional in the specific sense of altering 
our experience of time. Cinema takes time but also gives back 
time. It is very odd that way. I think cinema wears off, again, 
like a drug or a fever, whereas I imagine that religious practices 
probably permeate life at a far deeper, more basic, and organic 
level. Maybe I am not giving art enough credit but I don’t like 
the conflation of art and religion. Of course, religion can close 
people just as easily to the encounter with otherness, but I imag-
ine you would say that’s not really religion.
This effect of good cinema on the spectator is as real and as im-
portant as anything I have experienced anywhere by any other 
means. It has the capacity to recontextualize the world outside 
of the sanctuary of the theater as being poetic or transformed. 
Because film changes our capacity to contemplate our experi-
ences, I think Kracauer called something like this process “cam-
era-reality.” (There’s that nerve-wracking word again!) I won’t 
use the word “holy” (although Kracauer calls this “redemption”) 
because that begs too many questions for which I don’t have any 
answers. Even the greatest film is, in an ultimate sense, a two-
dimensional flat plane, or even, to take it farther, just celluloid 
in a can or a bit of data on a computer. Welles might be hinting 
in F for Fake that cinema is an illusion but maybe what he’s re-
ally trying to say is that it would be absurd and blasphemous in 
a sense for him to pretend to compete with Chartres. It might be 
a form of idolatry to take up Bazin’s view of the cinema as being 
capable of some deeper relationship with reality, perhaps? I do 
think Malick is sometimes liable to a Romantic blasphemy of 
this nature, that at times he is overly taken with film’s seductive 
power. That is to say, I think that Malick in large measure shares 
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Bazin’s view of cinema, about which I have my doubts. I imagine 
we differ on this, and that your view is more like Bazin’s. That 
difference, if I have identified it correctly, makes for good con-
versation.
I’ll close by mentioning how careful Malick is about his titles: 
To the Wonder can gesture in a general direction of travel, like 
Woolf ’s To the Lighthouse, but it also seems to capture a sort of 
“apostrophe” in which art dedicates itself or offers itself “to” the 
wonder or addresses the wonder. So, I don’t find your notion of 
“opening up to the wonder” to be corny… but I suppose that is 
the risk of such a title and such a wonderfully uncynical cinema. 
It hurts to admit this but I am not totally on board with Malick 
on this and I am not really sure why that is.
Some notes from your friend JMT
P.S. Having broached this topic of film and reality, would you be 
interested in outlining your ideas about “mystical realism” at this 
stage in the conversation, with Malick’s film in mind? That might 




December 26, 2019, 11:44 AM
Josh,
Okay, so in 1929, a Dutch filmmaker named Joris Ivens made a 
short film called Regen (Rain). You’ve probably seen it. It’s one 
of those things that gets shown in history of film classes and 
whatnot. Ostensibly, the film records a day in Amsterdam. It’s a 
day when it happens to rain. At the beginning of the day, there 
is no rain. Then, drops start to fall. Soon, the city is transformed 
by a rainstorm. Not a huge storm. But enough rain to change 
the character and pace of the day. Later, the rain slows and then 
stops. The city goes back to the way it was before the rain. 
You could call the film a documentary. It’s as close to straight 
realism as we get with film. There are no actors or sets or ex-
ternal lighting. There is no sound, though the film often gets 
shown now with a score from Hanns Eisler (student of Schoen-
berg, which is not uninteresting) that, to me, fits the film pretty 
well and that was paired with the film in the 40s at some point. 
Anyway, the point is that on the surface, this is a film that you 
could say has a more or less one-to-one correspondence with 
reality. There was a rainstorm in Amsterdam one day. This film 
records that event. 
Except of course that this is complete bullshit. First of all, the 
footage was collected over several years. So, there’s no day. 
There’s no rainstorm. The whole thing is cobbled together from 
a series of experiences in order to “record” something that never 
happened in the first place. Also, the film is heavily edited in the 
sense that there are continuous jump cuts and juxtapositions. 
The entire film is essentially one long montage. The drama is 
created by the pace and flow of all the quick cuts. And then there 
are the visuals, which are never straightforward. What actually 
is rain anyway? Is it the drops falling from the sky? Is it the accu-
mulation of all the water? Is it drops hitting puddles? Is it the way 
the sky looks? In the film, the rain is all these things and none of 
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them. Much of the time, we get the feel of the rain through the 
various and multiplied reflections. The coming of the rain is like 
the transformation of Amsterdam into a fun house of mirrored 
surfaces. Everything begins to reflect everything else. And the 
film itself is reflecting all of this. 
If this is documentary, then what’s it documenting? What’s the 
reality that we are being shown? Where does the “real” stop and 
the “representation” of the real begin?
The answer, I think, is that the two cannot be separated. Fiction 
is part of what makes reality real. Representation does not stand 
outside of reality, it is part of what constitutes reality. There is no 
reality without reflections. There are no things, no objects, with-
out images of things and objects. A thing is its image. An image 
is a thing. A story is a reality. Reality is a story. The film Regen 
is real, it is a real thing in the world. And it also reflects other 
things in the world, helping them to be real. Reality is a tumble 
and it is also a jumble. It has no smooth surfaces. It is doubled 
over on itself and contorted and weird as shit. Reality is mysti-
cal all the way through to the very core. By mystical I mean that 
reality is always hiding itself exactly as it reveals itself. The tricks 
and games are part of what it actually is. The mystery is constitu-
tive of the thing, not a surface manifestation or something you 
pass through on the way toward some kind of resolution. 
I’ve come to think of this as “mystical realism.” Mystical realism 
is true because reality is, in fact, mystical. The truth that reality 
is mystical means that truth is thus necessarily confusing and 
impossible to pin down. You will forever be in the fun house 
because there is nothing other than the fun house, which doesn’t 
mean that nothing is true or that everything is relative or any 
of those sorts of simplistic thoughts. The necessarily mysteri-
ous nature of reality is in fact real. It can be shown, though that 
showing will, itself, always be mystical in nature because the na-
ture of nature is to be mystical. Film can be true when it is true 
to the mystical nature of reality. There are tons of ways to do 
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this. Film can be mystical realism by setting a camera in front of 
a window and filming the Empire State Building for eight hours 
and five minutes and then seeing what you’ve got. What you’ve 
got in that film, by the way, is not unmediated reality. That film 
is mediated all the way through, from the specific nature of the 
film stock, to the artificial lights on the Empire State building, to 
Warhol’s romantic visions of New York City that stimulated the 
idea in the first place. That’s okay. That’s good. Because reality is 
mediated all the way through. It’s mystical. 
Film can also be mystical realism by indulging in the fantas-
tical and constructed nature of itself as a medium. Cocteau’s 
Beauty and the Beast is mystical realism because, to me, the film 
is about the fact that there is no dividing line between fantasy 
and reality. Reality is constituted by fantasy and vice versa. The 
film’s not about some other place where fantasy can be found. It 
is about the fact that film can, through its own tricks and games 
and illusions, bring us closer to the tricks and games and illu-
sions that are the very fabric of reality in the first place. To be as 
close to this unstable truth as possible, to dwell in the vibrating, 
tense undulating shadow world of real reality is, in my mind, to 
be close to God. Of course, part of being close to God is accept-
ing the fact that reality is so mystically weird that you can only 
be close to God by being in the constant process of forgetting 
what mystical reality is like and falling out of relation with it 
every day. Every day is the process of remembering and trying 
to reproduce what it is like to be close to God. And then forget-
ting again. That’s part of the mystery of mystical reality. Which 
is also delightful and funny and strange and sad. And plenty of 
films express and portray and explore this strange structure of 
daily being, and those films are mystical realism too. 
In a sense, everything is mystical realism because that’s all there 
is. So how could there be anything else? But, of course, and 
paradoxically, some films are more mystical realism than oth-
ers. So, we look for the films that get us closer to the way things 
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are, and the way things are is mystical realism. A film like To 
the Wonder is especially mystically realism because of the very 
fact which you pointed out. It isn’t “The Wonder.” It is To the 
Wonder because it is in the nature of reality for there to be some 
hiding involved and for the very thing that is most obvious to be 
most elusive. We are in Heraclitean territory here. Nature loves 
to hide, and so the job of a mystical realist is to show nature in 
her deepest nature as hiding, to show reality as a hider. She’s 
doubled over on herself. The task of art is not to iron out the 
creases. That would be to destroy the truth, which can only be 
true by being doubled up, folded, covering itself. The job of art is 
to show the truth precisely as the convoluted thing that it actu-




Dec 27, 2019, 1:22 PM
Dear Morgan,
I enjoyed your account of Rain! Reading your notes on Ivens 
made me want to watch the film again, and, when I did so, I 
saw more than before. I cannot really view the film as mysti-
cal in its intentions — was there ever a more secular filmmaker 
than Ivens? Maybe we can meet somewhere in the middle of 
this theoretical thicket and suggest that the world’s irreduc-
ible complexity — things, places, and people seen through the 
lens of art — is dramatic and profoundly mysterious. And there 
is something medium-specific about film, at least in its 20th-
century, photochemical incarnation, that links it with unrepeat-
able and poignantly complex moments of time, captured or re-
flected or distilled on the day, that we experience decades later 
as spectators as seeming to have been bottled forever like some 
exquisite perfume. My Buddhist-inflected perspective leads me 
to propose that Rain is a film that the viewer experiences either 
as boring or fascinating, empty or astonishing, in almost exact 
proportion to their own level of interestingness as a person. Ac-
tually, I think that’s also true of Malick’s recent films. They con-
tain tests of the audience’s life experience, ability to empathize, 
and capacity to sit still and patiently notice others and the world. 
That’s what I value. But they are also experimental and some-
what modernist films, so a comparison with Ivens makes sense 
to me on that plane.
I wonder if you were thinking, directly or indirectly, of the Rus-
sian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev and his 1907 essay “Deca-
dentism and Mystical Realism”? In particular, I found these pas-
sages resonant with our discussion of Malick:
With the artist there ought not to be religious tendencies 
only, but rather a religious world-feeling, and then in his art 
will be manifest the religiousness of everything in the world, 
the religious depths of everything being disclosed in this. The 
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decadentist world-sense hinders the artist from immersion 
into the depths of the religious mystery of the world and only 
great artistic talent can catch sight of the religious realities, 
despite the decadentist rendering asunder from being. Au-
thentic genuine art is as it were a photo-imaging of absolute 
activity, a reflection of eternal ideas. It is necessary most of 
all to be rid of that prejudice, that religion is of something 
else, some sort of special sphere. Religion — is everything, 
religion — is in everything, or it — is nothing. The religious 
world-feeling reveals the depths of being in everything, it as 
it were is an opening to the mystery of creation.
…
Mystical illusionism either passes over into mystical realism 
or it degenerates and becomes vulgar, extinguishing being.
I can’t help thinking that these ideas provide substantial if 
oblique illumination on Malick’s filmmaking, and, in that re-
gard, I think you’re exploring an intriguing critical concept 
here. As I understand it, Berdyaev appreciated how decadent 
art challenged modern secular ideas of rationality and progress 
but found its Russian proponents lacking in a proper spiritual 
grounding. My gloss on this might be that Berdyaev understood 
how artists were needed to challenge modernity’s disenchant-
ing and joyless regime of rationality, by entering the realms of 
dreams, madness, and fantasy, but that he felt the decadentist 
“world-perception” and “world-concept” remained redolent of 
the “illness of spirit” that plagued modern life with selfishness 
and perversity. His call, then, is for a counter-reformation in 
modern art, if you will, from which genuinely spiritual artists 
would arise. 
If we were translating Berdyaev’s concept to contemporary film-
making, we might consider Lars von Trier as a decadentist and 
Terrence Malick as a mystical realist. Both artists understand, 
at a very basic level, what the problem is with conventional nar-
rative filmmaking, and its (over)reliance on conventional no-
tions of realism, whether those are called psychological real-
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ism, capitalist realism, bourgeois realism, domestic realism, or 
Hollywood realism. Perhaps both filmmakers could be called 
very late modernists in the specific sense that they challenge the 
fundamental rules of storytelling and reveal them to be built on 
questionable assumptions, I’m not sure. But Berdyaev probably 
would view von Trier as a decadentist filmmaker because he 
scorns both narrative and moral conventions, flouts politeness, 
and undermines beliefs in systems such as detection and medi-
cine in favor of exploring extreme states of self-destructive faith, 
madness, supernatural fantasy, and other forms of “mystical il-
lusionism” that often degenerate into “vulgar, extinguishing” 
modes. Whereas Malick does seem intent to trace the “religious 
world-feeling” that “reveals the depths of being in everything” 
and, for this reason, his films provide “an opening to the mys-
tery of creation.”
Which brings me back to watching and rewatching To the Won-
der. What struck me anew was the way the film recapitulates the 
themes of paradise lost and paradise regained. (And the purpose 
of art as it relates to time and memory — somewhat near the 
end, when Affleck and Kurylenko are back in the States, togeth-
er but not happy, there’s a glimpse of Rembrandt’s bathing wom-
an that Kurylenko is snipping out of an artbook, presumably for 
use in a collage, that I find poignant.) A secular person can un-
derstand the film’s suggestions that life is a pilgrimage and that 
love is what makes life beautiful, and that the loss of love turns 
a heaven into a hell, etc. (The demon’s comment from Marlowe’s 
Doctor Faustus always feels apropos: “Why, this is hell, nor am 
I out of it. Thinkst thou that I, who saw the face of God…” etc.) 
The place we live doesn’t matter — it might be crowded Paris 
or the Oklahoma suburbs. With love in one’s life it’s a paradise 
wherever we are. Without love, there’s “something missing,” as 
Kurylenko’s French daughter from a previous relationship sug-
gests when they’re in the USA and Affleck refuses to marry her 
mom. I love the sequences of the couple goofing around in the 
supermarket, by the way, and, equally, but more painfully, the 
strange doubling return to the Sonic drive-in restaurant, where 
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their destructive fight begins after her affair in the Econo Lodge. 
As I mentioned before, however, Malick speaks up for America 
and allows it to hold its own against Paris, or rather, shows that 
without love Paris can be a screeching underground hell of its 
own. Another doubling perhaps worth mentioning: the flicker-
ing images of the couple filming themselves, happy, in the win-
dow of the train, near the beginning, which we might contrast 
with Kurylenko’s miserable look around the subway trains later 
on when she’s “in exile at home,” much later on in the film.
This whole notion of our human life as a form of exile — para-
dise lost — brings the movie a critical Christian dimension. For 
all of its shots of Kurylenko dancing at sunset and McAdams 
looking around her farm in fetching red dresses, with the wind 
whipping up her loving smile, To the Wonder ends on a rather 
somber note. Affleck and Kurylenko are separated. She’s in the 
French countryside, licking buds on tended stems, perhaps in 
an orchard. (Is this The Garden? Far from it… yet it resem-
bles a Potential Garden/Garden To Be/Garden Remembered/
Garden That Was/Garden That Might Never Happen Again… 
heartbreak.) Meanwhile Affleck is living in what looks like yet 
another new house, it would seem, once again dislocated and 
endlessly American in his itinerant ways. There may be another 
child glimpsed here, a brunette? There seem to be two children, 
actually, an older girl and a younger boy. The sequence is bril-
liantly oblique. (I’d love to take up the film’s technique, and espe-
cially how it puts time in blender, and estranges the viewer from 
ordinary reality, since this is a perceptual defamiliarization that 
also hints at how the same image or the same moment might be 
viewed as paradise or as exile from a position of ardent yearn-
ing.) Has Affleck blended his family just as Kurylenko tried to 
blend hers with him? The classical European music here plays as 
she attempts to make the old world new and he tries to put down 
roots in the new world. Or is it her, after all, Kurylenko, in blue 
or purple in the sunrise, back in Oklahoma? Is Odyssey-like re-
turn to love and home possible? I paused the film at this point 
to look more closely. The woman’s face is, deliberately, not leg-
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ible. Has the impossible happened? Has time split in two? Has 
paradise been regained, outside of time, or is this just another 
sequence of memories, like the stunning closing image of Mont-
Saint-Michel? Where are they? When are they? Is this world 
heaven or hell? What does she shout at the world? Is it, “Wait?” 
Then something in French? Why isn’t it translated? Does it mat-
ter that we cannot hear her? I love this film.
What they share, in the closing image of the “wonder” of the 
holy island, is a memory of the past. Might we say that for Mal-
ick time cannot be regained? We are sinners, broken and exiled, 
wandering this world, to use a more specifically Christian set of 
terms that fits the film. Pilgrims who get a chance to walk on the 
holy mud once in a lifetime. We are very lucky if we ever know 
real love for very long. We lost what we had; we lose what we 
have. Not just our possessions and eventually our health and 
our time on earth. But if we are human we also lose love, we 
stray and err so badly. Love once lost never returns, try as we 
might. There is a memory of Mont-Saint-Michel to share. It is 
almost like a postcard, like the postcard of Mont-Saint-Michel 
I’m looking at now as it sits on my desk next to my computer 
screen. The noble idea that we once loved and might love again. 
But love, once broken, cannot be repaired. We try and fail. We 
lose paradise and wander in search of it everywhere, but it is 
nowhere to be found once it is lost. 
Or is the implication of the ending that we can pick up the piec-
es later on, with new friends and lovers, in a new home, or on 
our own, shouting at the animals or the sky in a French pasture? 
We remember the wonder and we want to regain it. The film, I 
think, makes a point of not only not saying that this is possible, 
but also not saying that this is impossible. Rather it (the film) 
or Malick (if you prefer) doesn’t pretend to know if such things 
are possible. Why would we expect Malick, only a human artist 
after all, to know this? All we know is that we yearn for some-
thing beyond ourselves. We are riven but also seek to love and 
be loved. The lost past drives us on to try to find a better future. 
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Meanwhile, we sin and pollute, we mistake our world and our-
selves and hurt those we love. The honesty of this picture!
Christianity, unlike the Pollyanna positivity of New Age spir-
itualism or “change the way you see the world” American com-
mercial hucksterism, contains the deep temporal problems of 
paradise lost and original sin. Christianity has the specific and 
potentially tragic problem of historicity insofar as Jesus’s life 
happened in the past and his return has been delayed, it would 
seem indefinitely. This world isn’t heaven and it can never be. 
We have been in exile from before the beginning, because of 
what happened before. We are pilgrims whose ancestors lost 
their way and wrecked our world. We experience time as finite 
and irreversible, at least here in this world and in this life, the 
only ones we know. On the individual level, we repeat the same 
mistakes and patterns, rejecting love that is offered and entering 
what Blake called the “endless maze” of folly, in Songs of Ex-
perience. Malick’s songs are also, I think, songs of experience. 
There’s that hippy song, “Woodstock,” about how “We got to get 
ourselves back to the Garden.” Well, no. Malick is far more skep-
tical about whether that’s possible. I adhere to that critical am-
bivalence, if I am understanding it correctly, that Malick weaves 
into the ending of To the Wonder. My own impression is that 
Malick lives in faith but doesn’t pretend to have the faintest idea 




December 30, 2019, 11:41 AM
Josh,
Not only would I not say that there was never a more secular 
filmmaker than Ivens, I would say that there is no such thing, 
really, as secular film making. Wow, so many double negatives 
in that sentence I’m not even sure what it means. But you get my 
point. Secularism is a legal and political concept. Separation of 
church and state type stuff. But art, to me, is not a secular arena. 
I mean, there are plenty of artists who think it is. But they are 
simply confused, which is fine. Nothing wrong with being con-
fused. Nothing wrong, even, with making great art and believ-
ing, incorrectly, that it is somehow “secular.” But art, by its very 
nature and history and purpose, is the realm of the sacred. 
But you’ve made the very point I am making with your quote 
from Berdyaev. Actually, it sort of annoys me that Berdyaev 
speaks so cogently to this mystical realism idea, since I’d come 
to the formulation more or less on my own. Of course, what is 
one’s own? My view of art, writing, my own writing, my own 
ideas, is that the whole point and purpose is to be a channel. 
To be a conduit of that which was never exactly one’s own in 
the first place. So, great, Berdyaev has already made the point. I 
guess I will have to read more Berdyaev. Or maybe the point is 
that I should never read any more Berdyaev since I’m thinking 
his thoughts anyway. A slight side note here. I bought Berdyaev’s 
Dostoyevsky book some years ago and have picked it up, read a 
few pages, and put it down several times since then. Something 
about it always agitates me and I stop reading. I’ve toyed around 
with writing a small book called “Nabokov vs Dostoyevsky,” 
which would tell strange and delightful stories about Dostoyevs-
ky’s Swedenborgian mystical weirdness and bring up uncom-
fortable facts about how even great “rational enlightenment” 
philosophers like Kant are impossible truly to understand with-
out mucking about in this religio-mystico material. What, really, 
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is Kant all about in his search for/prohibition against intellectual 
intuition? But that, my friend, is another discussion! I digress.
Also, though, it is not another discussion. It’s the very discus-
sion we’re having. What does film do? What does art show us? 
What’s it to be alive? What is reality and how do we confront it 
really? 
I love everything you’ve said, every observation about To the 
Wonder. If those are “secular” observations, by the way, then the 
Pope’s a bear who shits in the woods. You are not secular, my 
friend. But that’s easy for me to say, I know, since I don’t think 
anyone is secular. Are we at the end of an age, I sometimes won-
der? Are we witnessing a period drawing to a close, a period 
in which the illusion of secularity fades away? Interesting, too, 
that it would be William Blake who returns to us at the other 
side, bookending the Secular Age quite nicely. Actually, my own 
airy speculations aside, this is precisely what Charles Taylor 
is getting at in his A Secular Age, if one likes airy speculations 
grounded in lengthy and weighty philosophical tomes. 
But back to the movie. Your thoughts on To the Wonder provoke 
the following observations. I really took in the sense of its narra-
tive rules the third time I watched it, and this gets at something 
you’ve said so wonderfully. There is a totally fresh relationship 
to time in this movie. It isn’t, as the harried and annoyed viewer 
to this film is apt to say, it isn’t that the film has no narrative 
or that it is “impressionistic.” Actually, the film is quite struc-
tured. But it is structured according to the logic of emotional 
time, rather than the pace of a story or of lived experience. It is 
as if Malick took a normal story, removed all the parts that most 
people would call “the story,” and left only the deepest moments, 
the moments in life where you know in your heart that you were 
absolutely and truly alive, both in your sense of joy, or pain or 
whatever. I have this memory of when I was a kid and I woke 
up early on a Sunday morning. I knew that my parents would 
be getting up soon and making me and my sister breakfast. I 
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knew that I would soon get to eat my favorite cinnamon rolls 
(the kind from those old frozen cardboard tubes you used to 
put in the freezer). I felt deeply cared for and deeply “at home.” 
But it was too early for anything to happen. So, I was awake 
and just waiting. And the sun was coming through my bedroom 
window. And the morning sun was catching the dust motes that 
were floating ever so slowly around my room. A feeling of joy 
welled up in my stomach, almost like a feeling of nausea, but 
with none of the pain or fear. An overwhelming feeling of full-
ness as I watched the motes and the sun and waited for the day 
to come. I will never forget that moment, even though nothing 
happened. But everything happened. I knew something about 
the universe, about God, in that period of blissful waiting. Ter-
rence Malick makes movies about that, instead of about all the 
things that happened to me the rest of the day, many of which 
might have been actually quite interesting, from a narrative or 
storytelling standpoint, probably far more interesting than the 
few minutes with the motes and the sun. But as Malick knows, it 
is the moments with the motes and the sun that sets the ground 
for the possibility of everything else. As you say, the scenes of 
the family goofing around in the supermarket have managed to 
capture a form of experience that we rarely get to see in works of 
art, and very rarely in films. Something tremendously precious 
there, in the good sense of the word “precious.” 
The doubling you are talking about, the simultaneous viewing 
of paradise lost and paradise found comes from the fact that 
these sorts of moments are bigger (in the spiritual sense) than 
the others. They contain the seeds of everything else. They are 
the conditions of possibility for whatever happens to us… all 
time is contained in them, if you know what I mean… .
But, as you say, we don’t get to opt for paradise, we don’t get 
life as a continuous rapture of dust motes and sun. I love all the 
things you are saying about faith and Christianity here. That’s 
what faith is, going into that “fallen” place where Bardem is 
dwelling every day. The Bardem priest is an amazing charac-
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ter and I love the way that Bardem plays him. And I wouldn’t 
call him an unbelieving priest. He gets it, in his heart and in his 
head. His homilies are exactly right. But he doesn’t, as most of 
us do not, he doesn’t get to touch the light of the Spirit and have 
it warm his hand and get the sense of immediacy and confir-
mation that such a thing would give. Perhaps certain kinds of 
“organic mystics” get to do that. Who knows? But the rest of us 
do not. So, the work of it is in the going out and being with the 
suffering humans in the actual non-Romantic day-to-day shit of 
their suffering, and joy and whatnot. This is the work, which is 
real. And the fact of Mont-Saint-Michel, the possibility of dip-
ping your toe in the holy mud sustains it, and yet God as God is 
always receding. Even being at Mont-Saint-Michel is just being 
at a castle church. There’s nothing there. You’re never going to 
get the confirmation beyond the hints and whispers… which, 
by the way, is not BECAUSE of the fall. The Fall is a story that 
confirms what we know to be the case. There’s no reason for the 
Fall, actually, which is so wonderfully captured in the story of 
the Fall, which has to have been willed by God to have happened 
in the first place. So, who’s fault is it, really? The condition of be-
ing fallen is simply necessary because it is what we are. We know 
that it is, because we are it. Bardem is a priest of the necessary 
situation of the Fall, which isn’t something that happened, but 
which is the scenario in which we find ourselves as the kinds 
of creatures that we are. Being human is being-like-this, being-
like-Bardem. It is a condition you cannot work your way out 
of. The only “solution,” which isn’t a solution at all, is to work 
yourself further in, something that Bardem struggles to do, as 
do we all. 
But the other part of the movie, and I’d like to talk about this 
more, is Malick’s using his own experience, his own failings as a 
human-being-like-Bardem to show what happens in the course 
of a life where we think that our decisions and who we want to be 
matter too much. We think we have to make it the way we want 
it, and therein we lose the thing that was already made. That is 
how we throw paradise away, and I think the film is a very deep 
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showing of how that works, in an emotionally exhausting play-
ing out of the stages in that process. Maybe this is too vague. But 
if you have a sense of what I’m getting at, I’m eager to hear what 





Jan 1, 2020, 2:16 PM
Dear Morgan,
Happy new year! About the Bardem character, Father Quintana, 
I agree with you that he holds a central place in the meaning of 
To the Wonder despite being a supporting role without much 
screen time. A New Yorker feature by Chris Wiley, “The Ameri-
cans Who Confessed Their Pain to Javier Bardem,” contains 
some insights about how those segments, with Bardem inter-
viewing the struggling residents in the community of Bartles-
ville, Oklahoma, were filmed by Eugene Richards:
Do the interviewees know that their interlocutor is a Hol-
lywood actor and not an emissary of God? Richards says that 
all were informed that they were participating in a work of 
fiction, and that Bardem was not a priest. “Most people knew 
him as the murderer in No Country for Old Men,” Richards 
said. “A couple people knew him as Penélope Cruz’s husband. 
Some didn’t know who he was at all. And absolutely no one 
cared, in the end, who he was, except that he was there to 
listen.”
Richards developed a 40-plus-minute film, Thy Kingdom Come, 
about these encounters. (N.B. His film is not yet available out-
side of festivals and is currently for sale only as an educational 
DVD.) Characteristically, Malick commissioned the footage but 
then included very little of it in the completed feature. That said, 
given Malick’s previous history of cutting out entire roles (and 
A-list stars) from his films, I suppose Bardem might feel lucky 
that the priest character made it into the final cut at all! I like 
how Malick subdues the audio in those sections of To the Won-
der and collapses the interviews into a brief but very moving 
collage filled with ellipses and lacuna, undercutting the appear-
ance of straight documentary with formal disruptions while 
simultaneously incorporating non-actors and ordinary people 
into the picture — and the story.
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There’s a poignant tension well-described in your notes on this 
vital character. I don’t think I could say it better, so I will try 
to broaden the discussion of the religious concepts involved. If 
the basis of mysticism at the most general level might be said 
to involve the coextensive aspects of the mundane and the di-
vine, there remains the awkward and painful question as to why 
we don’t experience it all as love or bliss — why we feel so un-
loved so often, why we suffer, fail, lose out, or go dead inside for 
stretches of time that feel too long. Maybe that’s the connection 
Malick is drawing between the personal/autobiographical and 
the collective in this film.
Apropos of Richards’s title, I think one of the interesting ques-
tions here involves the religious conception of time we have 
been discussing. When Jesus remarked that “The time is ful-
filled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand” (Mark 1:15), I believe 
that the grammar implies nearness, both spatially (in being “at 
hand” — within reach or nearby) and temporally. Other transla-
tions of this passage are “The Kingdom of God is near,” “shall 
come nigh,” and, most intriguing, “hath come nigh,” from Rob-
ert Young’s 19th-century Literal Translation, which connotes the 
present result of a past action. This makes good sense insofar 
as the parallel claim is that “time” is “fulfilled.” My professor of 
Biblical Greek at Cambridge had a memorable gloss on this pas-
sage, saying that if the Kingdom wasn’t already here, its arrival 
was expected in the next few lines by the speaker. Thy Kingdom 
Come, as a title, develops a contrasting impression that, while 
retaining some ambiguity as an isolated phrase, seems to denote 
a future wished-for state, particularly when joined up with “Thy 
will be done, on Earth as it is in Heaven.” This strongly hints that 
the desired outcome hasn’t happened yet, and that we must wait 
longer. So, a stereoscopic view there on the timing involved with 
the Kingdom, one that is difficult to merge into a single seamless 




Father Quintana’s spiritual anguish doesn’t feel petty or precious 
in comparison with those in his community, somehow, even 
though they are suffering in more literal ways that interrupt the 
flow of fiction and confront the viewer with real physical agony. 
Quintana is trying to live the words of the gospel, and as view-
ers we afford him a far more generous identity than the one he 
gives himself. This is a more interesting picture than the pop 
culture directive to “fake it ’til you make it,” but it has a deeper 
resonance involving the role and meaning of fiction itself. As 
you wrote previously, a story is a reality and reality is a story. 
It’s bizarre and hilarious as well as deeply touching to consider 
that the subjects of the interviews with Bardem largely knew 
him as the vicious sociopath hitman character, Anton Chigurh, 
from the Coen brothers’ No Country for Old Men. Part of me 
wonders whether and why people were as willing to open up 
to this fictional priest/assassin and real celebrity/performer, 
especially when accompanied by a cameraman, as they would 
have done with an actual minister. I am interested in Malick’s 
willingness to pursue this part of the project, which strikes me 
as something more intriguing and complex than a play-acted 
charade or even a character development exercise for the ac-
tor. The fictional produces something real and valuable which is 
then folded back into the fiction of the feature film that results. 
This feels subversive and disruptive to both the secular and the 
religious perspectives.
Sidebar: When you wrote that “a story is a reality” (which I 
might italicize as “a story is a reality”), I think you wrote mod-
estly and with thoughtful care. But there is an obvious distinc-
tion between “a reality” and “the [only] reality,” and between 
“a story” and “the [only] story.” (Something like Lyotard’s petits 
récits or “little narratives” factor in here, don’t they?) Isn’t there 
a push-pull in much religious discourse, in contrast with artistic 
expression, involving something like this distinction? Can reli-
gion rest content with being “only a story” rather than “the only 
story”? Yes and no — or perhaps that is the wrong question? Per-
haps the real tension is rather between a story (not necessarily 
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the story, although it is for most religious people, I think it is fair 
to say) and a story that is one of several (equally?) valid stories, 
as opposed to a spectrum of other stories? Not a rhetorical ques-
tion, and not one to conflate with a fundamentalist reading of 
Biblical texts as literal. Not literal, but not just a story. Overlap-
ping stories redolent of fictional construction, but not just made 
up. Etc.
Malick is humane to open his movies to the broken world we 
share, whether we self-define as religious or secular or post-sec-
ular non-materialists, hmm. Especially what we’ve done and are 
doing environmentally to the “New” World (which feels increas-
ingly old). I noticed the last time I flew from DC to LA — coast 
to coast — an entire continent extracted and exhausted, but re-
taining its fundamental natural magic. Ruined and yet some-
how also un-ruin-able. A Christian ideal of a ruined world in 
desperate need of a Redeemer? Or Kracauer’s complex notion 
of cinema as a “redemption of physical reality”? Or some other 
ideal that understands it might turn out to be an illusion — or a 
fiction? Maybe that logic of fallenness you mention extends to 
Malick sharing his own flaws, including flaws in his own recent 
films. (I like the fact that his newer films are so flawed, and I 
think their insistence on showing their flaws involves a religious 
artfulness, like showing the wounds or confessing one’s sins.) 
These stories might be viewed as alternative autobiographies, 
and the voiceover gives them a diarist’s flair, as if we’re seeing 
the journals of a filmmaker wrestling with his process. I’ve read 
that this film does contain autobiographical elements — Malick 
is said to have gotten a divorce from a woman he met in Europe, 
or something along those lines. I don’t find that this aspect adds 
very much to my appreciation of the film. But it’s interesting, 
perhaps, as another example of how fiction and real life, per-
formance and documentary, as well as narrative and memory, 
are bound together in To the Wonder, as well as in the relatively 
quickly produced series from The Tree of Life to Knight of Cups 
and Song to Song. These films also might be viewed as theat-
rical documentaries of actors acting — or meditations on the 
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building-blocks of cinematic language — as much as narrative 
fiction films.
Your question about the film’s structure feels vital to me. I take 
To the Wonder to be an anti-Odyssean narrative in its basic 
shape insofar as it challenges the ideas of return, going home, 
restoring a marriage with a waiting partner, and so on. In At-
las of Emotion, Bruno describes her notion of pilgrimage as a 
process of “wandering” in which cartography is “errant” and 
connected with “the sensation of wonder.” Following Bruno’s 
remarks about the role of gender in travel narratives, I would 
also say that I find Malick’s women narrators in Badlands, Days 
of Heaven, and Song to Song to be more compelling than his 
male protagonists, generally speaking, and even more stringent 
in their anti-Odyssean drifting, since they are being recast as the 
wandering/wondering pilgrims embarking on their own jour-
neys rather than as stay-at-home Penelopes waiting on some 
man’s return. 
Malick adds in a more specifically Christian resonance in con-
sidering the Edenic in a doubly poignant sense as a place that 
has been lost but never forgotten because it also lies within. 
We catch it in glimpses throughout our lives, like the image of 
the holy mountain or Mont-Saint-Michel, in moments of calm, 
nearness to others, and astonishing encounters that encompass 
everything from nature’s sublimity to the rows of soup cans at 
the local grocery store and the faces at the clinic or the place of 
worship. Everything about this life is impossibly beautiful and 
painfully necessary, when viewed from the perspective this film 
attempts to induce. Heartbreaking, when these moments pass 
or we lose the ability to see what’s “at hand,” to quote St. Mark 
again. The Kingdom promised in those radical lines of the gos-
pel is here in a somewhat similar sense to Coleridge’s “secret 
ministry of frost” in “Frost at Midnight,” raising the poet’s hope 
in his child’s future as one in which “all seasons shall be sweet 
to thee.” But — it won’t — because it cannot. The yearning for 
something so impossibly lovely is poignant and true, but Mal-
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ick is too honest to end his stories on such notes. The image of 
the wonder is tantalizingly near and yet we are always far away 
from it. To me this is one basic truth of Christianity, involving 
a humility in sensing that we are not where we are supposed to 
be, on every level and in every possible sense, but also that this 
fact about life is not meant to be taken as a discouragement. No 
wonder so many people despise this spiritually disquieting film, 
deemed “rotten” (47%) by the Tomatometer and condemned 
by “audience reviews” (37%) filled with claims of its supposedly 
“boring” run-time and one-star user comments about this being 
“one of the worst films I have seen.” 
I suspect that some viewers are recoiling from Malick’s basic 
challenges to narrative convention — the film’s attempt to be 
modern and novel. There is a kind of revulsion in some audi-
ences to anything different than generic elaborations of pre-
molded storylines, a new philistinism that seeks to expunge 
anything other than commercial values and easily digestible 
narratives of phony moral clarity. Here, Malick’s radical vision 
of Christian experience, or its Romantic critique of Hollywood 
Romanticism, seems to participate in a much-needed rejection 
of the capitalist self as it is expressed by LA stories of uplift. Yet 
Hollywood, in the form of the stars who line up for tiny roles in 
Malick’s films, as well as in its widespread support and enthusi-
asm for his alternative view of cinema, tends to embrace him, 
since some forces in the movie business believe that Malick, like 
Kubrick and Scorsese, also represents a stubborn adherence to 
the old-fashioned promises and idealistic dreams of the New 
Hollywood to square the circles between art and commerce. In 
any event, his films raise the old questions about how the New 
Hollywood lost its radical edge, while these figures remained 
dedicated to something more rigorous and true even at the risk 
of alienating audiences.
I’m amazed by how closely woven together Malick’s films 
are — in particular, the more recent and more deliberatively ex-
perimental pictures he produced in the short explosive stretch 
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of productions from The Tree of Life to Song to Song. That dou-
ble-edged flaming sword of paradise lost haunts all of his films 
from the beginning, of course, from the violence and sinful 
expulsions into exile or worse, featuring castoffs cast out into 
“bad” lands in Badlands, losing the “days” of Heaven referenced 
in Days of Heaven (it’s not called “Heaven” — we only get days), 
to the “thin red line” separating war and peace, the newness of 
the old world for the lovers at the surprising end of The New 
World (which unfolds, pointedly, in a garden in England), and 
the retrospective structure of The Tree of Life that brackets most 
of what we watch as the freewheeling memories and fantasies 
of Sean Penn’s character as he sits in his office and contemplates 
universal time from a position of exile and yearning for the al-
ternative fruit of the Garden. To an extent, memory, music, art, 
and storytelling all bring us into a harmonious relationship with 
our shared Proustian search for lost time. Malick’s ambiguity 
about whether or how we find it or not, and for how long these 
respites or recoveries last — cinema as a salvage operation on, 
in, and about time — seems true to life. The odyssey has no end-
point because we aren’t allowed to return in any full or perma-
nent sense — at least not in this life we share here on earth. It’s 
an exilic cinema that also encompasses an ongoing meditation 
on cinema itself.
So maybe Bazin was mistaken after all? Film produces the expe-
rience in the viewer of having bottled time’s perfume, it is true. 
But, as Jacques Derrida argues in Of Grammatology, experience 
is an “unwieldy” concept. This experience, no matter how se-
ductive, cannot be the end point of cinema. What this aspect of 
the cinema reveals more than anything else is the yearning to 
be nearer to the flow of life — but also the impossibility of this 
task. The photo-chemical negative also represents an exile from 
reality — whatever that is. The cut — or even the presence of the 
camera itself — even the impulse to photograph something — re-
veals our distance from an unknowable subject as well as our 
unfulfilled wish to close the gap, or to emulate a more humane 
alternative in which we might draw nearer to the radical other-
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ness that might be found in all things, creatures, and persons. A 
photographic negative carves out of light something that hap-
pened on the day, but the shutter speed slices out a fraction of an 
instant and, therefore, presents a subtly different and distanced, 
mechanical effect than what we saw with our own eyes when we 
were there or were attempting to “capture.” (Interesting word!) 
The motion picture camera only apparently solves this complex-
ity or impossibility by increasing the span of attention, since it 
remains a view that is framed, bordered, cut, developed, and, in 
the era of digital technology, subject to all manner of painterly 
or even animated effects. That doesn’t mean it’s not “real,” since 
artifice, as you noted previously, carries its own reality, and the 
art object — and the fictional story — is a part of the world that 
also shapes the world. But the viewer is liable to that peculiar 
kind of Bazin-like seduction that is endemic to cinema.
As I see things, Malick’s cinema — especially in his more disrup-
tive films — resists that process of seduction even as it simulta-
neously falls prey to it. I don’t find that ambiguity to be overly 
problematic, just honest and humane. This is how we all experi-
ence things over and over again, depending on our capacity to 
love, and regardless of whether we self-identify as people of faith 
or not. Malick places the viewer in provisional and incessantly 
interrupted sites of glimpses, cuts, and overlapping voiceovers 
in film after film that emulate the position of his characters as 
people facing a shared exile from the seamless dream of unmedi-
ated contact with… whatever one wishes to call it. (The wonder, 
the tree of life, paradise, the good lands, the days of heaven, the 
new world, the place beyond fighting over bloody borders and 
red lines, the places of song, life, reality, love, etc.) This paradox 
inevitably also applies to the artist. The structure of cinema is 
revealed to be exilic, like life. Malick’s cinema is part of the mod-
ern reckoning with storytelling conventions while also ground-
ing itself in a Christian perspective on the disenchanting aspects 
of modernity itself, it is true. In a sense Malick is attempting to 
fulfill Berdyaev’s call regarding the “tasks of religious art,” and 
for work that is both modern and spiritual, whereby “the an-
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guish regarding Heaven is transformed into a thirst for the new 
real flesh of life.” Malick’s recent films contain various elements 
of ars poetica — reflections on the nature of filmmaking and the 
fictionality of fiction. To my way of thinking, this places them 
in an indirect line of inheritance with searching religious works 
that retain their modernity, like Eliot’s Four Quartets and their 
proposed “raid on the inarticulate / With shabby equipment al-
ways deteriorating”… .
The use of voiceover in Malick’s films provides one set of keys 
to his art, would you agree? Don’t these voices establish our ex-
perience of his art, as well as the experiences of his characters, 
as a shared quest for meaning that foregrounds storytelling as 
the most fundamental human act? Some stories are simply more 
resonant than others, perhaps? Is that how it boils down for you 
as well?
Your friend JMT




January 7, 2020, 12:25 PM
Dear Josh,
I am enjoying your little pictures, btw. I’m not sure I have any-
thing to say about them, but I wanted to acknowledge that I get 
them and look at them and am delighted by them. Th ey are a 
testimony, also, to your own capacity for looking. So that’s nice.
I’ll confess that I’m not sure where to go with this given how ex-
haustively you’ve treated all the important issues around To the 
Wonder, and perhaps fi lm, in general. Th at’s a wrap, my friend! 
Of course, you’ve given me one little nugget potentially to fi ght 
about in your characterization of religion as committed to one
story versus a story. But you also suggest a way out, which is pre-
cisely the one I’m going to take. Th at’s to say, I’m gonna pass on 
this one. Th e mystic, to my mind, is able to see this “debate” as 
a trap, a trap within which everyone loses. On these rocks eve-
ryone founders, religious, agnostic, atheist. Everyone. It’s a trap. 
Here’s a little tidbit on which all mystical realists agree, whether 
they are explicitly conscious of it or not. God outstrips every-
thing. We have some sense of the “truth” of God every time 
we realize that there is something more, every time we are 
confronted with the realization that the smallest speck of dirt 
confounds us at every turn, even as it is undeniably real, real 
precisely to the degree that we cannot pin it down, encompass 
it completely, know it beyond the always provisional tools with 
which we confront it. Because God is the name we give to the 
fact of outstrippability, every word uttered of God should be 
spoken with a little smile, a wink and a shrug. A bit of laughter. 
But all in nonetheless. All in on the game of being, becoming, 
and passing away. 
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I find it amusing that in all the films Malick has made since The 
Tree of Life there are these scenes of people just being together 
and having fun, goofing around, the play of everyday life. Often, 
the scenes don’t work so well. At least to me, they can feel forced. 
Like Malick simply directed his actors to “play around,” “be in 
love,” “have a good time.” The actors aren’t able to make these 
moments seem genuinely spontaneous, for the obvious reason 
that the moments are not spontaneous. These are the hardest 
moments to create because they are the very ones that “just hap-
pen.” Film is up against its most difficult structural antinomy 
here. On the one hand, film is all about control and as you say, 
the weird idea that experience can be “captured.” On the other 
hand, film is all about the possibility of something happening, 
an event transpiring in front of the camera that is more than 
what we ever expected. To me, all the wonder and greatness of 
film exists in the tension between those two otherwise irrecon-
cilable truths. So, like you, I kinda like the sloppy and otherwise 
“failed” nature of all these Malick films. They know they can’t do 
it. But they do it anyway. 
Do you remember the scenes from To the Wonder where they 
are goofing around in the supermarket? Nothing special hap-
pens. The couple and the child push the shopping cart through 
the aisles. They put products in the cart. But they are laughing 
and playing in a way that feels quite authentic to me for brief 
periods, and then often feels forced again. I especially love these 
scenes because being in the supermarket with my spouse is like 
that. She has a heightened sense of how strange and wonder-
ful the supermarket is. She never moves from aisle to aisle with 
any plan. She moves randomly, changing her pace, suddenly 
rushing ahead, then stopping, then laughing about some inane 
product she’s just discovered. It is like being in a supermarket 
with someone who’s never been to earth before. Time changes 
when you’re in a supermarket with my Shuffy. Malick seems to 
have experienced something similar and to have found a way 
to capture that feeling on film. Such an unforgettable rendering 
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of time that in an ordinary film would have been considered 
beyond meaningless.
But here Malick manages to reproduce an experience that we 
rarely get to see in works of art, and very rarely in films. And it 
is precisely because these are such banal moments, such in-be-
tween times, unimportant episodes in the aisles of a supermar-
ket — that they can be so suddenly imbued with joy. Everything 
feels saturated with the divine, which is, in fact, the case. For 
me, that’s what Malick wishes to convey or provoke, especially 
in his newer films, as uneven as they might feel. I cannot forget 
the scenes of desperate people crying in parking lots from Song 
to Song, another much-maligned but extraordinary film from 
Malick’s recent outburst of new work. 
I’m not sure that I am able or want to say much more about it 
than that. These are the treasures that can be shared in watching 
To the Wonder, and all the other films Malick has made in the 
last few years. That these treasures go unappreciated so often 





Jan 19, 2020, 8:19 PM
Dear Morgan,
Yes, the supermarket scene in To the Wonder, the crying in the 
parking lots of Song to Song! (Two of Malick’s most interesting, 
least loved, and most dismissed films.) Or the moments where 
the actors seem to be improvising in a space, maybe just playing 
with a lamp (Affleck and Kurylenko) or standing in a field (Af-
fleck and McAdams). These are the moments in the film when 
the experience of time seems to stretch and bend, to alter our 
perception of time with a paradisal glimpse through the misery 
of love lost. I think the effect is most akin to Tarkovsky’s de-
scription of poetic time, with its inevitable spiritual resonance, 
but it also reminds me of the more secular Shklovsky’s notion 
of perception refreshed by making works of art more difficult 
to absorb quickly, or resistant to strip-mining for some inner 
meaning or message that allows us to throw away the husk of 
the artistry itself. 
These moments also remind me of Wordsworth’s “spots of time” 
in The Prelude, since they tend to involve acts of memory casting 
back into a reparative state:
There are in our existence spots of time,
That with distinct pre-eminence retain
A renovating virtue, whence — depressed
By false opinion and contentious thought,
Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight,
In trivial occupations, and the round
Of ordinary intercourse — our minds
Are nourished and invisibly repaired
Wordsworth adds: “Such moments / Are scattered every-
where.” He finds himself recollecting “an ordinary sight” — a 
girl with a pitcher of water balanced on her head, walking into 
the wind — and finds himself at a loss to describe the “vision-
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ary dreariness” of her “lone eminence.” A Terrence Malick film 
made in 1805.
Those who accuse Malick of slowness I think are so utterly lost 
that I am almost worried for them and what they might do to 
others and themselves in their haste to disregard the world and 
“get to the point” of some movie story. I find the fear of and 
revulsion towards his more experimental work to be both fasci-
nating and revealing of our cultural moment, when any formal 
difficulty is met with outrage and contempt. Time spent with 
real art is always given back. Art’s mystery is connected at a 
deeper level with how we experience time differently as a result 
of the encounter. And our memory of the encounter.
I suppose that some of these critics of Malick are similar to the 
critics of Wordsworth who argue that the latter wrecked The 
Prelude by revising it along more theologically “correct” religious 
lines that seemed to move away from a broader Romantic pan-
theism. In one revision often cited by scholars, the “dark / invis-
ible workmanship” in The Prelude of 1805 — similar in its timbre 
to Coleridge’s “secret ministry of frost” that collects frozen water 
into remarkable shapes — finds itself sitting next to the awkward 
addition of “immortal Spirit” in The Prelude of 1850. To give the 
critics their due, I think it’s fair to claim that Wordsworth’s revi-
sions tamed his poetry and damaged the fabric of his insights by 
making them less artful and disorienting. By initially joining art 
and spirituality, Wordsworth reached into something profound, 
but, later, by making art much more subservient to one religion, 
he retreated from the full complexity of his own work by mak-
ing it less defamiliarizing, less difficult, and more consonant 
with dull platitudes and sermonizing. We’re less shaken because 
the text feels more devotional and saccharine.
I find some of that Wordsworth-ized revisionism — the feeling 
of The Prelude of 1850, if you will — in certain sections of Mal-
ick’s The Tree of Life. (In truth, that film is extremely complex 
and rewards multiple viewings, each of which almost seems to 
 57
wonder
contain a different film.) But, mostly, this blanding down is not 
the case in his films. And the reason why, perhaps, involves that 
strong sense of suffering suffusing his work and culminating 
in A Hidden Life. Malick is painfully aware of tragedy. His pro-
tagonists are often witnesses to violence. His characters dwell 
on their losses and often seem like marooned outcasts or lost 
wanderers. We seem to agree that Malick’s work involves Chris-
tian stories — the exilic story of paradise lost (one that is always 
remembered and sought) and the tragic story of an executed 
holiness (but one that always remains to be discovered or reas-
sembled, at least in a partial or potential form). 
Where we might differ is in my contention that his films contain 
a surprise for both the secular and the conventionally religious 
person. The arrogant secular world of reason feels disenchanted 
and materialistic and the conventionally religious experience 
seems overweening in its unwarranted certainties as well. This 
is one reason why I think Malick is an important 21st-centu-
ry artist, since we currently face the double encroachments of 
destructive zealots from both camps. Materialist capitalism is 
rapidly wrecking the planet while the levels of what they call 
“ecumenical hate” in American Catholicism and Evangelical 
Protestantism have reached such extreme degrees of heartless-
ness in certain quarters of the USA that, according to the Catho-
lic writers Antonio Spadaro and Marcelo Figueroa, they might 
be compared in some ways with the ideology of Al Qaeda. Many 
thoughtful religious thinkers find a tonic of opposition to capi-
talism and unjust laws in Christianity, while the forces currently 
crushing us also claim the mantle of faith. This fact cannot be 
ignored or dismissed as some fluke, even if their understanding 
of the divine is grotesque. What’s clearer to me is that wiccans, 
tree-worshippers, and Quakers are not to blame for our current 
predicaments. Anyway, there’s my two cents on the matter, not 
that you asked!
I think ultimately Malick is looking for an antidote to human 
violence and trouble in a form of artful seeing that views the 
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ordinary mundane world as sacred, if only we can learn ways of 
encountering it rightly or unlearn wrong habits deeply embed-
ded within us. But it’s not just a matter of seeing — the ocular 
metaphor so connected with cinema proves desperately inad-
equate — but rather of binding ourselves more closely to what 
we love, or weaving ourselves in with a love of things, creatures, 
and people. All of which is my roundabout way of saying that 
I hadn’t intended my questions to you about fiction and story-
telling as a trap. Personally, I find that the secular notion of the 
New Testament as *only a story* and the widely held assertion 
amongst many believers that it is *the only story* to be equally 
unsatisfying. If you meant that the binary structure itself is a 
trap, that response makes good sense to me, but I find these po-
larities interesting and useful. Some stories are more nourishing 
than others. Including Malick’s.
This brings me to a new discovery. Thanks to the good folks at 
Grasshopper Films, I was able to gain access for us to watch the 
Eugene Richards film Thy Kingdom Come. It’s an extraordinary 
little movie and I found it deeply moving to see the full film 
and to watch Bardem encountering all of these broken and suf-
fering people in small-town Oklahoma. I realize that the film 
isn’t by Malick, and in some ways it is a curiously anti-Malick 
production in its extremely anti-Pastoral, anti-Romantic dwell-
ing in abjection. This aspect of Thy Kingdom Come is a credit to 
Richards as a photographer and filmmaker, but also, I think, to 
Malick, in unfolding this sidebar project as an important part 
of his production process on To the Wonder. There is very little 
that is wonderful about what’s happened to anyone in this film. 
Or, let me backtrack and put this differently: Thy Kingdom Come 
insists on allowing in everything that is not wonderful. And that 
seems fitting to Malick’s larger project, especially in Badlands, 
Days of Heaven, The Thin Red Line, and A Hidden Life, of in-
cluding the violence, pain, misery, wandering, and pathos of the 
fallen world in his pictures.
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And so we witness a movie star, a great actor, dressed up as a 
priest and trying his best to perform the role of one. Bardem’s 
opening voiceover sets humble parameters: “Is this a true story? 
Yes, I would say so. Is the priest a real priest? No. But it’s as if 
they were waiting for him.” Throughout, but especially at the 
beginning of the film, Bardem’s face is removed from the frame 
or filmed from an angle that deemphasizes the star. At times, 
we only see his hands, sometimes folded together, sometimes 
touching a cancer patient or a developmentally disabled person, 
or held at the glass with prisoners on the other side. We meet 
a regretful ex-KKK member radicalized to violent racial hatred 
in prison, but also a Black prisoner who directs Bardem what 
to do with his cigarette: “Put it on the floor and stomp it out. 
That’s what they did to me.” (He later scoffs after Bardem leaves 
his cell, mocking the idea that he’s actually seen a “priest.”) Then 
there’s a woman who has endured multiple sexual assaults and 
says of herself: “I’ve always been fat. I’ve always been dull.” And 
another woman whose child accidentally drowned in the bath 
when she was sleeping something off. We also get glimpses of a 
couple doing better because he’s gotten a job as a gas station at-
tendant. We see Bardem lift an old man from his wheelchair so 
that they can lie in the sunlit grass and the actor can point out a 
passing butterfly.
This is a realm of bleeding heartbreak and unstinting suffering 
with only occasional moments of relief, such as when one sub-
ject sings his kid to sleep after changing his diaper. No, it’s not 
all going to be okay. No, there isn’t a rescuer on the way, as far as 
we can see, or that promised future when “a Comforter” (John 
14:16) will arrive. (I don’t say this with any mockery whatsoever, 
since the power of the story of the Comforter is of the essence 
here — its factual lack of literal veracity is less important than 
its comforting story.) While I was watching the film, with tears 
building up in my eyes as these stories are intercut, weaving 
and returning to their subjects several times over the course of 
the forty-plus-minute film, I felt not pity but an overwhelming 
sense of nobility in almost all of these people. They deserve so 
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much better, and there is so much suffering. And it is suffered 
by people that nobody seems interested in noticing, much less 
listening to, or helping. I apologize for these platitudes.
Bardem seems to recognize that many of the people he’s talk-
ing to are the saintly ones, if I can put it that way, and that he’s 
only there as an occasion for them to unfold their stories. Not to 
say that his interventions aren’t thoughtful. To the prisoner with 
whom he shares a cigarette, he takes the risk of telling the man 
that he doesn’t believe him when he claims that he doesn’t dream 
of anything. Bardem exists in the realm of vicarage in the truer 
sense, of being the conduit or connective tissue between these 
people and something larger. The film’s premise should feel like 
a conceit and fall flat — it shouldn’t work. Nothing about this 
film should succeed, and yet Richards has elicited something 
astonishing, I think. The whole production carries the risk of 
coming off like a Hollywood actor helping himself train for a 
role as a priest by collecting and harvesting these stories and 
lives. But thanks to Bardem’s demeanor and Richards’s way of 
filming from a respectful axis, the film doesn’t feel exploitative 
or exoticizing. It wasn’t that the subjects “bought” or “didn’t 
buy” Bardem’s “performance.” It’s more that they didn’t care, 
that their stories were so raw and their pain so personal and 
overwhelming that they just needed to tell someone. Certainly 
no one, from the filmmaker to the actor to the viewer, is looking 
down on what happened to them. But that additional layer of 
distance involved with this fictional priest somehow fails to de-
tract — and in some ways adds — to the overall effect of compas-
sionate listening conveyed by the film. The viewer feels honored 
by the trust of the person telling their story. Maybe that can help 
us, somehow, simply as an act of courage to emulate their telling 
of the truth.
What struck me while watching Thy Kingdom Come was that 
the priestly function of confessor is in some ways just that, a 
function, one that allows, in its basic humility, a human story 
to emerge. It sounds drier and more soulless than intended to 
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put it this way, but confession becomes a narrative function. It 
matters very little, in one sense, that Bardem is not a real priest, 
since it is the confession itself that matters. Fiction produces 
something real. A fictional priest is as good as a real one…? Not 
quite. That’s also a volatile, even dangerous or possibly blasphe-
mous notion, no? A fictional priest and a camera crew are some-
thing different than an organized, institutional, confidential 
confession. Are we to take it from Thy Kingdom Come that there 
are not enough real priests — or social workers, counselors, or 
political representatives — around listening to these stories? Or 
that an actor can replace the priest because it is the narrative 
function of confession itself that is the thing most desperately 
needed? (Unlikely.) Or that there aren’t enough good fictions, 
good stories that are capable of encompassing the world’s really 
acute distress?
I will admit that I am emotionally stirred up by what I’ve seen, 
in the best possible sense. I feel Thy Kingdom Come only makes 
To the Wonder feel larger, more complex and more expansive, 
less the film that everyone dismissed and more the movie that 
moved us. 




January 28, 2020, 11:39 AM
Dear Josh,
The most incredible thing that Javier Bardem does in Thy King-
dom Come, to me, is that he just sits there much of the time, 
unflinchingly. He listens and looks into people’s faces. He faces 
it. He faces them. This is an extraordinarily difficult thing to do. 
I am not a priest. I am training to be a deacon and I engage in a 
ministry around my church on the east side of Detroit in which 
I am frequently confronted by situations not unlike what Bar-
dem faces in the film. I do a poor job of it most of the time, I am 
sure. But the hardest thing about being with people in genuine 
states of acute suffering, grief, anger, despair, the hardest thing 
to do is nothing. The hardest thing to do is to honor the con-
frontation with that person, with the story, with the unfathom-
able reality that each person presents. The easier thing to do is to 
put up a barrier. The barrier generally consists of advice, or of-
fering potential solutions, or whatever. Rarely does the impulse 
to intervene in some way actually help the other person. Usu-
ally, it simply blunts the sense of shock and bewilderment that 
comes from confronting another human being in the rawest of 
raw states. But that is what must be done in these situations. 
And it is exactly what Bardem does. What to do next will come 
of allowing the situation to unfold of its own accord. Perhaps a 
way to help, to do something will come next, perhaps it will not. 
That’s not for the person doing the priestly work to pre-decide. 
That, to me, is where genuine faith is tested. Genuine faith, as I 
understand and experience it, is simply the trust to enter into 
that space of radical confrontation with another and to know 
that what needs to happen will in fact happen when all the bar-
riers are dropped. And to know that you don’t know, that your 
plans and ideas are laughable, that you are entirely outstripped 
by the reality of another person, that you are a joke but that you 
have to go through with it anyway. 
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So, yes, this is an amazing short film. It fits together powerfully 
with To the Wonder and, as you say, with A Hidden Life, which 
Shuffy and I watched together in a mostly empty movie theater 
at a 9pm showing this past Christmas Eve. Which was some-
thing.
If I had, for some crazy reason, to discard all of New Testament 
scripture and keep just one thing, it would probably be the fa-
mous lines from Matthew 25:37–39. 
Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry and gave you food, 
or thirsty and gave you something to drink? And when was it 
that we saw you a stranger and welcomed you, or naked and 
gave you clothing? And when was it that we saw you sick or 
in prison and visited you?
What Bardem is doing in all the scenes of Thy Kingdom Come, of 
course, is fulfilling those lines. So when is the kingdom going to 
come, then? What is the kingdom? Does it exist somewhere in 
time, in the future? Is it somewhere out there, a heaven? 
To me, the answer to this question, insofar as there is an an-
swer, is that the kingdom is constantly present all the time and 
can be accessed with complete simplicity. That’s to say, when the 
other person is confronted radically and with complete trust in 
that confrontation. When the prisoner is visited. When the sick 
person is shown care. There it is, the kingdom is fully present. 
I want to acknowledge something discomfiting about what I’m 
saying here, because it doesn’t quite jibe with the general sense 
of “making the world a better place” you get from typical do-
gooderism. I have no idea whether the world is becoming a bet-
ter or worse place. I have no idea how you would judge such a 
thing. And I find the polemics around this question utterly emp-
ty. I don’t care what happens to America or the modern world. I 
don’t care what is the course of contemporary civilization. I opt 
out of those discussions. They mean nothing. I am in America. I 
am a part of contemporary global civilization. I neither endorse 
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it nor oppose it. I simply refuse to acknowledge its sovereignty. 
What is sovereign is the kingdom. And entering the kingdom 
is simple. Not easy. It’s extremely difficult, gut wrenching work. 
But simple. You just do what it says in Matthew 25.37-39. What it 
really says. Not what you think it says or wish it said. Just what it 
says. And the kingdom will be there. You will be in the kingdom. 
To be in the kingdom is to experience wonder by definition. It is 
to be wide open to life, to be in a state of experience that is most 
intense. “To the Wonder” is “Thy Kingdom Come.” They are two 
different ways of spinning the same thing out. That is my experi-
ence anyway, and my faith. That is the core of it.
You asked me once when we were driving around Detroit to-
gether whether it isn’t better, more effective and a sounder use 
of resources to give money to people in need through organi-
zations that know what to do with such resources and how to 
make the best of them. I bumbled an answer. But what I was 
trying to say is that it is more sensible and efficient to do it the 
way you were saying and that that is precisely why we shouldn’t 
do it that way. We should do it face to face. Even if it leads, es-
pecially if it leads to uncomfortable situations for both parties. 
The kingdom does not come when we try to make the world 
better through our distance and our planning and organization. 
The kingdom comes when we face the person and the person 
faces us and we get into it with one another, even if just for a 
few minutes of terribly awkward conversation and the passing 
of a dollar bill on a street corner. Even if we walk away feeling 
confused and unsure of whether we’ve done a good thing or not. 
What does any of this have to do with film? I don’t know ex-
actly. But I find it remarkable that To the Wonder and Thy King-
dom Come are, surprisingly, even ridiculously with the absurd 
and insulting conceit of Javier Bardem pretending to be a priest 
among genuinely suffering people, with everything that, as you 
say, shouldn’t work at all, with all of that, somehow the thing 
still works. The kingdom is present. What does it mean that film 
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can access the kingdom? Again, I don’t know exactly. We are 
entering into the realm of stunned and awestruck silence here. 
But it must mean, if nothing else, that all the stuff we make up 
is just as powerful as all the stuff that makes us up. It means that 
the kingdom is fully sovereign and that we are responsible in 
every realm, in daily life, in art, in dreams, in everything we are 





February 2, 2020, 11:57 AM
Dear Morgan,
I should clarify, in case you don’t know, how much I admire 
your dedication to your city and your parishioners. I think of 
our time in Detroit often, it meant a lot to me and caused me to 
reflect on trying to lead a more intentional life with purpose that 
serves others in this broken world. When I said that a friend ad-
vised me to give money to organizations rather than individuals 
on the streets, I was thinking of her charity in San Francisco, 
which works with the homeless face to face and advocates po-
litically. For what it’s worth, my own point of view is that gov-
ernments should provide shelter and food as basic rights for all 
people who need and want them, and that charities should not 
be forced to perform the role of governments. But I do feel the 
force of your critique, since I agree that such pragmatic talk of 
“solutions” is both unsatisfyingly smug and distancingly ration-
alized, and just, in general, highly annoying, since the urgent 
scale of suffering is so immense. I think we would agree that 
we cannot allow ourselves to unsee what’s happening, in Detroit 
and everywhere around us. To fall back once again on my “Bud-
dhist” version of Shklovsky, one of the things that art can do, in 
general, and which Malick’s films can do, in particular, is restore 
our vision and help us see how to see. For me, that’s one inter-
stitial passageway that might be traveled between the curative 
waters of To the Wonder and Thy Kingdom Come.
I think I understand, too, where you are coming from in your 
emphasis on what most people would call the irrational. Art is 
in the questions business and the seeking business. It cannot be 
rationalized — if it could, there would be no reason to go to such 
great efforts to produce a film when one could simply publish a 
pamphlet, write a t-shirt slogan, or post a tweet. (Personally, I 
look forward to the day when AIs can create bad art — novels 
and movies — so that humans can focus on producing good art.) 
So, too, is religion, I believe, in its deeper guise, in the business 
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of questions, although I do recognize that this viewpoint might 
be jarring for some who find in religion some set of certainties 
based on rigid doctrines. What I like about what you are say-
ing — and why I admire the way you are living — is that you are 
emulating the teachings of Jesus as best you can, rather than 
being guided by the kind of theology that leads people to this or 
that conclusion about some moral judgment or political policy. 
We desperately need more radical Christians like you. Chris-
tians can play a specific role in freeing us from the monstrosities 
that their Evangelical and conservative Catholic brethren have 
created.
But surely A Hidden Life, about Austrian farmer Franz Jäger-
stätter’s (August Diehl’s) nazi-era persecution and murder for 
his unwillingness to swear a loyalty oath to Hitler, focuses on 
the need for believers to resist when so many official structures 
of religion have been compromised beyond all recognition po-
litically. Perhaps some sort of fanaticism is required to serve a 
higher purpose? It’s the person of some faith who is irrational 
enough to reject an order to comply with evil on pain of death. 
I think it’s undeniable that Malick wants his historical fiction to 
resonate somewhat with the present, and to act as a call to arms 
to Christians to resist what’s happening now, don’t you? The 
timing of the film’s release in late 2019 seems difficult to ignore. 
It’s not that Malick is necessarily equating any current regime 
with fascism per se, but rather that he wishes for Christians in 
particular to stop lending their support to a regime that is in so 
many ways antithetical to the teachings of Jesus (while simul-
taneously pretending to represent the interests of Christians). 
While Malick fails to consider that other types of secular 
faith — Marxism in particular — were motivating much of the 
resistance against nazism, he does make a powerful plea about 
the vitality of Christian radicalism and the need for a bit of 
fanaticism when it comes to resisting those with the power to 
crush you. Courage requires faith, even if that faith is only in 
the idea of the future, or in one’s fellow human beings. Actually, 
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I think A Hidden Life is even more powerful than that. What if 
believers took their faith a little more seriously? What if eve-
ryone had followed Jägerstätter’s example? This is utopian and 
could even be called unreasonable and naive, as well as poten-
tially self-destructive and self-sacrificing in a dangerous sense. 
But the historical record also shows evidence of Italian Catholic 
priests like Don Pietro Pappagallo (the basis for Roberto Ros-
sellini’s priest character, Don Pietro Pellegrini, in Rome Open 
City) who not only sheltered but actively aided the partisans in 
the era of “Hitler’s Pope,” Pius XII. A strictly nonviolent radi-
cal faith — one that stands ready to throw away one’s life if nec-
essary — is yet another mode of resistance. Not the only one, 
by any means, but the one that Malick wishes to explore here. 
Throughout, there is an insistent parallelism reminding the 
viewer of the Christians who were executed by Roman Gover-
nors for refusing to swear loyalty oaths to the Emperor, and who 
were put to death for being unwilling to burn a piece of grain on 
a pagan altar or even unwilling to purchase a forged document 
claiming that they had done so.
There’s a kind of “insanity” here, but one viewed in a positive 
sense, I would argue, on the part of Jägerstätter, as depicted by 
Malick. I don’t mean to denigrate the role of faith (or the suffer-
ing of mental illness) by putting things that way but rather to 
emphasize his irrationality in terms of the typical secular value 
placed on basic self-preservation. (In reality, of course, he is the 
only sane one — but, sociologically, that amounts to the same 
thing.) That’s not to say that secular people are incapable of re-
sisting the powerful or even the murderous without the aid of 
religion but rather that the believer has a specific mission of re-
sistance that might be emboldened or kindled by an authentic 
sense of faith. This particular act — of being incapable of putting 
Hitler above God — is peculiar to Jägerstätter’s conception of the 
divine. His wife Franziska (Valerie Pachner) does not require or 
even request that he reconsider in order to save himself, or to 
protect their family from serious trouble in their community, 
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because she also recognizes that this is about the state of the 
soul. It is not reasonable to ask him to be reasonable. 
So, wife, family, town, and country all must be regarded as sec-
ondary considerations on some fundamental level. This is both 
right and “crazy.” It is beyond ethics, in the Kierkegaardian 
sense — or redolent of religion considered as a sphere distinct 
from ethics, as outlined in Stages on Life’s Way. Jägerstätter is 
right because he resists nazism at its core, but he is crazy because 
he must give up everything in order to adhere to faith. This cra-
ziness of his faith is what, for Malick, makes Jägerstätter good, 
although righteous might be a better word. As a cinematic point 
of comparison, in Dreyer’s 1928 silent film of The Passion of Joan 
of Arc, Joan’s fanatical devotion to her faith at the risk of her life 
is described by one of the accusers at her trial as “insensé,” out of 
her senses or mad. These are the acts that authentically religious 
people are capable of when others sometimes lack the spirit. For 
this reason, A Hidden Life is one of the most powerful religious 
films — not just a film about religion — that I have ever seen.
About a year ago I attended a lecture by the academic and phi-
losopher Philip Francis called “When Art Disrupts Religion,” 
based on his book of the same title. Francis’s form of research 
is sociological, revealing through interviews with individual 
Evangelicals how contact with modern art caused many to ques-
tion or abandon their faith and others to redefine and reinforce 
their belief. In an interview Francis makes his case for a par-
ticular framing of this discussion, and one that I think is worth 
quoting at length:
Many of these Bob Jones and Oregon Extension alumni 
[Evangelicals who studied and practiced art] say that these 
unsettling aesthetic encounters saved their faith, rather than 
destroying it. They experienced not disenchantment but 
re-enchantment through the arts. This took several forms. 
For some, out of the ashes of their rationalistic evangelical 
identity arose a different sort of religious self, one with a 
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newly discovered capacity to dwell in mystery, uncertainty, 
and half-knowledge. If that isn’t a deepening of faith, I don’t 
know what is. For others, the arts not only unsettled their 
previous religious identity, but stepped in as the substitute 
form of enchantment. People in this category speak of the 
arts as providing a stand-in for their traditional religious ob-
jects, a means of glimpsing the transcendent, of experiencing 
the power and depth of the numinous, of being enraptured 
by the sublime. In some ways, these latter participants are 
typically modern in their devotion to the secular religion of 
art. As Hegel once noted: we moderns have no qualms about 
revivifying “the corpses of dead cults” in “the guise of aes-
thetic objects.” Hegel is being sardonic but I’d prefer to see 
this modern substitutionary relationship between art and re-
ligion as a reaffirmation of the deeply human instinct to find 
enchantment where we can — and to get creative when we 
can’t. So much for Weber’s modern disenchantment theory.
In his lecture, Francis contrasted what he called “practices of 
certainty” in Evangelical religion with the “practices of uncer-
tainty” he finds in the enduring value of modern art. To “com-
plete this thought,” however, requires one to consider how art 
also disrupts secular certainties as much as it challenges reli-
gious certainties. I am not sure if Francis would be willing to 
go this far but it is a line of thought that emerges organically 
from contemplating his research. It seems obvious to me that 
many nonbelievers are just as attached to their conceptions or 
certainty as fundamentalist believers are. If one considers the 
clumsy and shrill “new atheist movement” led by the likes of 
Richard Dawkins and his “God delusion” thesis, one begins to 
recognize that fundamentalists and atheists often share similar 
patterns of thoughts in their polemics. I view them all as having 
almost a secret, unwitting accord that I would like to resist be-
cause I believe in cinema’s complexity, questioning, and search-
ing — and all those properties that Francis ascribes to modern 
art. Whether art can be or should be a substitute for religion I 
will leave to one side for the moment.
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We’re constantly being told that we need to protest the “war 
on truth” that is plaguing our society by taking refuge in 
facts — more facts, better facts, more factual facts, more care-
fully fact-checked facts in greater and greater numbers. No! We 
desperately require better narratives, more interesting stories, 
counter-myths, and art of greater complexity. The discourses of 
sobriety alone won’t save us from our current crises — ecologi-
cal, economic, political, cultural, or religious. Modern art — and 
contemporary cinema — are overflowing with challenges to 
dead certainties of all kinds. What do T.S. Eliot, Graham Greene, 
Ingmar Bergman, Kieślowski, von Trier, and Malick make of 
the cold compassion-less-ness one encounters in nonbelievers 
and believers alike? Even those artists who reject religion for 
themselves — or who end up in the interesting no-man’s-land 
of agnostic uncertainty that does not pretend to know — seem 
to intuit the depths, heartbreak, and solace of faith or the loss of 
faith better than many of the self-professed champions of God, 
on one hand, and the fanatical gladiators against any kind of 
faith, on the other. Religion and cinema invite contemplation 
about human complexity and everything we don’t know. These 
things refresh us in this dark age of dead-eyed polemics. This 
emphasis on complexity forms an alternative to the commercial 
view of cinema — and life — in part by attempting to express an 
old-fashioned critical humanism as a path for art that seeks to 
understand everything that is new and strange and troubling 




February 5, 2020, 10:18 AM
Josh,
I know what you mean by calling Franz Jägerstätter a fanatic 
in A Hidden Life. You say he is crazy in a good way and I agree. 
He’s crazy in a good way. I was thinking that he’s sort of the op-
posite of all the funny and tragic scoundrels of faith in Shusaku 
Endo novels. Endo characters often want to be good Christian 
martyrs but they can’t do it. They blow it. They chicken out. 
They sell out their friends. They betray the faith and the cause. 
They are deeply cowards. So, they are wonderful. There is a deep 
misunderstanding of Endo in Martin Scorsese’s recent filmed 
version of Silence, by the way. Everybody was supposed to love 
that movie, especially art-minded Christian types. But I thought 
it was garbage. I don’t want to get into it too much here, but 
Scorsese makes a hero of the European who has come to Japan 
as a Christian missionary. No. That is not what Silence is about. 
Silence is about how the Japanese already know everything 
they need to know and that it is the fucked up, failed, deeply 
human Japanese Christians who teach the Portuguese mission-
ary something about what it really means to live and have faith. 
Scorsese missed this completely. 
But back to A Hidden Life. To me, the film is a deep meditation 
on how we are very little in control. I don’t think Jägerstätter 
really chooses anything. He is not heroic. He’s simply caught up 
in something that’s so far beyond him that the logic of it crush-
es him. The film is also about beauty. Maybe it is mostly about 
beauty. Yes, the more I think about it, the film is dealing with the 
deep theological problem of beauty. The beauty of the moun-
tains and especially of the Südtirol. It was a surprising movie 
for me to watch partly because I’ve spent so much time up in 
that area of the Austrian/Italian Alps. There is something very 
hard to describe that can be encountered up there. Every time I 
visit Abbas and Margit and travel around those towns and vil-
lages, I experience it. Those old fashioned and understandably 
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troubling words “beauty” and “sublime” just keep popping into 
my mind. 
The strange thing about beauty and the sublime is that we don’t 
really know what they are. I always loved Kant’s definition of the 
beautiful as basically the subjective universal, which is essential-
ly saying that beauty is a squared circle, it has no rules, we don’t 
know what makes something beautiful, and yet we confront it 
as an undeniable reality. Beauty exists, then, mostly to mess with 
us. That’s something I always want to say about beauty, that it is 
a problem. Beauty isn’t nice or sweet or proof that everything is 
okay. Beauty is tortuous and strange. A beautiful person makes 
you behave in ways you don’t necessarily want to behave. Beau-
tiful people and objects and things in the world make an imme-
diate claim on us. They introduce a wild element into existence. 
They drive us out of control. Beauty breaks the world up, shakes 
it around. Beauty is not the proof that God is good, beauty is the 
proof that God is strange and wild. 
Beauty and suffering are, therefore, not unrelated at all. They 
are deeply intertwined. Beauty refuses to let you go on exist-
ing in the way you were existing before you confronted beauty. 
Pain and suffering do the same thing. And what, by the way, do 
mystics run to more than beauty and suffering? What’s the point 
of being alive at all? Beauty and suffering, of course. The only 
answer that’s worth anything.
Anyway, those mountains up in the Südtirol are achingly beauti-
ful. Sometimes a vista opens up, a series of those rose-colored 
peaks, a mountain meadow tucked just so into a crease in the 
sky. You don’t even know what to do, it is so beautiful. I’ve cried 
a couple of times up there just confronting the scene. It is so 
much, too much. Have you ever watched the YouTube video of 




I’ve never seen the full, devastating beauty of those mountains 
captured on film before. Malick manages to do it in some of 
those scenes. Or close to it. The motorcycle driving along the 
little dirt road, the mountains looming in every direction all 
around. Some of those scenes in the field, reminiscent of Days 
of Heaven. Film yearns for beauty, does it not? And generally 
fails in the task. But that’s not a bad metaphor for beauty in gen-
eral, the desire that can’t quite find its object. Beauty is beautiful 
partly because we don’t know how to have it, can’t have it, are 
held at a tortuous distance from the thing that seems to be right 
before us. Film can make that ache all the more poignant. 
In A Hidden Life, the pain and suffering that is crucial to the 
ache that is beauty transforms into the other side of suffering. 
That’s to say, a confrontation with beauty is a confrontation with 
the very core of what is given to us in experience. This territory 
is beset with dangers. You don’t get to hide from anything if you 
are going to open yourself up truly to beauty. So, the camera that 
lingers on the slopes of the mountains of the Südtirol is going to 
have to be true and honest and open to the tragedy at the heart 
of all existence. That camera is now going to be pulled also into 
the prisons of the Third Reich, for instance. In a sense, the logic 
of beauty demands this. Here, too, morality and aesthetics are 
completely intertwined, as the ancient thinkers always claimed. 
To be committed to beauty is to be committed to goodness all 
the way through. And that is going to mean a wild ride. That’s 
the way of the Cross. Beauty and goodness do not take you to a 
pleasant and easy place. They take you to the crucible. That’s the 
strange thing about being alive. The more you give yourself to 
beauty and goodness, the more you get burned. 
So where is the camera going to go? Where is Jägerstätter going 
to go? How far do we trust ourselves, do we trust God, the uni-
verse, whatever, in trudging the path of real experience, real life, 
the way of the Cross? At what point do we chicken out? At what 
point does the camera chicken out? 
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To me, A Hidden Life is an exercise in the cosmic game of chick-
en. What does a film have to do in order to be honest about the 
conundrum, the incredible challenge of beauty? 





February 7, 2020, 11:20 AM
Dear Morgan,
I think your meditation on beauty takes us to the right place 
with Malick. Of all the lost edens from which his characters are 
driven into exile, St. Radegund feels among the most compel-
ling. (Strange to consider that the places we started from and 
ended up, Mont-Saint-Michel and the Italian Tyrol, have such 
personal resonance for one or both of us. Our friends Abbas 
and Margit live in the region near Brixen, no? I believe that 
is where Malick filmed the garden of the bishop’s palace.) In 
part that’s because Jägerstätter’s fellow citizens — in particular, 
the frightening mayor character — have made a hell of heaven 
through their toxic absorption of hatred and fear. 
But there is also another element operating in A Hidden Life 
that I am calling the Kierkegaardian one. Jägerstätter recog-
nizes that he must let go of all that beauty in order to take his 
faith seriously. That commitment is one that, in a specific way, 
overthrows the “either/or” of the push and pull between the aes-
thetic and the ethical and most resembles the third sphere of the 
religious. It is simply a different set of demands — if that is the 
right phrase for it, since these demands exceed the normal run 
of responsibilities towards spouse, family, community, or even 
one’s self-care — that Jägerstätter must contend with. 
Would it be churlish to respond to what you’re saying by argu-
ing that this necessarily takes him into a realm beyond beauty? 
Maybe the difference here is semantic, since there is nobility 
(and, in that specific sense, beauty) in his quest. Yet even the 
nazi prison in Berlin where Jägerstätter is executed has green 
things attempting to grow just beyond that final window. Beau-
ty cannot be extinguished. It always gets in. Perhaps that ques-
tion about beauty is best left open since the word can resonate 
in so many different directions at once…?
 77
wonder
I had cause to regret calling Jägerstätter “crazy” or a “fanat-
ic” — those words should remain in inverted commas where 
they belong — but I’m relieved that didn’t offend you. I was a 
little bit clumsy, I think, in trying to get at how he would be 
viewed by others who were attempting to justify their inaction 
and passivity in the face of the nazi onslaught. The “social con-
struction of reality” argument, including what constitutes sanity 
and normality, as well as an Erich Fromm-like challenge to it 
and to “the sane society,” was what I was attempting to grasp. 
I also meant to get at that Kierkegaardian element to this sto-
ry that transcends a conventional account of ethics. But this is 
about more than an individual leap of faith and its consequenc-
es. It’s also about what D. Anthony Storm, in his commentary 
on Stages on Life’s Way, calls “Kierkegaard’s main criticism of his 
time” which was that “people lacked the willingness to exercise 
passion in their commitment.” I think Malick well conveys the 
sense of awe and even fear that Jägerstätter encounters in the 
religious authorities along his path to death. These are men who 
recognize in another person that passionate commitment they 
themselves lack or justify failing to pursue, perhaps because of 
their adherence to an ethical framework that include a strong 
dose of denial or self-preservation (the self-serving logic of, “I 
can do more good if I don’t sacrifice myself, people need me,” 
etc.) or perhaps because, unlike Jägerstätter, they simply can-
not let go of being alive. (Jägerstätter never blames them.) All 
this, then, says something more than what Seal sings about: “No, 
we’re never gonna survive unless we get a little crazy.” There are 
times so murderously upside down that a lot more craziness is 
required. But very few of us are up to the task because we dwell 
only in the aesthetic or ethical realms rather than fully commit-
ting to that third, religious sphere of life, which is a hard and 
sometimes fatal way. I think Malick shares that sense of awe or 
fear. But he’s clearly not setting himself up as a Jägerstätter, and 
in fact, he includes in the film a cameo of a religious artist doing 
his best that feels like a self-portrait.
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I sense a devastating critique of modernity building up here, if 
modernity is considered to be a world structured by rational 
instrumental calculations that serve a vision of progress which 
is fundamentally self-serving, with its primary goal to increase 
our life expectancy, live those remaining secular days in the ma-
terial prosperity of maximized utilitarian comfort, and so forth. 
(I think modernity is more interesting and complex, but this 
aspect of modernity is what Malick seems to reject, with good 
reason.) People and communities in such states of mind have 
little motivation to resist or to commit. As I mentioned before, 
I also find this element of Malick’s work to be a surprisingly po-
tent critique of the generation of “failed seekers” (as Hunter S. 
Thompson called them) who emerged from the radicalism of 
the 1960s with a selfish and self-blinding ideology that has not 
served the country or the world or the planet very well. A view 
of Malick as a generational dissident among the New Hollywood 
filmmakers of the 1970s might involve a Kierkegaardian critique 
of the Boomers’ own lack of commitment to their professed 
ideals. Perhaps it is the temper of the times through which we 
are now living, but I wonder, too, if it’s possible to detect in the 
resonant echoes of Malick’s historical fiction a barely suppressed 
condemnation of American Christians who don’t seem to mind 
seeing immigrant kids put into cages as long as their investment 
accounts keep doubling in value every ten years. I realize that’s a 
“different Malick” than the one that is commonly assumed. But 
I think it’s in there…
* * *
Speaking of contemporary filmmakers whose view of moder-
nity is severely critical, I wonder if you think I was being fair 
to Lars von Trier earlier in our exchange? I described him as 
decadent, and I think that is accurate up to a point. Yet I always 
suspect there is more to his work than what I read and what I 
hear people saying, especially those who despise him. My feel-
ings about him are more mixed, and maybe mixed up. Specifi-
cally, there is an insistent exploration of faith of various kinds 
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in his films, mostly obviously in Breaking the Waves. Faith and 
fanatical commitment to one’s own subjective sense of things, 
up to the point of madness, are portrayed in what might be his 
best film to date, Melancholia. Outbursts of irrationality, often 
related to mental illness, but also to the outlandish and even 
the supernatural, haunt his work. And of course he titled one of 
his most powerful and disturbing films Antichrist, which raises 
questions about religion, even if the title might seem mocking, 
scoffing, or deliberately blasphemous at first glance. On one 
hand, I cannot think of a filmmaker who represents an artistic 
position so diametrically opposed to Malick’s than von Trier’s, 
can you? On the other hand, they both seem invested in smash-
ing up the smug certainties of secular modernity, on one hand, 
and in utterly rejecting the assumptions of a dead, disenchanted, 
materialistic world, on the other hand. I confess some degree 
of critical perversity in making this pivot, but I remember that 
we’ve argued about von Trier before. (He is, to his credit, an 
artist that thoughtful people fight about.) Does it sound totally 
off-base to suggest that Malick and von Trier might be opposite 
sides of the same coin rather than entirely different currencies, 
so to speak? Having had some time to reflect on von Trier since 
we last discussed Antichrist, what’s your take on him and his 
films?
Your friend JMT
P.S. Attached is a closeup of a tree in the Naturpark outside Tübin-
gen, which in certain lights on certain days reminded me very 
much of the shots of the woods in Antichrist (filmed nearer to 
Bonn, if I remember correctly). Since I cannot possibly mimic the 
color of the green forest in von Trier’s film, I am abstracting my 
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Josh,
I don’t even think I want to think of Lars von Trier as the oppo-
site side of Malick’s coin. Because I don’t really think of them as 
opposites. They are both seekers of a sort, to my mind. And they 
are both interested in film as something that actually matters, 
that shows us something, that can shake us the fuck up. 
But I think it makes sense that you call von Trier a decadent. I 
mean, if we think of the actual Decadents of the late 19th cen-
tury, from Baudelaire to Wilde, Huysmans to Beardsley, there 
is a kind of obsessive exploration with the emptiness and sheer 
surface effect of life. There is a willingness to go there, if you 
know what I mean. Nothing matters and therefore every form 
of expression is inherently as interesting or as uninteresting as 
anything else. A dalliance in pure pleasure for however long that 
lasts. An interest in perversion for the sheer sake of perversion. 
A desire to test experience and the limits of experience. A will-
ingness to tear everything down but without giving a fuck about 
what the outcome might be. Revolution without purpose. A love 
of shimmering things. A fascination with the dissolute. Disgust. 
In general, the willingness to be disgusted. Macabre laughter. 
Fits of mania followed by fits of melancholy. Suicidal longings 
and then almost a childlike love of being alive. The desire to 
persist transforming into the desire to be extinguished. 
Personally, I take people like this very seriously. They are my 
brothers and sisters. Or more to the point, I have been them. 
I have been that. I don’t mean to sound overly tragic and dra-
matic here, but when I read someone like Huysmans or look at 
the paintings of Odilon Redon or watch one of the movies of 
Lars von Trier I am taken very quickly to a memory of lying in 
a hospital bed after drinking more than a fifth of bourbon and 
having popped a handful of sleeping pills. I mean, there it is. I 
wanted everything from the world in those days, and I wanted, 
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sometimes, nothing at all. I was running away from myself and 
the pain of, what, what was it exactly, just of being alive and 
the basic wound that is existence itself? The problem of being 
a creature that lives and that knows it will die. Very soon it will 
die. And what is the point? What was the point of all this? And 
then running back into life with a wild abandon, but one soaked 
in alcohol and other drugs. A kind of mad dash that secretly 
hopes the whole thing will just blow up. And then also the se-
cret hope that someone, somehow, somewhere will help. 
I remember reading a couple of years ago that von Trier was 
making a film out of the premise that life is utterly and com-
pletely meaningless. I guess that is what became The House That 
Jack Built. I haven’t seen that film yet and do not especially want 
to. I know it will be harrowing. But that is the point. And in a 
sense, all of von Trier’s films are an exploration of that basic im-
pulse. To push as far as he can into the darkness of the darkest 
thought. All of his films are inherently sadistic. Because he is a 
sadist! But, you know, an honest sadist has something to offer, 
which is sadism. A sadist who is trying to go all the way with it 
is going to teach you some serious shit about life, and art, and 
what the two might have to do with one another. 
To me, von Trier uses film to strip the world to its bone, to ex-
pose the real truth hidden there beneath the lies we cover it all 
up with. We try to go through life, la de da de da, pretending 
that there isn’t something terrible, something terrifying there 
at the core of it. But von Trier goes right to the inner terror. 
Every one of his films should end with the line, “Take that!” 
This is very interesting to me. It is someone looking for an an-
swer and being willing to accept the most horrifying answer of 
all if it happens to be the truth. And the worst answer of all is, 
nothing. That there is nothing and that the whole fact of there 
being anything at all is just a kind of cosmic mistake. It is Sile-
nus telling King Midas that the best thing for man is never to 
have been born at all and the next best thing is to die quickly. 
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This is the story that Nietzsche dwells on throughout The Birth 
of Tragedy and which animates everything he ever wrote. How 
do you deal with the truth of Silenus? Von Trier’s answer is that 
you keep making films that explore the limits of this truth. He 
is thus the Nietzsche of film. I mean that as a compliment, of 
course. To me, in my experience of life, those are the only two 
options, anyway. And the strength of Malick and von Trier is 
that between the two of them one realizes the starkness of our 
condition. The cosmos is either completely filled with God, God 
besotted as the mystics say, or it is nothing at all. Everything else 
is a kind of hedge, a little lie, a bullshitting to avoid the issue and 
slide through life without confronting the central problem. 
I tip my hat to von Trier. He is a genuine seeker. He is willing 
to take the hard answers. And I wouldn’t be too surprised if he 
ends up in church at the end of the day, as did so many of the 
decadents, and as did I. And if he does he’ll have earned it. Be-





February 15, 2020, 7:01 PM
Dear Morgan,
You might enjoy reading this article by Françoise Meltzer, 
“Baudelaire, Maistre, and Original Sin,” developed from her 
2014 lecture at the Lumen Christi Institute at Notre Dame Uni-
versity. It charts Baudelaire’s reconfiguration of his poetics after 
reading Maistre. The essay bolsters your case that decadence 
was, for Baudelaire, a form of seeking, drenched in religion, al-
beit of an eccentric kind born of loathing the world as a place of 
sin and evil. But, of course, as everyone who has seen The Ex-
orcist knows, a belief in the literal existence of the Devil (with a 
capital “D”) can be a gateway drug to belief in God (with a capi-
tal “G,” presumably). Certainly that was William Peter Blatty’s 
intention with his book and with the script of the film — terror 
as a form of proselytizing. Baudelaire is more complicated, with 
his “Litanies of Satan” in Flowers of Evil providing one possible 
template for von Trier’s put-on Satanism.
Malick and von Trier: One artist’s wonder-world is another’s 
horror-scape? What a difference in this change of lenses!
Von Trier feels like the most Baudelairean of contemporary 
filmmakers. Meltzer writes of the latter:
The obsession with duality in Baudelaire is regularly demon-
strated by the remark he famously notes down in his journal: 
“There are in every man two simultaneous postulations, one 
toward God, the other toward Satan.” These “postulations” 
of a simultaneous ascent and descent (note the topography 
of up and down) are further complicated by the fact that 
the descent is a “joy,” and is connected with love for women 
and “intimate conversations with animals, dogs, cats, etc.” 
That statement shows that Baudelaire has no illusions about 
mankind; not only is man given to evil, but he enjoys it. The 
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choice — God or Satan — inscribes the “equilibrium” be-
tween these forces with one of Baudelaire’s most consistent 
beliefs: Original Sin as the root of all human experience. The 
equilibrium can be no better resolved in this context, since 
sin will always trump any move toward the good, and the 
good will frequently turn out to be enjoying its own descent 
toward Satan or indeed turn out to be Satan.
I am put in mind of von Trier’s peculiar and personal appear-
ances in his early television series, The Kingdom (interesting 
choice of title), in which he makes the sign of the Cross and 
then flips his hand into devil’s horns as the credits roll, smiling 
with an air of joyful malevolence. And this passage also reminds 
me of the “intimate conversations” with the talking fox who re-
veals that “chaos reigns” in Antichrist. That Baudelairean close-
ness with devilry is embedded in the title sequence of the film, 
which may be read as “Lars von Trier Antichrist.” And of course 
it was von Trier’s obscene comparison of himself with “Hitler in 
the Bunker” that got him banned from Cannes. These vile jokes 
carry within them not so much the feeling of “Ha-ha, the Devil 
dwells within me, let’s party!” but rather “Please, God, help me, 
I am evil at the root, surely among the worst of men, and con-
vinced that I must be damned!”
Von Trier’s idea that humanity is evil by nature does feel redo-
lent of the Maistrean Baudelaire described by Meltzer:
Baudelaire’s frequent recourse to children who demonstrate 
their potential for evil is a reminder to himself not to be tak-
en in by the seductive promise of goodness: for him, it will 
always be a promise broken. Another of Augustine’s phrases 
from The Confessions can only have been endorsed by our 
poet: “If babies are innocent, it is not for lack of will to do 
harm, but for lack of strength.” The passage that follows in 
Augustine is as if an earlier version of [Baudelaire’s] “Le Gâ-
teau”: “I have seen,” writes Augustine, “jealousy in a baby and 
know what it means.” […] Equilibrium will always yield to, 
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or be rooted in, evil. It follows quite logically, then, that it is 
virtue that is artificial, and evil that which is effortless and 
natural. Consider the following passage in “The Painter of 
Modern Life”: “Crime,” he writes is, “the taste for which the 
human animal acquired in his mother’s belly, is originally 
natural. Virtue, on the contrary, is artificial.”
Joanna Bourke, of Birkbeck College, open to the film’s unnerv-
ing power, limns similar territory in her critical response to An-
tichrist:
The effect is breathtaking and compulsive, like a drug; I 
would have watched the film a second time if it had been 
possible. The theme of the film is an ancient one: what is to 
become of humanity once it discovers it has been expelled 
from Eden and that Satan is in us? Despite the erotic begin-
ning, Von Trier has little interest in desire; his focus is on 
Sadeian extreme pain and enjoyment, the abject emptying of 
self and other (including the audience, who are made com-
plicit in the sexual violence infusing the film).
Bourke’s critical generosity towards von Trier brings to mind the 
hypnotic and repellant opening scenes of Antichrist, in which a 
child flings himself to his death in the snow from the window of 
the apartment in which his parents, He (Willem Dafoe) and She 
(Charlotte Gainsbourg) are having sex — filmed explicitly — in 
the shower. Later, in the mind-distorting (or mind-distorted?) 
woods where they have sought refuge and healing from the 
tragedy, Dafoe remembers (or fabricates a memory of) seeing 
an x-ray of his child’s feet, which appear to be distorted or clo-
ven. An idea emerges that rhymes with the Baudelairean riffs on 
Augustine described by Meltzer — this kid might have enjoyed 
committing suicide in order to drive his parents to madness. 
Augustine balanced Original Sin with his absolutely fundamen-
tal insistence that our world is good because it is God’s creation. 
I would argue that von Trier, like Baudelaire, drifts away into 
Manichaeism, at least in Antichrist.
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Your own generosity towards von Trier positions him as a seek-
er in the Nietzschean mode, and I am interested to hear more 
about that vis-a-vis the film. I haven’t read Nietzsche’s The Anti-
Christ but I wonder if Bourke’s invocation of Sade works for you 
and whether those two strands of philosophical influence on 
von Trier might be seen to converge. It makes sense to me to 
consider von Trier as a humanist explorer of extreme states of 
mental and physical anguish and abjection, with sexual pleasure 
and degradation in particular now seen as limit cases that ex-
press aspects of the human, which animals, for example, do not 
seem to experience with the same cruelty and relish. 
But I want to cling to von Trier’s films as highly artificial and 
constructed fictions, if only to remove myself from what’s on-
screen much of the time, but also to appreciate an artistic ac-
complishment that often revolts me more often than not. I see 
von Trier’s films as containing distancing mechanisms of vari-
ous kinds that allow me as a viewer to remember, with gratitude, 
that I am “only” watching a movie at key points in the screen-
ings. Yet for this very reason I also take von Trier to be a master 
manipulator more than a seeker. 
I know that Antichrist is dedicated to Tarkovsky, whose own de-
votion, in turn, is unquestionably spiritual and deeply religious 
at the core. And I would welcome your take on that hat-tip to 
Tarkovsky, because I find it puzzling and cannot seem to take it 
at face value no matter how much time I spend thinking about 
it. For myself, I cannot help linking von Trier to Hitchcock in his 
insistent artificiality, his lack of psychological realism, his Ex-
pressionist play with the horror genre, his self-aware framing of 
his cinema as cinema, his creepy comedic cameos in The King-
dom (so redolent of Alfred Hitchcock Presents), his placing of his 
name above the title of Antichrist, and so forth. There’s a kind of 
Hitchcockian malevolent cynicism here that I find foregrounds 
the movieness of movies in ways that allow me as a viewer to feel 
that I am “allowed” safely to explore deeply disturbing realms 
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from which I think I would recoil immediately and reject mor-
ally in real life.
In von Trier’s grin in The Kingdom and in his films more gener-
ally I detect the death’s head rictus of Norman Bates (Anthony 
Perkins) at the end of Psycho [1960] — or perhaps Bates’s earlier 
fleeting smile when he realizes, in complicity with the viewing 
audience, that Marion Crane’s (Janet Leigh’s) car is going to fully 
sink down and disappear into that muddy pond after all, which 
means, he thinks, that he’s going to get away with it. 
Once we revisit the opening of Antichrist through the various 
departments of film form and craft excellence — slow-motion 
cinematography, the score of Handel’s Rinaldo, the cutting to-
gether of pornography with a special effects sequence of the 
falling child, all reframed as a new “shower scene” binding eros 
and thantos in one “Hitchcoction” — then the film starts to take 
on the shape of an elaborate prank that is grimly fiendish and 
wickedly critical of conventional picture-making. Welcome to 
my movie, please find your nearest exit. Oh, you’re still here? 
Why? Haven’t you left yet? No? Why? What’s wrong with you? 
Are you sure you wanted to have seen that? Can you believe 
your eyes? Aren’t you sick? But after all “it’s only a movie,” isn’t 
it? Or is it? In his book An Invention without a Future, critic 
James Naremore describes the basic affect of Hitchcock’s films 
as combining the impulses of laughing and screaming. Isn’t that 
notion fundamental to von Trier’s work, as well?
In one sense what’s most compelling to me about von Trier’s 
films is very simply the powerful creativity of their own fabrica-
tion and effects, as well as their insistence on messing with au-
dience expectations regarding narrative coherence, genre, and 
the fate of their protagonists. I wonder, though, if I am on the 
wrong track entirely, or whether there really is more Hitchcock 
in von Trier than Dreyer, Bergman, and Tarkovsky. A counter-
intuitive reading to be sure. I might be wrong about all of this. 
Maybe it’s a case of an artist so doubled in his core impulses that 
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he contains and encompasses all of these urges and influences 
in an extremely unstable, brilliant, wildly distressing Molotov 
cocktail of a bomb-throwing artistic personality that is bursting 
at the seams in different directions simultaneously, releasing all 
manner of demons, ghosts, and fallen angels?
Yr f(r)iend JMT
P.S. Here is a snapshot from a storefront in Richmond, where I 
found the ancient hand of Nosferatu haunting the buildings of the 
art school where I teach my film history courses. Sometimes hor-
ror is the only sensible response to a world gone mad… .
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February 19, 2020, 10:39 AM
Dear Josh,
You are certainly right that von Trier likes to play around and 
likes to screw with people in making his devil’s horns and play-
ing the little devil. There is an interesting confirmation of this 
in some of the stories Willem Defoe tells about von Trier in the 
interview included in the Criterion edition of the film. Defoe 
says that at one point while all the crew of the film was going 
around introducing themselves, von Trier whispered to Defoe, 
“when it comes to our turn, let’s just pull down our pants and 
show them our dicks.” That impulse crops up in von Trier’s films 
all the time. The final fifteen minutes of Antichrist is an extended 
“show them our dicks” moment. It is gratuitous to the point of 
making one question the seriousness of what’s gone on in the 
preceding hour or so of the film. 
Tarkovsky and Malick, by contrast, definitely make work that 
takes itself seriously all the way through, perhaps too much 
so at times. But, you know, Tarkovsky wrote something in his 
amazing book Sculpting in Time that I think links up with the 
previous discussion. He wrote, “Since art is an expression of hu-
man aspirations and hopes it has an immensely important part 
to play in the moral development of society — or at any rate, that 
is what it is called to do; if it fails, it can only mean that some-
thing is wrong with society.” I’d say that Tarkovsky and Malick 
both take this “calling” quite seriously. But in his own strange 
way, I’d say that von Trier does too. Von Trier is making art that 
explores what happens when, as Tarkovsky puts it, “something 
is wrong with society” and, perhaps more ominously, something 
is wrong with the universe itself. Melancholia explores what it 
looks like when we are forced to face the fact that the universe 
is profoundly indifferent to our being here. Antichrist explores 
what it looks like when we confront the fact that nature is gener-
ally a hostile force and further, and this is the real shock, that we 
are nature. So, in some deep and fucked up way, we are the hos-
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tile force that we have to confront. The enemy outside is actually 
inside. The point I am making is that these are spiritually seri-
ous propositions. In essence, the three filmmakers are united 
in making spiritually significant work that refuses to allow us 
to become inured or complacent in our existence. They want to 
create spiritual crises within the viewer. Tarkovsky and Malick 
want to wake us up to the kingdom of God within us, if you will. 
Von Trier wants to wake us up to the swirling abyss of meaning-
less doom that lurks within. In his heart of hearts, I believe that 
von Trier actually wants to be talked out of it. He is, as I sug-
gested before, a seeker. But he is treading a dangerous line, he is 
getting as close to the abyss as he possibly can and may one day 
fall all the way in. I admire him for his courage. Like Nietzsche, 
he may one day snap and find himself in the middle of the road 
weeping and insane.
One of the more moving aspects of Antichrist is, to me, the way 
that von Trier so successfully captured the look and feel of a true 
panic attack on film. Indeed, the whole damn movie is worth it 
if only for those scenes. Both Charlotte Gainsbourg and Willem 
Defoe are incredible in those scenes. The scenes when Gains-
bourg (She, of the movie) is having her attacks before they go 
to the cabin are truly terrifying, much more so than the sillier 
scenes of horror at the end of the movie. And the scenes early 
at the cabin where Defoe (He, of the movie) is trying to help 
her gain enough confidence just to walk across a small patch of 
grass are profoundly moving. The fact, as I learned, that von Tri-
er suffers from such panic attacks himself and that he made the 
movie as an attempt, partly, to get himself back to some mental 
health make those scenes all the more powerful and also fit well 
into my thesis of von Trier as a sort of struggling Nietzschean 
seeker/artist. 
So, I suppose the more that I think this through and the more 
that I respond to you just by writing my ideas out, the more I 
cannot accept the idea that a big key to Antichrist is its all being, 
in some ways, “a big joke” and that cinema is fundamentally a 
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place of phantasmagoria. Again, my own thinking on film is that 
it is not, and can never be, a place of safety. Film does not get 
to play with reality because it is reality. Indeed, I’m going to go 
out on a line here and claim that von Trier really is more Tarko-
vskyan than you are giving him credit for being. To me, von 
Trier, like Tarkovsky (and not, perhaps, like Hitchcock, though 
this is another discussion altogether), thinks that cinema has the 
capacity to cut to the core of reality, to show us something like 
the unvarnished truth. The truth, for von Trier, is a dark and 
horrifying thing. But it is, nevertheless, the truth. 
Maybe I missed the joke, but the baby falling out the window 
scene at the beginning of the movie did not strike me as cin-
ematic and therefore unreal in the way it struck you. I found it 
intense and horrifying and genuinely traumatic. The fact that we 
come back to that scene later in the movie to find out (spoiler 
alert) that She was, perhaps, aware of and even in some terrible 
way complicit in the death of the child only heightens the im-
mensely disturbing aspect of that traumatic moment. Von Trier 
is showing us, I think, that we have deeply ambivalent and even 
sometimes hostile feelings to the very lives that we are otherwise 
supposed to hold most dear. (The creepy photos that He finds 
in the cabin where She has consistently put her child’s shoes on 
the wrong feet is a powerful visual image of this ambivalence). 
Some part of us wants to kill what we love and also perhaps 
deeply wants to kill ourselves. Here is also where She begins to 
hate herself explicitly as a woman (and touches on the poten-
tially misogynistic side of von Trier). The reason that She hates 
herself as a woman is that women are the means by which hu-
manity reproduces itself. Since life is an essentially disgusting 
and hateful thing, the womb becomes the site of the crime, as it 
were. Sexual pleasure becomes the horrible lure by which we are 
tricked by nature into perpetuating the cycle of life and continu-
ous reproduction that, by all rights, should be ended so we can 
finally be put out of our misery. 
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These are the dark thoughts, I’d say, that lurk at the center of 
Antichrist. And I think that von Trier means them. Or he is, at 
least, willing to explore them all the way to the bitter end. To me, 
to respect this film is to allow it to be the genuinely, disturbingly 
horrible thing that it is… . I look forward to hearing how this 





February 29, 2020, 9:07 AM
Dear Morgan,
We might not disagree as much as you think, or maybe we do, 
after all — no terrible thing, that. I don’t think it’s necessary 
for us to disappear into the thickets of film theory but Richard 
Rushton’s remarks on Bazin come to mind when I read your 
letter. Rushton writes in The Reality of Film that “realism is not 
a matter of being true to perceptual reality and therefore not 
a theory of realism’s correspondence with reality, but one in 
which realism is a matter of being true to life.” That comment 
may be helpful, but I might try to tinker with it further by sug-
gesting that film conveys a view of life.
Cinema delights for its fundamental hybridity and ability to ab-
sorb contradictions and paradoxes of many kinds — like Bazin 
wrote, it’s a “mixed” art form. I feel foolish talking about it! 
Filmmaking is collaborative but often conveys a strong point of 
view; it’s somehow both impressionistic and expressionistic (an 
impossibility made possible by artificial lighting, lenses, camer-
awork, editing, and postproduction effects interacting with of-
ten unpredictable actors, natural light, or real locations); it can 
be highly personal while being distributed globally as mass me-
dia; it’s commercial entertainment and contemporary art; and 
it feels like it lives very close to life while simultaneously open-
ing up realms of special effects, animation, fantasy, dream-like 
memorable fancies, and illusionism. Now that the reign of pho-
tochemical film has loosened its grip on the art form of cinema, 
and now that the 21st-century moving image very often floats 
free of any moorings in a specific array of photons captured on 
negative film stock, movies are more interesting than ever. Peo-
ple care about films so deeply that they fight over them — a sign 




I do admire von Trier’s divisiveness and his ability to provoke 
a good fight. (He would be pleased if we bickered, I think… .) 
Above all I value his resistance to what I would call the medi-
calization of art, the contemporary belief that works of art are 
like pills or therapy prescribed to make us feel better about the 
world and ourselves, provide uplift, prove that virtue is reward-
ed, contribute to a healthy lifestyle or the right set of opinions, 
etc. I find von Trier refreshing because he challenges something 
fundamentally puritanical about the current cultural consen-
sus, which is based on mindless repetition of correct platitudes 
and the self-surveillance and the disavowal of anything nasty, 
perverse, irrational, sick, and destructive about human nature. 
(Ha!) By constantly denying in public that any of us are any of 
these things, and increasingly invading and contaminating the 
most basic notions of private life and self-definition with impos-
sible declarations of cleanliness, godliness, or politically perfect 
viewpoints, we haven’t been able to sanitize the world of these 
grievous flaws, maladies, and sins after all. Far from it. In fact, 
we might be contributing to the growth and victory of these 
horrifying attributes by denying that they have a deep place to 
hide in the human heart or soul. 
When I think about von Trier’s films in their totality, I get the 
overwhelming impression of a powerful artist who is deeply 
suspicious of Enlightenment values, in particular, the domain of 
clinical reason in which the experience of the irrational is sup-
pressed or derided. This drift puts him at odds with liberal mo-
dernity as well, and I can see why many viewers reject his work 
as being misogynist or reactionary, which seems fair enough 
even though I think there is more there than meets the eye. I 
think some of his films have aged better than others, but aged 
rather well, however, because they feel more in tune with a world 
gone mad than with the illusions of calm order and technologi-
cal progress that were the hallmarks of the end of the 20th cen-
tury and the “end of history” that we supposedly reached. Now 
that history has reasserted itself and the return of the repressed 
is everywhere in evidence, the landscape we inhabit feels more 
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unhinged and deranged, like in a von Trier film. As the open-
ing credits of The Kingdom suggest: “For it is as if the cold and 
the damp have returned. Tiny signs of fatigue are appearing in 
the solid, modern edifice.” All true, and perhaps truer now than 
when first broadcast.
Von Trier often tells the stories of marginalized people who are 
mentally ill, deeply religious, liable to visionary experiences 
of one kind or another, or otherwise overwhelmed by convic-
tions that do not make sense or which leave them vulnerable 
to exploitation and abuse. These characters are most often the 
women in his films. (Dreyer’s The Passion of Joan of Arc, which 
I mentioned previously vis-à-vis Malick, centered on the suf-
fering human face of a strong woman being crushed by male-
dominated institutions, forms a key precursor for much of von 
Trier’s work, I think it’s worth noting for its “Danish” form of 
artistic continuity.) 
The other type of character one encounters again and again in 
von Trier, generally male, is a kind of grotesquely “reasonable” 
person who offers their “help” to these vulnerable souls — a 
kind of help that controls, maims, or even kills. I’m thinking 
here of the doctor played by Kiefer Sutherland in Melancholia, 
but Dafoe’s character in Antichrist fits the bill just as well. There’s 
another horribly rationalistic doctor, a Swede, in The Kingdom, 
who constantly derides the “Danish scum” he works with (and 
must treat), for being a disorderly and superstitious lot, if I 
recall correctly. In any event von Trier hates doctors for their 
relentlessly modern form of dissecting rationality, which often 
acts as a disguise for baser drives to power, control, manipula-
tion, and exploitation.
There is a very real sense in which Antichrist, as a narrative, 
is designed as a torture machine to reduce one of these male 
representatives of “rational thinking” to a shattered and smold-
ering wreck, humiliated, mutilated, and stripped of his smug 
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certainties. A similar fate awaits Sutherland’s character in Mel-
ancholia. Meanwhile, the mentally ill protagonist, played by 
Kirsten Dunst, finds that she is well placed to comfort others as 
the world ends because her visionary experience of the world 
has been vindicated, with emphasis. In Antichrist, the He char-
acter (Dafoe) is actually more of a would-be doctor, a therapist 
who thinks he knows better than the real doctor what is best for 
the suffering person (Gainsbourg’s She). She’s on to him from 
the beginning, even before they depart for the woods, when she 
begs him to “trust others to be smarter than you.” Instead, he 
convinces her to flush her pills — a classically misguided way to 
treat mental illness, and, in fact, one that is more characteristic 
of peopole suffering from mental illness themselves. He then 
drags her out to the woods, the very place that she says frightens 
her the most. A special place in Hell awaits him, and, for that, an 
Antichrist is required.
So this, then, is some kind of course of cognitive therapy and 
New Age-guided meditations that are supposed to replace all 
medication and provide the answers for moving beyond her 
clinical depression and pathological grief about the loss of their 
child. Dafoe’s character likes to talk about “scientific fact” but he 
is more of a zealot for self-hypnosis. His American psychobab-
ble is extraordinarily precise and carries the ill logic of rhyming 
advertising jingles: “What the mind can conceive and believe it 
can achieve.” Later, he claims that “your thoughts distort reality.” 
This type of “logic” that places the source of all illnesses in the 
patient’s mind is reversed and refuted by the film itself. Instead 
of being purely subjective, reality indeed appears to be liable to 
distortion from thoughts in this world of the enchanted forest. 
Or something like that. For his arrogance He is almost put into 
a Dantean Hell of Contrapasso in which He is forced to experi-
ence her illness. He is made to see and feel the world as She 
experiences it when she is ill. The film transfers her sickness to 
him, one might say. 
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At the climax, he undergoes that panic attack you mentioned 
that is intercut with images of hers. It is at that moment when 
Satan, if he exists, triumphs. The Antichrist has succeeded. The 
precise nature of that success is deeply disturbing and intel-
lectually fascinating. The devil has won by convincing Him to 
kill Her. In order to do that, He must accept, on some level, the 
“truth” of Her thesis on Gynocide. He previously mocked her 
thesis specifically for its misogyny. In the film, Gynocide in-
volves her theory that the women killed in the witch trials really 
were, or might have been, actual witches. When He strangles 
her, he is assenting, in essence, to her thesis and destroying a 
creature he regards as a witch. (He burns her body.) How de-
lectably sinister, from the “satanic” perspective, this course of 
action is! The devil, if he exists, has induced a healer to kill his 
patient, violating the letter and the spirit of any healing profes-
sion. That is despair distilled.
So the job of the devil is to convince Dafoe to commit murder 
on the basis of his conclusion about the devil’s real existence. 
Extraordinary to contemplate this thought-pretzel. If he does 
not truly believe that a demon has possessed his wife’s soul, and 
if he does not accept her premise that “someone must die” when 
the “Three Beggars” (the fox, the deer, and the black bird) ap-
pear, there is no reason for him to kill her. It is here that von 
Trier offers what amounts to a scandalous counter-historical 
reading of the witch trials — one that is not “serious” but never-
theless remains intriguing. All those witches really might have 
been witches, this line of thought would run, but even if this 
were true the figures who truly did the devil’s bidding were the 
witch-hunters themselves, who slaughtered their fellow human 
beings, often for extremely petty crimes, on thin evidence, af-
ter horrifying tortures, and so on. The “crimes” committed by 
witches, such as they were, were often banal, and, in more cases 
than not, these so-called “crimes” involved healing or other 
small acts of decency. But the crimes committed against witches 
were truly diabolical. 
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Imagine, for a moment, the trial of Dafoe’s character for his 
wife’s murder. “The devil was inside her!,” as a defense, offers 
about the same mitigation as “The devil made me do it!” That is, 
none at all, especially by the standards of modern liberal reason 
He himself claimed to adhere to at the beginning of the film. 
So Dafoe has merely prioritized his form of madness over hers. 
That is the specific madness and the specific evil of the witch-
hunter. The film may not be as simplistically misogynist as it 
seems. Although its claim on the “womanly” tendency towards 
the irrational appears stereotypical and objectionable, that claim 
is the one with which the film (and the filmmaker) ultimately 
side with against the “male” forces of reason. (Von Trier demar-
cates both Breaking the Waves and Dancer in the Dark in a some-
what similar fashion, creating two more compelling Joan of Arc-
like characters in the process.) All this probably works better as 
a negative critique of one half of the equation than it does as a 
positive proposition about the other. And of course it relies on 
the biological essentialism that it partly criticizes, down to the 
film’s allegorical names for “He” and “She,” as if there were no 
other kinds of humans, and as if the equation itself were really 
binary.
At this point it would be remiss not to mention another clas-
sic Danish filmmaker, Benjamin Christensen, whose 1922 film 
Häxan, an early silent film masterpiece, took up the subjects 
of witchcraft and mental illness. Christensen’s theory was that 
many of the symptoms that were mistaken for witchcraft in the 
premodern era resembled mental illness — various neuroses 
and hysterias. The film became notorious for the reason that 
its often gruesome depictions of witchcraft — a coven assem-
bles to devour a baby — and its direct portrayal of torture were 
both pretty extreme. (I think Häxan wound up being banned in 
several countries.) Christensen’s film mixed documentary and 
dramatic “reconstructions” of witchcraft (the director played 
the devil, speaking of cinematic Antichrists!) with a sort of il-
lustrated lecture format. The result is, on the surface, a positiv-
ist, confident document about modern rationality’s ability to 
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explain all previously mysterious phenomena. It is rather simi-
lar in its jaunty self-assurance to Defoe’s character’s attitude at 
the beginning of Antichrist. At least some of the materials from 
Gainsbourg’s Gynocide thesis look similar — or even might have 
been taken from — the depictions of torture in Häxan. 
So there are some “Scandi” concerns and sensibilities operating 
here in the magnetic fields between the overlapping influences 
of Christensen and Dreyer on von Trier, perhaps. I do find it 
interesting that von Trier is essentially reversing the polarity of 
Christensen’s classic by offering a fiction in which mental ill-
ness melds with supernatural irruptions. This forms a direct 
challenge to modern rationalist discourse exemplified by the 
voiceover of Häxan, while aligning itself more directly with the 
solidarity towards the irrational at the core of The Passion of 
Joan of Arc. One of von Trier’s core convictions as an artist in-
volves a thoroughgoing critique of modernity, in general, and of 
the disenchanting process of instrumental reason at the heart of 
modern life, with its maladaptive, violent, and self-destructive 
tendencies, in particular. Impulses and processes from which he 
cannot exclude or excuse himself.
The standard Weberian line on “the central dynamic of mo-
dernity” encompasses “systematization, instrumentalization, 
secularization, demystification” and “de-magification” (Entzau-
berung), according to Jane Bennett’s insightful summary, “Mo-
dernity and its Critics.” Von Trier’s films pulse with awareness 
of what Bennett calls the very high “cost” of a “rationalized 
world stripped of all ‘mysterious incalculable forces’” and the 
“meaningless world” that results. Cinema is the right medium 
for conjuring these things back into view precisely because of 
its paradoxical qualities of erasing distinctions between illusion 
and reality, dream and waking life, documentation and embel-
lishment of the world out there and the visionary experience 
that cannot be pinned down to a purely subjective or interior 
private variety of experience.
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Would it be fair to say that von Trier would rather face a uni-
verse that is malevolent than dead and meaningless? This is an 
intriguing idea precisely because it does not seek to re-enchant 
the world on the basis of a New Age or therapeutic ecology, a 
gentle wondering Christian mysticism, a Buddhist embrace of 
infinitely divine complexity, or any other such positive reversal 
of secular certainties. But then I do not feel when I am watching 
von Trier’s films that he is presenting a view of life as it should be 
or as he would prefer it to be. Nor do I sense that he wishes his 
viewers to leave the cinema thinking that they’ve seen life as it is, 
at least not for most of us. Instead, to invoke yet another Scandi 
artist, I get a strong Edvard Munch vibe from von Trier, as if 
I’m seeing that suffering skull-face radiating its pain from the 
inside out into the world — leaking, visible suffering coextensive 
with the universe itself — in the 1893 painting displayed with the 
German title Der Schrei der Natur (The Scream of Nature). (Or 
is the figure attempting to block out the hell everywhere around 
it? Either way, the inside is the outside.) Munch wrote of “blood 
and tongues of fire above the blue-black fjord and the city” in a 
note on the painting. “My friends walked on, and I stood there 
trembling with anxiety, and I sensed an infinite scream passing 
through nature.” Chaos reigns! Some scholars link the painting 
biographically to Munch’s mentally ill sister, Laura, who appar-
ently was in an asylum near the geographical scene depicted in 
the painting.
It’s tempting to reduce the complexity of Antichrist to a depic-
tion of the filmmaker’s well-documented bouts of extreme men-
tal illness. The film’s genesis as a therapeutic experiment that 
von Trier undertook after a breakdown provides the kind of 
classic dodge that forms a specialty of artists who live to pro-
voke. But this interpretation sells the film short by limiting its 
scope to autobiography or a mere byproduct of the process of 
artistic research into the worst things one can imagine. 
I guess I’m not really sure whether von Trier “means it” or not 
when he dedicates his picture to Tarkovsky, the great religious 
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artist of postwar Russian cinema. Or what he means by it. Or 
if he knows what he means by it. (Not that this diminishes the 
work, at all.) Tarkovsky’s world is alive with “mysterious incal-
culable forces,” but ones that generally feel divine rather than 
satanic. One exception I can think of in Tarkovsky’s work, how-
ever, might be one that bears on von Trier’s. When the rain be-
gins to fall inside the house of the protagonist in Solaris, one is 
reminded that the world Kris Kelvin inhabits at the end of the 
film is a fabrication created by the planet Solaris, which has gen-
erated a world for him to live inside that is a warped misfash-
ioning of his own memories. For Kelvin, the inside is outside, 
literally. 
When the acorns fall on the roof of the house in the woods in 
Antichrist, it signals the advent of a waking nightmare in which 
the outside world, as experienced by the protagonists, is one that 
seems to be conjured from the contents of their own ill heads. 
It’s as if both Tarkovsky and von Trier took up Descartes’s idea of 
a “great deceiver” who can manipulate our perceptions of reality 
and trick us into believing that a fictional world is real. A meta-
phor for the cinema if there ever was one!
When I’m watching a film by von Trier, I’m often reminded of 
Marlowe’s devil in Doctor Faustus and that memorable phrase I 
quoted before, vis-à-vis Malick, “Why this is hell, nor am I out 
of it.” It’s insufficient to deflate the power of the experience of 
von Trier’s films by limiting them to a distancing commentary 
on the subjective experience of mental illness. (Or a revenge 
fantasy about torturing yet another doctor character… .) To call 
this a variety of religious experience feels like blasphemy, but I 
think that specific form of blasphemy is more or less what’s in-
tended by von Trier. For Descartes, I think, God’s goodness and 
omnipotence bankrolls his confidence in his ability to generate 
a clear and distinct picture of the world and the self by thinking 
through the cogito ergo sum. It is this Cartesian world — the grid 
of reason — that von Trier utterly rejects, positing instead the 
disturbing idea that a great deceiver is far from impossible and 
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that the world’s “mysterious incalculable forces” might not all 
be in our minds and, in fact, might be out to get us. Or maybe 
not — maybe it’s all fiction, smoke and mirrors, magic lantern 
tricks and an evening’s entertainment brought to you by movie 
magic and effects that the filmmaker knows full well aren’t real, 
in part because he himself is the great deceiver of his audience. 
Everything depends on one’s answer to the question without an 
answer: Who, in the film, is the “Antichrist” referred to in the 
title?
I worry that you won’t like this reading of the film, but I’m not 
invested in needing to “win” an argument over a work of art 
that resists any master-key interpretation. Does everything boil 
down to the well-worn comment about the devil’s greatest trick?
From your friend JMT
P.S. Here’s a view from the area of the church in central Pilsen. The 
agitated man we encountered at the entrance to the church spat 
out the English words “I know Satan” when we refused to give him 
money. Meanwhile, a local wedding was in full swing.
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April 10, 2020, 12:50 PM
Josh,
I’m gonna return, for a moment, to a sort of tricky Wittgenstein-
ian move I was trying to make a few letters back. I would like 
to sneak out of the whole Realism and Film debate by simply 
stating that films are real. They are reality. So, we don’t have to 
worry about how they “hook up” with a reality that is, suppos-
edly, out there somewhere. Films are simply part of the overall 
collection of things that exist in the real world. Point being, it 
is all real. The question then becomes “what’s the deal with this 
reality that completely surrounds us? How do we want to be in 
it?” rather than, “How do we get access, through our sensual 
apparatus, or by means of this or that medium, to this thing 
called reality that can somehow be isolated from other things 
that aren’t quite real.” The skeptical problem dissolves when you 
simply grant everything full reality, including all the so-called 
fictions we’ve created. 
But another big problem emerges. And the second problem is 
the one that I think Lars von Trier tackles. The second prob-
lem goes like this: Okay, films are just as much reality as any-
thing else. But films are also tricks, games, fictions, put-ons. So, 
if films are reality, does that mean that reality is like a film, all 
the way down? Is everything we are doing here more or less an 
empty and pointless game, the rules of which are utterly arbi-
trary and the punchline always something like a sick joke? I take 
all of von Trier’s experiments in film to be just that, experiments 
with this deeply unsettling thesis in order to see what happens. 
He’s genuinely curious. And he’s just screwed up enough as a 
person to have the stomach to push reality, in the form of film, 
as far as he can push it. I like your Cartesian analogy for that 
reason. You’re right. It is like a Cartesian thought experiment 
except that in von Trier’s case the experiment is with the very 
material of reality itself. That’s to say, by making films he gets 
to create little realities in which his various insane propositions 
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play themselves out in real time. In Melancholia, for instance, he 
gets to destroy the entire earth in a random cosmic act and find 
out whether it matters or not. Does the prospect of complete 
erasure, total eradication render everything else moot? Do we 
only ever get up in the morning because of some deeply held 
but basically inarticulate sense of eschatology? It is going some-
where, even if we know not where, so we can trudge forward for 
another day. But take that away and what happens? So von Trier 
takes it away. And what happens? I guess that depends on how 
you watch the film. 
Clearly, von Trier has no simple one-to-one idea of what mov-
ies are supposed to show us about the world. But his Dogme 95 
period is, I think, crucially important, especially since aspects of 
Dogme Realism are a huge part of Antichrist and of really every 
movie he has made since then. 
Here, for instance, is some of what von Trier and Thomas 
Vinterberg wrote about Dogme 95:
Today a technological storm is raging of which the result is 
the elevation of cosmetics to God. By using new technology 
anyone at any time can wash the last grains of truth away in 
the deadly embrace of sensation. The illusions are everything 
the movie can hide behind.
DOGME 95 counters the film of illusion by the presentation of 
an indisputable set of rules known as THE VOW OF CHASTITY.
Amazing to me that they call it a “vow of chastity” by the way. 
Here’s a clear relation between the Dogme 95 movement and 
the path of the religious mystics and ascetics who, precisely 
by renouncing a frivolous relationship to reality, sought to put 
themselves into deeper contact with the Real. The whole point 
of the Dogme 95 movement was to say that movies have a spe-
cial responsibility vis-à-vis truth. The manifesto says this quite 
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explicitly. Those who sign up to do a Dogme film are supposed 
to make the following pledge:
My supreme goal is to force the truth out of my characters 
and settings. I swear to do so by all the means available and 
at the cost of any good taste and any aesthetic considerations.
I’d call this a fair summary of exactly what I mean by mystical 
realism. And I’d say that exactly such a truth comes out in what I 
consider to be my favorite of the Dogme 95 films, In Your Hands 
by Annette Olesen. The whole point of that film, to my mind, 
is to ask the basic question, “how much do we really believe in 
what we are experiencing?” The main character of the film is a 
pastor at a women’s prison. But she is a pastor who, when con-
fronted with the true weirdness, the depths of possible forgive-
ness, the uncanny and profoundly disturbing nature of reality 
itself, pulls back in unbelief. This is a movie about the fact that 
you have to be able to have faith in the world exactly as it pre-
sents itself, which is to say as a place in which brute reality and 
strange shards of redemption exist side by side. You have to have 
faith and you have to actively choose the path of the suffering 
that truth requires or it all falls apart. 
Maybe another way to put it is this, if you live with eyes fully 
open then every single thing is totally and completely shock-
ing in every single way. Movies can have the wonderful effect of 
bringing the intensity of this basic fact right up into our faces. 
Von Trier, to my mind, has understood this fact from day one. 
It is what all his movies are about. This is true Realism. And if 
movies are not about that, if movies are not up to the task of true 
Realism, then to hell with them. Seriously, to hell with them. 
That, I take it, is how von Trier views film and the attitude from 
which he makes his films. 
I think that this is exactly what von Trier is up to in The Five 
Obstructions. Actually, I think the The Five Obstructions is key. 
But I guess I want to stop here first and ask what you think about 
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The Five Obstructions and how you view it. Because, in a sense, 
the conversation can’t go on until we get that film straight. So, 





April 13, 2020, 9:57 AM
Dear Morgan,
I wonder if our letter-writing has prepared us in some ways for 
the absence and isolation that marks the way we live now during 
the pandemic. All good wishes to you and Stefany in Detroit. 
I also wonder how this moment will change me. Having not 
heard from you about our book last month I became worried 
that it seemed like a trivial pursuit or that you were encounter-
ing difficulties. I’m reminded of an Onion headline from after 
9/11, “Nation Yearns to Care about Stupid Shit Again.” I’m not 
sure if writing about movies matters any more but I’ll take my 
distractions where I can get them, and it’s good to be in touch, 
my friend.
You know, von Trier does have an early film from the late 1980s 
called Epidemic, but it is not available to stream and I’m not con-
vinced I would want to watch it now, when thousands are dying 
each day, even if I could. And I have little interest in asking a 
delivery driver to risk their life to bring me a DVD copy of a film 
with that title, which would be a grotesque abuse of privilege, I 
think. 
I did, however, have a chance to watch von Trier’s most recent 
release, The House That Jack Built. Immured in the desert of its 
charmlessness I felt something new — von Trier was wasting my 
time (and, a far worse sin, wasting the time of Matt Dillon, Bru-
no Ganz, and Uma Thurman, whose cameo ends abruptly with 
a tire jack in the face, recapitulating perfectly how this movie 
makes the viewer feel). I seriously wanted to pack it in, stop 
writing about movies, stop teaching film, stop watching movies 
forever. Calgon, take me away!
Now that this feeling has passed, I do think there is something 
notable about The House That Jack Built. Near the end of the 
film, the serial killer protagonist played by Dillon finally finds 
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himself face to face with Ganz, Wim Wenders’s famous angel in 
Wings of Desire and the movie Hitler of Downfall. Ganz’s voice 
has been with us since the beginning of the picture, speaking 
offscreen to Dillion’s Jack, whose preternatural streak of luck al-
lows him to elude capture by the authorities in eerie ways that 
suggest the opposite of divine intervention. As the cops finally 
close in on his corpse-ornamented cold storage room, Dillon 
is invited by Ganz to descend into a hole in the ground. But 
this “escape” turns out to be a trap — Ganz is a Virgil-like figure 
(named “Verge”) and Dillon finds himself in a Dantean under-
ground landscape representing Hell. 
Jack spouts Nietzschean claptrap, about the superiority of the 
great artist in a meaningless world in which all is allowed, until 
the bitter end, while Ganz preaches about how real art can only 
come from love. Ganz makes a distinction between an architect 
and an engineer — Jack cannot build his dream house and keeps 
demolishing it because he is not an artist and cannot create, only 
destroy. As humorless as the film is (and it must be seen to be 
believed — mostly it’s too dumb even to offend), it’s an auteur-
theory critic’s dream because it’s a bad film that nevertheless 
provides a skeleton key to the rest of von Trier’s work. 
The filmmaker views himself as a divided soul, half architect 
and half engineer, half angel and half devil, half Dreyer–Berg-
man–Tarkovsky remix DJ and half Hitchcock-esque reactionary 
troll, an elderly enfant terrible and bearded baby who makes a 
meal of provocative cinematic violence but really just wants to 
express the difficulties of being madly alive in a human skin. He’s 
both figures — a manipulative Dillon-like psycho and the self-
described “nazi” who was banned from Cannes, and who keeps 
getting away with his crimes against good taste, and a Ganz-
like tour-guide of the darkest circles of Hell. He never intended 
to endorse anything he represented; he was simply bleeding on 
the screen to get it out of his head. I think you are right that he 
yearns to serve some higher power, like Dante, or at least to be a 
Virgil of the psychological underworld of the bankrupt modern 
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condition, condemned to Limbo but still illuminating the world 
with his poetry, one who reveals little panels and scenarios of 
sinners suffering on our tour of this latter-day Inferno. Credits 
roll as the devil falls into the abyss — cue the song “Hit the Road, 
Jack” (really!). Von Trier will reform and create his Purgatorio 
and then his Paradiso. But, not yet.
The thing is that I don’t fully believe anything von Trier says 
because he’s so mercurial. Or, rather, to use the standard line of 
all parents in horror films, I believe that he believes it, or at least 
that he means what he says when he says it. That sounds a little 
bit harsher than intended, but it’s true that he himself endorsed 
his own banning from Cannes. A lot of this is self-publicity 
(which is how I view his DOGME 95 manifesto).
Honestly, I cannot think of a better description of The House 
That Jack Built than what DOGME 95 condemns as the “deadly 
embrace of sensation” and those “illusions” that “the movie can 
hide behind.” I’m sure this reversal is deliberative. One might 
argue that von Trier, in going from one extreme to the other, is 
testing the limits of cinematic form, stretching the audience’s 
patience beyond the breaking point, and staking out two contra-
dictory approaches to filmmaking that allow him to explore the 
antinomies of the medium without synthesizing them.
The Five Obstructions does seem to get right to the heart of the 
matter, yes. By asking Jorgen Leth to remake his 1967 film The 
Perfect Human with various absurd restrictions and seemingly 
impossible “obstructions” (such as shooting a scene featuring 
the protagonist eating a meal in Mumbai’s Red-Light District), 
von Trier paid homage to Leth’s filmmaking. In attempting to 
obstruct Leth, von Trier simply revealed how inventive he was. 
(Personally I find Leth’s films to be distastefully obsessed with 
depicting paying for sex in ways that feel uncomfortably neoco-
lonialist and exploitative. That might be neither here nor there 
for the purposes of our discussion about Antichrist, but it is the 
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case that sexual misconduct allegations also bind Leth and von 
Trier.) 
In the film’s culminating sequence, von Trier finally admits that 
he has something like a little brother jealousy complex of some 
kind towards Leth as a filmmaker, and that his devilishly sadistic 
behavior and childishly defiant obstructions are really just his 
way of expressing his insecurity about the possibility that he is 
the inferior artist. To me that confession is the real von Trier. He 
dedicates Antichrist to Tarkovsky, who would have despised it, 
and he speaks to Mark Cousins in The Story of Film about Drey-
er and Bergman, both of whom knew how to restrain them-
selves in ways that von Trier has never mastered. As another 
great Danish writer once wrote, “The more a person limits him-
self, the more resourceful he becomes.” To me that’s what’s most 
complex and valuable about his best early film, Europa, and his 
best later work, Melancholia. The former is formally constrained 
by its use of back-projections to represent historical fiction, and 
therefore becomes a meditation on (among other things) how 
stories can manipulate their audiences. The latter is narratively 
limited largely to women’s subjectivity as they experience states 
of severe depression and face down male arrogance about how 
science will save the world from its inevitable destruction. If Eu-
ropa reveals how optimism can lead to evil, then Melancholia 
reconfigures despair as a form of hope, suggesting a positive role 
for the mentally ill in comforting the (supposedly) sane as the 
world collapses around them/us. Timely, no?
Your remark that the function of DOGME 95 was to renounce a 
“frivolous relationship to reality” in order to establish “deeper 
contact with the Real” caught my eye. I think what’s clear, from 
rewatching The Five Obstructions, Antichrist, and The House 
That Jack Built, as well as Europa and Melancholia, is that von 
Trier has gradually rejected the notion that any particular film 
style can provide a unique access point to truth. In other words, 
it’s not the presence or absence of this or that method of light-
ing, type of film, method of filming, or narrative genre (DOGME 
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banned “superficial action,” specifically, “murder”!) that brings a 
work of cinema into deeper contact with life. We see this in The 
Five Obstructions, in which it matters not whether Leth films in 
Cuba or India, with animation or with a split screen, or using 
shots no longer than 12 frames. Cinema is only what one makes 
of it, and DOGME was, at its best, a useful “obstruction” for its 
time that opened new avenues of creativity with its limits and 
restrictions, in much the same way that a modern poet might 
use a limiting form like a sonnet or a haiku. The issue is not one 
of a lack of artifice being closer to the truth than an overload of 
artifice. It’s about the poetry.
So it’s not that all is an empty demonstration of surface appear-
ance, phoniness, and illusion. One does adhere to one’s vision 
and inevitably one projects one’s personality into the frame. 
And certainly I agree with you that film (or any work of art 
that has value) becomes a part of the world and in that sense 
is not separate from reality. Roy Armes, in his wonderful 1974 
out-of-print book Film and Reality, discusses realism in film 
in a threefold sense. He describes how documentary impulses 
draw filmmakers to represent the social world out there, how 
narrative impulses draw filmmakers to add new variations to 
established storytelling genres deeply embedded in the cultural 
imagination, and how experimental impulses draw filmmakers 
to question the nature of reality as most people see it. 
I take von Trier, for the most part, to be one of the last category 
of filmmakers, an artist who wishes to ask his viewers whether 
there are “more things” than are dreamt of in their philosophy. 
It’s not that the mad, the visionary, the marginalized, the saintly, 
the poor, the abused, the disabled, or the criminal among us 
have any more perfect bead on truth. It’s that their story of the 
world is also valid and disrupts the smug certainties of modern 
secular liberalism. In this manner, Weberian de-magicification 
continues to unravel in the 21st century on all sides of the cul-
tural and political spectrum as all that is solid melts into air. This 
process seems to be accelerating as we speak. Von Trier’s films 
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reveal how this process of undoing the secular world is very far 
from being necessarily wonderful or moral, but instead also 
contains nightmare possibilities for depravity and abjection. Af-
ter all, it was von Trier who recognized in the idea of “America” 
these twin dangers: the figure of the neo-nazi terrorist “Were-
wolf ” in Europa, the precursor of today’s white nationalist, and 
the oppressively tyrannical self-help New Age liberal therapist 
in Antichrist, the representative figure of the hapless prosper-
ous society bereft of any spiritual defenses whatsoever against 
violent outbursts of darkness.
I think that is one reason why polite conversation often steers 
clear of von Trier. It’s sometimes unbearable for decent people 
to endure his films. I myself don’t even want to talk about his 
work right now, yet I feel compelled to do so, because he speaks 
directly to the nightmare of history from which there is no pos-
sibility of awakening. With all that said, I do think that simply 
attempting to tell the truth as one sees it is an act of hope that 
rests on faith in some form of futurity. 
I badly want that truth and that future to be different. I hope 
things turn out more like the ending of a film by a different Tri-
er, Joachim. In Thelma, Joachim Trier offers a strangely specific 
antidote to the poisons unloosened by Antichrist. It’s a super-
natural tale of a queer woman protagonist (Eili Harboe) with 
telekinetic powers who overcomes her conservative religious 
family’s belief that she’s possessed by evil. She liberates herself in 
order to pursue a romantic relationship with her girlfriend Anja 
(Kaya Wilkins) at university. Having accidentally transported 
her baby brother with her mental powers to a frozen spot under 
the ice of a lake near the family home when she was a young 
girl, Thelma overcomes her childhood guilt and eventually dis-
patches her fire-and-brimstone preaching father by helping him 
to spontaneously combust.
Like Thomasin (Anya Taylor-Joy), Robert Eggers’s protagonist 
in The Witch, the eponymous lead of Thelma suggests the joy 
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of women’s liberation as a happy counter-narrative. Their 
fates deny the dominant and oppressive narratives of religion 
as constituted by the historical records of the New England 
Witch Trials and by the puritanical violence perpetrated against 
LGBTQIA+ people by the “ecumenical hate” of contemporary 
evangelical Christianity. Both films have a sort of “would that it 
were so” attitude towards their pagan supernaturalism that also 
links them with the less supernatural freedom sought and found 
in the “devilish woodlands” of polytheism by Dani (Florence 
Pugh), the protagonist of Ari Aster’s Midsommar, another 
women’s liberation narrative. 
But let’s give the devil his due. Von Trier remains admirably 
stringent in his rejection of any such unmixed positivity in the 
irruption of deep irrational currents of the mind or in outbursts 
of otherworldly forces. There are no answers here, and the solu-
tions chosen by Thelma, Thomasin, and Dani are to be seen for 
what they are, wish fulfillments that please their audiences by 
providing ways out and hints about futures that might be worth 
inhabiting. Von Trier offers no such succor to the viewer. He 
hasn’t gotten there and maybe he never will. Maybe it’s just his 
foul temperament or maybe it’s his most valuable quality as an 
artist — the same quality that might make his company unbear-
able and his films insufferable. Even at their most wretched and 
objectionable, these works of art disallow any comfortable rest-
ing point. They’re still modern and I think they are fundamen-
tally opposed to liberal subjectivity, particularly the ideals of 
autonomy and free choice that our culture values.
Von Trier fits the old definition of humanism ascribed to Ter-
ence, “I am human and nothing human is foreign to me.” This 
is the bitter taste of knowledge that comes from that other Tree 
not mentioned in the title of Malick’s 2011 film. How fitting for 
our ruinous and fatal moment in which leadership is depraved, 
science has been rendered useless and degraded by an avalanche 
of lies, technological progress seems to be a dangerous vehicle 
traveling fast in reverse, and the whole edifice of individualism 
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and capitalism appears to be clinging by its fingernails to the 
edge of an abyss. Maybe it’s best to let go, but there’s no map 
for this long fall. I would prefer to think that more humane al-
ternatives are viable in rebuilding from this wreckage. But in 
the event that this nightmare only deepens, it will provide more 
evidence, if more is needed, that von Trier speaks urgently to the 
state of things. I hope everything will look different and much 
better in a few months or a year, but for now I’d like to record 
these notes in situ and simply say, with the Beach Boys, that God 
only knows.
The Tree of Life and Antichrist were released within two years of 
one another, but in fact Malick’s film was sold to distributors in 
the same season of stock market boom (Spring 2009) that von 
Trier’s was released. Malick’s critical romanticism feels more in 
tune with the Obama years of recovery from the financial cri-
sis than von Trier’s sour notes of acid pessimism. One of these 
two films nearly doubled its money. The other lost millions of 
dollars, and yet probably feels truer to the spirit of our times 
than the Pre-Crash era — seemingly now vanished forever — in 
which it was created. With uncanny precision, the unrelenting 
horror of Antichrist fits the dimensions of this year’s Easter of 
plague, mass death, and empty churches, from which the deep 
story of reawakening or rebirth has never been more welcome.
Notes from your friend JMT
P.S. In a search for hope and beauty, I attach an image of happier 
days — a photo of you and Stefany enjoying an afternoon of art 





April 30, 2020, 11:24 AM
Josh,
Well, I guess I’m not gonna watch The House That Jack Built 
right now. Not, maybe, because I am depressed or don’t want to 
face the ugliness of it. I’m actually not depressed. The world that 
COVID-19 is destroying right now is not my world. I’ve already 
let it go. Years ago I let it go. I’m in another place. In a funny 
way, the machinations of COVID-19 have simply brought a lot 
more of the people out there into the world I’m already living 
in, here. But these are thoughts that I’m not sure make sense to 
anyone who hasn’t already died to the world. Dying to the world 
is a spiritual exercise and you don’t do it for fun, let’s just say. 
You do it because you have to. But once you’ve done it, however 
deeply or definitively you’ve done it, you realize that you can’t go 
back. And you also realize that you haven’t stopped loving the 
world or being part of it. It’s just that everything has changed, 
because you have, in some important way, died. I know, now, a 
little bit about what the ancients meant when they said that liv-
ing is learning how to die. I’m learning how to die. I’ve learned, 
a little bit, how to die. In some important way, I’m dead. 
I do feel weary of talking about von Trier right now, though, 
and I don’t want to watch any more of his films for the moment. 
I think you summed the main points up nicely. I have nothing 
to add. 
The only thing that still sticks in my mind is the letter that von 
Trier writes as if Leth wrote it and then has Leth read it to him at 
the end of The Five Obstructions. Actually, I don’t own a copy of 
the film and I can’t find the text of the letter online. So, I’m just 
going from my memory of the culminating scene. But the point, 
sort of as you’ve said in your last letter, is that von Trier has 
been fighting with himself all along. I don’t think that letter is 
just another trick or game. Somehow, it took all this obfuscation 
finally to confront the problem of the root shame and embar-
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rassment and utterly exposed, vulnerable just being-a-person 
that is at the root of making anything at all, doing anything at 
all. Why do something instead of nothing? This is the practical 
corollary, and, one could say, the ethical dimension of the core 
metaphysical question why is there something and not nothing. 
I remember being genuinely stunned when Leth reads that letter 
at the end of the movie. 
All of this is linked, I want to say, to this imperative that we must 
learn how to die. And the mystery embedded in this imperative 
of learning to die is that learning to die can’t be done without 
it being, simultaneously, the discovery of how to live. The films 
of Lars von Trier are, to me, tackling this problem, they are this 
problem. So, that’s enough. That’s more than enough. 





May 5, 2020, 12:50 PM 
Dear Morgan,
It sounds like you are in an interesting place, my friend — and 
I don’t just mean Detroit! By any chance are you writing about 
the territory covered in St. Paul’s letter to the Galatians? I note 
a similarity in phrasing between what you are saying here and 
Galatians 6: “the world has been crucified to me, and I to the 
world.” It’s interesting, too, about “the world” and what this con-
cept might mean, in terms of “having a world,” “being in the 
world,” “renouncing the world,” “building a world,” or, as you 
write, seeing “the world” destroyed. This conceptual framework 
often takes on a dualistic, world-denying critique, which in my 
opinion is just too easy. Those aspects of “the world” — viewed 
in an Early Christian sense as the realm of sin and fallenness 
ruled by human wickedness — we would all like to do without, 
like Amazon.com, far from being destroyed, are only triumph-
ing from this nightmare of destruction and plague, no? I think 
you mean something else here, perhaps the destruction of cer-
tain bourgeois platitudes or consumerist conceptions of long 
life through dietary supplements and mindfulness? (They’ll be 
back… .)
I take heart from the fact that you say that you haven’t stopped 
loving the world or stopped wanting to be a part of it — spo-
ken like a good mystical realist, indeed. What I like most about 
hearing your remarks is that when I combine them with what I 
know about how you’re living, I feel a sense of delight (and even 
pride, if I might that use, strange as it sounds) in your chosen 
path of service in your church, your community, and your city, 
and in your honest way of relating to your art students through 
non-B.S. mentoring as they attempt to navigate this impossible 
landscape and put their chips down on art in a “world” that dis-
courages and warps this impulse in every possible way. What 
an intrepid and lovely generation, “these children that you spit 
on as they try to change their world,” as Bowie sings. And all of 
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this is, of course, inseparable from your faith and represents the 
truth of what the Buddhists call “right livelihood.”
Galatians is one of those self-reflexive points in Paul’s writing 
where he pauses to describe the writing process itself: “See with 
what large letters I am writing to you in my own hand!” Now 
we’re exchanging our own letters about a film, The Five Obstruc-
tions, in which the reading out of a letter reveals von Trier’s view 
of his art by means of an epistle. That’s a good place to close one 
loop in our exchanges. Yet — sorry/not sorry — I am not ready 
to let go of this film, this Antichrist, that I find so haunting, dis-
turbing, upsetting, objectionable, and compelling, for reasons 
probably best described in terms of abjection by Julia Kristeva 
(see below). What is a genuine work of art but something that 
cannot be unseen or undone — even one that you sometimes 
wish you had never seen?
It’s interesting that in Galatians Paul is fighting with some of 
his friends via one of his many futile-sounding letter-writing 
campaigns attempting remotely to sort out all of the confusion 
and bad behavior that his radically egalitarian ideas had sown 
across pockets of the Mediterranean. By what authority did he 
presume to speak? What a madman! How did he know, to an 
absolute certainty, that he wasn’t wrong? He dared to suggest 
that because the words of the prophets were about to be fulfilled, 
so too their assertions needed to be taken seriously that anyone 
and everyone anywhere on earth could share in inheriting the 
Kingdom of God. Regardless of their class, their ethnicity, their 
gender, or, even their religion (or lack of religion, in a specific 
sense?). A mind-boggling assertion from which the world has 
never recovered, and over which all of us are still arguing (even 
if we don’t know it), and over which many are fighting, for good 
or ill.
Anyway, some of the Galatians want their religious community 
to be circumcised, apparently to avoid persecution of some kind. 
Paul (himself a self-described former persecutor of Christians) 
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would have been circumcised but, unlike von Trier and Dafoe 
were said to have done on the set of Antichrist, he doesn’t show 
everyone his supposedly authoritative whang. Instead, he writes 
that it is immaterial to make a “good appearance in the flesh” 
but he also makes clear that not getting circumcised doesn’t 
solve one’s problems, either. It doesn’t matter to Jesus. Yeah, why 
would it? God is not a bouncer at a supposedly exclusive club 
with a list of names and plus ones. None of that matters anymore 
to Paul. Only a “new creation” matters.
* * *
I suppose that any artist’s most basic calling, too, is to place the 
value of new creation above that of making a good appearance 
and avoiding persecution. But what are we to do with these 
problematic older lions like von Trier who pace their cages and 
really draw blood whenever they’re let out? Like you I also want 
to put him down, but I cannot, because he offers us no quarter, 
and no answers, only a host of troubling questions that spiral 
down into the vertigo of film history and the most basic func-
tions of movies as a medium. Von Trier cannot go along to get 
along. He must say and show the wrong things. This is the pain-
ful, shameful process that you describe as integral to his view of 
cinema. Here is the anti-Paul of Antichrist, writing with a thesis 
so hideous and foul that he must ascribe it to a fictional char-
acter.
In The Five Obstructions, von Trier puts emphasis on Leth as 
a fellow “wretch” who is “abject,” which might invoke another 
figure from a Pauline epistle, the “wretched man” of Romans 7. 
That’s one of the most fascinating chapters in Paul’s letters. Here, 
Paul makes his most startlingly honest confession: “For I do not 
understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I 
do the very thing I hate.” Von Trier in a nutshell!
I rewatched the scene you’re describing in The Five Obstructions. 
It’s in the final seven minutes of the film. Yes, what von Trier has 
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done there is to write a script for Leth to read in the final “ob-
structed” version of The Perfect Human. Meanwhile, von Trier 
presents his own edit of Leth going about his filmmaking tasks 
and daily life (including what appears to be a visit to a doctor). 
In this nested series of self-reflective moves, as you say, there’s a 
letter that appears to be from Leth to von Trier, but which is, in 
fact, written by von Trier. I agree that this is a critical moment 
that reveals something basic about the artist.
The script reads:
Dear Lars, thank you for your obstructions. They’ve shown me 
what I really am, an abject, human human. I try to fool the 
world because I don’t want to be part of it. My trick is cheap 
and I repeat it endlessly. If I go on telling the viewer what I 
see — like a prisoner of war repeating his name and num-
ber — without adding anything, emotions are too danger-
ous — the world and I will fall for it. I call it art — but I am 
certain that I cannot do a thing. I only do all this so that I can 
put up with myself. My films are a bluff. A hideaway, Lars. 
Thank you for chastising me so lovingly! Was that nice? Does it 
make any difference? Maybe you put words into other people’s 
mouths to get out of saying them yourself.
The script goes on:
The dishonest person was you, Lars. You only saw what you 
wanted to see. The skepticism you felt about yourself must go 
for me, too. But you exposed yourself. You wanted to make me 
human, but that’s what I am! You got me to play along but you 
let me get on the defensive. As we all know, it’s the attacker 
who really exposes himself. The truth is, you got it wrong! I 
obstructed you, no matter how much you wanted the opposite. 
And you fell flat on your face. How does the perfect human fall? 
This is how the perfect human falls.
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That last line is accompanied by a sequence of Leth dropping 
to the floor, seemingly exhausted, in order to watch television 
in a bedroom. Leth, then, is the “perfect” human, for von Trier, 
because he is a wretched and abject “human human,” flawed 
and vile, the person who does not understand their own actions 
and makes art in a failed, repetitive attempt to “put up” with 
themselves. I wish I had a better translation of this line: “I call 
it art — but I am certain that I cannot do a thing.” What is the 
opposite of one saint writing to another? That’s probably nearer 
to the heart of the matter.
* * *
I see von Trier, especially in Antichrist and Melancholia, reach-
ing back into the history of cinema to invoke abjection in Chris-
tensen, Dreyer, and Bergman. In light of their films, we can-
not accept the contemporary consumer premise that art must 
be nice. Or that good art makes for good people. Or that only 
good, stable, normal, hygienic, ethical people make good art. 
This new theory bears no relationship with the history of art, or 
with reality, unfortunately.
I think some viewers wish to shield themselves from abjection 
in art because they already find themselves immured in an ab-
ject world of necropolitics and economic ruin from which they 
seek relief and escape. Fair! What they might not realize, how-
ever, is that gulping down artistic saccharine and bingeing on 
cinematic comfort food probably is not going to help — it’s only 
going to harden their emotional arteries and line their brain 
synapses with conceptual plaque. 
There’s another set of viewers who seem drawn to abjection in a 
variety of interesting ways, through horrifying and effective cult 
productions like Twin Peaks: The Return, Most Beautiful Island, 
Mandy, You Were Never Really Here, The Lighthouse, Midsom-
mar, In Fabric, and even popular blockbusters like Joker, perhaps 
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as some sort of coping or release mechanism for the onslaught 
of vileness in public life. 
I think it’s mistaken to attempt to assign an ideology to these 
films based on their content or the ethics of their creators. As a 
mode of criticism, this is very low-hanging fruit at best. Instead, 
I see these films as serving an even more basic purgative func-
tion in the collective unconscious, acknowledging that the wak-
ing world now often seems like a nightmare. Antichrist forms an 
important precursor to this 21st-century series in which “chaos 
reigns” and the sleep of reason breeds monsters.
Obviously I belong to this second set of viewers and I consider 
myself a friend of horror, but I recognize that these pictures are 
not for everyone. To me, however, these films feel like home-
opathy, fighting like with like — admittedly similar in their ab-
surdity to some ancient medieval remedy in which one buries 
oneself up to the neck in dung to escape from ill vapors. These 
movies perform their spells best when they are understood to 
be theatrical constructions, surreal fabrications that allow one 
to explore the worst that can happen from a slight distance, 
refracting dreams through distorting mirrors rather than at-
tempting to portray any superficially “accurate” or “plausible” 
set of circumstances. In a therapeutic sense, then, I value what I 
take to be the Expressionist elements of make-believe and play 
in these devilishly delicious confections because, like the works 
of Edvard Munch, Jean Cocteau, or Maya Deren, they reveal 
the complexity or even the unaccountable/unacceptable nature 
of the inner world. When the world’s tyranny of niceties and 
etiquette reaches the level of demanding that we control our 
dreams or stop our mouths from honestly telling how it feels 
to us to be alive, we must revolt. And sometimes be revolting.
In doing this work, cinema that is formally disruptive and de-
liberatively unreal erodes the bourgeoisie claims of psychologi-
cal realism and the generic platitudes about morality in the arts 
that mark the publishing and entertainment industries and the 
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social media discourse that now drives them like the proverbial 
mix-up about the horse and the carriage. At its best, this newish 
micro-trend for horror fights on three fronts simultaneously: It 
stands against socialist realism’s moralizing cant about upbuild-
ing political progress through the arts, against psychological 
realism’s narcissistic cant about the wholesomeness of liberal 
subjectivity, and against capitalist realism’s cant about the need 
for entrepreneurial pleasantness, civility, cleanliness, and com-
promise in a world gone mad.
Instead, the art of abjection, when viewed from a safer space, 
performs some of the functions ascribed to the concept by Kris-
teva in Powers of Horror. The book opens with a quotation from 
Victor Hugo that also feels apt to von Trier in general and Anti-
christ in particular: “No Beast is there without glimmer of infin-
ity / No eye so vile nor abject that brushes not / Against light-
ning from on high, now tender, now fierce.” An all-important 
capitalization here, since, like von Trier’s talking fox, the animal 
is perhaps being raised into the figure of The “Beast.” When I 
think of Antichrist I cannot help thinking of Biblical phrases like 
“the lord of this world” or “the prince of the power of the air.”
Kristeva begins:
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark re-
volts of being, directed against a threat that seems to ema-
nate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the 
scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. […] What 
is abject is not my correlative, which, providing me with 
someone or something else as support, would allow me to be 
more or less detached and autonomous. The abject has only 
one quality of the object — that of being opposed to I.
Yes, this is almost precisely the timbre of Antichrist, as well, and, 
I must add that, after reading Kristeva describing corpses, feces, 
vomit, and decay, I feel more phlegmatic about getting to grips 
with von Trier in a less squeamish manner. Some combination 
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of psychoanalytic and religious thinking may prove good guides 
for exploring the particular appeal or calling of abjection and 
horror. Something European (for lack of a better word for it) 
and anti-utilitarian is going on here at the core and one begins 
to feel somewhat childish and puritanically American in its an-
cient presence. Did we really think we were safe from history, 
with its mass graves, torture, persecution, plagues, or that we 
were permanently inoculated by modern medical science and 
industrial supply chains from the experiences inflicted on eve-
ryone else for centuries? That there would be no return of the 
repressed? No Trump? Like Max von Sydow says in his guided 
meditation-style voiceover near the beginning of von Trier’s 
eponymous film, “You are going deeper into Europa.”
I remember visiting the Isenheim altarpiece in Colmar and 
thinking that Matthias Grünewald’s depiction of the dead and 
diseased Christ with his suppurating wounds worked well on 
me as an object of reflection. I thought to myself, rather stu-
pidly: Well, this is not American art! And: Huh, yeah, I guess 
death is inevitable, better get rolling with what really matters! 
Grünewald’s iconography was a tribute to the monks of St. 
Anthony who treated and also may have suffered from plague 
and fungus-poisoned rye. I also read that ergotism, the illness 
caused by this type of infected grain, may have played a role 
in the Salem witch trials, where the symptoms of convulsions, 
vertigo, tinnitus, and hallucinations were similar, according to 
some medical scholars. In any event, this way of making art 
through the depiction of abjection survives in contemporary 
consumer society mainly in the horror-tinged films like Claire 
Denis’s Trouble Every Day, with its flesh-eating epidemic, and 
von Trier’s treatment of crime in The Element of Crime, of self-
harm and mental illness in Antichrist, and of debilitating de-
pression in Melancholia.
Like Grünewald’s paintings, von Trier’s films are designed for 
the audience to identify with the sufferers. But, also like the 
Isenheim Altarpiece, they compel the modern viewer’s resist-
 129
horror
ance and objection to the upside-down notion that suffering is 
somehow divine (and, therefore, in some sense, deserved, or a 
special marker of an especially deserving person, a misery-in-
ducing thought from either a secular or a religious perspective). 
This, above all, is the aspect of von Trier’s work that disturbs 
liberals, especially those who would like to consider themselves 
allies of women and minorities who have been told this ration-
ale for their oppression all their lives and are over and done 
with all that. I think von Trier intends his films as fictionalized 
autobiographies of the “I am Madame Bovary” variety. That’s 
why I think Melancholia remains his masterpiece, since Kirsten 
Dunst’s character Justine is von Trier and since the film pro-
poses a positive place or role in the world for the mentally ill 
person who has enough privilege and autonomy to console oth-
ers when the world falls to pieces, rather than punishing them 
simply for existing. I sympathize with those who find in von 
Trier’s films only an appropriative or trolling gaze — don’t watch 
it, then! — even if I assert my own wish to see things differently. 
I might be wrong.
* * *
With von Trier we seem to have landed on the diametrically op-
posite side of contemporary cinema from Malick. I would like 
to see the wonders and horrors in their films, respectively, as 
poles on the same globe that cannot balance properly without 
the existence of both extremities. I see no possibility of synthesis 
between their two viewpoints, or, to further mix up my meta-
phors, I don’t think that this is a case of two lenses on the world 
that would create some clearer view through binocular vision 
if they were ever brought together. No, they are prime lenses, if 
you will, ones that affix to the same camera body. 
Either way, we have two hedgehog filmmakers here, modern 
artists of repetition who are making the same film over and 
over again in many different variations and styles. Malick and 
von Trier are themselves visual artifacts of the analogue era 
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who have carried over their persistence of vision into the digital 
realm. Their respective aesthetics stood in fierce opposition to 
the 1990s zeitgeist about “the end of history” and the inevitable 
victory of liberal capitalism and modernity as defined by tech-
nological progress. Now their idiosyncrasies feel prescient.
I think that’s why, even though they can be made to represent 
the most obnoxious and oppressive aspects of the auteur theory 
of privileged personal cinema, and despite the obvious fact that 
their films are artistically incompatible on almost every level, 
Malick and von Trier still seem so well suited to the mood of 
the 21st century in their off-kilter productions. Perhaps that is 
because they, like Matthias Grünewald, went against the grain 
of their own time.
Is it going too far to claim that Malick and von Trier remain 
medieval on some level? Maybe that’s a silly comment to make 
about artists working with the most technology-dependent art-
form of all. Or might the cinema be a valid place to seek out 
resistance to the historical catastrophes of instrumental reason, 
the mechanized war on the planet, and the “dead eyes” of a dis-
enchanted world?
Please forgive this very long letter, you’ve given me much to 
consider.
Notes from your friend JMT
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May 5, 2020, 4:45 PM
Dear Josh,
I understand your reservations about my “dying to the world” 
stuff. I also take some pride in your pride for me, especially in 
my little ministry around Saint Anthony’s here in Detroit. The 
somewhat absurd game of being Brother Morgan, whoever that 
is. 
But for a moment I’m gonna risk doing damage to that pride. 
Because I want to hold onto something in that otherwise bad 
two-world metaphysics of the early Christians and of plenty of 
other religious folk throughout the ages. The world that you die 
to in “conversion” is all of the world, not just the bad stuff. You 
don’t get to pick and choose. I don’t get to pick and choose. Some 
aspect of dying to the world is about recognizing in a complete 
and total and shocking way that it is all death. The whole thing 
goes away. Every part of everything is nothing. None of it has 
substance. None of it is real. This is the realization. This is the 
insight. 
Of course the mind revolts at the thought. Of course we imme-
diately want to reject the thought and say “yeah, sure, in some 
sense, but… .” But the degree to which one is really transformed 
by the experience of dying to the world is the degree to which 
one can hold off the “yeah but” objection. How long can any of 
us hold it off? How unbearable is the thought? 
One of the things I’ve always been drawn to in art of any kind, 
actually, and in the case of our discussion, in film, is the elegiac. 
Is it possible to say that all art is elegiac at its core? I suspect that 
this is true, though I cannot prove this and have no interest in 
proving it. One either knows this in one’s soul or one doesn’t. All 
we can really do, in art, is name the thing in its passing. The hor-
rible doomed fragility of everything in its passing is so beautiful 
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it is beyond words. It is beyond images. Nevertheless, we attach 
the words and images to mark the passing.
The greatest films, to me, are the films that are somehow ad-
equate to this elegiac mood. Maybe it is just one scene. One mo-
ment that justifies all the otherwise pointless scaffolding of plot 
and character and narrative and whatever else was the excuse 
to give us one scene of elegiac beauty, to show the beauty of an 
object or a creature or an experience or a feeling in its passing 
away and never being again. The incredible overwhelming loss 
that is at the core of all living. 
I’ve always enjoyed the movie writing of Manny Farber even 
though some aspect of his, I don’t know what to call it, grubby 
materialism bothers me. But I love that he watches a movie not 
for the plot or the ideas or anything that normal people look 
for. He watches a movie with his termite eye, burrowing into 
scenes just for the weirdness of watching the camera move or 
the shapes and colors of a scene. He’s completely open to the 
fleeting feelings and jumps of emotion or interest that a movie 
creates, often despite authorial intention, as you watch it. 
There are certain scenes in Antichrist that make me feel the 
creepiness of existence and the sadness of the various attempts 
to confront the fear and creepiness that is being alive. The hor-
ror and the menace of the acorns falling on the roof of the cabin. 
That is pure horror. The gut feeling that nature is utterly malevo-
lent, satanic to the core. The switched shoes or wrong-footed 
feet of the dead child. The pathetic scene where Man tries to 
get Woman to confront her crippling terror and depression 
and simply walk across a short stretch of ground. I don’t want, 
personally, to construct big arguments about what these scenes 
mean. They just capture the sense in which existence is horror. 
Those scenes justify the existence of the film. They are enough. 
Lars von Trier has the basic decency to be ashamed of himself 
for creating such scenes. His decency drives him to further acts 
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of indecency. He can’t help himself. His filmmaking is the film-
making of anger and distress. His films are a revolt against being 
alive. This, to me, is a valid form of art. I call it elegiac filmmak-
ing because he creates scenes, in every one of his movies, where 
one gets the palpable sense that there is no answer in the face 
of death. 
I suppose I could make the very facile point that the great dif-
ference between von Trier and Malick is the difference between 
meeting the terrifying triumph of finitude with anger or with 
love. Probably it is a difference. And I am glad to be able to say 
that I frequently have the experience of the universe as an object 
that is in love with itself, in love even with the reality of constant 
overwhelming loss. But I also want to say that, in the end, it is 





May 17, 2020, 1:37 pm
Dear Morgan,
You are really laying down the law with this “it is all death” and 
“none of it is real” stuff, cheers! :) But I think you also believe 
that it is all love and that it is all real. To reframe these reflections 
as a question, how does the artist try to live up to the name of 
the Buddhist deity, “The Regarder of the Cries of the World”? It 
starts with accepting suffering as the first truth.
I contemplate this landscape of death that envelopes all of us 
now as we witness the excavations of plague-pits and as eve-
ryone experiences the lurking fear of sheltering in place, with 
its dark dreams, its derangements of isolation and virtual meet-
ing places, and its absurd and vile discourses upon toilet paper 
shortages and germ-plumes. Just to breathe or (apparently) to 
talk too close to the wrong person is to risk death or involuntary 
manslaughter. This is our current “structure of feeling” and it is 
unbearable.
In a passage apropos of your remarks and von Trier’s film title, 
Kristeva writes, “Abjection accompanies all religious structur-
ings.” Her mini-chapters on “Perverse or Artistic” and “As Ab-
jection — So the Sacred” seem apt to our discussion:
The various means of purifying the abject — the various ca-
tharses — make up the history of religions, and end up with 
that catharsis par excellence called art, both on the far and 
the near side of religion. Seen from that standpoint, the ar-
tistic experience, which is rooted in the abject it utters and 
by the same token purifies, appears as the essential element 
of religiosity.
Kristeva also notes (in “Catharsis and Analysis”) that modernity 
tends to “repress, dodge, or fake” abjection. She offers psychoa-
nalysis and contemporary literature as a manner of sublimating 
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abjection, making the latter “a substitute for the role formerly 
played by the sacred, at the limits of social and subjective iden-
tity.” I think we can avoid a scrap over the primacy of religion, 
art, or analysis by simply noting the alliance of these three dis-
tinctive modes against the smug certainties of consumerism, 
with its empty promises of life-extension in a world devoid of 
meaning. 
This unstable but important alliance forms a good lens for 
bringing von Trier’s film back into focus. In Willem Dafoe and 
Charlotte Gainsbourg, he has found two actors whose commit-
ment to abjection appears to be total. They want to be here in 
this terrible place together, it would seem, but why? Present my 
leg as attached to a millstone? Ha, sure, why not? Mime me cut-
ting off my own clitoris? Okay, I’m game, it didn’t really happen, 
after all. My best guess is that for all of these artists there’s some 
background belief in role-played abjection as a form of therapy. 
Their issues have issues, and some viewers who feel “the black-
ness of darkness forever” (as described in that Biblical Letter of 
Jude) may take a strange comfort in these projections of hor-
ror. They might feel less alone in their paralyzing depression. 
Certainly this is true of Melancholia and you’ve said the same 
applies to Antichrist’s rendition of a panic attack, for example. 
The mini-tradition of “abyss-gazing” applies here, I think, for 
those who wish to “go there.”
Yet I maintain that without a clear understanding of the fictive 
nature of a film like Antichrist, its potentially cathartic powers of 
horror are easily misunderstood. It makes better sense for von 
Trier to highlight the confected nature of his films — and of cin-
ema in general — than to adhere to the DOGME 95 theses, which 
mistake style for truth. The artist, writer, singer, critic, analyst, 
authentically religious person, or filmmaker who opens their 
wounds forms a node of resistance that is all the more valuable 
for being fictive, since facts alone cannot save us from this situ-
ation. Real wounds, but, importantly, filtered through the fash-
ioning of fiction, even if it’s autofiction on some level.
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Kristeva aligns her analysis with her reading of Aristotle’s con-
cepts of catharsis and performance in the Poetics, as opposed to 
the standard view of Plato’s denigration of art as a second-order 
copy or shadow of reality. So:
To Platonic death, which owned, so to speak, the state of pu-
rity, Aristotle opposed the act of poetic purification — in itself 
an impure process that protects from the abject only by dint 
of being immersed in it. The abject, mimed through sound 
and meaning, is repeated. Getting rid of it is out of the ques-
tion… .
Indeed. One might be reminded once again of the ancient ho-
meopathic practice of burying oneself in dung to escape from 
ill vapors, which is not a bad analogy for von Trier’s films. This 
mimicry cannot exorcise the abject but brings the audience and 
perhaps the actors and the filmmaker into a closer habitation 
with its rhythms. The fictionality of fiction, then, is not only fit-
ting but also necessary for distinguishing the operational func-
tion of this kind of art from the merely exploitative or sensation-
alistic torture-porn, which tends toward reactionary affect when 
it is more realistic.
The punk or goth or genuinely religious alternative of letting eve-
rything in is not easy or necessarily wise — it leaves us open to 
the abject because the damage of personal and collective history 
runs deep and everyone is implicated. It’s not anybody’s place to 
force this stuff on anyone else in some sort of sadistic tripping 
through some catalogue of trigger warnings or taboos — which 
is how I felt about the depravity of The House That Jack Built. But 
disavowal of the abject also stifles us inwardly because it cuts off 
our ability to speak or even admit that we feel truthful things out 
of a repressive terror of appearing unclean.
Ultimately, I wonder if Antichrist will be viewed, in secret or in 
very small groups, for hundreds of years, as a Grünewald-level 
curio and toxic counter-exhibition from an utterly demented era 
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in which countless hours were spent on Facebook and billions of 
pounds of carbon released into the atmosphere in a fruitless col-
lective project to convince everyone (including ourselves) that 
we were normal, healthy, upbeat, productive contributors to a 
smiley-faced society (like Dafoe’s “Man” at the start of the film). 
The whole artistic landscape of the New Extremity is, perhaps, 
at its best, a characteristically “European” reaction to and rejec-
tion of an Americanized globe that refuses to recognize the va-
lidity and calling of the abject as the actual structure of birth and 
death, and as something fundamental to the deep storytelling of 
art, myth, and religion. If we think we can do without abjection 
we’ll end up as cloned colonists on Mars farming space cabbages 
for Elon Musk and call it “progress.”
I’ve been trying to think of a good way to describe what I feel 
are the limitations of von Trier’s aesthetic. The filmmakers he 
wishes to emulate — Dreyer, Bergman, and Tarkovsky — make 
comparisons somewhat absurd. But, to return to a point I made 
earlier, I see von Trier as more akin to Hitchcock in that they’re 
both very much “on brand” most of the time. This isn’t really 
true of his trinity of conscious influences, especially not Dreyer 
and Bergman. Bergman makes films that deliberately contradict 
one another, like The Hour of the Wolf and The Magic Flute. Both 
pictures feature scenes of audiences watching Mozart’s opera, 
but one is nightmarishly surreal and the other cuts away to kids 
laughing at the antics onstage. This goes beyond the conven-
tional limits of the auteurist or Old Masters conception of cin-
ema as a pantheon of (invariably white and male) figures with 
signature styles and recognizable worldviews, which was never 
a very good fit for this art form in any event. 
Bergman is more Shakespearean, for lack of a better word, in 
this insistence on multiplicity rather than duality. He considers 
many of the same or similar problems and poses some of the 
same questions we’ve been considering, in various guises, but 
with a staggering range that feels incompatible with the con-
temporary approach to registering a kind of stylistic trademark 
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and branding oneself as the purveyor of this or that type of stuff. 
It’s silly to say that von Trier is not Bergman, as if that’s some 
insight. But this line of thought inevitably leads me to wonder 
if there was a contemporary filmmaker who overlapped with 
our own lives as moviegoers and who reached further into these 
depths. Whose work is never just one or two things, but con-
tains its own contradictions and yet somehow expands beyond 
them into deeper mysteries… Kieślowski?
Good cheer, if such be possible, from your friend JMT
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May 18, 2020, 12:02 PM
Dear Josh,
Ha! Definitely not interested in “laying down the law.” So, my 
apologies if the last letter was pushing a bit too hard for you. 
It is a fine line sometimes between trying to express my own 
thoughts and experiences in a satisfying way on the one hand 
and trying to convince you of something on the other. I am 
interested in the former. I’m not at all interested in the latter. 
As an argument, my points about death and elegy are, I know, 
completely unconvincing and verging on the unhinged. But for 
me, the actual sense of it is obvious and clear as day. The gap 
between those two things is probably infinite. But I do think that 
there is a reason that so many people who have had religious ex-
periences or spiritual awakenings or whatever you want to call 
it, talk, in some sort of insufficient language, about dying to the 
world and then being reborn to it out of that dying. This experi-
ence is completely reorienting. It happened to me, as you more 
or less know, in my alcoholic collapse that brought me down 
into a place darker and more abysmal than I had ever imag-
ined possible. Down in that place, the self I thought I knew was 
essentially obliterated. Funnily enough, that turned out to be a 
good thing, though it took me many years to fully realize this. 
One thing that has stayed with me is the very deeply felt sense 
that, as Ecclesiastes puts it, all is vanity. Really and truly. Not a 
cliché. But really and truly all is vanity. This does not prevent me 
from participating in the vanity with all my heart and soul. In 
a sense, vanity is all there is, so we may as well dive in. But eve-
rything shifted, for me, out of the experience of having already 
died once, sort of. I can’t quite believe in the world in the way I 
see others believing in it. I believe in something else, though be-
lief isn’t really quite the right word for it either. Alas, that’s about 
the best I can do right now putting words to it. I know it fails.
It is interesting to me that you keep bringing up Kristeva. That 
Powers of Horror book fascinates and frustrates me by turns. 
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One thing you haven’t mentioned is that the literary hero of the 
book is Céline. I don’t know, but if I had to think of someone 
who is to film as Céline is to literature it might very well be Lars 
von Trier. I think this only strengthens the point you are mak-
ing.
Yes, you could say that von Trier and Céline are both artists of 
the abject. But then there is a question of what the artist of the 
abject is trying to do. Your point is that the abject is a useful 
tool for pruning. It helps us get rid of that which is empty and 
hypocritical and false. But we don’t want to fall into the abject 
as abject. We don’t want to get pulled into the whirlpool of the 
abject for its own sake, because there is only death and destruc-
tion and horror down there. The abject has to do something for 
us or else it becomes the cure that is worse than the disease, 
the disease being, in your example, the shallow consumerism, 
literal and aesthetic, of modern life. I think what you are saying 
is absolutely true. Von Trier, as we’ve talked about, is deeply in-
terested in the therapeutic and Kristeva is, of course, also think-
ing about all of this from the standpoint of the analyst and the 
psychological. But for me, the abject isn’t so easily controlled.
In the pretty damn amazing last chapter of Powers of Horror, 
Kristeva wonders aloud to herself what the point is of empha-
sizing the “horrors of being.” Her answer is that there are those 
people, through the circumstances of history, or through their 
own personalities, who have had the normal fabric of their sub-
jectivity ripped wide open. They’ve seen and felt that the thing 
that is supposed to be real and self-contained, the “I,” is in fact a 
kind of madness riding on the id-wracked seas of the abject with 
all its inchoate indeterminacy, everything that revolts and dis-
gusts precisely in the subject’s need to substantiate itself as over 
and against all that cannot be substantiated. The person, the art-
ist, who allows herself to be taken into the realm of the abject 
learns that the abject is not something outside of the subject by 
which the subject can test itself, but is, more scarily (more sa-
credly?), the very source and origin of that very subjectivity. It 
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is what’s down there. We are all nothing but the abyss. To go 
down in there is to risk seeing that. And to risk never coming 
out again.
This, I think, is what von Trier has been trying to risk in all his 
movies. It is his own semi-secular version of the dark night of 
the soul. He has access to what Kristeva is talking about, to the 
powers of horror. And I don’t think he has a choice. Maybe he 
sometimes plays it as if it’s all just a joke in the end. It is all just 
a movie, all fiction. But once again I must say I disagree with 
you that this is any key to what von Trier is doing. I think, quite 
to the contrary, that von Trier always brings up the artifice of 
the filmmaking process to give you a false sense of relief and 
then to destroy even that relief, to show that there is no refuge 
from the abject, that there is no comfort in the false distinc-
tion between fiction and reality. It takes fiction, in this case, to 
show us the real truth of what we’ve known all along. That is also 
what Kristeva says Céline does with literature. To create a form 
of writing that makes the abject into an unbearable reality that 
should completely and utterly destroy our ability to hold our 
world together, hold ourselves together, that throws us into the 
abyss without any tether whatsoever. 
Why do this? There is no why here. There is no assurance that 
can be given. That’s why the abject is pure horror. You are not 
in control anymore. This kind of art is about relinquishing con-
trol. This kind of art is about throwing oneself completely onto 
the mercy of the infinite, which has no mercy in the traditional 
sense. What happens in this process is that all bets are off. One is 
transformed. The outcome is for the gods to decide, which they 
always do anyway. 
Well, for what it’s worth, that is my best shot and drawing all 
these threads of the last few letters together into one crazy and 
probably incoherent set of thoughts. I recognize that this is not 
your experience, either of the world or of yourself or of the films 
of Lars von Trier. My hope is not that you see it my way. I don’t 
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want Josh to be anyone but Josh, just as I can be none other than 
Morgan. My hope is only, I suppose, to be heard a little bit just 
as I am trying to hear you. I think you are right, anyway, that it 
would be interesting to redirect our attention to another kind 
of artist, a less demonic artist, an artist who has a different re-
lationship with the medium altogether. It was Kieslowski, after 
all, who tried to make the holiest movie of them all. He actually 
tried to film the Ten Commandments! That thought, I must say, 









May 21, 2020, 12:37 PM
Dear Morgan,
These letters are a balm in the midst of all this — whatever this is 
or will be called. Late Spring in a poisoned garden of earthly de-
lights where the whiff of magnolia and dogwood blossoms and 
an invisible cloud of death hangs in the air above the masked 
walkers in our nation’s capital. 100,000 already dead from COV-
ID-19 in America, with the likely toll much higher than the of-
ficial figure. We are learning to live under a scythe, somewhat 
like the dreaming figure depicted in the mysterious publicity 
still from Dreyer’s Vampyr (1931) of the young woman sleeping 
beneath the shadow of death.
I think we have marked out a good, flexible boundary for our 
exchanges here with our shared interest in Kristeva’s view of 
catharsis. I agree with you that catharsis has to be real — we 
have to “go there” and experience the abject. (Well, we have no 
choice, really, in the end, it’s only a question of our level of hon-
esty about it, as you suggest. As the gospel song has it, we all go 
to the lonesome valley, and nobody else can go there for us.) 
But I cling to the fundamentally fictional aspects of these works 
we’re discussing, like Jimmy Stewart hanging on to the gutter 
above the street many stories down, in the opening scene of Ver-
tigo (1958). We never see anybody save him and in fact he’s in a 
position from which it seems impossible to survive or escape. 
Hang in there, kitten! 
I think some sense of distance is necessary to the catharsis of-
fered by fiction. I don’t think that’s true, or as true, for analysis 
or ritual. And this basic necessity for distance, in the safer space 
of the theater or the cinema, especially, marks a difference from 
either the analyst’s room or the confessional, where the distance 
shrinks. Each mode contains its own reality but they operate 
differently. It’s not that art isn’t real but that it has its own func-
tion, purpose, flavor, or what have you. We’re lucky and glad not 
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to be experiencing the things depicted onscreen, on stage, or in 
a book. 
I’m also saying that the cinema is not a chapel and should not 
pretend to host a “congregation,” etc. Otherwise we land in the 
soft zone of “the Bible as Literature” and all that New Age muck. 
And I’m not talking here about contemporary secular ideas 
about fiction and positivist truth-claims or box-ticking assent to 
a series of relative absurdities as the basis on which the value of 
religion should be assessed. That’s garbage talk from the Dawk-
ins/Hitchens crowd.
This difference means everything. Saint Paul experienced some-
thing extremely important to him on the road to Damascus. A 
hell of a lot of human history depends on what he experienced 
and what it all meant to him. It’s no good saying “I believe that 
you believe it, Paul,” like the parents in that proverbial horror 
movie, although that was basically James’s unimpressed reac-
tion, we’re told.
There’s hardcore Jewish theology involved in Paul’s claims, not 
just some nice ideas about equality in the face of the divine, or 
ladies wearing hats while preaching, or even the overwhelming 
Pauline sentiment that basically boils down to “please stop jerk-
ing around.” His claims regarding Jewish prophecies are fasci-
nating. Paul was probably wrong in his historical claims about 
those prophecies, or at least he had his timing off by thousands 
of years, and this matters, too. James was probably correct on 
a technical level that his brother Jesus was someone to be fol-
lowed and emulated, not worshipped. Both would have found 
the concept of the Trinity bizarre if not blasphemous from a 
Jewish theological perspective. So what?
The whole thing is painful, awkward, and scandalous, as the 
theologians like to say, but there’s no use crying over spilt 
milk, and, besides, I’ll take Mont-Saint-Michel over Starbucks 
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any day of the week. At Chartres, as I think I mentioned be-
fore, the congregants seemed to hold a service underground to 
avoid the tourists snapping disgraceful and meaningless photos 
of bowed figures praying before the Virgin’s Veil. The mean-
ing of the prayer isn’t invalidated if someone gets the idea of 
performing chemical tests on the Veil, and divinity, if present, 
does not evaporate the moment the tourist posts their photo to 
Instagram to document that they’ve “done” Chartres. No, they 
haven’t. They were never really there at all, in one sense. But you 
can be sure that they themselves have suffered in another, hid-
den place. Or that they will suffer.
* * *
More and more I try to adhere to the Chekhovian view that fic-
tion attempts to pose certain questions rather than to provide 
answers to life’s problems. For me, Kieślowski is the Chekhov 
of the cinema. Dekalog is like a book of Chekhov stories that 
have been linked together into something approaching perfec-
tion. Even its imperfections are part of its perfection, in that way 
that certain masterpieces have of gathering new meanings over 
time. It’s an Everest or a K2 of cinema and yet it was made for 
broadcast television, far away from the studios of Hollywood. 
Kieślowski did not invent quality television, of course. Bergman 
and Fassbinder had done remarkable things with the medium in 
the 1970s, for starters. But Dekalog helped to presage our era of 
hour-long serial entertainment as a node of serious art.
Nothing about this production should have been possible and 
yet the series seems to contain the universe inside it. Dekalog 
was created by Kieślowski and many of the key players in his 
“stock company” at a shocking pace in 1988, during the final 
years of the communist regime in Poland. You can find the 
whole world within his tower block of flats. Everyone and eve-
rything seems to be in here, all of postwar 20th-century history, 
America, Europe, and the Eastern Bloc, the Holocaust, commu-
nism, and Christ. Murder and love, betrayal and loyalty, com-
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edy and tragedy, suicide and redemption, philosophy and milk 
delivery. You can lose yourself and find yourself in this series of 
short films. Watch them again and they rearrange themselves 
into a new configuration with novel surprises. Look into any 
window and you’ll find your neighbors and family members liv-
ing there, no matter who you are or where you are — or when.
That effect is little short of miraculous, but we’ll likely disagree 
about whether the movies themselves are all so holy. I doubt 
Kieślowski viewed it that way. In fact, he abandoned filmmak-
ing. He refused to call himself an artist. Think of that. This might 
make him appear saintly in our eyes, in the way that a saint 
never thinks of themselves as a saint. And, sure, Kieślowski’s 
films are shot through with… something. 
His most important collaborator on Dekalog, Krzysztof Piesie-
wicz, also his co-writer on No End (1985), The Double Life of 
Veronique (1991), and the Three Colors trilogy (1993–94), was a 
serious man of faith (and later, a prominent politician — O Eu-
rope!) who injected a second layer of reflection on Catholicism 
into what we might try to discern as “Kieślowski’s worldview.” 
Kieślowski’s own remarks about Piesiewicz are more compli-
cated and torn. So are his own remarks about religion, as you 
know. Kieślowski was deeply interested and personally involved 
in — as well as intellectually intrigued by — religious thinking, 
religious skepticism, the paranormal, supernaturalism, and the 
durable value of Biblical texts for attempting to think through 
the complexity of contemporary life. 
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than 
are dreamt of in your philosophy” — this is the statement of a 
character in a play who’s seen a person after their death, whose 
visitation seems to compel specific conclusions and actions. Yet 
Hamlet’s certainty about what he thinks he knows of the other-
worldly is fatal to him and many others. That’s interesting to con-
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template for a minute — or a lifetime. I take it that Kieślowski’s 
viewpoint is not Hamlet’s but Shakespeare’s. It accepts the idea of 
“more things,” even if it doesn’t pretend to know what they are, 
what they mean, how they operate, exactly, what they require of 
us, or whether they are even certain to be salutary. Interestingly, 
Shakespeare’s phrasing here is not “in heaven and on earth,” it 
is “in heaven and earth,” implying that there are more things in 
earth and that heaven and earth — whatever might be meant by 
those terms — may not be disconnected realms. Which, in turn, 
suggests that we might not really know what we mean by those 
terms after all. And then there is the matter of hell and earth, a 
matter that is implied but censored in Shakespeare.
This gesture towards “more things” is also the basic position 
that scholarship on Kieślowski tends to take up. Annette Ins-
dorf, whose work in her book Double Lives, Second Chances is 
recapitulated and expanded in her interview with the Criterion 
Collection for the DVD release of the restored Dekalog, argues 
her case like this:
Kieślowski is one of the great filmmakers who used the phys-
ical to express the metaphysical. There is the suggestion so 
often in Kieślowski’s Dekalog of something beyond the prac-
tical, the quotidian, the perceivable. If we look closely at the 
cinematic storytelling of the Dekalog, we’ll be able to see this 
masterful use of imagery, of music, of structure, even, but not 
just for its own sake. For me it’s a literal “going beyond.” In 
other words, going beyond what the camera can frame, going 
beyond what the eye can see. And Kieślowski, who himself 
was not comfortable with the adjective “religious,” preferring 
“spiritual” — I think he would have acknowledged that he be-
lieved that there was transcendence in our daily lives. That at 
moments, for example, when we feel and express love we are 
transcending the ordinary.
Geoff Andrew, in his book on Three Colors, comes to a similar 
conclusion about The Double Life of Veronique:
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Critical reaction to the film was largely enthusiastic, but the 
critics were a little mystified as to what, precisely, Kieślowski 
was trying to say: this emphatically, was his most “meta-
physical” work to date, predicated on a mysterious, almost 
supernatural connection between its two protagonists. At the 
same time, however, notwithstanding a visual style described 
by critic Jonathan Romney, in a review for Sight & Sound, 
as “luminous, numinous, and ominous,” Kieślowski firmly 
grounded his story of “irrational” presentiments and inex-
plicable emotions in a recognisable material universe. Quite 
simply, the film was a brave, unusually successful attempt to 
evoke and explore the unseen, unfathomable forces — fate 
and chance — that shape our lives as we go about our banal 
business in a tangibly corporeal world.
The overlap in the critical consensus on this issue is clear, ac-
cording to these two books published within a year of one an-
other, during 1998–99, the peak of the Kieślowski Boom, one 
might say, a few years after the filmmaker’s untimely death in 
1996, when critics had time to collect themselves from the shock 
and compose their considered tributes. (I was just out of col-
lege then, so, for me, the Dekalog did not hit home until the 
2016 restoration from the Criterion Collection, which you and 
I screened in full for my students when you visited my class in 
Richmond in 2017. We saw it projected in its full nine-and-a-
half-hour glory, on a single day, an unforgettable cinematic peak 
experience on the big screen at the Grace Street Theater. Very 
different, however, from the original viewer’s experience of the 
broadcasts!)
I think the Kieślowski Boom, in its turn, contained some sort 
of nascent recognition that materialism wasn’t going to cut the 
mustard anymore as the century and the millennium drew to a 
close. Kieślowski weights the dice in favor of religious thinking’s 
ability to cut through the warped and damaged self-conceptions 
we’re conditioned to accept by the structures of modern ration-
ality and secular instrumental industrial belief-systems that ac-
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company them. So Kieślowski, in retrospect, becomes another 
artist that presages our postsecular era and forms a generational 
bridge to the 21st century. One thing that is so fascinating about 
his work is the fundamental skepticism about both capitalism 
and communism that underlies his filmmaking methods. The 
real battles and the real stakes are elsewhere, he seems to sug-
gest. Religious thinking and art offer a rich set of alternatives 
with which to fight back against liberal market supremacy and 
evangelical reactionary traditionalism. In this specific sense, his 
films offer many potential futures in which alternatives might 
be contemplated vis-à-vis certain modern confusions over the 
meaning of love and sex, morality and law, equality and power, 
freedom and solidarity, and so on. Something like this — Chris-
tian humanism — lies at the heart of the Dekalog.
I’m confident that Kieślowski can be quoted as having said that 
there must be a deity of some kind. But I think this makes him 
feel humbled rather than exalted about the status of his art, and 
causes him to downgrade rather than praise his own work. For 
you these films feel holy. For him this might sound like idolatry. 
Art — or at least film — didn’t have that status for him. Of course, 
he might have been wrong. And maybe this attitude marks his 
work as all the more holy for you. That seems like a thoughtful 
reading to me, I don’t wish to deny it, at all. All I’m saying is 
that this is an artist whose appeal is not primarily devotional 
but rather questioning and troubled. And Dekalog is a produc-
tion that resonates deeply with believers and nonbelievers alike. 
The published screenplay of Dekalog compelled the unheard-of 
compliment of a Foreword by Stanley Kubrick, after all. Kubrick 
used to call up Stephen King when he was filming The Shining 
(1980) and ask King if he believed in God. Apparently Kubrick 
liked to hang up on King. Kubrick toyed with notions of things 
beyond our ken and deeply vibed with the irrational elements 
of humanity but he had little patience for conventional religion, 
to put it mildly. Yet here he is penning a paragraph about how 
Kieślowski and Piesiewicz pierced his heart because of the writ-
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ers’ “very rare ability to dramatize their ideas rather than just 
talking about them.” But you might turn and say that’s precisely 
what you mean by a holy film — one that can reach the zero Kel-
vin depths of the coolest of cool hearts. Fair play.
It’s almost as if Kieślowski’s films act as a kind of Rorschach Test 
for one’s one beliefs. Or that they cause us to investigate what it 
is that we really truly believe. This remains true, I think, even 
if the pictures never seem to clarify anything precisely in any 
way that distinguishes between the human experiences of the 
divine, the otherworldly, the supernatural, the spiritual, or the 
spiritualist. In fact, the more I think about it, the more spiritual-
ist Kieślowski seems, in a way that’s problematic for any ortho-
dox religious reading of his films, since spiritualism raises so 
many difficult theological questions about the nature of a deity 
who would indulge themselves in such things. Religious viewers 
who already share certain beliefs might experience Kieślowski’s 
cinema in ways that challenge those beliefs in some ways and 
reinforce them in other ways, if I can use such blunt and clum-
sy language. Put another way, this stuff is there in the films for 
those who have ears to hear. But I think Kieślowski’s real target 
is certainty about these things — the “more things” described by 
Shakespeare in Hamlet. As I see it, his is a continuation of the 
struggles in Bergman, especially in Fanny & Alexander (1983, 
another movie designed for television!).
Don’t you think Kieślowski would have delighted in this ability 
of his work to keep alternative readings in such delicate balance? 
This goes to the heart of what I value most about his films, per-
sonally, their expressions of such strong ambiguity or negative 
capability, holding, again, like the films of Bergman, both sides 
of seemingly irreconcilable polarities. Kieślowski reminds me 
how little I know, how much of what I think I know requires 
unknowing, and how there might be more things that I do not 
yet know and probably will never understand. This brings me 
back to Kieślowski’s most fundamental self-definition of himself 
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as an artist as “somebody who doesn’t know, somebody who’s 
searching.”
I’ll be glad to hear you reframe all this very differently. What 
you mean by a “holy movie” is simply going to be much more 
interesting since you are living it and following the gospel. And 
that stunning first episode of Dekalog seems to provide plenty of 
threads for you to gather up here into your own pattern. How 
do you see all this?
Notes from Your Friend JMT
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May 23, 2020, 11:23 AM
Lovely thoughts, Josh,
My one objection is the following. Whoever said that devotional 
was the opposite of questioning and troubled? Devotion is ques-
tioning and troubled, or it is not devotion.
Which brings us to your question of whether Dekalog is a holy 
film, at least for me, and what I might mean by that. I like to 
think of Dekalog in contrast to Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten Com-
mandments, with Charlton Heston and all that. I don’t actually 
want to run down DeMille’s film, which, for all its unintended 
campiness, contains tons of delightful scenes and manages to 
distill enough of that DeMille exuberance to, I don’t know, be 
something in its own right. There is one huge problem with The 
Ten Commandments, though. Its attempt to depict the biblical 
era is a complete failure if the intention was to draw us closer to 
the actual meaning and purpose of the biblical stories. I mean, 
it’s a wonderful disaster as an attempt to make art of holy scrip-
ture. 
So, I think of Dekalog as an attempt to answer the question of 
what’s actually holy about holy scripture. Or, to put it another 
way, what if anything actually matters about something as sup-
posedly important as the ten commandments? Is there a way 
that those commandments still have relevance in the late-20th-
century world? Do they make a claim on us? And what would it 
look like if they did? What kinds of stories of day-to-day Polish 
life in the 1980s would you tell if you wanted to show the root 
issues of human life and its limits? Because that’s what the com-
mandments are about, right? The commandments frame human 
behavior with a set of limits. And they suggest that the breaking 
of those limits will always constitute crisis. Coming up against 
the set of parameters that are the ten commandments means 
coming up against the very boundaries of human behavior. It is 
not, by the way, that those boundaries cannot be crossed. Even 
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in the Hebrew Bible they are crossed all the time. All the frickin’ 
time. By the very people otherwise also described as the holi-
est and most favored by God. In fact, the holiest people seem 
more often than not to be the ones who live life closest to those 
boundaries and who often overstep them. King David, for in-
stance, is a murderer and adulterer, just to name a couple of his 
transgressions. He is also, as you would put it, questioning and 
troubled. He does wrong knowing that it is wrong and is then 
torn apart by the dilemmas he has thrown himself into. Maybe 
that’s why God loves him so much. David seems to understand 
deep in his bones that being human is a problem. It is some-
thing to be struggled with. The commandments simply name 
the outer limits of that struggle, the place where the tensions of 
the struggle condense into diamond-like intensity. 
The commandments are holy because they establish the con-
tours of human life as something generally meaningful, where 
something is actually at stake, and within which we wrangle the 
specific meaning that is an individual life. God the Father, the 
author of the commandments, is simply a name to give the cos-
mic reality of this truth, a truth we don’t choose willy nilly, but 
one that is real, given to us, lived within, and met with obedi-
ence, not obedience in the stupid sense of being a robotic rule 
follower, but obedience in the sense of getting it, getting that be-
ing a human being means being in a constant tumult, a constant 
crisis of action and deliberation whereby we sort of know what 
we’re supposed to do but we have no idea how to do it and we 
are a mystery to ourselves most of the time even as we try to be 
what we think we’re supposed to be. 
And then sometimes, despite ourselves, it all snaps into place. 
And when it does, there is a kind of luminous rightness about 
the world, or other people, or our own souls, if just for a mo-
ment. We see that love is real. We know that we are cared for, 
somehow, by someone or something. And then the feeling fades 
and we are back out in the cold again. All of this is possible be-
cause there is a “not us.” Even if we don’t know exactly what 
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that is or how to define it. But one way, at least, to gesture at 
this looming and intractable “not us” is to refer to the pillar of 
the commandments as that pole around which it is possible to 
strive to be as much the human being as one can strive to be. 
You brought up Kubrick. I don’t think the monolith of 2001: A 
Space Odyssey needs to be thought of as any kind of extraterres-
trial presence in the typical sense of space aliens or whatever. In 
fact, the monolith is just the sort of looming stone upon which 
ancient cultures liked to write their laws. It looms, it hovers, it 
dominates. We ignore it much of the time. But we cannot get 
away from it. There is something real, something internal and 
external at the same time, by which we are constantly orienting 
ourselves in our struggle just to be. 
That whole set of tensions and realities and possibilities and real, 
true human struggles in the face of trying to get it right, that’s 
the material that Kieślowski is working with in Dekalog, in my 
opinion. What kinds of human stories do the “reality” of the 
ten commandments actually generate? What sorts of tragedies? 
What sorts of comedies? The movies that Kieślowski created are 
holy, to me, because of how seriously they take this proposition. 
The fact that he frames it all under the umbrella of the Deca-
logue means that he is fundamentally a religious artist, like it or 
not. The point of being a religious artist is simply the acknowl-
edgment, in this case, that the religious is unavoidable. Being 
a being of any sort, a creature, and especially being the sort of 
creature that is the human creature, is to be in the throes of a 
dilemma. It is to be pulled apart and to seek, foolishly and seem-
ingly without hope, to pull it all together. Or, to put a word to 
this struggle, to re-bind: re-ligio. 





May 25, 2020, 11:28 AM
Dear Morgan,
What you say about DeMille is interesting. I’m reminded of the 
flabbergasting opening of King of Kings (1927). After enlisting 
the clergy in the marketing campaign for the film, and lard-
ing the credits with various pieties about spreading the Gospel 
and playing a “reverent” part in the unfolding story of Christ, 
Demille opens his picture in… a brothel. The devastating Jac-
queline Logan, playing Mary Magdalene with intelligent inner 
sadness, is on display in front of an array of feasting men who 
wish to purchase her services, while she cuddles a leopard and 
a scantily-clad troupe of musicians serenades the scene. And it’s 
all in glorious color, unlike most of the scenes of the Carpen-
ter that follow. The scene is outrageous and splendid. It’s struc-
tured like this: “Jesus Christ blah, blah, blah… BOOM, BANG, 
BOMB — LOOK, HERE’S A SEX LEOPARD!”
Kieślowski’s not having any of that approach to his material, 
you’re right. Your perspective makes sense to me because the 
Dekalog’s claim on the viewer is of the “you must change your 
life” variety. And I agree with you that devotion is not separate 
from troubled questioning. I was looking back to see how I 
wound up saying something so silly. I think I wasn’t intending 
to limn the nature of devotion itself (if so, I was plain wrong) 
but rather to attempt to draw a distinction between works of art 
that demand to be read as devotional in a celebratory sense and 
Kieślowski Dekalog, which contains more free-play and ambi-
guity. Kieślowski isn’t entirely convinced one way or the other. 
I think his attack is on certainty and smugness itself, both secu-
lar and religious. That’s why I would place him, as I mentioned 
previously, somewhere between Bergman, who was haunted 
by his rejection of faith, and Tarkovsky, who was attempting to 
create parables of faith whenever he made a film. If I imagine 
Kieślowski’s heart of hearts, I see the word “hmm” imprinted 
there, without irony. I don’t think he’s a religious skeptic in any 
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pure sense but I do see him as a (post)modern follower of Mon-
taigne’s maxim, “What do I know?” 
For me it’s difficult if not impossible to reconcile the various 
modes of supernaturalism in No End, Dekalog, Double Life, and 
Blue. It’s all a little bit messy, but, like, in a profound, search-
ing way. To ask which of these films “gets it right” would be the 
wrong question in my view. The right questions for these films, 
I think, are “Is there something more?” and “What do we really 
know about it all?” and “How must we try to live here and now?” 
(Or how to die, as you have made a strong case in your previ-
ous letters.) I sense that Kieślowski is relentlessly exploring a 
subject (it goes much deeper than this intellectual-sounding de-
scription, of course, but perhaps you get my drift?) rather than 
finding a resting point in any single devotional attitude towards 
a deity to whom he feels bound, in the specific sense that you 
describe as the etymological core of the word “religion.”
Not to take away from your points, especially regarding the pos-
sibility of what you call the “not-us” and your beautiful remark 
that “being a human being means being in a constant tumult, 
a constant crisis of action and deliberation whereby we sort of 
know what we’re supposed to do but we have no idea how to do 
it and we are a mystery to ourselves most of the time even as we 
try to be what we think we’re supposed to be.” That’s a sentence 
to savor and let simmer for a long while. And not to deny your 
insight about the boundary-crossing aspects of the human ex-
perience of the Commandments, in the Bible and in the series. 
I’m reminded of Kieślowski’s strong emphasis on Jewish identity 
in the Dekalog, especially in the all-important Episode 8, about 
the Polish experience of resistance and collaboration during the 
Holocaust. One of the most basic and long-standing Christian 
misunderstandings of Jewish religious thinking involves the 
false idea that the “Old Testament” in general and the Com-
mandments in particular are to be viewed as “legalistic.” (Mis-
readings of St. Paul are involved, which I won’t get into here.) In 
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fact, as you point out, the Jewish tradition often involves us in 
the dramas of those who have broken the Commandments. The 
role of the faith community was always more about the tension 
and struggle to keep oneself within bounds. Simply put, they 
would not be needed if they were kept, and faith brings us back 
into alignment with God when we’ve gone astray.
In fact, it is Christian ethics that has always faced theological dif-
ficulties with confused believers thinking that they can do what 
they like to others because they are born again, up to the pre-
sent day. Paul tried his damnedest to develop answers to these 
problems and was frustrated by those who did not view ethical 
conduct as common sense. And it took the subtlest minds in 
the galaxy centuries of wrangling to figure out a way to describe 
the Christian faith and the worship of Jesus as somehow itself 
not a violation of the Commandment to have “no other gods 
before me.” Not to preempt our discussion of Dekalog 8, which 
we should put on the back burner for now, but that’s the episode 
where one of the most noble characters in the series wears neck-
lace ornaments featuring both Jewish and Christian symbols. 
And this is not presented in the spirit of New Age syncretism.
Part of me would like to go out on a limb and attempt a “Jewish” 
reading of Kieślowski, if I can put it that way, and to inch out 
even further on that limb by suggesting that this reading posi-
tions the filmmaker as responding to Poland’s deepest historical 
trauma. 
In any event, his challenges to ideas like Providence in parts of 
the Dekalog, especially in that opening episode, are extreme. 
David Hume would have appreciated it just as much as anyone, 
since the meaningless death of a child conveys better than any-
thing Hume’s highly annoying, brutally precise questions about 
a God who, in his view, cannot be all-powerful and all-good 
simultaneously, especially not if that God is all-knowing. Or 
that such a God as has been said to watch over this world is not 
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worth the paper He’s printed on, for Hume, given how things 
have turned out.
I’m not saying that Kieślowski shares Hume’s view, only that 
he encompasses something like Hume’s considerations in his 
drama, as well as many more perspectives besides. In Dekalog 
1, he gives his protagonist — the one who ultimately rejects God 
and topples the altar in his church — his own first name, Kr-
zysztof (played by Henryk Baranowski). But, again, with this 
filmmaker, that “move” does not mean that Krzysztof is Krzysz-
tof ’s mouthpiece. Far from it. 
The character puts his faith in a computer which calculates 
the depth of ice in the pond near their home based on current 
weather conditions. As a result, he tells his boy, Paweł (Wojciech 
Klata), that it is safe to skate on the ice when it’s not, and Paweł 
drowns. I’ve read that in the draft screenplay, an explanation 
was offered for this fatal error of calculation. An adjacent fac-
tory was pumping warmer water or waste of some kind into 
the pond, a factor not taken into the machine’s accounting. This 
emphasis on a local social problem is replaced in the finished 
film with a far more cosmic mystery, since the cause of the thin 
ice remains unknown. 
The narrative becomes elliptical when this information is re-
moved, expanding the film’s reach in a more philosophical di-
rection. All we know is that modern instrumental rationality 
has failed, spectacularly, in its supposedly utilitarian mission. 
The machine has not been of use — it has proved fatal. One must 
admit that without the computer it’s just as easy to fall through 
ice, but maybe the machine makes us arrogant in some specific 
way that leads to our destruction. Maybe we would not venture 
out, maybe we would act more humbly? Actually, I doubt it! 
There’s a spongy spot in the narrative here.
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Of course there is an equally important character in Dekalog 1, 
Paweł’s aunt, Irena (Maja Komorowska), a person of faith who 
wishes to instruct the boy in religious mystery. After Paweł’s 
death, Irena’s faith remains strongly intact while Krzysztof ’s an-
gry atheism is also reinforced. Faith is a light in the darkness 
and a solace in the storm of grief. Faith is an illusion covering 
up the abyss where grief indicates that everything is meaning-
less suffering. We’re presented with two things that are both true 
and yet cannot both be true. We must choose and yet we cannot 
choose. For me, this is Kieślowski.
When Krzysztof attacks the altar in his rage and despair near 
the end of the episode, something occurs that is either a coinci-
dence or a tiny miracle. The wax drips on an icon from a candle 
that has been knocked down. The wax hits the face of the icon 
just right so that it seems to be crying. God cries even for (or 
especially for?) those who lose their way or even lose their faith. 
Another miracle happens here — somehow, Kieślowski’s han-
dling of this moment, tonally, is beyond irony and yet not in-
tended as any definitive proof of anything. I think that is why it 
does not strike most viewers as cheesy when it really should do 
so. Yet another example in his films of something that shouldn’t 
work but does, somehow.
Actually the episode leaves a more careful theodicy intact. It’s 
not God’s job to intervene in human free will — it was Paweł’s 
own decision to go out on the ice and Krzysztof ’s choice to 
tell him it was safe. Without free will, including the most de-
structive choices or tragic accidental blunders, humanity is not 
worth anything. And yet it’s not God’s business to alter the laws 
of physics in order to prevent Paweł’s drowning, any more than 
it is to prevent volcanoes from erupting and burying cities and 
towns from time to time. Without a universe that operates on 
regular rules, everything would be so bizarre and chaotic that 
it would make things worse, not better. This comfort is cold. It’s 
theologically sound, but at a cost.
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I don’t really think that it’s Kieślowski’s intention to present this 
theodicy. I think he wants to show us the human experiences 
of Krzysztof and Irena. Krzysztof responds to the tragedy with 
anger. One could say that his atheism is escalated by his son’s 
death, but I’m not so sure. He wrecks the altar rather than walk-
ing away from it. That rage suggests he’s still in conversation 
with God, on some level, since you cannot blame someone who 
does not exist for something they did not do. God feels distant 
and uncaring in this light. This is Hume’s God, who, if He exists, 
is not worthy of our worship. We reread the Bible — or the his-
torical record — looking for clues about why God intervenes in 
one place and time but not another. He sacrifices a child — along 
with the Jews of Europe — to keep his divine attributes intact, 
but then pops up to make a bit of wax fall in a certain way on 
a painting that one time? Krzysztof ’s reaction suggests that he 
thinks God is punishing him for his atheism — for breaking the 
First Commandment, taking a computer as an idol, and ascrib-
ing omniscience to a human-made hunk of plastic and wires. 
But God cannot punish unless God exists, and this seems to me 
to be a very clunky reading of the episode. What’s horrific and 
rigorously exacting about the Calvinist insight into monotheism 
comes to the fore here. God knew that Paweł would die and sat 
on His hands. 
Irena sees the same events from an entirely different perspec-
tive, of course. Taking up Irena’s view of things and extrapolat-
ing from it, we begin to see that dripping wax as being suspend-
ed between chance and something larger. Through Irena’s eyes, 
we begin to see Krzysztof ’s anger and even his atheism — even 
the disarray of the altar after his outburst — are not something 
separate from the divine. This requires the nonbelievers watch-
ing the episode to jolt themselves into uncomfortable territory. 
God takes in all this misery and much more besides. God isn’t 
punishing Krzysztof, but in this case divinity cannot intervene. 
Why should people expect this to happen for them when no 
intervention took place on the Cross — or in Auschwitz? 
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Irena’s faith exists at a more profound level, we sense. She ac-
cepts God’s lack of intervention in the world, refuses to assign 
blame, and finds comfort in worship for what is unbearable. To 
say that something good will come out of Paweł’s death sounds 
like idiocy, and yet that idiocy is the most basic belief of the 
Cross. A deeper pattern must exist, Irena believes, even though 
she cannot imagine what form that might take. Do we see that 
dripping wax through her eyes or through his?
In this image of the face of an icon, God has accepted and em-
braced Krzysztof ’s anger and rejection. Startling thought — God 
feels that on some level Krzysztof is right, or at least loves him in 
his very human grief and his understandable inability to move 
beyond a limited understanding of the universe. Atheism and 
even the hatred of God is encompassed by the divine. Yes, athe-
ism is divine — we know this because so many ardent atheists 
are such lovable, ethical people. They care too much to worship, 
although we don’t know what they really believe in their heart of 
hearts on any given night, sleepless, alert, worrying about those 
they love, at 2am.
The ultimate thought, often ascribed to the early Christian the-
ologian Origen, is that, given a long enough timeline, all will 
be saved, eventually, even the Devil. And certainly, long before 
that, good people like Krzysztof. To me this is the truest truth of 
Christianity, even though it was regarded as unorthodox if not 
heretical. Perhaps we’re given an inkling of this “secret minis-
try,” as Coleridge calls it in a very different context, in the small 
coincidence of the icon that cries with the help of one who is 
rebelling against God. But it’s up to us to repair the world after 
the unthinkable happens. If God did this for us it would hold 
no value. 
Obviously I’m drifting into heresy but I think that the episode 
is also questioning the First Commandment itself. Is it really 
necessary to have no other gods? Why? Is science really a god? 
Do we really worship science as a false idol, or is science some-
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thing else entirely? Is it really necessary for the First Command-
ment to come first, before the prohibition against murder? Why 
would God care if we worship, what we worship, or how? Does 
God intervene, and, if so, why, when, how, and for whom? If 
not, why not? Does God play favorites, as so many who worship 
believe to be the case? What’s the story of the story here?
I haven’t mentioned the Artur Barciś character, yet, who reap-
pears throughout the Dekalog in various guises as a kind of an-
gelic observer figure. In the first episode, this nameless figure 
is there weeping from the very beginning, if I recall correctly, 
sitting by a fire in a sheepskin jacket near the pond. He knows 
what’s about to happen and yet he’s fated only to observe, not to 
intervene. That makes him a little bit like the television viewer, 
and a little bit like an emissary of a very “hands off ” divinity. But 
this idea is as disturbing as it is comforting, at least to me.
Notes from your friend JMT
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May 26, 2020, 11:07 AM
Dear Josh,
I remember having an argument with you about Dekalog 1. 
Maybe we were in the car. I think it was on the way back from 
Richmond after we’d done the one-day screening of Dekalog you 
mention in your letter. Anyway, it was one of those pointless 
arguments we get into sometimes where neither of us are budg-
ing and your stubbornness and monomania starts to get deeply 
under my skin and my wicked tongue gets the better of me. 
Plus, I suspect we were both exhausted and sort of burned out 
and bamboozled from the all-day screening and the intensity 
of those films. Dark energies were released, for better or worse. 
I bring it up because you had it in your mind to deny that Deka-
log 1 is in any way about the fact that the son dies because the 
father is worshiping a false God with his computer and his cal-
culations and what-not. I mean, you refused to acknowledge 
that this has anything to do with the film at all. This drove me 
nuts and I kept trying to force you to accept that this is, indeed, 
what happens in the film. 
Of course, you were nuts. That is obviously the basic structure 
of the film and the obvious way in which the film is a dramatiza-
tion of the First Commandment. But the more I think about it, 
the more I appreciate your resistance to that interpretation of 
the film and the more I think you are right that the film can’t 
really be about that. I’m coming around to your point of view. 
One thing about Dekalog 1 is that it just breaks my heart. Some-
where early in the film you start to feel in your gut that the kid 
is going to die. But you can’t believe it will really happen. Later, 
you can’t accept that his is the body dredged up from the pond. I 
suppose the genuine grief evoked in this film is some of the most 
potent grief to be found in any film that I know of. It is estab-
lished in those short scenes in the beginning of the film where 
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the boy interacts so wonderfully with his father and so power-
fully with his aunt. There is so much warmth in those scenes. 
It is intolerable that this boy is going to die, that Kieślowski is 
going to kill him. I still feel a residue of anger toward Kieślowski 
for doing that. He is the heartless and evil God in this case. How 
could he have done it? How could he have taken our Paweł away 
from us?
I sort of hate Dekalog 1.
If it is simply the case that Krzysztof is being punished for his 
false worship by the death of Paweł, then God is evil and we’re 
done. Full stop. We are in an evil universe. God is a monster. 
Get out of this shitshow however you can and as fast as you can.
But I think you are right that this has little to do with what the 
film is actually exploring. What if the First Commandment is 
not really a commandment in the traditional sense at all? What 
if it is more like a statement of certain conditions. More and 
more I am convinced that in reading scripture, any kind of 
scripture, holy writings, you have to be as loose and flexible and 
creative in your thinking as are the texts themselves. You have to 
play, up and down the register and with leaps and shifts all over 
the place. Where’s the poetry of the text actually taking us? And 
might not another work of art, like a film, often be better able 
to search out the unthought elements of the scripture than any 
traditional form of exegesis? 
What if the point of the First Commandment is that it is show-
ing us something about the tragic structure of the world, the 
universe? You shall have no God before me is not a threat or a 
potential punishment. As you say, it is kind of strange when you 
look at it that way. Why is God so jealous, so petty? But when 
you look at it as the poetic revelation of a state of affairs, the 
situation changes. God is saying that there is no way out of the 
bind. Life will proceed, in part, tragically, no matter what we do. 
No lesser God, i.e., no other technique or skill or mastery is go-
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ing to shift us out of that basic condition. Anankē, Fate, rules at 
a higher level. There are things that are simply going to happen. 
God the Father is not a being in the universe looking over the 
situation and deciding whether to intervene or not. Not really. 
That’s just a metaphor and a rather clumsy one at that. Useful 
maybe here and there. But a very limited and mostly not useful 
metaphor. The metaphor that the First Commandment suggests 
is more like the thoughts of Anaximander and other Presocrat-
ics. Again, call it Fate. Call it Moira, call it Anankē, call it God 
the Father. There is a Way Things Are and Will Be that thwarts 
and resists every other force, that is somehow beyond the pos-
sibility of being fully contained, constrained, reined in, what-
ever. The locusts will come. The plague will come. Ours is not to 
control that fact, but simply to deal with what happens once Fate 
has sent whatever it has sent. The First Commandment names 
this force, names this state of affairs. You will have no other God 
before me means that in the last instance Fate will have its way. 
There is no because here, no why. It isn’t the punishment for 
anything. It isn’t something you can change or amend. 
Sometimes, Paweł will die. 
This is a tragedy in the full sense of the term. There is no way to 
out-think it. There is no way to make sense of it. Fate cannot be 
outmaneuvered. That doesn’t mean that we throw up our hands 
and consign everything to Fate. There are different forces in the 
world and there are nine more commandments. Life is governed 
by many gods. But the God of Fate is the most terrible Face of 
God. 
Or something like this. Do you see what I mean?




May 29, 2020, 12:52 PM
Dear Morgan,
Fair points all round in your letter, although my own memories 
focus on the wonderful things, like the undergraduate audience 
for our Dekalog screenings who brought their sleeping bags and 
pillows to the last few episodes as midnight approached. But 
sometimes a good fight over a film is clarifying. Heaven knows 
that my own household has been in a long-running… conver-
sation… about von Trier in which I have been utterly routed 
and defeated for my idiocy many times over the years. That said, 
may all our future cinematic disputes be agreeable ones, salud! 
What’s notable to me is how much films matter, full stop.
It’s funny how stupid ideas (I mean mine, not yours) can be il-
luminating sometimes. Obviously, Dekalog 1 reveals our faith in 
modern science and rationality to be a form of idolatry. But, 
I stand by my blinkered, dunderheaded assertion that Paweł 
does not die because of Krzysztof ’s worship of a false god, that 
wonderfully strange green-screen 1980s personal computer that 
cannot answer any of our deeper questions about dreams, mys-
tery, love, and, yes, as you say, fate. Like our minds, which are 
infinitely more complicated by comparison, the machine simply 
doesn’t have enough wires and cannot make sufficient connec-
tions due to its lack of information — and wisdom.
This reading means that Krzysztof is not being punished by a 
jealous, ridiculous, petty, capricious, and vindictive god, as you 
rightly note. Instead, it’s simply this: What must happen must 
happen. (And not “whatever will be, will be.”) I like your take on 
the Presocratics in this regard, although I don’t know enough 
about that to comment. Avidly reading through your letter a 
second time, I also wonder if there is a perspective beyond the 
tragic. I believe so, much as I admire and respect your point of 
view. I cannot account for this belief, which might not even be 
a belief in the strict sense, but, rather, feels more like a personal 
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temperament or mood. Maybe because I’m so prone to severe 
depression I need to cling to this belief, but I do not mean to 
protest too much, since you might feel differently, and for very 
good reasons. We cannot see everything sub specie aeternitatis, 
which apart from everything else requires zooming out too far 
from personal tragedy (and joy) into a remote galactic view-
point that can seem way too cold and distant. We can try, but 
this might involve traveling in the wrong direction.
Dekalog offers stunning leaps of compassion about all of these 
fraught situations in which we find ourselves as the collective 
residents of this same tower block of apartments in the city we 
all share in various overlapping ways. However, the series re-
quires a challenge to the First Commandment itself, since that 
Commandment tends towards anthropomorphizing the divine, 
risks corroding God’s all-goodness, and creates a confusing, su-
perficial impression of a worst-of-both worlds deity who talks 
out of both sides of their mouth in Dekalog 1. So, on some level, 
we’re supposed to believe that God is simultaneously condemn-
ing an innocent child to death without lifting a finger to help 
him, and then sending Artur Barciś to cry about it in his sheep-
skin, and, finally, daubing a bit of wax on a painting to mark a 
gesture of grief? This makes no sense whatsoever. So I can see 
why you hate the episode, since on the surface it seems to por-
tray God, if God exists, as being unworthy of worship. Again, this 
is different from atheism, although more atheists fall into this 
category than you might think.
One of the more interesting takeaways from the resentful and 
irritable classicists who study early Christianity, like Robin Lane 
Fox, in his book Pagans and Christians (1986), is that Christian-
ity altered human subjectivity by shifting the blame for tragedy 
away from the gods, and their chaotic conflicts, and towards 
individual or collective sin as an all-encompassing explanation 
for why bad things happen to good people. And the concept of 
tragedy cannot be used as a political cudgel for justifying inac-
tion in the face of (or, worse, passive acceptance of) oppression. 
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Historically this feels like a valid critique and it helps to explain 
why we’re supposed to blame ourselves for things that aren’t our 
fault, which is one of the more toxic legacies of our canonical 
tradition. Ironically, this way of structuring experience and au-
tobiography is one that most secular folks fully and unwittingly 
embrace as well: We got cancer because we ate too much pizza 
or didn’t drink enough kombucha; we’re wrong ’uns if we don’t 
jog; being fat or sick or depressed or crazy is a moral failing; etc.
This worldview is based on a very limited idea of the divine and 
a poorly grasped conception of how God, if God exists, might 
or might not reveal their divinity or operate within people. And 
Jesus himself wasn’t ecstatic about some of the interpretations of 
the First Commandment, either. Where Jesus got into trouble 
was when he broke the Sabbath and then denied doing so — in 
short, he was accused of breaking various Commandments. In 
Matthew 22, the Pharisees try to trip up Jesus by asking him 
about the “greatest commandment.” Jesus cuts through the knot 
of the question by reading the First Commandment as insepara-
ble from what’s now called the Great Commandment:
Master, which is the great commandment in the law?
Jesus said unto him, thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all 
thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.
This is the first and great commandment.
And the second is like unto it, thou shalt love thy neighbor 
as thyself.
On these two commandments hang all the law and the 
prophets.
This departs productively from the ideas about having no oth-
er gods and about graven images in the Decalogue. And Paul 
chimes in on a similar note in Galatians 5, claiming that the 
whole of the Law is fulfilled in the sentence “love thy neighbor 




Jacques Derrida wrote an interesting book, The Gift of Death 
(1992), connecting Kierkegaard’s reading of the story of Abra-
ham and Isaac to this seemingly intractable tension between 
loving one’s neighbor as oneself and having no other gods be-
fore God. I think Derrida respects the conundrums and para-
doxes we are discussing, noting that the seeming contradiction 
between these two directives drives a lot of religiously motivat-
ed violence (as well as the mutual contempt that often marks 
exchanges between believers and non-believers, I might add). 
Derrida offers a potential way in to the aporia that seems to ex-
ist between these Commandments. He formulates an alternative 
maxim worth consideration, and worth the definition of good 
philosophy, in my view: “Every other (one) is every (bit) other.” 
This is not mere linguistic gymnastics or deconstructive soph-
istry, I don’t think. Instead it’s a borderline postsecular assertion 
that we might attempt to encounter in others their radical oth-
erness (normally reserved for God) rather than smashing their 
faces in (in order to serve God). Since in life, unlike in the Bible, 
no angel ever arrives to stay our hand when we slay or attack 
another person, we must attempt to stay our own hands.
Does the First Commandment truly help us to do this? Not a 
rhetorical question.
This, then, is not the God of Bob Dylan’s “Highway 61,” who 
demands that a father sacrifice his son and then notes, in a rath-
er cavalier adaptation of Biblical texts, “You can do what you 
want, Abe / but the next time you see me comin’ you better run.” 
While the events in Dekalog 1 don’t take up any clear parallels 
with the Abraham and Isaac story, the father-son relationship 
and the death of the son at the hands of a Moloch-like false god, 
Krzysztof ’s computer, seem to blend these stories and sources 
together somewhat.
Another intriguing dimension — perhaps the most intriguing of 
all, in a way — is that the computer sometimes acts like a sub-
stitute mother for Paweł, but one that fails its motherly duties 
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by not keeping him safe. It gives him poor “advice,” one might 
say, while his real mother is too distant (in another time zone, 
and already asleep when Krzysztof and Paweł are querying the 
computer about dreams) to help him. Some of the same or simi-
lar questions get posed and reposed in various ways throughout 
the series: What’s a family, what’s a mother, what’s a father, and 
whose child is whose? What’s missing from this world is a moth-
er (in the widest possible sense, and with an attempt at aware-
ness of the dubious gender dynamics involved in making this 
claim). Not the cult of domesticity but rather the associations 
with fierce protection of children and especially the tending to 
the dying and the dead, as in the New Testament and classic 
mythology. 
Irena knows this and does her best for her nephew Paweł, but 
her scope of action is limited. Her grief offers an alternative to 
Krzysztof ’s anger, one grounded in faith. Her tears parallel those 
of the Madonna with the wax dripping from her eye, and those 
of the Artur Barciś character as well. Tears are not the end-point 
for her, we trust, but rather the beginning of a process of at-
tempting to repair the world. Beyond the traditional limits of 
gender, this process feels like mothering to me, if I may put it 
that way.
What I am trying to ask is, can we change fate (to use your term)? 
Does our limited conception of fate blind us from what might be 
possible? How do we square the circle of God’s omniscience, if 
God exists, with human free will? If the faithful gather together 
with the faithless to create change for the better, is that foreseen 
or preordained? If the faithful or the faithless destroy others and 
themselves, does that have something to do with their beliefs, 
in general, or the First Commandment, in particular? Believ-
ers express their faith that God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and 
all-good, but these three attributes appear to be irreconcilable, 
not only between themselves but also as reflected in the world. 
I say “appear” for a reason, because our brains are too small to 
understand. At least mine is… .
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The future is everything and I cannot know if it already exists 
or what that might mean, even. I do recognize and respect that 
faith is not faith if the outcome is certain — or known — to us. It 
is the opposite, on every possible level, of operating a computer 
program, I imagine. So what we mean by omniscience, omni-
presence, omnipotence, and all goodness is, equally, severely 
limited. In particular, our ideas of divine goodness are probably 
puny at the best of times, since God, if God exists, and if God has 
these attributes, is the ultimate player of the long game. Maybe 
it’s all about God’s faith in us rather than our faith in God? 
These paradoxes are too complex for me. I am utterly defeated 
by the equations of general relativity and the concept of space-
time and the full implications of Spinoza’s remarks about “god 
or nature” as “one being,” or “by reality and perfection I under-
stand the same thing.” I retreat in abject failure from these scat-
tered notes with an even deeper awe in the face of the Dekalog’s 
ability to ask all these impossible, vital questions. To think that 
Paweł isn’t real and didn’t die! Wojciech Klata, the actor who 
portrayed him, just a few years younger than us, remains alive 
and well. He’s roughly our age. I just read that he acted in both 
Schindler’s List (1993) and Boys Don’t Cry (2000).
Fate, blind chance, destiny, double predestination, happen-
stance, coincidence, serendipity, kismet, synchronicity; the 
lucky and the cursed; one’s lot in life versus the triumph of death; 
the work of the sisters of the fates and the daughters of night (es-
pecially Lachesis) — proceed with caution, guided by any name 
you prefer. I recognize that these words and the concepts and 
the stories and ideas associated with them are not at all identical 
by any means. But all of them seem relevant to Dekalog 1 and 
perhaps even more so to Dekalog 2, don’t you think?
Notes from yr friend JMT
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June 3, 2020, 11:07 AM
Dear Josh,
But Paweł did die! Paweł is real. I watched him live and die again 
just the other day. That some guy named Wojciech Klata is still 
alive is no consolation to me.
Anyway, the last few lines of your letter do indeed spill nicely 
into Dekalog 2. I’m digging the idea that each of these films is a 
riff on the Ten Commandments as specific aspects of the divine 
encountered in actual life. Dekalog 1 is the way that we encoun-
ter the hard side of fate. The world will be the way that the world 
is and there are limits, hard limits, to our ability to alter this. 
Some things are unalterable, in short. That’s all well and good 
to say in the abstract. But what does it actually look like? How 
does it actually feel? Dekalog 1 gives us that look and feel. It’s the 
rough edge of life as tragedy, tragedy not just as a bad thing that 
happens, but a bad thing that must happen. Life is full, actually, 
with this aspect of the divine. It is one of the deeply non-serious 
sides of modern life that we have little chance simply to lament, 
to recognize that no one is really at fault, to surrender to the big-
ger forces that govern all life and to acknowledge that the arena 
in which we do exert any control or choice is actually quite a 
small one. In this, the ancient peoples probably had it right. The 
first Commandments are the Commandments that stress our 
lack of power and control. It is only in the later Commandments 
that we come into the realm of human autonomy, which is a 
limited and provisional autonomy at best.
Right now I’m seeing the Second Commandment (don’t take the 
Lord’s name in vain, in the Catholic numbering) as a kind of 
slightly softer version of the First Commandment. But the point 
here is still about control, about authority and sovereignty, is 
it not? There’s a kind of usurping that is going on in taking the 
name of God in vain. One ceases, basically, to take God seri-
ously. You use the name of God, the idea of God as a tool or 
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a weapon to get what you want. Here, one has lost the fear of 
God. But it is important to fear God, to fear the absolute vi-
brating totality of the Big Other, that which completely outstrips 
our possibility of grasping, understanding. This is the God of 
the Tetragrammaton, the name that cannot be spoken, the God 
Who Is Who They Are, whose face cannot be looked upon, who 
is the burning of the burning bush and the whisper that comes 
to Elijah. This is some shit that, shall we say at the very least, 
cannot and should not be taken lightly. These are the mysteries 
of name and identity that govern the highest things and, for hu-
man beings, tend to arise around matters of life and death and 
of mourning and grief and therefore also around birth, coming 
to be and passing away.
It is interesting that Dekalog 2 deals with all such issues. And it 
deals with them according to an essential mystery, a fear and 
trembling before the question of who gets to live and who gets 
to die. I don’t wish, actually, to pull apart the specific plot points 
of the film and try to explain them. Because I think the greatest 
strength of the film is that it conveys a kind of mood, a mood in 
which we are in the very presence of Death and therefore also of 
Life. The fact that Kieślowski managed to capture that little shot 
of the bee circling around the rim of the cup and almost falling 
to its death. May we say, just for a minute here, that that bee is 
one of the best actors in the entirety of the whole Dekalog se-
ries? She’s clinging onto the handle of the spoon and almost falls 
into the liquid jam like three or four times, just toying with us. 
That bee, she has an amazing sense of drama. I don’t know the 
degree to which Kieślowski manipulated the bee in that scene, 
or how many times they tried to get her in and out of the jam. 
But there is only so much coaching you can give to a bee. You 
probably know more about the backstory of the bee than I do. 
But this, to me, is the genius of Kieślowski’s filmmaking and the 
degree to which he is a person of faith. That’s to say, put doc-
trines aside. This is a man who has faith that the world will do 
what the world does and that his films will be provided for. The 
bee will come when the bee needs to come. Roberto Rossellini 
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is another filmmaker who comes to mind as having this kind of 
faith. Get out there with the camera and more will happen than 
you could ever have dreamed. The film will almost make itself. 
Or it will be made. It will be made through your willingness to 
let it be made through you.
This very idea of how to make a film is tied up with the les-
son of the Second Commandment. You cannot take hold of the 
name of God and use it for your own purposes. No, the name of 
God works in and through you. It makes you, you don’t make 
it. Here we are again in the realm of Thea Moira, the very Thea 
Moira that Plato names as the agent of creation in the Ion dia-
logue, which was, it ought to be mentioned, the very dialogue 
that Shelley most responded to in his attempt to explain what it 
going in the act of poetic creation.
The doctor in Dekalog 2 is another character who, for very damn 
good reasons, by the way, having to do with his own confronta-
tion with tragedy, but he’s another character who is essentially 
closed off to the force of the divine name. He is no longer a ves-
sel for Thea Moira. He has closed himself down. He is, in es-
sence, a version of the father from Dekalog 1 after the tragedy 
of losing his son. He has been deadened, closed down, shut off 
by the tragedy and the loss that has collapsed his own life. He 
no longer recognizes that, as a physician, he is in direct contact 
with the most august matters of life and death, the mystery of 
coming into being and passing away. He can’t feel it anymore. 
The events of Dekalog 2 bring him back into the realm of mat-
tering. Not control. He cannot determine fate. But he can be a 
vessel once again. He can tremble before the divine name know-
ing that forces beyond his ken are flowing in and through his 
person. 
One of the things that most moves me about Dekalog 2 is the 
extent to which the doctor subtly changes from the beginning to 
the end of the film. It is not a spectacular change. But he has sof-
tened. His hardness of heart has softened into something else, a 
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willingness to be the vessel. His eyes are softer, his face is softer. 
It is an amazing performance, actually, almost as wonderful as 
the bee! The doctor is standing outside of life at the beginning 
of the film and he is standing on the inside again by the end. 
He’s regained his fear and awe of the stupendous magnitude of 
the divine name. Without saying so explicitly, he has submitted 
himself again to the Second Commandment. 




June 6, 2020, 11:13 AM
Dear Morgan,
Kieślowski’s bee! Yes, I think it attended the Actor’s Studio and 
studied The Method under Pacino. Sorry for the flippancy, I 
think you have a good bead on this crucial turning point in the 
series as an expression of fate and the tragic structure of life. 
How do we handle the impossible situations we’re dealt? What a 
scene. After being declared a terminal cancer case by his doctor, 
a man, Andrzej (Olgierd Łukaszewicz), mysteriously gets bet-
ter after watching a bee that has fallen into a jar of strawberry 
preserves crawl out, clean off its wings, and survive. Will this 
latter-day Lazarus be made happy by his earthly resurrection? 
Or is this seemingly providential outcome being ironized inso-
far as Andrzej is rejoining a world (and a wife, Dorota [Krystyna 
Janda]) that no longer wants him? Are we to believe that An-
drzej sees a “sign” in the bee, or that he’s inspired to fight for his 
life, like the bee? Or is this simply a visual analogue to a process 
of survival taking place within and without?
The first-time viewer remains focused on the doctor character 
(Aleksander Bardini), who I don’t think is named. The doctor’s 
namelessness lends additional weight to his role as an everyman 
and leads to the reading you suggest about the Second Com-
mandment. Dorota demands that the doctor swear that her hus-
band is certain to die. All the indications point in that direction. 
She’s pregnant by her lover, not her husband, and she’s told him 
that she will cancel her scheduled abortion if her husband dies. 
If her husband survives, she does not wish to have the baby. The 
doctor, who is religious but says he believes in a “private god,” is 
left in a moral crucible by Dorota’s painful request.
The Artur Barciś character reappears in this episode as a lab 
tech or assistant in the hospital who is rendered wide-eyed by 
the events they are witnessing. Dekalog 2 also exists in larger 
networks of stories and characters unfolded later on in the se-
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ries. The events depicted here will be recapitulated as a textbook 
story in a philosophy class in Dekalog 8 as an example of a moral 
dilemma. And the leitmotif of the postal service and postage 
stamps that plays out in Dekalog 6 (also the basis for A Short 
Film about Love [1988]), and again, in a different form, in Deka-
log 10, begins here.
What amazes me about this episode and the bee scene in par-
ticular is that it cuts against the grain of Hollywood storytelling 
and its notions of what it might mean to root for the protagonist 
of a film. What the studios were producing in 1988 were box-
office hits like Who Framed Roger Rabbit?, Big, Three Men and 
a Baby, and Die Hard. Nothing against those films in particular, 
but one can see why Kubrick and other filmmakers went crazy 
for Kieślowski in this context of filmmaking at the very end of 
the Cold War. 
I mention the historical context once again because I think that 
Kieślowski is one of those artists whose work encapsulates an 
entire era. In this case, by importing the deeper concerns of re-
ligious life into Polish television (with West German funding), 
he was challenging communism in a sense that never broaches 
open warfare and which assiduously avoids any sustained po-
litical markers on the surface. However, one counterbalancing 
fact worth noting is that, vis-à-vis the moral dilemma portrayed 
in Dekalog 2, it was only during the communist era that abor-
tion was fully legalized and relatively unrestricted. Abortion is 
now mostly banned in Poland, I think, and the impetus for the 
changes in the law have been religious in their motivation. I do 
not think Dekalog 2 is primarily “about” abortion, but I also 
don’t see this as an irrelevant sidebar. 
Simultaneously, by rejecting Hollywood filmmaking as a com-
mercial enterprise in which the audience cheers on a likeable 
character to victory against the odds, Kieślowski also implicitly 
rejects the capitalistic model of movie-making. Here, we meet a 
leading woman (Dorota) who runs over her doctor’s dog, tells 
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him that she wishes she had run him over, and then corners him 
into an excruciating, unsolvable situation involving infidelity 
and abortion. Nobody is going to be “happy” in the sense prom-
ised by the end credits of films produced in Los Angeles.
Dorota is a woman of a kind that Hollywood has rarely accepted 
in any era: strong, angry, loving, and in an agonizing situation 
lacking in moral clarity. Kieślowski’s women characters almost 
always feel modern regardless of the year in which they are 
screened. Hollywood’s false idea of providence involves reward-
ing characters for making the right “life decisions,” and framing 
its narratives within melodramatic genre storytelling, so that 
the viewer is almost always certain they know what is right and 
wrong. That’s out the window here.
Kieślowski’s rejection of the dominant ideologies of his day is 
humanistic rather than directly political, but it is pointed and 
consistent. In a sense, one might even argue, without disrespect, 
that he died at the right time, in 1996, before Hollywood offered 
him a truly Faustian bargain as a filmmaker with potential Oscar 
ambitions. The evil shadow of Harvey Weinstein passes across 
Kieślowski’s later career, with Miramax acting as the distributor 
of Kieślowski’s 1990s films. Kieślowski devotees already loathed 
“Harvey Scissorhands,” without knowing anything about his sex 
crimes, because of Miramax’s grotesque interpolation of a melo-
dramatic father-daughter hug tacked on to the American release 
of The Double Life of Veronique. Wasn’t Kieślowski’s renuncia-
tion of filmmaking in the 1990s well-timed, too? It might be an 
exaggeration to read this withdrawal from movies as proof of 
resistance to the Third Way of filmmaking in 1990s America, 
but I do think it’s relatively well-known that Miramax was keen 
on producing a new Kieślowski cycle of films set in Hollywood 
involving the themes of Heaven and Hell. I’d like to mytholo-
gize the great artist as one who rejected the Devil himself (“all 
these things will I give thee…”), but I don’t know if biographical 
scholarship would bear out that hope of mine.
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My term for Kieślowski’s filmmaking would be “a cinema of un-
knowing.” Hollywood tends toward giving us the answers to all 
of our questions. It offers knowledge, information, or message-
making in pill form. If we think about Hollywood filmmaking, 
we know who to root for, we know who’s in love with whom, and 
we know who committed the series of grisly murders by the end 
of the film… . Melodramatic narrative structure requires an end 
to mystery. This is what I would call “the cinema of knowing.” 
These stories satisfy an impulse towards escape and closure, and 
we cannot expect commercial cinema to do otherwise than to 
supply what’s in demand. Of course, there is sometimes a differ-
ence between commercial cinema and popular cinema — Deka-
log, for example, was broadcast on television and probably 
reached millions of people.
We know that life isn’t really like the movies. People are mys-
terious and unknowable. Love is inexplicable, vast, cosmos-
shakingly splendid, and sometimes, tragically self-destructive. 
What about the questions that have no answers, or the varie-
ties of experience that, while common, appear inexplicable, and 
which we refer to variously as the uncanny, the supernatural, or 
the divine? These are the kinds of experiences that Kieślowski 
explored in the 1980s and 1990s. For me, these films contain 
resonances of spirituality while posing questions and presenting 
mysteries that have no clear answers — and which I don’t think 
his cinema attempts to solve. We are left to wonder, not to know. 
Instead, we are made to unknow things we thought we knew. 
Another cinema is possible, with a different relationship to nar-
rative structure and characterization.
If I call Kieślowski’s filmmaking a “cinema of unknowing,” I 
mean to gesture to the 14th-century English mystical text The 
Cloud of Unknowing, which advocates contemplating the divine 
through other means than the reifying, blundering, and clumsy, 
overrated human faculty of the intellect. God “can well be loved, 
but he cannot be thought,” according to The Cloud of Unknow-
ing. “By love he can be grasped and held, but, by thought, neither 
182
wonder, horror, mystery
grasped nor held.” (I think there’s a modernized translation of 
The Cloud that uses the word “embraced” rather than “grasped.”)
Something potentially supernatural is often going on in many of 
Kieślowski’s films, at least as many of his characters experience 
things. Geoff Andrew summarizes Kieślowski’s outlook in his 
book: 
Kieślowski belongs to the small number of filmmak-
ers — most notable are Dreyer, Rossellini, Bresson, Bergman, 
and Tarkovsky — who have attempted to explore, through a 
medium that is by its very nature materialistic and confined 
to the visual reproduction of physical surfaces, a world that 
is obscure, metaphysical, and transcendental. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that Kieślowski differed from Bresson 
and Rossellini in not being a Catholic, and from the Luther-
an-raised Bergman in not being anguished, it seems, by the 
‘silence’ of God. While refusing ever to describe himself as 
‘Religious with a capital R,’ he hated organized religion — he 
would, if pressed, admit to being ‘religious’ only in that, ‘I 
do think something exists beyond this ashtray, this glass, 
this microphone.’ […] It was, first and foremost, his ability 
to evoke those mysterious forces and our reaction to them, 
that made him one of the greatest filmmakers in the history 
of the cinema. 
According to Andrew, Kieślowski put it this way in an interview 
about The Double Life of Veronique: “The realm of superstitions, 
fortune-telling, presentiments, intuition, dreams, all this is the 
inner life of a human being, and all this is the hardest thing to 
film… .” 
A detour into Blue is in order, I think. As in Dekalog, specific 
Biblical texts inform the first film of the Three Colors. Kieślowski 
weaves the ending of Blue around St. Paul’s words from 1 Cor-
inthians about how “if I have not love, I am nothing… . If I have 
a faith that can move mountains, but do not have love, I am 
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nothing.” We all know these words of Paul from weddings, but I 
think they are worth repeating any time:
Love is patient, love is kind. It does not envy, it does not 
boast, it is not proud. It does not dishonor others, it is not 
self-seeking, it is not easily angered, it keeps no record of 
wrongs. Love does not delight in evil but rejoices with the 
truth. It always protects, always trusts, always hopes, always 
perseveres. Love never fails. But where there are prophecies, 
they will cease; where there are tongues, they will be stilled; 
where there is knowledge, it will pass away.
So love supersedes what Paul calls knowledge. Paul’s word for 
garden-variety knowledge is gnosis, which according to Biblical 
commentators is contrasted throughout his letters with another 
word, epignosis, which denotes a stronger and more spiritual 
understanding of God. The point is that there are different kinds 
of knowing.
The Cloud of Unknowing conveys a somewhat similar stance 
against intellectualization, this “knowledge” that will “pass 
away.” The modernized translation of The Cloud calls this “hy-
per-analytical” knowledge or intellect, which sounds conceptu-
ally useful if somewhat anachronistic.
Another point of contact here with Kieślowski is that both Paul 
and The Cloud remain true to Jesus’s saying that the whole of the 
Law is to love — and specifically to love thy neighbor as thyself. 
The meaning of love and its connection to one’s neighbors, to 
self-seeking forms of modern freedom, as well as to other Paul-
ine themes of trust, hope, and protection, all form key elements 
of Blue. I think this connection is worth exploring in more detail 
since the idea of “neighbors” also lies at the center of Dekalog. 
After all, it is because they are neighbors that Dorota and the 
doctor come into contact, when he encounters her smoking on 
the stairs of their apartment building. (Thank you for indulging 
me on this already long-winded sidebar, by the way.)
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In Blue, Julie (Juliette Binoche) is trying to cope with the trauma 
of the sudden deaths of her husband and their daughter in a car 
accident, which she has inexplicably survived. Her widowhood 
plays out very differently than Dorota’s presumptive (but prema-
turely assumed) widowhood, but the theme of music provides 
another point of continuity between these films, since Dorota 
is a member of an orchestra and Julie is a composer. At first 
Julie reacts to death by withdrawing from society completely. 
She walls herself away from other people, seeking freedom in 
absolute solitude, and moving to an anonymous section of Paris. 
She throws away her musician husband’s latest composition-in-
progress, an incomplete symphony for the “reunification of Eu-
rope.” We see his musical notes on the page being ground up in 
the garbage truck and assume that the symphony will be lost 
forever.
So Julie wishes to forget the past and to hide in her new apart-
ment. From her window, she sees a stranger being beaten up 
on the street but refuses to answer when he tries to escape and 
knocks at her door. He’s dragged away. But Julie gets another 
chance to be a good neighbor to a stranger in distress. She wit-
nesses a woman being threatened with eviction because she’s 
an exotic dancer, Lucille (played by Charlotte Véry). Lucille is 
also having an affair with another neighbor’s husband. It is this 
modern-day Mary Magdalene figure who stirs Julie’s empathy 
and makes her wish to reach out to the world again. Who is our 
neighbor and who is not? Who is worthy of love?
In forming a friendship with her neighbor, Julie finds her own 
self-seeking “freedom” (or so-called freedom) to be isolat-
ing, self-serving in Paul’s sense. Unlike Dorota, who appears 
doomed, Julie eventually achieves healing and rebirth through 
the process of redefining her freedom (Blue being the color of 
the French flag that signifies liberty). She learns to embrace her 
connectivity with other people. Eventually she begins the pro-
cess of finishing her late husband’s symphony, along with an-
other man who worked with her husband and who is also in 
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love with Julie. This hybrid work represents a merging of their 
artistic identities, one might say. Julie brings the music back into 
her soul, to employ a very clunky metaphor, by rejecting the 
modern, instrumental conception of freedom as self-sufficiency. 
She turns negative freedom — “freedom from constraint” — into 
positive freedom — “freedom to love.” Her victory exists as a 
bookend to Dorota’s defeat. Both outcomes in these respective 
films ring true; art provides no answers.
At the risk of trying your patience with a detour inside a detour, 
and on a much less lofty note, there are two more very intrigu-
ing and strange moments in Blue where Julie interacts — or, 
rather, fails to interact — with two people on the street. The first 
is a street musician and the second is a stooped old woman do-
ing her recycling. In Blue, the film uses editing to reveal Julie’s 
reactions to both of these people. In the first scene, Julie, sit-
ting at a cafe, notices the street musician playing the flute. He’s 
a curious figure who keeps reappearing in the film, minor but 
resonant, and, in this sense, he plays a similar role to the elder-
ly woman with her recycling. In another scene Julie finds him 
sleeping on the street. Presumably he’s a talented musician but 
also an addict of some kind that prevents him from functioning 
in the professional world. She stops to touch him rather than 
passing by — Blue is the story of a woman learning to see, hear, 
and connect with other people as part of her grieving process. 
Again, this outcome exists as a counterweight to Dorota’s fate in 
Dekalog 2.
When Julie hears the street musician, she’s inevitably reminded 
of the symphony her husband was composing before his death. 
Music connects people together — it can make a stranger into a 
potential neighbor, one might say. Adding to Julie’s emotions at 
this point in the film is an additional complication that makes 
all the difference. We discover that, in fact, she had been work-
ing all along as an uncredited collaborator on her husband’s com-
positions. What the public considered “his” music was actually 
created by coauthorship. What is the self? What does it mean 
186
wonder, horror, mystery
to say that a work of art — a symphony or a film — is “by” one 
person?
As for the second sequence, with the elderly woman and her 
recycling, with Binoche again at a cafe, Mark Cousins argues 
in his 2011 documentary The Story of Film that this small mo-
ment in Blue is one of the great moments in the history of cin-
ema. I agree. It is crucial, Cousins argues, to understanding the 
potential lying dormant in the cinema to act as what he calls 
an “empathy machine.” And empathy — if it involves the act of 
merging with another — is something we can equate on some 
level with love. To love thy neighbor as thyself, we must first see 
our neighbor, not just watch them, but truly see them as being 
connected to us, and then see all people as potential neighbors. 
Blue allows this to happen to the viewer, and later, to Julie, but 
not here, not yet.
On one level, Kieślowski might well take the opposite point of 
view from the mystical tradition, as expressed in works like The 
Cloud of Unknowing. If the goal of unknowing is to forget the 
world in a monastic setting, Blue seems to present this as a dead 
end by showing that Julie will not find what she seeks on her 
own in her little cell. Julie is no Julian of Norwich, although her 
progress involves a series of cinematic “Showings.” 
On the other hand, if the goal of unknowing is to return us to a 
deepened sense of the world and everything in it — now viewed 
from a different perspective, one of compassion — then there is 
a paradox that is worth thinking about in comparing some of 
the classic religious texts with Kieślowski’s cinema. These en-
during puzzles relate to what The Cloud of Unknowing describes 
as the “sister” paths of the active and the contemplative life. 
Julie takes the path that leads to rejoining the active life, and 
in fact the climax of the film uses her orgasmic reunion with 
her worldly lover as its resolution to the mystery of love. This is 
intercut with, among other things, Lucille contemplating a sex 
show, a mechanical and joyless facsimile of love, to be sure. In 
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some sense Kieślowski replaces Pauline love for something more 
carnal, even as he invokes its splendor and power and threads 
Paul’s text on love into the warp and woof of his narrative. Is this 
a secularized update of Paul or something more blasphemous? 
Or is it holy after all?
Julie’s husband’s music is shown being ground up into the maw 
of the garbage truck, and the old woman is just trying to add her 
bottle to the recycling bin. Kieślowski uses these miniature dra-
mas centered on trash to suggest that mysterious connections 
might exist between lives, places, and objects that most of us 
are not able to see, but which, his films suggest, are right before 
our very eyes. Very far from some exalted realm, these invisible 
webs are pointedly noticed amidst the garbage. (And Lucille is 
treated by her neighbors as if she were human garbage.) The ba-
nal is the exalted space in Kieślowski. All these people are trying 
to do is make one tiny gesture towards leaving the world a bet-
ter place, even though they themselves are clearly running out 
of time. Are we all leading separate lives, or is there something 
that connects us together, and, if so, how do we best respect this 
mysterious something that binds us together? Blue poses these 
questions differently from Dekalog.
By the end of the film Julie has returned to life and feels inspired 
to finish her dead husband’s music for the reunification of Eu-
rope. As I mentioned, it features a choral rendition of Paul. By 
means of this musical passage, Julie reaches out in three ways 
simultaneously: First, to her deceased husband by completing 
his music, and second, to the living man who has offered her 
love throughout the film, and who she has mostly rejected so 
far. Third, we see her write the words “flute solo” (“flute sol”) on 
the musical score! This is Julie’s gesture of homage to the street 
musician we saw earlier, and to the music that moved her so 
deeply, which we also heard edited together with the sequence 
of the old woman and her recycling. (That magnificent score is 
by Zbigniew Preisner, who also wrote the haunting music for 
both Dekalog and The Double Life of Veronique, in which the role 
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of music in joining together people who do not know each other 
is also reprised.)
The viewer is left to reflect on certain questions after watching 
and rewatching Blue, and many of these questions are present in 
the Dekalog episodes as well, especially this one. Are uncanny 
forces at work in the universe after all, or is everything we’ve 
seen a beautiful form of human poetry and the accidental or-
chestration of events? Is continuity after death or surrounding 
death possible? If so, how? Is there some form of divine inter-
vention, some manner of subtly inserting little annotations into 
the subtext of events and the universe for us to scry or to ignore, 
depending on our receptivity to them? Or are we witnessing 
something more like Carl Jung’s concept of synchronicity un-
fold onscreen? 
Should we seek out a secular explanation, a spiritual(ist) expla-
nation, or a religious explanation for the events that unfold in 
these fictions? I think it is valuable to note the distinctions be-
tween these three things in Kieślowski’s work, since each carries 
different demands with it, if I can put it that way. Dekalog and 
Blue, despite the radically contradictory outcomes they dram-
atize for their characters, preserve a delicate sense of balance 
between these three avenues of thinking (chance, fate, and di-
vine intervention) about what we’ve seen. The films cannot be 
reduced to one or another of these “explanations,” and that is, 
in my view, not a mistake on the part of the artist or a flaw in 
the films. By presenting Julie’s and Dorota’s narratives as fiction, 
Kieślowski doesn’t have to answer metaphysical questions about 
the ultimate nature of reality. Instead he can remain true to his 
task of searching for and asking questions.
We’re probably diverging in our basic orientation towards these 
films at this point, but, as you mentioned before, that’s what is 
so interesting about exchanging these letters, so I don’t take that 
as a bad sign, at all. Your point of view on the Commandments 
seems well-suited to Dekalog 3 and its relationship to the mean-
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ing of the Sabbath as a Holy Day. Feel free to demolish my ideas 
here before continuing, of course! But I would be delighted to 
read your response to the next episode. I think Dekalog 3 is my 
favorite of these “panels” on Kieślowski’s cinematic altarpiece.
Again, thanks for listening to such an absurdly lengthy letter! 
Once I start thinking about Kieślowski I find it almost impos-
sible to stop.
Notes from your friend JMT
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June 8, 2020, 10:30 AM
Josh,
I’ll take up the challenge of talking about Dekalog 3. I’ve noticed 
in much of the literature on Dekalog that Dekalog 3 tends to be 
especially mystifying to people because they can’t figure out 
how it has any relationship to the Third Commandment (in the 
Catholic ordering). The Third Commandment is the command-
ment to remember the Sabbath day and to keep it holy. What 
does a story about a taxi driver who leaves his wife and child on 
Christmas Eve to go on an all-night wild goose chase around 
Warsaw with a woman he’s been having an affair with have to do 
with keeping the Sabbath holy? It’s a good question.
I think of this film as a Gnostic wrangle. What I mean is this: 
given the suffering of life, given how hard it can be just to get up 
and keep doing it, day after day, the Gnostic doubt is going to 
creep in sooner or later. The Gnostic doubt is basically the doubt 
that creation is worth anything at all. For the Gnostics, the situ-
ation here on earth is so bad that we are forced to conclude that 
the creator God is a false God. Creation is therefore a mistake, a 
terrible error. And Lord that it doesn’t feel that way much of the 
time. To my mind, anyone who dismisses the Gnostics out of 
hand isn’t paying attention, or is scared to face the strange mix 
of boredom and misery that characterizes more of our earthly 
hours than any of us would probably like to admit. If there is a 
chart somewhere that accurately counts the minutes of my life 
in which I’ve known anything like happiness or contentment 
versus the opposite it is a chart I don’t ever want to see. For the 
Gnostics, then, the only way truly to be holy is to turn away 
from the falseness of the world and to commune with the spirit 
of the true God, who exists in utter and complete separation 
from earthly creation. 
Of course, the problem with this approach to God and the world 
(however satisfying it might be in various ways) is that it is hard 
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to sustain without falling into complete despair. The true Gnos-
tic, it seems to me, is always going to end up a suicide. Also, of 
course, for anyone espousing any sort of faith in the Abrahamic 
religions, the scriptures give a clear account of God creating the 
world and then declaring it good. From the Gnostic perspective, 
of course, those declarations are the declarations of the false 
God, the seriously deluded creator God, and can therefore be 
ignored. But this, to my mind, is to discard what is most radical, 
most challenging and incredible about what the Hebrew scrip-
tures propose. The Hebrew scriptures propose that God creates 
the world, the cosmos, out of goodness and love. Really? What 
in the Hell? How does that jibe with our experience, which is of 
a creation shot through with malice, selfishness, violence, ran-
domness, and the like? Ultimately, of course, there is no perma-
nently satisfying answer to these doubts and worries. My faith 
flounders on these rocks all the time. 
But what does all of this have to do with Dekalog 3 and with the 
Third Commandment? I think it centers around the issue of the 
Sabbath, the day of rest, and what the day of rest is really about. 
A time of rest is, by nature, a time of reflection and of introspec-
tion. As Genesis has it, every time God does a bit of creating, 
She also does a bit of reflecting, almost as if the two things go 
hand in hand in a kind of dance. Create a bit, step back, reflect, 
consider, go back in for some more creating, and so on. 
And God called the dry land Earth; and the gathering togeth-
er of the waters called He Seas: and God saw that it was good.
And then a bit later:
And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed 
after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in 
itself, after his kind: and God saw that it was good.
And so on and so forth. The Sabbath day, to put it simply, is just 
the institutionalization of this stepping back and reflecting and 
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seeing and declaring it good. It is the solidifying of this aspect of 
the process of creation into the rhythm of the week, as it were. 
It is a way, also, that we get to participate in the same dance of 
creation and reflection that, in the bigger cosmic sense, is the 
ongoing and infinite work of God, the work of which we are 
some small, individualized part. 
The fact that God looks upon the creation and declares it good 
is, in a sense, impossible to understand. It is one of the chief 
outrages of the Hebrew scriptures and something that more re-
alistic Middle Easterners of the time, people like the Assyrians, 
probably laughed at and ridiculed. It really is the height of self-
delusion and wishful thinking. And yet. And yet. I also think it 
is one of the most beautiful thoughts that religion in any form 
has given us. It is, in a sense, the greatest thought. The thought 
is that all this is good. This is good. Not the beyond. Not some 
other place that we can dream about in its perfection, but this 
shit right here is good. Truth and goodness and beauty are right 
here, being created and recreated all the time, infinitely. To me, 
this is either deeply true in some impossible to fully explain way, 
or we should all blow our brains out right now. Literally, right 
now. Go out, get a pistol, and blammo. These are the only two 
options. To me, much of atheism is the attempt to pretend there 
is a third way. Nope. Either there is something fundamentally 
good here, and life is a quest to touch upon that goodness, or 
else it is a vast expanse of endlessly churning misery, in which 
case the only honest move is to get out now. 
This is the dilemma, the stark and honest choice in the mind of 
Ewa in Dekalog 3 as she decides to trick her former lover into 
spending the night with her on Christmas Eve. She is having 
her own kind of Sabbath of deep reflection. She is testing God, 
which is a dangerous game. She is trying to find out if there is 
a reason to live and if Care will come her way. And she will kill 
herself if not. This is a sort of nasty thing to do, and rather unfair 
to Janusz, who has his own life, his own family, and who has not 
been warned that he will be the mechanism by which Ewa tests 
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God. But, that’s the genius of Kieślowski, for this is an entirely 
plausible modern-day scenario in which we can see the deep 
question of whether creation is good or not playing itself out in 
the actual drama of human lives.
Ewa’s actions bring both of them to the existential brink, liter-
ally. There is the scene where they are both in the car and Janusz 
decides to play a game of chicken with the oncoming tram. This 
is literally the moment in which one must choose life or death. 
The scene is amazing too in that Janusz first pulls into the path 
of the tram in a kind of frustration, almost like a game. But then 
it becomes real. I think we have all experienced moments like 
this. I wonder how many suicides actually start out this way. A 
game becomes real. Janusz veers out of the path of the tram at 
the last second. The tram is being driven, of course, by the “an-
gel” figure who appears in most episodes of Dekalog. 
I also find the scene in the drunk tank to be especially moving. 
A sadistic guard keeps spraying the naked drunks down with 
cold war. It is a difficult scene to watch. Here is a situation in 
which the coldness and the cruelty of existence, the complete 
lack of care is manifest. Finally, Janusz steps in and threatens 
the guard and stops the abuse. We understand, at this point, that 
this episode of Dekalog is not really about marital infidelity or 
romantic love. For all his failures as a man, as a husband and 
father, Janusz does have the capacity to act upon feelings of care, 
he has the capacity to give this to another human being. That is 
why Ewa has sought him out on this night above all others. He is 
going to be the mechanism by which God’s providence is tested. 
In the end, he stays with Ewa until morning. They do not resume 
their affair or engage in acts of romance. Janusz goes ahead with 
the fiction that they are searching for Ewa’s husband, knowing 
that this is not true. Ultimately, he understands in his heart, if 
not his head, that she needs him to stay and that what they ac-
tually do throughout the night is of little importance. He must 
simply be with her, physically, and go through the travails of the 
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night until the sun comes up. This is what will allow Ewa to go 
on with life. It is a small thing, but it is also the largest thing. 
This is the fragment of care, the proof that there is goodness in 
the created world, a fragment that is large enough that Ewa can 
hang the rest of her life upon it. 
So, they have shared a real Sabbath together. They have discov-
ered that life is worth living because Care is real and it can be 
trusted. They have stepped back from creation and have, unex-
pectedly, through a freezing night in the depressing city of Sovi-
et-era Warsaw, nonetheless been forced to “see that it was good.” 
I think it is important that Dekalog contain this affirmation of 
the Sabbath. Because otherwise Dekalog is a testimony of Gnos-
tic denial of the created world, a renunciation that has nagged 
at Christianity from the beginning and that nags at me. But if 
God is love then it can’t be right that creation is just a hell, a 
punishment, a mistake. And we know that God is love because 
we’ve all experienced some version of the affirmation of life and 
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Dear Morgan,
Isn’t it remarkable how much of what we call our philosophy of 
life comes from our personal temperament? One person looks 
at the image of the “deep field” of a thousand galaxies from the 
Hubble Telescope and sees a cosmic and indifferent beauty in 
which all meaning here on earth is human-created. Another 
sees God’s Creation and a kind of pattern or wisdom guiding the 
whole swirl. Still another sees nothing but black holes, cold emp-
tiness, and a grim predatory collision of dead matter. (“Chaos 
and murder,” in the voice of the inimitable Werner Herzog in his 
film Grizzly Man [2005].) I’ve known jolly hedonist materialists 
and Marxists who deny the divine yet firmly believe, without 
any clear proof from history, that a more equitable future is pos-
sible. I’ve known suicidal atheists and Catholics so bleak in their 
vision of “final things” that they’re almost convinced that this 
world is Hell itself, despite verging on blasphemy and heresy. 
Some people think of killing themselves every day, others cycli-
cally, and some rarely, or never. The idea of suicide — one of the 
key themes of Dekalog 3 — might not occur to the lucky few. I’m 
not sure it has much to do with their religious beliefs, though. I 
had a relative, a Catholic, who lent me his paperback Kurt Von-
negut novels, and, in the process, helped me to think about be-
coming a writer. He drank radiator coolant, and lived, somehow. 
If I had been able to explain the enduring good he’d done for me, 
I’m not sure that would have helped him much, ultimately, since 
people in agony and despair also lose their ability to listen to 
and see the good in themselves and others.
Certainly, though, the “problem of evil” is perhaps the puzzle 
for monotheists. Not that suicide is necessarily evil in all cir-
cumstances, that’s just the 101 theological terminology for all the 
bad stuff that can happen to people. The religious explanation 
for human suffering in monotheism isn’t always very satisfy-
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ing since it tends to impinge on God’s all-goodness (and, as you 
point out, the goodness of Creation). God knows in advance 
of the suicide’s plans and has the power to stop them, but does 
not do so. In Dekalog 3, it’s significant, I think, that the Artur 
Barciś character appears in the guise of a tram driver when the 
ex-lovers Ewa (Maria Pakulnis) and Janusz (Daniel Olbrychski) 
come hurtling towards the tram in their car. The tram operates 
like fate — its course and its schedule does not alter — while the 
wheel of the car depicts the limited free will that we can exer-
cise, perhaps? This is clunky but I’ll let it stand for now, because 
I see a dynamic at work in Dekalog 3 related to our thread of 
conversations about fate, chance, and human decision. A similar 
dynamic applies to Dekalog 4, no?
As I mentioned previously, we might need to adjust our ideas 
about God’s all-goodness in order to comprehend why one per-
son is dealt a genetic matrix of severe depression or an abusive 
upbringing that makes them feel worthless every day — and an-
other person is not. It’s not that God fails to intervene but rather 
that God’s understanding of goodness is vastly more complex 
than ours. It’s not that God “pre-approves” tragedies in order 
to allow us to make good out of bad but rather that the mean-
ing of humanity involves, on some basic level, this attempt to 
make something better. Smash up the car and the tram and we 
multiply and spread misery — this might be murder as well as 
suicide. Spend the night away from one’s wife and family with 
a suicidal ex and, despite the surface-level wrongheadedness of 
this decision — Janusz’s obvious immorality — one might par-
ticipate in saving a life or repairing a little corner of the world. 
Janusz would never think of himself as a Christ-like figure, and 
in so many ways he is not. Yet the two figures share a hidden 
trait, breaking with all expectations of proper behavior on a day 
reserved for God in order to help another person in pain. Janusz 
comforts the prisoner, as you noted, in the drunk tank when 
they are being abused, and he helps restore the taste for life to 
Ewa, but does so by neglecting his own family, at Christmas.
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It would be a cruel God that prevented either suffering or re-
demption, since this would remove much of what it means 
to be human and fully alive. It is God’s goodness — you are 
right — that, for the monotheist, is the ultimate mystery. In a 
sense, we must act in order to prove this attribute of the divine, 
and the evidence for this attribute (or lack of it) depends on our 
actions. God entrusts us with the outcome, one might say.
In any event, in Dekalog 3, Janusz does right by doing wrong, 
and by breaking more than one ethical directive, risking losing 
his marriage and his family as well as his own life in the process. 
A decent outcome for him is only possible, of course, because 
of the forbearance of Janusz’s wife (Joanna Szczepowska), who, 
in her grace, somehow knows to trust Janusz on some ultimate 
level. She’s the real hero of this story, in a sense.
As for the Third Commandment: The Holy Night of Christmas 
Eve, on which the third episode of the series is set, is, in a way, 
the Sabbath of all Sabbaths. If there is a place to mark hope for 
something better, an end to the infinite winter and its waves 
of grief and sorrow, it is here. A moment for glimpsing what’s 
worthwhile. Janusz confronts a Janus-faced night that heralds 
the advent of January and the new year as well as celebrating 
the birth of Jesus. There will be another year and a chance to 
make good, to strengthen relationships and heal our wounds. 
Non-believers understand why the birth story of Jesus needs to 
dovetail, miraculously, one might say, with the pagan ceremo-
nies involving the return of light to the world after the darkest 
and shortest days of the year. On some plant-like level, is it just 
our distance from and planetary orientation towards the sun 
that exerts so much force on our mood?
As you suggest, it’s not just a matter of rediscovering the good 
in the world and in ourselves, it’s also about releasing ourselves 
from our fantasy of controlling events. Suicide, in a way, forms 
the most desperate illusion of control, in that we select the end-
point of our life by cutting it short rather than accepting the 
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time (and the suffering, or the potential for something other 
than suffering) that has been allotted to us. And, what’s worst, 
suicide is a decision that inflicts suffering on everyone we’ve 
ever known or loved — suffering they must experience as long 
as they live, but which we do not have to experience anymore. 
Sometimes people are simply in too much pain to want to keep 
living, and moralizing about that in some abstract way would be 
ridiculous and offensive. But often suicide only makes sense as 
an act of revenge.
Yet for all this, one of the wonders of the Dekalog is seeing how 
the series undercuts its own heaviness or at least offers unex-
pected juxtapositions and surprising turns that act as counter-
points to the main narratives. In Dekalog 3, that aspect of the 
series takes the form of the skateboarding young woman who 
works at the train station where Ewa and Janusz wind up near 
the end of their orphic journey into the abyss. This nameless and 
delightful character appears only for a minute or two, and then 
vanishes from the Dekalog forever. But for this very reason, she’s 
an eternal figure who, with her skateboard and her PKP (Pol-
ish State Railways) uniform and cap, permanently marks my 
memory of the Dekalog as a viewing experience. She’s an utterly 
charming and intelligent person we’d like to know better. Prob-
ably some viewers would agree to marry her on the spot without 
requiring any additional information.
She’s a nameless “railway employee” played by Dorota Stalińska. 
Serendipities abound on Stalińska’s Polish-language Wikipe-
dia page, including mention of her intriguingly titled book of 
poems, Unfaithful Time, and a telling anecdote about the ac-
tor’s appearance “skipping rope” in front of “a Warsaw block of 
flats” in a 1984 series of photos for British Newsweek by Chris 
Niedenthal promoting the “global popularity of fitness.” It might 
be fanciful but one can imagine Kieślowski’s mind tumbling 
over this image and finding a place for Stalińska in the Dekalog 
as a representation of this image of young Poland.
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Clearly, I have a celebrity crush on Dorota Stalińska! But my rea-
sons for mentioning her role in Dekalog 3 aren’t entirely trivial. 
What’s she doing there? Why the skateboard? Certainly there’s 
a funny juxtaposition between her communist-era uniform and 
her freewheeling hobby of patrolling the Warsaw station on her 
board in order to stave off the loneliness of the bureaucratic 
winter night. What ought to be a joyless and depressing govern-
ment job suddenly springs to life with the application of an ac-
tivity that falls on the spectrum somewhere between sport and 
play. In the last place on earth where we might expect to find a 
game being played, the graveyard shift in a broken train system, 
Stalińska has created some fun by breaking the rules. There’s a 
subtle sense in which we might detect or predict the end of com-
munism in this image. The system cannot withstand such room 
for play much longer.
Some people seem to be unaccountably okay whereas others are 
stalked by misery and the constant thought of death. Again, I 
think this is a matter of temperament, even if our basic outlook 
is deeply shaped by our circumstances, upbringing, ideology, 
beliefs, and genetic inheritance. The nameless railway employee 
reminds me of the basic unfairness of our various lots in life and 
the undeniable fact that our brains contain the hand we’re dealt 
and have to play in life, even if we might be able to draw new 
cards and modify our hands, so to speak, discarding some cards 
and adding others. Some people somehow find the fun in what 
should be bleak and others manage to ruin the happiness they’ve 
built up over years in a single self-destructive moment. This is a 
basic human mystery, but one that takes on additional frisson, 
beauty, heartbreak, tragedy, and complexity if we attempt to rec-
oncile it with the idea of a divine presence that watches over us.
A tangle of mysteries regarding nature and nurture (yet another 
matrix for exploring destiny and free will)! Does this seem like 
a decent entry-point to the difficult moral quandaries portrayed 
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in Dekalog 4? Or, how do you see that troubling, daring episode 
operating within the larger series?
Notes from your friend JMT
 201
mystery
June 12, 2020, 12:26 PM
Josh,
Your most recent letter is filled with many moving thoughts, my 
favorite of which must, of course, be your extended love note 
to Dorota Stalińska. It’s true that something marvelous happens 
in that brief scene where she rides up on the skateboard. Like a 
warm Spring breeze somehow flows into the film, even with all 
the dark and gloom of the deep Polish winter. These are the little 
miracles of Dekalog, the unexpected moments and the elements 
that a more controlling sort of director might not give space to. 
You can’t imagine a more economical filmmaker, someone like 
Ozu, letting things just sort of erupt into the structure of a film 
as Kieślowski does. Not that Ozu is therefore any less of an art-
ist. It is just a different sense of what film does. A different kind 
of faith in the process.
This faith gets another strange and interesting twist in Dekalog 
4. For all the difficulties in watching many of the other Dekalog 
films (will the murder of the taxi driver in Dekalog 5 ever actual-
ly end?), there is something so profoundly disturbing in watch-
ing Dekalog 4. It is a film about incest. The scenes where the 
daughter tries to seduce her father are excruciating. But those 
scenes also contain some of the tenderest moments Kieślowski 
ever captured on film. There is a scene where the father gently 
pulls his daughter’s shirt down to cover up the skin of her back. 
It is him saying no to the sexual temptation. But it is also the act 
of an adult taking care for a child. The overlapping and confu-
sion between these two modes, sex and parenting, seems utterly 
and completely wrong and utterly and completely honest at the 
same time. Cinematically, Kieślowski pushes this awkward ten-
sion in every scene in the film. In your heart, you know that 
there is something wrong in the very first scene, where father 
and daughter are playing around at home, splashing water over 
one another as an Easter morning prank. But the play feels too 
much like flirting. It is flirting. 
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The deeper spiritual truth being uncovered in Dekalog 4, at least 
to my mind, is related to the biblical injunction to “honor one’s 
father and mother.” It’s that being human is being involved in a 
relationship of care with one’s fellow human beings that often 
demands that we act counter to what we really want, or think we 
want, or are compelled toward by the power of our desires. The 
parent/child version of this problem is the highest apex of this 
dilemma. And Kieślowski was brilliant enough to see that the 
dilemma is probably at its most confusing from the perspective 
of the child. Because once the child starts to grow up, once her 
desires change from needing the non-sexual love of the provider 
to the potentially sexual love of the adult world, where does that 
leave the previous feelings of love? Or is there ever such a clear 
divide in the first place, even in infancy? Isn’t this intense and 
sometimes all-consuming love between parents and children al-
ways necessarily mixed up with all the other feelings, some of 
them out and out sexual, that draw us toward one another? God 
is love, yes. But also God is profoundly weird, infinitely unset-
tling. So love too is weird, unsettling, disturbing. The forces that 
draw us together, the forces that make us fall into one another, 
to want one another, to want to get into one another’s bodies, 
to make the other person moan, to lick and suck and fuck one 
another, these are forces that are hard to control, hard to direct, 
hard to differentiate. And yet we are called also to do that. The 
idea, expressed in its purest form by the true libertine, that we 
cast off our “false” sexual distinctions and live in a realm of to-
tal sexual freedom is just as much an impossible fantasy as the 
misguided religious fantasy that we can somehow extricate and 
eliminate the desires of the flesh. The love that is God is the love 
that is always already mixed-up. You can care for someone in 
the tenderest way and also, in some part of yourself, want to 
fuck them into the wall or be fucked by them into the wall. 
Somehow, to be human, really and truly human, is to acknowl-
edge all of this, the strange brew of love and desire and care, and 
to come through it with the ability to make important distinc-
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tions, to protect some relationships from some forms of desire 
and to fit the right desire to the right context. That is what the 
commandment is about at its heart. The commandment is tell-
ing us that we are structured as the sorts of creatures for whom 
the experience of loving and wanting will sometimes be expe-
rienced as a crucible. It matters, therefore, what we do. We are 
not the sorts of creatures for whom desire and action are simply 
and basically one and the same. Desire does not lead directly 
to action in us. It cannot and it should not. Desire leads us into 
a murky realm of decisions. Core decisions. Crucial decisions. 
To be human is, in a fundamental way, to make distinctions be-
tween that which can and that which cannot be fucked. In a 
way, Kieślowski made a very darkly humorous move in Dekalog 
4. It really is audacious and funny all at once. He basically says 
that the secret thought behind the commandment “honor thy 
mother and father” is “don’t fuck your parents.” And so, con-
versely, also “don’t fuck your kids.” There is biological wisdom 
here, as the materialists never tire in pointing out. We are do-
ing the work of keeping the gene pool healthy in not fucking 
our own. But we are also doing the important work of salvaging 
something about love and care that cannot be reduced simply to 
biology. The social rules around screwing free us up to experi-
ence love in a richness that would not be available to us if all love 
did was to support procreation and child raising. To live in that 
world would be to live in a kind of biologically determined hell. 
But we know that there is more to life and to love than the sheer 
drives of coupling. We know it because we experience it and 
we experience it because we are forced to make distinctions like 
that initial clear distinction of making a no-fucking-the-parent/
child rule. 
And so, to me, Dekalog Four is an intense exploration of the 
way that we learn how powerful and strange love is by facing 
situations in which feelings of love and desire have become dif-
ficult and confusing. In the suffering of love is its truth. In the 
confrontation of the true weirdness of the world do we find its 
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divinity. Or so it seems to me. Perhaps you have a different read-
ing of that film… .




June 14, 2020, 1:42 PM
Dear Morgan,
Thank you for the kind words and for rising to the challenge 
of Dekalog 4, with all of its nerve-wracking and uncomfortable 
moments. When we screened that episode for my students, I 
remember hearing an audible, collective gasp of relief during 
that moment you mention, when the father character, Michal 
(Janusz Gajos), covers up the bare skin of his daughter Anka 
(Adrianna Biedrzyńska), rather than touching her. This breath-
taking effect is analogous in some ways to the queasy moments 
in Three Colors: Red when the retired judge, Joseph Kern (Jean-
Louis Trintignant) tries to flirt with the young student fashion 
model Valentine (Irène Jacob), when he is probably older than 
her own father. 
Kieślowski “goes there.” But in both cases he veers away from an 
exploitative and predatory narrative and towards what a Freud-
ian critic might describe as sublimated libidinal energy between 
generations that is ultimately transmuted into a more positive 
channeling of genuine care. This energy is the one that all too 
often turns into grotesque abuses of power when it is inappro-
priately sexualized. But that’s a perversion of its potential as a 
safe space for non-sexual friendships between genders and gen-
erations. In fact, I think both of these stories, Red and Dekalog 
4, probably only “work” in their most meaningful ways within 
a Freudian context, in terms of the influence of the “family ro-
mance” narrative in postwar 20th-century cinema. 
Kern may or may not be clairvoyant. What a fascinating and 
disturbing character, friendless, unkempt, and vile, with a look 
of uncleanliness and sick desperation about him, yet with some-
thing to offer that only Valentine seems able to discern because 
of her courage and her honesty in her dealings with him. It’s 
an open question whether he sees something in advance of the 
ferry disaster in the English Channel that completes the Three 
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Colors trilogy in such a heart-stopping finale — and brings three 
pairs of lovers together, one from each film in the series. Kern’s 
comments about dreaming of Valentine waking up contentedly 
next to a lover in a few decades make the viewer recoil at first, 
if they assume that Kern is talking about himself as that lover. 
Of course, the more attentive viewer understands immediately 
that the timeline he’s invoking makes that impossible — Kern is 
trying to tell her that her capacity for love will endure.
In reality, throughout the film, Kern has been acting as a strange 
sort of fortune-teller matchmaker-witch figure, an idea bol-
stered by the isolation of his enchanted home, constantly swept 
by ominous winds and swirls of dead leaves above Lake Geneva, 
kept company by his familiar, the wonderful (and possibly also 
psychic?) dog, Rita. But he might easily be mistaken by some 
viewers for a creepy adoptive father-figure, or an abusive older 
lover like the manipulative and exploitative puppeteer figure 
that Jacob encounters, and finally escapes from, in her “rebirth” 
near the ending of The Double Life of Veronique. The point is 
that Valentine “reads him right” by discarding her fear of Kern, 
like the ingenuous protagonist who encounters a good witch in 
a fairy tale, and benefits from their association through visits to 
the old dark house and its unsettling wonders and portals to the 
beyond. It’s Kern who tells Valentine to take the ferry to Eng-
land, putting her life in danger. One senses that he’s aware of the 
danger on some level but also that he has “seen” that Valentine 
will meet that good lover of hers on a risky sea voyage. I sense 
the tonal range and some of the subject matter (marriages and 
ocean disasters) of Shakespeare’s late romances, with Red as his 
Tempest and Kern as his Prospero.
Kern spends the film attempting to bring Valentine together 
with the young lawyer Auguste (Jean-Pierre Lorit) who lives 
across the street from her as her unknown neighbor in down-
town Geneva. If Kern has had a vision of Valentine and Auguste 
waking up together in the future, it’s an open question raised 
by the film as to whether he suggests that she take the ferry to 
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London because he knows or guesses from his eavesdropping 
on the phone lines of his neighbors that Auguste will be trave-
ling on the same boat. In fact his matchmaking contains an ad-
ditional layer of serendipity, since it’s Kern’s illegal wiretapping 
court case that breaks up Auguste’s previous relationship (his 
girlfriend meets someone new at Kern’s trial), leaving him free 
to pursue Valentine. Was this intentional or accidental on Kern’s 
part? We’re trapped here in the loops regarding free will that 
accompany all stories of psychic precognition, but, fortunately, 
we’re not given a clear answer.
Maybe Kern even knows about the storm and the disaster at 
sea that might bring Valentine and Auguste together? Certainly 
he seems stressed out about the details of her ferry ticket and 
attempts to confirm her safety in advance by calling up the “per-
sonalized weather reports” wrongly predicting sunny weather 
for the crossing. These reports, in turn, are offered as a toll 
phone service by Auguste’s former girlfriend, who, we discover 
later, dies in a yacht in the same storm with her new lover. If 
Kern does have foreknowledge of the storm, this paints him in 
an extremely dubious moral light as someone who plays with 
others’ lives, like the Old Testament God of Bob Dylan in “High-
way 61.” But the narrative is elliptical and the overall impression 
generated is that his precognition is fragmentary, which per-
haps helps to explain why he doesn’t warn the yacht-goer that 
her weather report might be wrong and why he doesn’t seem to 
know precisely what will occur on the ferry. All this could help 
to reframe the entire film in a less unsettling light by “explain-
ing” Kern’s interest in Valentine, but this is a matter for indi-
vidual viewers to decide for themselves, precisely because the 
viewer must determine what is meant by chance and what is 
meant by fate in Red, and how human decisions factor in to shift 
the matrix of the universe in ways that are unpredictable (or 
predestined, as one pleases). 
Valentine herself seems totally unphased by Kern’s creepy re-
marks, and maybe there’s something cultural or generational 
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lost in translation here about young women setting aside highly 
annoying sexual comments from perverted older men as de ri-
gueur in its day, I’m not sure. We must believe — or Jacob must 
make us believe — that she feels intrigued by and relatively safe 
with Kern in order for the film to function. Her performance 
is extraordinarily difficult and successful in disguising a sort of 
basic implausibility that makes the whole narrative tick. She is 
drawn into Kern’s eavesdropping scheme with a Rear Window-
like mixture of fascination and guilty transgressiveness (a little 
bit like Grace Kelly in Hitchcock’s 1954 film). But Kieślowski, 
and not for the first time, inverts Hitchcock’s basic plan. Kern 
reacts to Valentine’s condemnation of his illegal wiretapping 
by turning himself in to the authorities. Certainly it’s Valentine 
who’s the heroic figure in Red, trusting in love and in friendship. 
But she’s nobody’s fool and brings Kern up short, changing the 
trajectory of his life and causing him to confess his crimes.
Red contains what I would call the “spiritualist Kieślowski.” This 
drift grinds its gears against orthodox monotheism in its un-
derstanding of the potentially supernatural forces at work in 
the world that oscillate, as ever in his films, between random-
ness and destiny (and everything we do not know, but that 
is implied, by those terms and concepts). Then again, from a 
cultural perspective, that very blend of folk religion and deep 
forest witchery, intended in the most positive sense, combined 
with Catholic superstitiousness, is, itself, probably a common 
enough incoherence in popular belief in Europe in general 
and Poland in particular. Georgina Evans, in her essay on Red, 
“A Fraternity of Strangers,” suggests that “there is an invisible 
but fallible authority presiding over the world within the film.” 
This comment seems apt and yet it’s only one possible reading 
among many in exploring why, in Evans’s words, the film sug-
gests “uncanny resemblances” that are “not just coincidences.” 
Fallible gods and a host of unexplained, potentially supernatural 
phenomena, while far from orthodox, are certainly post-secular 




A long detour away from Dekalog 4, my apologies! But I think 
this, and your reading of the ethical dilemma posed by Deka-
log 4, takes us right to the heart of the matter. Once again, as 
in Dekalog 2, there is a deliberative avoidance of a silly read-
ing of the Commandments. This superficial reading would be 
to take Dekalog 4 as a reflection on the incest portrayed in the 
“Old” Testament. The literalist reading of the Bible is also called 
out here, along with the intellectually vapid and morally repug-
nant discussions regarding who slept with whom when there 
was nobody else to sleep with in order to propagate the species, 
etc. This not-very-interesting stuff is eschewed by Kieślowski 
in favor of something far more intriguing and profound. And 
that something is the nature and meaning of human liberation. 
It’s how Red connects its variations on the theme of Fraternité 
to Blue’s meditations on Liberté, by invoking the colors on the 
French flag. (This remains true even though Red takes place in 
Switzerland — albeit in Francophone territory.) The universal 
brotherhood of humanity can be reconciled with freedom only 
by invoking limits on individualism as the true path towards 
love.
So I would amplify what you’re saying here by describing true 
freedom as a series of decisions that constrain us, paradoxically 
enough, as opposed to a false freedom, based on modern con-
sumer culture, as the ability to do whatever we want whenever we 
want to. (Which is a phony liberation controlled and limited by 
selfishness and base desires rather than love and genuine com-
mitments.) In a way, much of Kieślowski’s career was dedicated 
to the utter demolition of this consumerist notion of freedom. I 
wonder if that is what makes him a quintessential 20th-century 
Pole, and a European, as well, finally, in his double skepticism 
of the American ideal of freedom as well as the Soviet ideal of 
liberation. We could cast this in more philosophical terms, how-
ever, by noting the basic difference between “negative” freedom 
(freedom “from” limits) and “positive” freedom (freedom “to” 
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decide to do something positive, even if that adds ties that bind). 
For me, this is the purest distillation of Kieślowski’s worldview 
as an artist and lies somewhere near the core of both the Dekalog 
and Three Colors. 
In Blue, as I mentioned before, Julie learns not only that love 
connects us to others by adding obligations that reduce our total 
lack of constraints, but also that this grown-up idea of love is a 
form of positive liberation. In your previous etymological ex-
ploration of the word “religion” as one that implies a “binding,” 
you dwell in the precise territory of overlap between Kieślowski’s 
ideas on love and on spirituality. This, again, is one “reason” (if I 
can use such an awkward term for the mysteries of art) why the 
ending of Blue, with its shocking joining up of sexual love, and 
side-eye glimpses of joyless sexuality juxtaposed from the strip 
club, combined with a musical rendition of St. Paul’s eternal sen-
tences about love, feels so satisfying on a deep level of yearning. 
This finale is both blasphemous and spiritual — Song of Songs 
deep. Liberation involves love, love involves binding ourselves 
to others, and to ideals greater than ourselves. Maybe even to 
things greater than secular ideals, things that are, on some level, 
spiritual or religious. If this is the case, it may be worth men-
tioning in passing, Kieślowski is also challenging the meaning 
of the Tricolor flag in another way, by registering a query about 
the secular basis of the French State.
This is all by way of concurring entirely with your reading 
of Dekalog 4. Michal and Anka, whether or not they are bio-
logically related (that is put in question, wisely, by the episode 
through the device of the secret letters about Anka’s parentage), 
are choosing to love one another as family rather than as ro-
mantic partners. And this choice diminishes a shallow under-
standing of freedom while enhancing a stronger bond than sex 
can provide and which sex would utterly destroy, along with 
their bond, wrecking both people, and both lives, in the pro-
cess. Michal and Anka are liberated by their lack of choice, and 
that’s something that you’ll never see advertised on commercial 
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television. Nor would such a drama have ever been broadcast by 
NBC in the 1980s. The reasons given would appear in the guise 
of public morality, but in fact this specific form of corporate 
censorship — harsher in its own way, at least in this very nar-
row sense, in capitalist America than in communist Poland in 
1988 — would be structurally related to this devastating critique 
of freedom offered in Dekalog 4.
* * *
On another line of thought that loops back to our previous dis-
cussions and disagreements, I think that it helps to clarify the 
intentions of Dekalog 4 by emphasizing the word “Dekalog.” The 
title of the series — and the lack of individual titles for each epi-
sode — emphasize extra-textual elements in ways that frame the 
story as fiction and pull the viewer out of total immersion in 
the realism of the story world. We search outside the text or the 
frame of the story for threads and meanings that attach what 
we’re viewing to the Hebrew Bible and the Mosaic Code (or its 
Catholic rendering). It’s an intertextual adventure leading into 
the thicket of film theory about adaptation. Kieślowski doesn’t 
exactly busy himself with breaking the fourth wall, although one 
might argue that something of that nature is going on with the 
Artur Barciś character throughout. This is more of a mild ges-
ture towards the frame of the painting that does not interfere 
very much with the illusion of its realism. It simply indicates 
that this is a story about stories in addition to being a story. 
I don’t want to overemphasize this facet of the Dekalog, espe-
cially not vis-à-vis Dekalog 4. But I do think this matters more 
to how the viewer takes in Dekalog 5. I also see this as a persis-
tent feature of much of Kieślowski’s work. I think this aligns him 
in some ways with other postwar postmodernist purveyors of 
metafiction, although his touch is far lighter and more subtle. In 
addition, Dekalog inevitably invokes the structure and order of 
narratives like James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) — modern ekphrastic 
works that “translate” or “update” some classic text to a contem-
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porary setting and derive at least some of their meaning from 
the free play between texts and eras. This facet operates some-
where in the DNA of both Dekalog and Three Colors, and it is not 
a trivial part of their meaning in my view. Kieślowski manages 
this feat without the radical formal disruption involved in high 
modernism but also without the pretentious gamesmanship and 
tedious overreliance on metafictional elements in many post-
modern works.
These relatively gentle but significant alienation effects allow 
me, as a viewer, to exist in two places at once. I am simultane-
ously inside and outside of the frame of the story. I’m allowed 
to peer into a window and spy on my neighbors in the Warsaw 
tower block, while, at the same time, I am made aware that I 
am not and have never been to Poland, do not understand the 
language, and am being presented with a series of dramas, all of 
which are a similar length, in a DVD collection of films broadcast 
on television thirty something years ago, which the filmmakers 
want me to reflect on in tandem with some Biblical texts. 
I mention this, again, not primarily in light of Dekalog 4 but 
rather in advance of discussing Dekalog 5 and A Short Film 
About Killing. Can I be honest? I cling with gratitude to these 
gestures towards self-conscious fictionality that are present in 
Dekalog 5. I don’t want to get dragged down into the abyss of 
this story without these signs pointing to what I have been call-
ing the fictionality of fiction. Maybe this reflects poorly on me. 
But I’m not sure I could bear to watch this episode over and 
over again without being reminded by the filmmakers, in small 
ways, that the events portrayed are not really happening. This 
fine-grained distinction between watching a theatrical work of 
fiction and witnessing real events in a documentary make all 
the difference to me as a viewer of Dekalog 5. These distinctions 
allow me to reflect analytically on what I’m watching rather than 
merely being pulverized by the sights and sounds of the murder 
and the execution depicted in the episode. I need this to be what 
it is — fiction. Not “just a story,” but a story.
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By saying this, I don’t mean to take away from the height-
ened atmosphere of realism that haunts the episode, or from 
the basically Chekhovian timbre that marks the Dekalog more 
generally. But I did want to check in and gauge your own re-
sponse to Dekalog 5 with our most basic critical disagreement 
about the series in mind. I think the various “visual artifacts” 
on the filtered image in this episode, and its other formal and 
intertextual elements, distort the picture in ways that make any 
easy consumption of the story more difficult. In this regard, I 
see Kieślowski’s films existing in continuity with the broader 
modernist inheritance of 20th-century visual art (in Dekalog 5, 
Expressionism in particular), even while the filmmaker yearns 
to move beyond the closed loops of postmodern metafictional 
games. And you?
Notes from your friend JMT
P.S. Now seemed like a fitting time to attach this image. It’s the 
statue in Washington, dc, just across from the White House, dedi-
cated to the Polish hero of the American Revolutionary War, and 
the architect of West Point, Tadeusz Kościuszko (1746–1817), as 
annotated by graffiti during the BLM protests, and seen through 
the metal fencing of the buffer zone created between the marchers 
and the Presidential residency. Imagine your faithful correspond-
ent, peering through the barrier.
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June 17, 2020, 11:42 AM
Dear Josh,
Well, my friend, I do think we’re gonna have to wrangle a bit 
more about this whole reality/fiction divide you keep reintro-
ducing. 
I completely disagree with you that Dekalog 5 works because 
we know it to be a work of fiction. Completely disagree. Deka-
log 5 works, to me, because it is so powerful an experience that 
we simply don’t care whether it is fiction or not, the distinc-
tion becomes meaningless. We realize that we’ve been shown 
something profound about what it means to murder someone, 
whether the state does it or whether an individual does it. We 
feel shame in the face of our own relationship to murder, our 
own complicity with the killing of other humans. Watching 
that film shakes you. It shook me. It didn’t shake me because I 
had distance from it, but because it collapsed all the distance I 
wanted to try to get from it. (The various filters of the film, to 
me, heighten the power and immediacy, since it is quite often 
the case that the most traumatic things we experience are expe-
rienced in a kind of fog). I want to run away from that film and 
I can’t. I will never forget, for example, the look on the lawyer’s 
face when he goes to visit the condemned young man in prison 
and his utter helplessness as he watches the horrifying execution 
unfold. Those are the images in the film that make it unforget-
table. The human conversations in the film, the story that the 
condemned kid tells about his sister being killed, those are what 
are burned into your brain once you’ve seen the film. 
To watch Dekalog 5 and then to be told that people in Poland 
watched the film and then wanted to abolish the death penalty 
is to believe such a thing possible (whether or not the film actu-
ally influenced the Polish moratorium on state killings). It is to 
believe that the otherwise impossible is completely plausible. I 
can’t, off the top of my head, think of another film like that. The 
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point is that the film demands something of us. You can’t just 
watch it and go on with your life. I mean, you can, of course. But 
you can’t. It is a film that reaches into your soul and seriously 
fucks with it. Why does it do that? How does it do that? I don’t 
know and in a sense I don’t care to know. Because I think the de-
sire to “figure out” how the film manages to rearrange one’s soul, 
to see the film as a “film,” is really the desire, in the face of fear, 
to mute that power, to gain some distance from it and to get out 
from under its thumb. I think one million film students could 
remake that film shot for shot and none of those films would 
match the power of the original for the reason that the cour-
age and the audacity and the humanity of the film would not be 
there in the same way those things are there to be seen on the 
screen, digital or analog or however it is presented, every time 
that Kieślowski’s film is shown. Why is that? Totally mysterious. 
Unexplainable. But I have no doubt that this is true. 
The proviso that this is “fiction” and we get some distance from 
the experience by knowing that it is “fiction” and that this is dif-
ferent from “reality” smacks, to me, of wanting something to be 
so and of simply positing a hard ontological divide where one 
does not exist. Some of the aspects of “fiction” that you claim 
differentiate it from “reality” are, I would say, just as much fea-
tures of that so-called reality. Being inside and outside of an ex-
perience at the same time. This happens to me walking down 
the hallway going to the bathroom. All of a sudden, I’ll be struck 
by myself observing myself as I walk, or whatever. By the same 
token, I have noticed thousands of times that the way I actually 
behave, things I say, ways I hold myself, attitudes I actually take 
toward others, these have all been lifted wholesale from novels 
I’ve read, movies I’ve seen, etc. My life is every bit as much a “fic-
tion” as a book by Victor Hugo or a movie by Alice Rohrwacher. 
What I am trying to say is that everything is real. Everything 
is Real. This is maybe a flip on the typical accusation against 
po-mo thought, the accusation that postmodernism claims 
everything is a construct, everything a text, etc. In a sense, yes. 
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But flip that around. The more interesting thought is that every 
object in the universe, a dream, a mailbox, a neutron, a song, a 
wombat, a quasar, a pain in the leg, stone, a movie, they are all 
Real. The killings that happen in Dekalog 5 are fundamentally 
important. We who have been a part of those killings, we who 
have faced those killings, we have been changed forever by those 
killings. Living through those killings is as inextricably a part of 
my life as are the first time I kissed another person on the lips, 
or held the hand of a loved person for the very last time, or any 
number of singular and powerful events that have changed me 
in the course of my life. 
What is the point of any of this, what is the point of watching 
any film at all or engaging with any piece of art unless we are 
brought, somehow, to a deeper engagement with the world, 
with ourselves, with God in doing so? Thus the seeming para-
dox between the highest commandment being to love God and 
the simultaneous injunction that we love our neighbor. It isn’t 
actually a paradox at all. To love God, truly, to get what that 
means is to realize that one must love one’s neighbor. Theory 
and praxis are collapsed here. They are just two different ver-
sions of the same thing. It isn’t that one thing, God, is Object 
A over there and the other thing, Object B, is the neighbor and 
therefore there could be some inherent conflict between loving 
the one and loving the other. It’s that a true understanding of 
God is seeing that God is the truth and beauty of the neighbor 
who therefore must be loved. The two just flow right into one 
another. It is kind of the same thing in watching a truly true and 
beautiful movie. Watching a film like Dekalog is not some sepa-
rate thing that I can choose to apply to reality or not. It already 
is reality. Watching the movie has already served to reshape and 
recreate what reality is. That’s why it matters. I’m not quite the 
same person after watching Dekalog, if I’ve really watched it. I’ve 
been converted. My soul has been affected. And one clear thing 
is that after watching Dekalog 5 I have deeper access, because it 
is not intellectual access, but what I’m going to call soul-access, 
experiential access. I now have this deeply and profoundly expe-
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rienced sense that the act of killing, in whatever cause, is simply 
horrifying. That truth is now like a wound on my soul. I’m not 
going to be able to uproot that wound in the same way that I can 
talk myself out of an argument. Because the wound hurts and it 
burns and it has a reality (there’s that word again). 
So, Kieślowski has done an incredible thing here. He has taken a 
potentially empty formula, thou shalt not kill, and he has turned 
it into a form of experience that literally changes your life. If 
that’s not God’s work, I don’t know what is. Here, in the film 





June 18, 2020, 3:34 PM
Dear Morgan,
This is a productive disagreement that illuminates the work of 
art we are exploring together from different sides, and I’d like to 
think that we are like two mountaineers attempting to summit 
the same peak from different trails. I appreciate your notes on 
cinema’s unusual medium-specific ability to reach into our lived 
experience and to become as real a part of our lives as many 
other memories. Too true. Certain novels might have a similar 
effect, but great movies do something to our wiring that is prob-
ably unique. Dostoevsky’s The Idiot (1869) probably has an anal-
ogous place in literature, and, in fact, a somewhat similar core 
idea to the Dekalog, as an “updated” Biblical story set amidst 
contemporary life. But obviously there are things The Idiot does 
that aren’t possible on television, and vice versa. I think the 
Dekalog is worthy of that company.
And, yes, like The Idiot, the Dekalog is a work of fiction. Ac-
knowledging its fictionality does not reduce its power, in my 
view. Starting from this fact, one attempts to reckon with how 
it operates, not only in terms of cinematography, acting, script, 
lighting, a lunch for the production cast and crew, and so forth, 
but also as it relates to something far less mechanical and far 
more mysterious. In this irreducible aspect — the one I suspect 
we are both attempting to describe in our own ways — resides 
something important and basic about the nature of art. Yours 
is the mystical path and mine is the analytical one, it would 
seem, at the moment. (Maybe, later, I could attempt to reconcile 
those two paths through a discussion of the Buddhist concepts 
of emptiness and Buddha-nature, but let’s stick with Kieślowski 
for now and not risk confusing the issue or getting sidetracked 
in things not directly related to the series.)
I imagine I must be worried that your approach obscures some 
of the operational facets of the work of art while you’re anx-
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ious to protect the mystery around things which cannot be 
known — why we make art, or why we worship divinities, or 
bury our dead, or wonder about chance and fate, or create con-
stellations and stories about the stars, rather than not doing 
these things. You be you. Our viewpoints might not be reconcil-
able. That’s okay. Interesting, even.
For me, the powers of horror in these films that link art with 
abjection and catharsis (to use Kristeva’s terminology from our 
previous conversation about von Trier), rely on their status as 
fiction and performance. In the extended scene of the execu-
tion from Dekalog 5, as it is presented with slight variations in A 
Short Film About Killing, the condemned man, Jacek (Mirosław 
Baka), defecates as he’s being hung. Including this element of 
horror in the film version is a faithful act of realism, as wit-
nessed by the lawyer-character, Piotr (Krzysztof Globisz), that 
not only permits the audience access to things rarely screened 
but also conveys the truth of what happens during a real hang-
ing. This speaks to the power of the fiction… .
And if this is true of the execution scene, it is also true of Jacek’s 
murder of the cabbie (played by Jan Tesarz). In fact, it is only 
because of the application of a ruthless and rigorous realism in 
the fictional story, contrasted with the artifice of the cinema-
tography, that the murder is portrayed as it is, horribly slow, 
messy, brutal, and devoid of any of the “virtues” that the cinema 
has ever lent to violence. In particular, it’s the elongation of the 
scene that allows the viewer to recognize the truth about how 
difficult and horrifying it would be to kill someone.
Dekalog 5 and A Short Film About Killing allow us to recognize 
that all of the cinematic violence we’ve been watching for our 
entire lives in mainstream commercial Hollywood films is fake 
and probably has a pernicious effect on its audience. But this 
doesn’t make Kieślowski’s films non-fiction, of course. In fact, 
Kieślowski made a lot of documentaries early on in his career, 
and then abandoned the form altogether, in part because of 
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his recognition that the truths he wanted to uncover needed to 
be told in fictional stories, and in part because he intuited that 
documentaries were not free from fictionalized elements that 
made real people into performers, in specific ways that made 
Kieślowski uncomfortable with the ethics of documentary film-
making. This shift in his work mattered to Kieślowski.
Acknowledging a work of fiction as fiction does not diminish 
its power or downgrade its status as a vessel for truth-telling, 
for me. Our feelings about it are real, of course. And the film 
itself is real, I agree! I very much like your idea about the real 
existence of the film as something that is not separate from the 
rest of the world. Once seen, we carry Dekalog 5 or A Short Film 
About Killing with us for life. They cannot be unseen. We might 
not ever see the world the same way again. Certainly this should 
be true for any hypothetical proponent of the death penalty who 
watches them, especially a Christian (or “Christian”) promoter 
of State executions, or really any proponent of just (or “just”) 
violence. These films also have the power to alter our basic con-
ceptions of what the cinema is, or, rather, what it is for.
Your reaction to the episode shows your large-hearted capacity 
to feel what the artist wishes you to feel as a result of encoun-
tering their fiction. I feel it, too. I feel a strong sense of humil-
ity — almost awe, in this case — in the presence of a work of 
fiction with these powers. But I appreciate the episode/film all 
the more, not less so, for its categorical status as fiction, and for 
Kieślowski’s deliberative decision to create fiction and not docu-
mentary. This fact about the work of art doesn’t leave me cold, 
although it does leave room for analytical distance. This dis-
tance, again, is not bad or good, it’s simply an expression of the 
spatial arrangement of the cinemagoer sitting there in relative 
safety, absorbing fictional events on a two-dimensional screen, 
and thinking about what they’ve seen.
One curious intertextual sidebar here involves Kieślowski’s sur-
prisingly strong interest in the films of Hitchcock, especially in 
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Dekalog 5/6 and A Short Film About Killing/Love. Mark Cousins 
demonstrates a connection between 5/Killing and Psycho (1960) 
in his section on Kieślowski in The Story of Film. There’s a visual 
rhyme apparent, when the cabbie stops his car to allow some 
children to cross the street, with the scene in Psycho when Mari-
on Crane (Janet Leigh) stops her car and exchanges glances with 
her boss as she’s leaving Phoenix after stealing the money from 
work. Cousins goes on to suggest that the sensationalized (and 
sexualized) frenzy of violence in Psycho’s shower scene is delib-
erately undone by Kieślowski’s murder scene, with its truthful 
lack of speed and absolute denial of audience titillation. Am-
plifying on Cousins’s remarks, one might also suggest that the 
Fifth Commandment is being directed here against genre film-
making. Thou shalt not kill — even in the movies — unless that 
fictional killing shows the audience what real killing is “about.”
A similar set of rhyming scenes seems to occur between Dekalog 
6/A Short Film About Love and Hitchcock’s Rear Window. It’s 
not simply that there’s a peeping tom character (Tomek, played 
by Olaf Lubaszenko) possessed of an unhealthy obsession with 
spying on his neighbors, and one neighbor in particular, Magda 
(Grażyna Szapołowska). It’s also that Tomek pieces together a 
“story” about Magda based on watching what amounts to a “si-
lent film” (albeit one seen through a telescope) about her life. 
What’s more, both films turn the tables on the voyeur by having 
the watched become the watcher (and vice versa) at a key mo-
ment when the spying is called out and these parallel lives begin 
to mix. That startling moment in film history when Lars Thor-
wald (Raymond Burr) trains his gaze on L.B. Jefferies (Jimmy 
Stewart) — and, according to the editing plan of the film, on us 
as a moviegoing voyeurs — is echoed when Magda confronts 
Tomek’s gaze.
Here again, Kieślowski seems intent on inverting and subverting 
Hitchcock’s tendencies towards melodrama and his addiction to 
genre fiction. In Rear Window, the trajectory of the story hur-
tles toward the solution to a mystery — Jeffries and Lisa Carol 
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Fremont (Grace Kelly) solve the murder case unfolding across 
the way. Their voyeurism is validated, in some sense, by the out-
come of the film, which ends with the mystery solved and the 
couple together. Dekalog 6 and A Short Film About Love proceed 
in just the opposite direction, with Magda visiting Tomek after 
he has attempted to kill himself out of shame. If I recall correct-
ly, the film version differs from the series in offering narrative 
prolepsis and a circular story, beginning with Magda attempting 
to touch Tomek’s bandaged wrist, then returning to that mo-
ment of physical proximity near the ending. 
Either way, the male gaze represented by Tomek — the one that 
dominates film history in general and Hitchcock’s movies in 
particular — has taken a big hit at the hands of Kieślowski. In 
her classic 1975 essay on this subject, Laura Mulvey describes 
how we’re often watching men watch women in movies. We’re 
said to experience a double pleasure of sexualizing the women 
onscreen and identifying with the quest of the male protago-
nist in their own romantic and/or sexual pursuit of those same 
alluring women. Kieślowski turns both of these assumptions 
of classical cinema on their head, inducing in the viewer deep 
discomfort while watching Tomek watching Magda, and chal-
lenging the voyeuristic observation of her sexual encounters by 
revealing that she knows she’s being watched. All of this culmi-
nates in Magda’s sexual humiliation of Tomek when he finally 
gains access to her apartment, when she causes him to ejaculate 
prematurely in a way that utterly destroys the oppressive struc-
ture of male romantic desire. But nothing is ever simple with 
Kieślowski. It isn’t just that his film punishes what Hitchcock’s 
film rewards. It’s that the audience unlearns an entire way of see-
ing — vision as domination and control — at the base of “visual 
pleasure” in commercial cinema (if not modern male sexuality 
itself). Tomek perhaps might be consoled with Magda’s contact 
in the final analysis, but given his attempted suicide it cannot 
really be said that he is rewarded for this painful insight.
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Hitchcock confessed the limits of his filmmaking bag of tricks 
to François Truffaut in the 1962 conversations that became the 
book Hitchcock/Truffaut (1966). Hitchcock worried that his 
films were too limited by their reliance on popular genre con-
ventions and he regretted that he had not experimented more. 
That might have been nothing more than a polite generational 
tip of the hat to what the French New Wave already had been 
able to accomplish in terms of its range of form and content 
by the early 1960s. But this remark also speaks indirectly to the 
manner in which many later filmmakers have productively con-
fronted Hitchcock’s legacy regarding gender and sexuality in a 
mixed manner of homage and deep criticism, from Antonioni 
in Blow-Up (1966) to Truffaut in The Bride Wore Black (1968), 
Brian DePalma in Sisters (1972), Kieślowski in Dekalog 5/6, A 
Short Film About Killing/Love, and Red, Almodóvar in All About 
My Mother (1999), and Lynne Ramsay in Morvern Callar (2002) 
and You Were Never Really Here (2018), to name only a few ex-
amples from each decade.
Antonioni and Kieślowski seem linked in their critiques of clas-
sic cinema and the whole notion of what a “mystery” entails. 
Antonioni scholar Frank Tomasulo employs a useful term, 
“epistemological quests,” for the filmmaker’s modernist manner 
of overturning Hitchcock’s insistence on tying up loose ends, 
ensuring that the audience is never confused about the solution 
of the crime, and using the detective genre as a mode of sto-
rytelling that bolsters the audience’s impression of a rationally 
constructed universe that can be detected by the detective fig-
ure in the story and the viewer of the film. (Vertigo [1958] is an 
interesting counterexample, one might argue; one which clearly 
influenced The Double Life of Veronique.) Instead, Antonioni 
highlights those things which cannot be known. He presents el-
liptical narratives in which important explanations for events 
are removed from view, and, more generally, represents human 
nature as a puzzle without any solution.
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Kieślowski’s filmmaking methods are less modernist or experi-
mental than Antonioni’s, and he tends to proceed in a far less 
aggressively radical storytelling mode, but I think he favors this 
idea of an epistemological quest. Here, the real mystery veers 
away from plotting and dwells in the characters, the investiga-
tions of which never really conclude and do not reach any stable 
ground of comfortable knowing. We end Dekalog 6 and A Short 
Film About Love without feeling that we know what’s in store for 
these characters or even why, precisely, they acted as they did. 
Maybe they themselves don’t know, either. If A Short Film About 
Love is, in fact, a short film about love, then are we left feeling 
that we know what love is or means? We’ve explored some of 
what it means to Tomek and Magda, and, in the process, learned 
of love’s existence, power, and basic necessity to the desire to 
keep on living. This is a lot already, and very far from nothing. 
But if we feel that we still don’t know what love is, exactly, that 
also speaks to the effectiveness of the film or the episode. We 
have continued a process at work throughout the series, one of 
unknowing a number of things we might have thought we knew, 
in this case about love.
There’s yet another interesting intertextual tension underlying 
Dekalog 6 and A Short Film About Love that you might be moved 
to explore further. In the Catholic rendition of the Decalogue, 
it’s adultery that is in question here, of course, but in the Hebrew 
Bible, the Sixth Commandment is the one we’ve been discussing 
so far as number five, “Thou shalt not kill.” Tomek’s attempted 
suicide takes on a double meaning, then, insofar as it might ex-
ist in the interstitial area between these two Commandments, 
no? This brings up another subject that might be worth your 
time and consideration. There’s a general critical consensus that, 
just as the Ten Commandments are not considered separable, 
the Dekalog is not limited to exploring one Commandment at a 
time. But, assuming that you agree with this drift, how do you 
see that more holistic approach operating within the framework 
of the series, both in terms of individual episodes and the whole 
collection of these stories? Is the word “Commandment” itself 
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unhelpful at times or potentially confusing to the person at-
tempting to live by these directives? Or I am asking the wrong 
questions here about these two critical episodes and the expand-
ed films that exist in parallel with them?
Notes from your friend JMT
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June 23, 2020, 3:10 AM
Dear Josh,
Productive disagreement! Yes, indeed. And please know that 
I’m not insinuating that you have a “cold” approach to watching 
films or confronting art. You are many things. You are not cold. 
I would like to talk about fiction just a little bit more and then 
add a thing or two about Dekalog 6. As a rough and ready tax-
onomy of stuff in the world I would say that it makes perfect 
sense to talk about fictions and non-fictions. Obviously, the way 
that characters “exist” in a book is different from the way that 
you and I exist right now. Still, at a certain point it gets fuzzy, 
since the very word “fiction” goes back to the Latin verb fingere, 
which simply means “to form” or “to shape.” We can understand 
how a work of art is something formed or shaped, literally or 
figuratively, in the act of making it. This kind of object could 
then be said to have a different ontological status than the stuff 
that is, let’s say, given to us without such deliberate forming or 
shaping. A tree, for instance, is a non-fiction while a novel is a 
fiction. But I hope you can see that the division already seems a 
little bit shaky here. Isn’t the tree formed and shaped as well, by 
Nature, DNA, God, whatever? 
Do you see the point here? What I’m trying to dispute is that 
calling something a fiction or a non-fiction gives us a handle on 
whether one thing is more real than another thing. I’m resisting 
the pull to create levels of reality. I want to avoid saying that real-
ity is one thing (and what is that, exactly?) and fictions, books, 
movies, etc., are then secondary reflections or byproducts of 
that primary reality. You said you were attracted to the idea that 
a movie is a real thing in the world. Great. But a corollary is 
that we must abandon the claim that the stuff that happens in a 
film didn’t “really happen” and the stuff that happens to you in 
“real life” (but again, what is that?) really did. Again, all of it is 
real. So, I’m suggesting that we put away the ranking of reality 
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and that we put away the idea that a fiction is “less real” than 
anything else.
What fiction is, though, and here we can probably find some 
common ground, is different from other stuff that is not fiction. 
The real object that is a movie kills people in a different way 
than, I don’t know, an electric chair kills people. You are, in a 
sense, allowed to kill people in a movie. The way that people 
die in a movie operates and functions with its own set of rules. I 
don’t personally want to say that deaths of persons in movies are 
less important than deaths of people in other ways, and I don’t 
want to say they are less real or didn’t “really” happen. Again, 
we’ve flattened the ontology when we’ve said that everything is 
real and that movies are real objects in the world. So, we can’t 
say that one set of deaths is more real than the other. Also, it is 
worth pointing out that killing and death are just as prevalent 
in movies as anywhere else. And we have just as much choice 
in confronting, witnessing, observing, and being around killing 
and death in day to day life as we do in movie life. The sense of 
some detachment, some reflective distance, and even some po-
tential cathartic pleasure that we can get in being part of death 
and killing when it comes to movies is, I’ll agree with you, part 
of the structure of what makes fiction an interesting part of the 
world and an arena that has its own special set of rules, effects, 
experiences, whatever. I just want to resist calling that somehow 
“less real.” 
And I also therefore don’t want to say that movies are only inter-
esting insofar as we can relate the lessons or the ideas or the ex-
periences in movies back to “real life.” Again, watching a movie 
is, in itself, an experience of real life. It doesn’t need to be related 
back to anything else. It is already what it is. That’s why I like 
your idea also that Dekalog 5 is very much, maybe even centrally 
about killing in other movies, or about the problem of killing 
when it happens in movies. I’m not saying, by the way (I’m not 
completely crazy!) that watching a movie about killing doesn’t 
affect us in all sorts of ways that relate to other aspects of life. 
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But the most powerful aspect of Dekalog 5 might be the degree 
to which it establishes quite powerfully that killing and murder 
in movies is, indeed, a real thing. Dekalog 5 takes a dim view of 
movies that try to have it both ways (using killing to give us a 
thrill but ultimately only a cheap thrill, as you describe so well in 
your last letter). The drawn out, excruciating murder of the taxi 
cab driver becomes an explication of what it would mean to take 
seriously the idea of killing someone in a movie. I don’t know if 
it causes us to take life more seriously. But it sure as hell forces 
us to take movies more seriously. 
Thinking this out a bit, I’m suddenly pleased with the idea that 
the whole of Dekalog can be seen as an arena where the Ten 
Commandments are seen as actually governing the kind of mi-
ni-world that a film can create. What if the question hovering 
over Dekalog as a whole is not so much “how can movies illus-
trate or explicate the Ten Commandments?” but rather “what 
effect do the Ten Commandments have on a movie?” What hap-
pens when you inject the Ten Commandments into the filmic 
reality of a few apartment blocks in Poland in the late 1980s? 
The effect is that the various Commandments change the films. 
They give the films a particular flavor, a set of problems, a moral 
dilemma, whatever it is in each particular film. Again, it is not 
that the film is tackling the Commandment, it’s that the Com-
mandment is bumping into the film and transforming it as it 
does. Somehow this thought is very pleasing and revelatory to 
me as I write it down. I suppose this is partly because, as we 
both agree, looking at Dekalog as a series of explications of each 
of the Commandments just seems dumb and not at all what 
Kieślowski was doing. 
Anyway, if we go along with this way of thinking for just a min-
ute more then we come to Dekalog 6, which is a pretty great ex-
ample of a film that tries to deny the very premise that watching 
a film is just some passive process of watching. There is really 
no such thing as “just watching.” The watcher of a film, just like 
the voyeur in Dekalog 6, is always being affected, determined, 
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changed by the thing being watched, whatever it is. Since all 
things are real, including films, being affected by a film is just 
as much a real encounter as being, I don’t know, hit by a bus, 
though the one is generally more physically injurious than the 
other. There is no safe place to “just watch.” And the kid in Deka-
log 6 actually knows this, which is an interesting turn around. 
He’s actually more willing to be hurt, to be wounded, to be af-
fected by other people than the woman that he initially treats as 
someone simply to be watched as an object of desire. And it is 
his honest and naive desire to watch as a way to be transformed 
and to be in genuine contact with something other than himself 
that awakens the woman too. So, this is a film about the fact that 




June 24, 2020, 12:28 PM
Dear Morgan,
Your insights unlock the episode really well for me. As I men-
tioned awhile back, the critic Roy Armes published a paperback 
in 1974 called Film and Reality. In this book, Armes argued for 
a threefold distinction regarding the cinema’s connection with 
reality. First, there’s a relationship between film and life that also 
applies to realistic fiction films. Second, there’s a component 
of genre filmmaking that speaks to the way in which narrative 
structure and deep storytelling captures larger patterns of life 
and culturally specific markers at the time these films are made, 
and that feel to their contemporary audiences real and truthful 
(or not, as the case may be). And then, third, and perhaps most 
interesting of all, there’s an element to experimental, surreal, or 
formally disruptive films that causes us to question what reality 
is, what it means, or what it might be, and how our perceptions 
and notions about reality might be open to question.
What’s remarkable about the Dekalog is that it accomplishes 
all three of these things simultaneously. Kieślowski presents us 
with ultra-realist images, like his unfakeable bee crawling out of 
the jam jar, then supercharges the dramas of his series by weav-
ing the Commandments into the cultural fabric of its storytell-
ing, and, finally, causes us to experience wonder and horror 
about the possibilities that uncanny, divine, or mysterious forces 
might be at work in the ordinary world. Isn’t the cab driver from 
Dekalog 3, Janusz, also the figure who narrowly escapes death at 
the hands of Jacek in Dekalog 5, because of something we could 
either label as chance or fate, with all that the latter term implies 
for religious believers? You know, I think the colors in Three 
Colors operate in a similar fashion, exploring all three levels 
of cinematic “reality” limned by Armes. While there are many 
things in the world that are really blue in a way that a camera can 
record, the steady accretion of blue colors throughout the film 
Blue indicates both that the story relates to the larger collective 
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narrative of equality implied by the symbolism of French flag 
and that the arrangement of all these blue things in Julie’s uni-
verse may not be entirely random after all. Something or other 
might be guiding the whole symphony of blues — and human 
lives. The world might have different rules than we thought.
So, yes, the Commandments seem to be operating on multiple 
levels in the Dekalog. They help to bring us deeper into the psy-
chological realism of the fictional world by raising impossible 
ethical paradoxes for the characters. At the same time, they 
cause each story to resonate beyond its individual characters 
into larger patterns of the collective unconscious of Warsaw in 
the late 1980s. And, in addition to all of that, they hint at things 
which exceed the conventional limits of the secular world as it 
was defined by the official ideology of the Polish State, in which 
its residents clearly have lost their faith. This overall effect also 
may well be medium-specific to film and television insofar as 
Kieślowski touches on the basic ambiguities or aporias of film’s 
seemingly obvious relationship to reality, which is in fact in-
credibly problematic, and the medium’s inevitable fictionaliza-
tions, which are endemic and inseparable from cinema as an art 
form. As you seem to be implying, correctly in my view, fiction 
and nonfiction are more deeply intertwined than many would 
like to imagine. Indeed.
Sidebar: It also might be worth noting that the real antidotes 
to the oppressive “war on truth” at issue in our own era are not 
only, as we are constantly told, more facts, better fact-checked 
facts, and so on, but also must involve better stories, better told 
stories, and stories that are better than the ones provided to us 
by liberal newspapers, reactionary pulpits, and the entertain-
ment thrill-rides of the culture industry, most of which merely 
promote and reproduce capitalist subjectivity in various forms 
and promote a set of dubious individualistic and selfish if not 
hateful and abusive or exploitative values shared by these sup-
posedly conflicting political camps.
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The Dekalog pushes us to ask ourselves what stories we live by, 
and how the stories we tell ourselves make life matter more, not 
less, if they are working well and if they are good stories. The 
Commandments, the symbolic colors of the French flag, the sto-
ries of Jesus, and the Buddha, etc., can be twisted into bad sto-
ries or they can be expanded into good stories, one might sug-
gest at the risk of stating the obvious. These good stories provide 
something akin to what the poet Wallace Stevens called “the 
idea of order.” They save us from the fake freedom of not having 
a story and potentially liberate us in providing points of contact 
with narratives that can help to guide us when we’re lost. For the 
European West, the Commandments provide the ultimate in re-
ligious storytelling while the French flag offers the ideal of secu-
lar iconography. I’m sure I’m not the first person to notice this 
intriguing fact about the larger trajectory of Kieślowski’s career 
arc from the 1980s and 1990s as he moved from one place to the 
other and offered communist Poland a deep-dive into religious 
storytelling while presenting liberal France with a fundamen-
tal challenge to the story of a secular state. And all without the 
heavy breathing of clumsy politicking in his art.
Your reading of Tomek’s larger role in the series as a stand-in for 
the audience feels fitting, albeit in the most intriguing and prob-
lematic way, since that idea puts the viewer in the position of the 
sick puppy who is nevertheless capable of giving and awakening 
(I like your word here) love. I agree that, as you put it, there’s no 
such thing as just watching the Dekalog. I would add that the 
Artur Barciś character’s silent witnessing throughout the entire 
series puts a similar question in a slightly different, more cosmic 
light, casting the emissary of the divine as a moviegoing observ-
er who is also a minor character in the film of life. On the op-
erational or logistical level, these characters allow Kieślowski to 
pursue realism and metafiction at the same time, which allows 
alienation effects and psychological insight to occur simultane-
ously, as in Bergman and Tarkovsky. On a more philosophical 
level, this means that we must reflect on what it means to be in-
volved in a story and to consider what makes for a good story or 
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a bad story. In some ways I really do think it is as blunt a choice 
as that, even if my words here are very clumsy.
And then there’s this thought — a deeply conservative, nagging, 
troublesome thought — that keeps recurring as I watch these 
stories. The potential in Christianity for good stories does not 
always involve good outcomes, at least, not down here, not now, 
not yet. Christian compassion, when its most basic truths are 
unlocked, is unusually attuned to suffering, misery, and the lives 
of marginalized people, of course. One good story of Christ in-
volves a tragic noble failure and one good story of Jesus’s follow-
ers is that of a grieving band of outcasts and nutters (all of us, 
in other words) trying to pick up the pieces after the death and 
disappearance of Jesus. I realize that the Biblical story unfolds 
beyond this point in some interesting ways, but I’m not sure I 
accept them. For me, at present, this is where the story ends. 
I’m not so sure the afterlife, in any form, is a good story. I don’t 
know.
I do know that I’m glad not to see Tomek and Magda tying the 
knot or entering Heaven together at the end of the episode, be-
cause those aren’t good stories. The bad stories of Christianity, 
liberal capitalism, and Soviet Bloc communism are not totally 
dissimilar insofar as they project a modern human progression 
towards happiness that is supposedly attainable (and which it 
is your fault for not attaining — suffering is due to sin). Wheth-
er that’s some easily obtainable afterlife arranged by certified 
membership in an organization that operates more like a mul-
tilevel marketing scam, or through some ultimate secular form 
of medical life-extension (a kind of Viagra for hard time), or by 
means of a revolutionary change in society whereby wealth is 
equitably distributed and the Central Committee lives on per-
petually, etc. No, everything breaks and fails. Good people don’t 
always win. One might wind up forsaken on a cross for doing 




In direct contrast, the good stories contained within Christian-
ity tell the most uncomfortable truths imaginable about how 
false and harmful these happiness-narratives can be. In particu-
lar, Christianity calls out to those in pain and acknowledges that 
their pain might not be surmountable in this life, or a problem 
to be solved, wished away, or vanished through the application 
of mindfulness seminars, or pills. We go into the darkness by 
acknowledging that misery and tragedy cannot be avoided in-
definitely, but instead need to be passed through, and may never 
go away. It’s part of the risk and danger of Christianity’s most 
honest stories to consider whether pain might be necessary, and, 
most disturbing of all, that pain might finish us off before we 
triumph over it. (Buddhism often views pain as a problem to be 
solved, and, at its most superficial, offers a bad story about pain 
as little more than a trick of the mind, but I think it, too, has a 
good story to tell in describing its first Noble Truth as suffering, 
full stop.)
Through their shared capacity to love, Tomek and Magda dis-
cover that freedom and liberation are not the same thing as love, 
and that pain, not happiness, is often the cost of loving someone. 
This is so serious that it almost results in suicide for Tomek, and 
the consolation that Magda tries to provide him and his band-
aged arms (which in turn hide opened veins) offers no guaran-
tee or even any real likelihood of future happiness. Nevertheless 
we must try to love. Not only do we have no choice in the matter, 
not really, but also we cannot attempt to become human without 
loving. The idea that loving is losing and that lovers are losers 
(and vice versa) is fundamental to the Mary Magdalene story, 
which, in a disappointing lapse, Dekalog 6 and A Short Film 
About Love reference in an unnecessarily obvious and clunky 
way through Magda’s name and her open sexual proclivities. 
This draws on an annoying accretion of mythology to which it’s 
easy to object, and which Kieślowski does well to subvert, in 
large measure, but which lies deeply rooted in European culture, 
from St. Luke’s “sinful woman” washing Christ’s feet to Hitch-
cock’s Madeleine (another name for Magdalene) in Vertigo. The 
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nobility of these characters is complex in the extreme — and re-
freshingly impolite, if inevitably problematic.
On a deeper level, however, this seemingly eternal chain of love 
and suffering, of love that binds more than it frees, feels true 
to human life on some fundamental level. It’s a good story and 
makes for good stories in which goodness is not rewarded and 
in which tragedy, in one form or another, is a train wreck for 
which all of us are ultimately headed down tracks that might 
have switches here and there but which guide our path with iron 
probability. As The Onion headline has it, the “Death Rate Re-
mains Stable at 100%.” I hope that is not the case for me or for 
you (or anyone, really) but I know that it is, and that it must be. 
That is the awful thought that seems to be inescapable even as I 
thrash around attempting to resist or deny it, and which in fact I 
find I cannot accept fully. I accept it in fiction, however, because 
it makes for good stories. This, however, is not the kind of story 
that dominates commercial fiction or filmmaking in the culture 
industry. Or in the spiritual industrial complex, for that matter, 
with its tempting promises of contentment.
How delicate, precise, and closely woven is the pattern that 
holds the Dekalog together? In attempting to describe Deka-
log 6 and A Short Film About Love here in these paragraphs, it 
dawns on me that I’m also describing much of the inner logic 
and narrative trajectory — towards specific forms of misery in-
duced by botched love, between lovers as well as parents and 
children — that haunts the bleak picture of Dekalog 7. Would 
you agree with this drift into what I take to be the interstitial 
material of the Dekalog — the threads that invisibly sew together 
the separate fabric pieces of these episodes?
Notes from your friend JMT
P.S. Some blasphemous (and, I think, incisive) street art here that 
I recorded a few years ago in Germany. It touches indirectly on 
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some of the points raised above about the problematic elements of 
the Magda/Magdalene/Madeleine mythology… .
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June 25, 2020, 10:53 AM
Dear Josh,
I’m not gonna beat a dead horse too much here, but the prob-
lem with talking about film’s “relationship to reality” as you put 
it in mentioning Armes’s book is that it still assumes reality is 
something “out there,” which film, or people for that matter, 
then have to figure out how they relate to. All the intractable 
problems of modern epistemology sort of spiral out from there. 
I’m suggesting getting rid of all that altogether. I’m not even sure 
how committed I was to this idea when we first started our ex-
change, but I’m talking myself into it more and more every day. 
Films are simply part of and partially constitutive of reality and 
vice versa. Done. No levels. No access problems. No primary 
and secondary reality. Just one big wonderful weirdness out 
there in constant contact with itself in every conceivable way. 
You claim, for instance, that I’m saying “fiction and nonfiction 
are more deeply intertwined than many would like to imagine.” 
Yes. But even more so. I’m saying that fiction and nonfiction are 
completely and totally intertwined in that they are both equally 
“reality.” That’s not to say that there aren’t interesting and impor-
tant differences between how fiction works and how nonfiction 
works. But one is not more “reality” than the other. I’m trying to 
completely flatten the ontology here. But maybe that is enough 
of that for now.
Definitely love your idea about the real question being one of 
good and bad stories, or about how well we tell our stories. I 
have been thinking similar thoughts. And yes, of course, a 
hearty yes to your description of the problem Christianity fac-
es in telling its story. To me, you are simply describing what it 
means truly to be a Christian (or, in the case of Buddhism, a 
Buddhist of the primacy of the 1st Noble Truth). I’m a Christian 
of the Cross, if I can put it that way, a Christian of the empty 
tomb. I’m deeply ambivalent about the Resurrection story. Fine 
as a metaphor, sure. But I get very nervous with all this talk of 
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conquering death. Death, to me, is fundamental. Real death. 
Not fake death, not going to sleep and waking up again just as 
you are but somehow infinitely and in heaven. No. This is silly. 
This is vampirism. There is some sense in which the dead are 
still with us, in which one must take very seriously the real pres-
ence of death, the dead, the ancestors. But this is another matter. 
The core problem of death does not go away for Christians and 
should not go away. The Resurrection does not solve it. In my 
most heretical moments I would like to imagine what a Christi-
anity without the resurrection would look like. No insipid con-
solation. Nothing. Just the hard ass Cross standing bleak as a 
motherfucker on the hill of Golgotha and the realization that 
love must be lived through to the very end. The point is that 
even in the shadow of Golgotha it is still worth it, love and all its 
wrenching vulnerabilities is still the only way. Collapse into the 
Cross and live and love and die, all ye who suffer. It is still worth 
it. It is still the only way. That’s what He showed us, say I. And 
that is why I break bread at His table. 
Dekalog is, to me, very much a document of this kind of Chris-
tianity. How that stands with orthodoxy I am not sure. But what 
is orthodoxy without heresy? The point is that both things are 
within the faith. It takes being within the faith to be a proper 
heretic.
To be a proper heretic means to propose, as you say in differ-
ent words, that love is both a solution and a terrible problem at 
the same time. It is a “solution” that only ever throws one out-
side oneself and into one catastrophe after another. Since God is 
love, and love is a problem, it would follow that God is a prob-
lem, that God must always partly be understood in the guise of 
the trickster, the satan. More heresy on my part, but, you know, 
the thought is unavoidable. Along these lines I think it is in-
teresting what you say about Dekalog 7. As you put it, Dekalog 
7 is an exploration of the “specific forms of misery induced by 
botched love.” Yeah. Or maybe not even botched love. Maybe 
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sometimes love simply sets up antinomies that are too much for 
any single person to resolve, or any family to resolve. One must 
bear witness to these stories too. One must face the situations 
where love gets so warped and tangled in upon itself that it is 
unbearable. I think you are onto something that Dekalog 7 is 
basically an exploration of this situation.
The problem, though, is that of all the Dekalog films I find this 
one to be the least successful. I don’t think we can brush this 
aside. Somehow, it just doesn’t work. And I’m still not really sure 
why. It seems to have all the elements that make the other Deka-
log films so amazing. In theory, it should be great. But it just 
plods and drags in a bad way. Somehow it looks and feels like 
an after school special much of the time. Is there a problem with 
the lighting? Do little technical matters break the spell? I truly 
don’t know. I suspect the script needed more work. Somehow, it 
is too talky. I mean, the other Dekalog films are talky. But this 
one has that kind of talking that feels like it is explaining the plot 
and the character motivations too much and that ruins it. I don’t 
know. It is such a fine line. I suppose the mystery of a bad film is 
as intriguing as the mystery of a good film.
The fact is that I don’t really like Dekalog 7 and this fact in itself 
bothers me. I don’t want to not like it. But it’s the only Dekalog 
film that, for long stretches, I find genuinely boring. I kind of 
want to pretty much ignore it for that reason, especially since 
Dekalog 8 is so amazing. Though Dekalog 9 has some similar 
problems. Of course, with Dekalog 9 I think that has to do partly 
with wanting to transition into something lighter, to add ele-
ments of silliness and humor that will then play out fully in 
Dekalog 10. But yes, 7 and 9 are problems for me. I don’t know 
if this is worth talking about or not. I mean, if you’ve got some-
thing wonderful to salvage out of Dekalog 7 I am all ears. Same 
thing I suppose with Dekalog 9. But I’m inclined to let those 
films more or less alone as examples of misses in the hit and 
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miss economy that is probably unavoidable in such an ambi-
tious project as Dekalog. 




June 28, 2020, 10:28 AM
Dear Morgan,
Reality — whatever that is — and nonfiction — whatever that 
means. The “Kieślowski” move here might be to challenge mate-
rialism by suggesting that we just don’t know if something more 
is open to us after death. In my Biblical Greek class at Cam-
bridge, as I may have mentioned before, we were taught that 
Mark was the first Gospel in chronological terms and that the 
earliest version of the text ended with the discovery of Christ’s 
empty tomb after Mark 16:8, with Jesus’s women followers flee-
ing the burial site in fear, “trembling and bewildered.” Yet that 
emptiness itself implies something more. The mystery changes 
depending on how one reads its white-robed person promis-
ing later visions of the risen Jesus and the various sightings de-
scribed after that. As to Jesus in Heaven sitting at the right hand 
of God, well, that’s not in the first version of the story. As you 
point out, the Resurrection story does not solve the problem of 
death, it only deepens it. And, yes, I see your point, it risks shift-
ing the focus of Christianity away from being a disciple of Jesus, 
in attempting to live by his words, to a supernatural theology 
focused on some other world.
But, you know, when our dear friend Matt Power died on as-
signment in Uganda as a travel writer, I definitely felt his pres-
ence afterwards. He traveled to me and comforted me by placing 
his hand on my shoulder when I was half-asleep. This might 
have been a dream, but it brought me real solace. Matt seemed 
to be suggesting that he was going to be okay, but maybe what 
that really meant was that eventually things were going to be 
okay without him. Another case. After my grandmother’s death, 
she used to visit my mother in a tattered bathrobe and call out 
to her. This tormented my mom and, as it happened, formed a 
prelude to her mental breakdown. (She’s okay now, I’m happy to 
report.) How much more powerful would a postmortem visit 
from Jesus have been for his followers? This is William James 
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territory for me. I don’t wish to discount these experiences as 
“unreal” but I have no clue what they mean. And, of course, they 
mean very different things to different people.
Kieślowski takes up the idea of the afterlife, in a deeply con-
flicted manner, in No End, The Double Life of Veronique, and, 
depending on how you read its suggestions of uncanny pres-
ences related to the protagonist’s deceased husband and his 
posthumous musical composition, Blue. In the latter, one senses 
that Julie’s husband is there in the mix of serendipity and syn-
chronicity or the divine arrangements, to use a musical analogy, 
of love. Critics describe No End as a prelude to Blue, insofar as 
it depicts a widow’s psychological journey, but also as a brutally 
critical counterweight to Blue, because of its lack of optimistic 
notes. (I think No End also contains the first of Piesiewicz’s law-
yer-characters for Kieślowski — Mieczyslaw Labrador [Dekalog 
2’s Aleksander Bardini] — who presages the studies of the legal 
profession in Dekalog 5/A Short Film About Killing and Red. The 
Dekalog is a lawyer–writer’s contemplation of the meaning of 
laws, of course, whether/why they are necessary, and what they 
mean. More on that later.) 
No End takes up precisely the problem you identify. The after-
life, if it exists, might not fix anything, perhaps it only contin-
ues our troubles in a new and disturbing form. Ulla (Grażyna 
Szapołowska), after seeing her husband, Antek (Jerzy Radzi-
wilowicz), appear to her after his death, eventually decides to 
“join him” (and to abandon their son) by taking her own life. 
Kieślowski describes the critical “thrashing” given to the film 
from both the government and the Church. One can see why. 
No End turns the conventionally religious idea of eternity on its 
head by taking it seriously. If it is a literal continuation of this 
life in another space — one the film implies is adjacent to our 
world and overlaps with it  — then it “makes sense” for Ulla to 
kill herself in order to hasten the process of her reunion with her 
husband. This is blasphemous if taken at face value, of course. 
 243
mystery
What must have upset the Church most of all was the depiction 
of the lovers happy together at the end of the film.
But it’s more plausible to view No End as a film that is less about 
morality and more about psychology. No End never conde-
scends to Ulla’s experience of her reality, with everything that 
implies, no matter how disturbing that might be to one’s con-
ventional ideas. It’s not that No End advocates for suicide and 
child abandonment, of course. This is more of an attempt to cre-
ate a compassionate account of a person who would do such a 
thing. Could such a deeply unethical decision be reframed as a 
humane story, not in terms of justification or glorification of su-
icide but rather in terms of basic sympathy for Ulla’s ultimate act 
of grief? Kieślowski’s humanism here overrides all other direc-
tives, political, ethical, or religious. I find it a deeply noble film 
that makes me want to live, not to die, and which reflects deeper 
truths about mental illness. (Not that it’s all in her head — the 
film is careful to portray another character, played by Dekalog’s 
“angel,” Artur Barciś, who also sees the deceased husband.)
We seem to be very far afield from Dekalog 7 and your questions 
about its value. In fact, Kieślowski is always circling back to the 
same themes. One of the most important of which is that our 
ideas about freedom might be illusory, or at least that freedom 
and liberation are not the same thing, and that our “life choices” 
rarely provide the autonomy we crave. Life-altering decisions 
involve us in deeper pain as often as not, and this is especially 
true when children are present. Ulla’s act of despair in No End 
is, for her, a tragic selection of her love for her husband over her 
love for their son, or, perhaps, to really enter into her maze on its 
own terms, a judgment that one needs her more than the other, 
or that she needs one more than the other. This is not wholly 
dissimilar to the tragic logic of Dekalog 7, although here the im-
possible decision is between one’s own freedom and being with 
one’s child. I take these two films as bookends because they both 
treat their women protagonists’ heartbreaking decisions, to let 
go of their children, with respect. In a sense, freedom is not pos-
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sible when love is involved, and love all too often precludes hap-
piness. We’re caught in a trap of our own devising. To quote the 
song by Felice and Boudleaux Bryant, love hurts. Child-rearing 
is not the ultimate source of meaning for these women, and this 
is an idea that challenges both capitalist and religious pieties.
In Dekalog 7, Majka (Maja Barełkowska) has a daughter, Ania 
(Katarzyna Piwowarczyk), with her high school teacher, Wojtek 
(Bogusław Linda). To hide the affair, Ania is being raised by her 
grandmother, Majka’s mother Ewa (Anna Polony), while the 
family pretends that Ania is Majka’s little sister, not her daugh-
ter. To complicate things further, Ewa was the principal of the 
school that hired Wojtek, who left his job after the hushed-up 
scandal involving Majka. Wojtek became a toy-maker who as-
sembles teddy bears in his isolated house. (The images of the 
bears provide some of the most poignant moments in the epi-
sode — he’s a manual laborer who makes things for children to 
play with, despite being separated from his own child.) When 
Majka, now an adult, decides to emigrate to Canada, she “kid-
naps” Ania and brings her to meet Wojtek, hiding out from Ewa 
while waiting for her train out of the country. Wojtek hints that 
he’s willing to consider raising Ania together with Majka in the 
open, but Ewa has forbidden this outcome because it would ex-
pose the family secret about the events of the affair at the school. 
There’s a devastating scene that unfolds on the platform at the 
end of Dekalog 7 in which Ania runs to Ewa as Majka’s train 
pulls away from the station.
I don’t find the melodrama of Dekalog 7 boring, maybe because 
it provides a little bit of a breather between the bombshells of 
Dekalog 5 and 6 and the extraordinary drama of Dekalog 8. 
Thematically, it binds the personal with the political; the cost 
of women’s liberation is reckoned with painful honesty in this 
intimate and private tragedy that bookends with the emphasis 
on women confronting public history together in Dekalog 8. I 
don’t think I could bear it if the series moved between episodes 
6 and 8 without anything between them. Dekalog 7 becomes 
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even more intriguing if it is considered as a story that blends two 
readings of the Seventh Commandment, which, in the Chris-
tian world, is directed against stealing, in the Catholic version, 
and against adultery, in the non-Lutheran Protestant context. Of 
course, it’s the stealing — the Catholic version of the Command-
ment — that resonates with Majka’s kidnapping of her own child 
(who, in turn, has been stolen from her). But Majka’s youth also 
has been stolen from her by her affair with her teacher. 
The easy — and really disastrous — plot-turn would have in-
volved the couple getting back together to raise Ania in some 
other city. Kieślowski doesn’t allow this to happen, which 
strengthens the series artistically on multiple levels, one of which 
involves taking the Commandment seriously by treating it as a 
law not to be trifled with. (Not so much as a moral law, since 
we’re not encouraged to look down on the characters, but rather 
as a law of fate, almost like a law of physics.) They — or Wojtek, 
as the adult — have violated both of its versions (adultery and 
stealing), and, therefore, they are not destined to prosper. This is 
harsh but feels true to life. Majka, despite her relative innocence 
in this situation, pays the ultimate price just for falling in love. 
This is too harsh, but, again, it feels true to life. 
The focus of the adultery (if adultery is being considered here 
at all) is not on marriage but rather on the corruption of the 
mentoring relationship between pupil and teacher. Stolen youth 
in a relationship that is irreparably damaging and desperately 
unequal. For Kieślowski, once again ahead of his time, the affair 
is never treated as a joke or a game for older men, or as a self-
actualizing liberation from social norms, but instead unfolds as 
a tragedy stemming from a mortal sin. Here the Dekalog series 
as a whole “reads” in more complex ways once the connective 
tissue between episodes is considered. If it is possible for a fa-
ther to keep his hands off a person who might or might not be 
his daughter in Dekalog 4, we might be wondering at this point 
in the series, surely Wojtek and Majka might have refrained as 
well. It’s not that we condemn them through finger-wagging, at 
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all, but rather that we come to understand their misery as an 
inevitable result of their misguided and botched attempt at love. 
They could not help themselves, and they are doomed.
There’s an intriguing reframing of the function of the law here 
that seems very much of the Piesiewicz ethos. His lawyers and 
judges, as in No End, watch human beings ground up in the 
gears of the legal system, but the response of these characters 
seeks understanding and wisdom, not judgment and condem-
nation. Viewed in a wider sense, Dekalog 7 provides hints about 
Piesiewicz’s worldview as a sympathetic observer to those who 
are suffering from having broken the law, literally or metaphori-
cally. His Christian humanism, grounded in compassion for 
sinners, takes the form of a kind of a confessor and advocate for 
the criminal element among us and in all of us. And, as a writer 
of fictions, some of which derive from his personal experience 
of Polish courts, he knows that it’s the person who breaks the 
law or wrecks their life through violating the Commandments 
that makes for the most interesting story. But I also think he has 
an “Old Testament” sense of the fated or fatal elements of laws 
whose reach guides lives to their destinies far beyond the court-
room. The law is what’s bound to happen. Moira again.
Perhaps most interesting of all, in my view, Dekalog 7 acts as a 
kind of prelude to Dekalog 8. The episode brings the element 
of family back into the picture of the series as a larger struc-
ture. The loss of a child in Dekalog 1 and the impossible deci-
sion about whether or not to have a child in Dekalog 2 — and the 
larger questions about who’s child is whose and what makes for 
a family in Dekalog 4 — need to return to the series at precisely 
this point. Dekalog 7 provides that interstitial material leading 
up to Dekalog 8, which itself is about taking care of children 
and about a process that resembles adoption. What happens on 
a personal level in Dekalog 7 is reprised at the collective and 
historical level in Dekalog 8. That element has faded a little bit 
in the onslaught of Dekalog 5/A Short Film About Killing and 
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Dekalog 6/A Short Film About Love, which are so powerful that 
they threaten to overwhelm and unbalance the series. 
Dekalog 7 restores balance by returning to the theme that used 
to be called “the family of man” (with all that is dubious about 
its universalist assumptions subject to question), and which is 
signaled by the flexible structure of the apartment complex and 
the urban environs of Warsaw as a metaphorical space that en-
compasses much more. So, my best case for Dekalog 7 (which 
probably applies equally well to Dekalog 9) is that it provides 
more than a break or pause from the devastating experience 
of Dekalog 8. It also acts like a passage in a symphony that, 
while admittedly may not be the most memorable or famous 
sequence, remains necessary for reintroducing leitmotifs from 
earlier on in the work and allows the audience to anticipate and 
encompass a more full experience of how the work is threaded 
together. If Dekalog is more than the sum of its parts, Dekalog 7 
plays a role in that idea of the series as a single work of art rather 
than just a collection of individual stories. (Dekalog 9 does the 
same in providing so many of the ingredients of Kieślowski’s 
career after the series — more on that later.)
I’m not certain whether you will be convinced about the mer-
its of Dekalog 7, but perhaps we might agree on the function of 
the episode as a preface to Dekalog 8? What are your notes on 
that all-important eighth episode? For me, it appears as the in-
timidating summit of an Everest of cinema. I am not even sure 
where to begin.
Notes from your friend JMT
P.S. Here is some chalk art I found on the sidewalk recently that 





June 30, 2020, 3:52 PM
Dear Josh,
Okay, that’s pretty good. I especially like your point that Dekalog 
7 brings the element of family life back into the picture. In gen-
eral, as I think I mentioned before, I like the way that Dekalog 
moves up and down the register of abstraction when it comes to 
“laws.” This is something that happens in the Commandments 
themselves. They treat the Absolute and the mundane both. 
You get the feeling of awe and fear that is one aspect of an en-
counter with the Divine. You also get the super-mundane, the 
super-local. Stanley Hauerwas often quotes a Jewish theologian 
friend of his who likes to say that a religion that does not tell 
you what to do with your pots and pans and genitals cannot be 
interesting. The divine is not some vague feeling. I mean, it can 
be partly that but it must also be about the tiniest and seemingly 
insignificant aspects of day to day life down to the very bottom 
(no pun intended). Makes perfect sense to me that Dekalog 7 
would shift the register in the pots and genitals direction. I still 
think it drags and plods in a bad way as a film. I still wonder 
why this is the case, given that a description of the film on paper 
would suggest that it’s no less powerful and amazing to watch 
than any of the other Dekalog films. But I’m also fine to just ac-
cept that. Maybe even the unintentional lapse in quality allows 
us, as viewers of the entire Dekalog, to appreciate the fact that it 
is, overall, such an incredible work of art. The flaws enhance the 
beauty, or some such bullshit. But maybe true.
One thought on the death of Matt Power. I completely agree 
with you. Matt Power exists. I had an experience last winter 
where a fly, a very large fly, was somehow buzzing around the 
house in the coldest weather of the year. There are never those 
big, fat summer flies at that time. For some reason I suddenly 
proposed to Shuffy that it was Matt come to visit us. I said it 
as a kind of joke, but when I said it, something shifted in the 
room. It was eerie. Shuffy became very upset. I did too. Then 
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that damn fly just stayed around and buzzed and visited us for 
days, weeks. He wouldn’t go away. I have no doubt that there 
are tons of psychological explanations for our transference of 
Matt qualities onto the fly. The point to me, though, is that his 
existence is so real, so powerfully in-the-world, even though he 
is dead, that his presence can now manifest in all sorts of ways. 
Matt is dead. But he still exists. On the other hand, saying that 
Matt is a fly also brings up, inevitably, the real things that were 
lost with the death of Matt. One of the things that made Matt, 
Matt, was that stupid incredible shit-eating delightful smile of 
his. You can’t separate Matt from that smile. It was him in so 
many ways. I have a little picture of him on the bookshelf in 
my bedroom. That smile gets me every time I see it and I see it 
almost every day. The fact that Matt is dead means that the smile 
cannot happen on his actual face anymore. That thing is lost. 
We can remember it. We can look at pictures. The smile is not 
erased. But the physical possibility of encountering the smile in 
a living person is lost. And that is final, brutally, heartbreakingly 
final. Is there a way to talk about death that captures both the 
absolute finality and that also acknowledges the uncanny real-
ity that the dead are with us, that death has nothing to do with 
cancelling existence, only with canceling life?
As to Dekalog 8, yes, indeed, yes, it is a heavy thing. The way that 
the 20th century fell on Poland, brutal. The suffering of Poland. 
And the crimes of Poland. So intertwined. And so hard for Poles 
to come to terms with. The crimes they suffered and the crimes 
in which they participated. One of the things that is profound, 
to me, about biblical and other ancient thoughts about sin (or 
crimes or whatever we want to call it) is that there is always an 
emphasis on time. Long stretches of time. The awful things we 
do to one another resonate down through the generations. This 
sort of links to some of the things we have been saying about 
death doesn’t it? People don’t just die. They die, but they stay 
around too. And we have to reckon with them over and over 
again. Of course, on the positive side, it also means that there is 
 251
mystery
always more time to get things right with people, with the ances-
tors, with the crimes and horrors of the past. But it goes on and 
on. Seven times seven generations. The sins that last an aeon. 
Whatever language you use. These matters are never cleaned 
up or dealt with easily. That fact does not typically sit well in 
contemporary life, which is more comfortable with the short 
stretches and which doesn’t like the idea that wounds will take 
longer to heal than a human lifespan can encompass. But even 
today in 2020 we are, obviously, still dealing with the crimes 
of America’s past, with the wound of slavery that will continue 
to reopen and that must continue to reopen. There is no way 
around it. The shit must come out. And it will. And it does.
To me, though, the moment that keeps poking at me in Deka-
log 8 is the weird scene where the ethics professor is giving a 
lecture and then the drunk student suddenly staggers into the 
room. Maybe you know more about how that scene ended up 
in the film. Perhaps it is something that happened to Kieślowski 
or Piesiewicz when they were students. But I love that scene be-
cause it has no purpose. Or let’s say the only purpose is to inter-
rupt the scene, which is one in which people are thinking about 
life in a philosophical manner. That’s to say, it starts out as an 
abstract sort of scene, taking a distance from life and thinking 
about it. And then this weird bit of uncontrollable life erupts. 
This bit of Erlebnis, as Walter Benjamin might call it, just drops 
like a turd right into the midst. It has the effect of trauma, which 
resonates so deeply with the fact that the philosophical discus-
sion in the room is all about trauma and about the fundamental 
trauma of the Holocaust and how it is dropped like a turd into 
the modern history of Poland. The little trauma in the classroom 
mirrors the giant historical trauma everyone is trying to grapple 
with. 
One of the most interesting and hilarious and sad and moving 
and tragic aspects of our experience is that we are always do-
ing this work of making narratives and tidying up the jagged 
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edges of everything we are going through and then, just when 
we think we’ve got hold of a structure we can rely on or a story 
that seems to keep everything together, another bit of wild and 
turdy Erlebnis drops into the mix and the whole thing gets ru-
ined and we’ve got to go back and try to package it all together 
again with more reflection and thinking. So the drunk student 
walking into the classroom is just that, he is the bit that doesn’t 
fit, the eruption of raw experience that can’t be accounted for or 
anticipated. And film is at its most powerful and most “mysti-
cal realist” when it is aware of that kind of eruption, when it is 
involved in showing us the dramatic interplay between Erlebnis 
and Erfahrung, to put it in fancy-pants terms. Films might resort 
to all kinds of tricks and techniques of the medium to do so, but 
that’s not the point. 
It strikes me suddenly, Josh… aren’t we really asking whether re-
ality itself is real? We can talk about film and realism. But aren’t 
we talking about the nature of experience itself? How is that 
structured? I appreciate the fact that you keep bringing up how 
unreal, how contrived, how fictional is actually the art and craft 
of making a film. This is completely true. But so is life. It is struc-
tured as hell in one sense and a total chaos at the same time. At 
any moment, something is gonna happen and you can’t know 
what, you can’t even guess what it will be until it happens. I hesi-
tate to call this a theory of film or a theory of realism since, in 
the end, it is more like trust. Another word for trust, of course, 
is faith. The faith and trust of the mystical realist film maker is 
the faith and trust that given just a little bit of opportunity real-
ity will show itself as this complicated mess of things we can 
know and anticipate and things we cannot. A bit of Erlebnis will 
drop into the mix and the magic and mystery of experience will 
play itself out before our very eyes. It’s like the drunk guy who 
staggers into the room just when we think we’ve got a nice and 
clean theory of ethics to let us know what to do next. But you 
can never know what to do when the drunk guy busts into the 
room, partly because you can never be sure what he’s gonna do. 
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In one of his interviews, Kieślowski talks about making an ear-
ly documentary that contained a scene with a doctor doing a 
procedure, I forget the exact details of the story. Doesn’t really 
matter. But one of the doctors mentions to Kieślowski before 
shooting that this certain kind of tool always breaks. And then 
Kieślowski starts shooting and he just knows that the tool is go-
ing actually to break, really just break, as he is shooting, and 
then it does actually break. Which is crazy. But also Kieślowski 
just knew that there was no possibility other than that it would 
break. That is the faith and trust of the mystical realist film mak-
er. The tool will break. The drunk guy will bust in. The lumpy 
turd of Erlebnis will drop into the room… somehow. 
The opposite of the realist film maker is therefore not Cocteau. 
Cocteau is a mystical realist. The opposite of the realist film 
maker is someone like Steven Spielberg, who is, in a funny way, 
the true heir to the early films of Eisenstein. That’s to say, there 
is a tradition in film making that does not have faith and trust in 
reality, does not want to let Erlebnis erupt where it may. This tra-
dition thinks that the medium is about control. Spielberg never 
once let the camera roll just for the sake of rolling in his entire 
life. Such a thing would scare the crap out of him. This makes 
him quite a good storyteller, quite a master of suspense and tim-
ing, if that’s what you want in a movie. And I can enjoy that sort 
of thing as much as the next guy… . 
I guess, though, that all of the films and the filmmakers I really 
love have an unruly quality to them, from outright sloppiness 
to a certain ungainly, amateurish aspect. Boredom can creep in 
watching these films. Realist movies have moments that drift or 
that fail to carry the story or plot at all, such as there is one. 
Loose ends all over the place. Dekalog is probably tighter than 
most in this regard. But, in the end, Kieślowski is a mystical real-
ist in precisely this way. He gives space for the drama of Erlebnis 
and Erfahrung and trusts in the weirdness and drama of reality 
254
wonder, horror, mystery
itself… and the drunk guy scene in Dekalog 8 just really nails 





July 3, 2020, 6:24 PM
Dear Morgan,
I think you’re right to bring things back down to earth with your 
talk of flies and dirt. After all, the slopes of Everest are covered 
in trash, and any holy mountain is bound to be a site of bloody 
contestation. 
I’ve been suffering from a bout of seriously debilitating mi-
graines recently, so it’s fitting that we’re discussing some heavy-
duty theory. I don’t want to sidetrack in our conversation about 
Dekalog 8, but I think this excursion illuminates the episode and 
the series in some surprising ways. Your viewpoint on cinemat-
ic realism sounds similar to that of Stanley Cavell and Richard 
Rushton. Rushton writes that, for Cavell,
films cannot be said to offer representations of the world or 
of some purportedly ‘real’ or ‘true’ world. Instead, films are 
exhibitions of the world; they offer experiences that are as 
much a part of reality as any other experience, perhaps even 
more so, for while at the movies, we are less on guard, more 
receptive, more vulnerable and less fearful of the possibilities 
the world is capable of offering to us. […] The cinema does 
not present us with images that merely re-present various 
states or stages of the ‘real’ world; instead, the cinema has the 
ability to redefine for us what reality itself is.
This feels like a decent resting-place to bury our dispute amidst 
the quicksand of film theory. We could just leave it there, I sup-
pose. But, then, again, we merely might be shifting the terms of 
the discussion from one term (reality) to another (experience) 
that is equally nebulous and confusing if we fall in line with 
Cavell and Rushton.
Maybe we should delve deeper into Walter Benjamin and your 
notes about his theories of art and experience (and those terms 
256
wonder, horror, mystery
you raised, Erlebnis and Erfahrung). After all, you wrote a Ph.D. 
dissertation on Benjamin, and there’s a lot written about him in 
contemporary cinema studies, as you might imagine, especially 
by Thomas Elsaesser (“Between Erlebnis and Erfahrung: Cinema 
Experience with Benjamin,” 2009) and Miriam Hansen (Cine-
ma and Experience, 2011). It might be worth asking whether or 
not only the fragmented lived experience of Erlebnis is open to 
modern life, and whether the integrated sense of experience de-
scribed by Erfahrung, as the creation of a coherent life-journey, 
can only ever be what Elsaesser calls an “ideological obfuscation 
or nostalgic (self-)deception.” 
Hansen, however, argues that Benjamin spent his life “theoriz-
ing the conditions of possibility of Erfahrung in modernity,” 
linking its
historic decline with the proliferation of Erlebnis (immediate 
but isolated experience) under the conditions of industrial 
capitalism; in this context, Erfahrung crucially came to entail 
the capacity of memory — individual and collective — invol-
untary as well as cognitive — and the ability to imagine a dif-
ferent future.
This reading, then, moves beyond nostalgia about the past and 
proposes a different story that seems more open to the interplay 
between these two concepts of experience. Hansen’s conception 
of Erfahrung in Benjamin involves a conception of connected-
ness and a (re)collection or projection of some past or future 
wholeness, however fugitive or seemingly impossible under 
current conditions.
I like Hansen’s reading because it’s more open to alternatives re-
garding the spiritual elements in Benjamin’s thinking, particu-




“to experience” [Erleben] without spirit is comfortable, if un-
redeeming. Again: we know a different experience. It can be 
hostile to spirit and destructive to many blossoming dreams. 
Nevertheless, it is the most beautiful, most untouchable, 
most immediate because it can never be without spirit…
This reading from a younger Benjamin as a writer who wishes 
to leave open the possibility for something more redeeming 
and beautiful, despite the ravages of modernity, and despite the 
historical processes that have exiled spirit to an ever-dimin-
ishing corner of the room, so to speak, appeals to me. I align 
with Hansen’s attempt to complete Benjamin’s project by bring-
ing his work into the present, where it calls us to ask whether 
more humane alternatives yet can be imagined within the space 
of modernity. If all this represents something other than self-
deceptive nostalgia, then we might be in a similar realm to the 
one that Derrida invoked in his phrase from Of Grammatology 
(1976) about glimpsing “the yet unnamable glimmer beyond the 
closure,” the hints of which Benjamin also seemed to be alive to 
registering in his more spiritually inclined moments.
Sorry for another lengthy detour. What does all this have to do 
with Kieślowski? Perhaps what we’re witnessing in the Dekalog 
is an attempt by the filmmakers and the characters to “put their 
lives in order,” in more than one sense, using the Ten Com-
mandments as a flexible premodern structure for doing so. On 
one level, this seems to provide the very “epic truth,” and the 
joined-up story of the self, implied by Er The film in the viewer’s 
head fahrung, that Benjamin claims is missing from modern 
life. An alternative interpretation might posit that the series 
only reveals how all these attempts to provide structure always 
fail, and that we keep seeing the impossible mismatches emerge 
between Erlebnis and Erfahrung once the scaffolding inevitably 
falls away, and reveals its promise of some regular shape to be 
an impossibility that isn’t true to life, at least as it is lived in the 
present. That’s more or less what happens with the Eighth Com-
mandment — “Thou shalt not bear false witness” — in Dekalog 
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8, isn’t it? The Commandment is used to structure the story at 
first, but, then, awkwardly, it seems to break down and it rapidly 
loses its explanatory or ordering force within the narrative. Ac-
tually, the meaning and application of “false witness” mutates as 
the story unfolds.
If something like this is what you mean by an interplay between 
Erlebnis and Erfahrung, that strikes me as a valuable summation 
of the dynamics operating within the Dekalog series as a whole. 
(Assuming that it makes some sense to treat it as a “whole” — a 
nearly nine-and-a-half-hour film and epic work of art — rather 
than a bunch of episodes.) As a total reading of the series, we 
could do worse than this. The filmmakers, just as much as the 
characters, know that under normal conditions (“the way we 
live now”) there only seems to be Erlebnis, even while everyone 
yearns for something more, something redolent of Erfahrung. 
This might or might not involve an assembly from memory or a 
utopian projection into a time to come. It might never happen. 
And, in fact, it might be nothing more than a pernicious fiction 
or a form of nostalgia for a time when life was (supposedly) bet-
ter ordered (morally, spiritually, aesthetically, etc.) than now. We 
try to project coherent narratives or posit the existence of laws 
or even Commandments that we can use to measure ourselves, 
to guide our path from here to there, and, in this specific sense, 
to control the story of our lives, as it were. But maybe this is not 
possible, certainly not now, maybe not ever. Then again, maybe 
there is more to the story?
This reading of the series cuts both ways. It might be said that 
Kieślowski clings somewhat quaintly to this impossibility of re-
storing some sense of classical order amidst the chaos of modern 
life. In this sense, Dekalog, like Three Colors, provides structures 
that tend in the direction of an ambiguous premise of some 
kind, regarding a more durable, perhaps even spiritual, shape 
to things. In this regard, Kieślowski might be seen to be fall-
ing into the trap of attempting to construct or interpolate some 
false or artificial sense of Erfahrung. And, therefore, Kieślowski 
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might be indulging in a nostalgia (that deadly but common pro-
cess of obfuscation and self-deception described by Elsaesser, 
above) for an order that no longer exists. Even worse, it might be 
Kieślowski’s tendency to embrace the cosmic, the spiritual, and 
the religious that leads him into this very trap. Your point about 
Erlebnis nicely cuts against this reading and helps to explain why 
it feels incomplete.
The ambiguity in Kieślowski’s work allows for these opposing 
forces to pull insights from the work in both directions simul-
taneously. The laws of Dekalog and colors of Three Colors might 
only be artificial structures, after all, patterns overlaid on the 
messiness of things. Or maybe there is more to it — “it” mean-
ing both these films and, maybe, also, life. To me, this double-
sided or double-edged character of Kieślowski’s films calls out to 
something deeply human, and humane. To be alive in the world 
means to wonder about whether the idea of order is only a fic-
tion or whether there is something to it, to recognize the insuf-
ficiency of narrative or mythological structures and yet to find 
oneself unable to dispense with them entirely, to see them fail 
to measure things, events, and people correctly, and yet to find 
them of value or consolation in other moments. Then again, this 
line of thought itself might be dismissed as an obsolete human-
ism (or worse) that latches on to the nostalgic elements of art 
in a denial of the basic problem of modernity, which is that Er-
fahrung seems impossible and only Erlebnis appears to available 
to play around with, and in. And around we go.
You relate the story of the drunken student in Dekalog 8 as an 
example of how the jagged and fragmented quality of Erlebnis 
intrudes into the frame of the series (and life), upsetting all of 
our carefully constructed ideas of order. I agree with you that 
his entrance into the classroom feels just right in its off-ness and 
asymmetry. In fact, there’s another student who condemns his 
disrespectful behavior, providing a moment of light relief and 
perfect pacing in the narrative, also giving us, the viewers, a 
place to pause and breathe, in a scene that might otherwise feel 
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very abstract and overly talky in a ping-pong-like game of dia-
logue.
Yet even this seemingly throw-away moment in the episode 
does not fail to resonate on a deeper level. The censorious stu-
dent who condemns the drunk speaks in English, and it’s pos-
sible that he’s a Muslim character, which could explain the of-
fense he takes at this display of public inebriation. Is Kieślowski 
portraying this character’s rule-following denunciation of oth-
ers as an overly strict reading of a religious code of conduct? If 
so, Kieślowski is also cleverly recapitulating the thematics of the 
entire episode in this tiny comical exchange. That’s analogous to 
the problem with the Eighth Commandment that is examined 
in the episode, viz., that it seems insufficient on its own to carry 
real weight in the human story about to unfold.
Another example of this balance of clashing elements in Deka-
log 8 involves its curious sidebar on 1980s exercise culture. 
Kieślowski presents his philosophy professor character, Zofia 
(Maria Kościałkowska) in her jogging outfit during her daily 
workout routines. And yet the main story involves a confronta-
tion with a traumatic episode from her past, one that also takes 
in the national and world trauma of Poland’s historical relation-
ship to the Shoah. Here the trivial and the mundane (which you 
nicely term the “super-local”) mixes with the deepest possible 
collective pain imaginable. As the episode proceeds, a visitor 
to Zofia’s classroom, Elżbieta (Teresa Marczewska) turns out to 
have been a Jewish kid that, decades earlier, Zofia had turned 
away from protective shelter during the nazi terror in 1943 War-
saw. 
This might be nothing more than a coincidence, but it’s worth 
noting in passing that Dekalog 9 links exercise with suicide, 
while Dekalog 8 presents a picture of a nation of aging get-fit 
fans whose banal pastimes in the 1980s exist in an incredibly 
distressing (non-)relationship with their actions in the 1940s. To 
me, this suggests that the dominant realm of Erlebnis, as splin-
 261
mystery
tered and incoherent modern experience, is unconquerable, but 
I think the episode eventually will challenge that view by provid-
ing hints about the dormant possibility for Erfahrung. Breath-
ing deep of the fresh air of forests surrounding Warsaw (places, 
however, that one imagines haunted with buried trauma), Zofia, 
on her run, encounters a contortionist. The contortionist seems 
to externalize the moral state of individual and collective ex-
perience of people and countries that tied themselves in knots 
during WWII. 
How can these appallingly uneven and disturbingly disparate 
registers exist in the same story? The answer must be that they 
also exist in reality or experience, within the same country, the 
same city, and even the same person. That’s life. The larger ques-
tion raised by the episode is the same one raised by the entire 
series. Is there, in memory, in the future, in the work of art, or in 
the spiritual realm, something of what Coleridge called a “secret 
ministry,” even if this ministry seems to be fleeting or lacking 
altogether in the jaggedness of daily existence? Are there eternal 
moral laws that matter, should we follow them, and, if so, how? 
How is it possible that these ideas of order seem to lead us astray 
as often as they guide us home?
I think it’s reasonable to divide Dekalog 8 into three intercon-
nected segments, with important linking scenes in between 
those segments that add further resonances or complications. 
The first segment takes place in Zofia’s classroom and its envi-
rons. The second one involves the journey of Zofia and Elżbieta 
into the past, in order to take account of Zofia’s actions during 
the war, with the hope in mind of creating some connection be-
tween them of value to their shared idea of the future. The third 
segment follows Zofia and Elżbieta on a visit to a sad little tai-
lor’s shop in a different neighborhood of Warsaw, where a man 
lives who saved Elżbieta’s life in 1943 after Zofia rejected her.
I’ve written around 5000 more words on the episode already, but 
I don’t want to inflict them on you boorishly in one dam-burst 
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without your permission. How would you like to proceed from 
here? Would you prefer to take up a different reading of Walter 
Benjamin’s concepts of experience and art, or are you ready to 
move on into the heart of the story of Dekalog 8? Do you think 
it makes better sense to take each of these three segments of the 
episode in turn, or would you prefer to read and respond to my 
entire rambling and rickety notes on the whole narrative?
Notes from your friend JMT
P.S. Here is a snapshot that bears on our discussion of these heavy 
German words and concepts — this is what happened when my 
DVD player broke down while it was playing Jules et Jim… .
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July 7, 2020, 12:16 PM
Dear Josh,
Yes. That is my response to this last letter from you. Yes. 
I would add only that I am, personally, loath to work Benjamin’s 
thoughts on Erlebnis and Erfahrung into too much of an actual, 
coherent theory of experience. Benjamin, in my understand-
ing of him, just was not a systematic philosopher. That much 
is probably easy to accept. But he also wasn’t one to provide 
anything like well worked out theories. Something that Adorno 
was constantly scolding him about. Also, I don’t think Benjamin 
was ever exactly sure what he meant by Erlebnis and Erfahrung. 
In different essays he’s playing around with different aspects of 
the terms and with his own shifting conception of what human 
experience is all about. I’m not especially a fan, for instance, of 
the essay that Benjamin is probably most famous for, “The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” The views put 
forward there about film’s revolutionary potential strike me as 
very close to silly. 
Another thing that I think is sometimes missed when it comes 
to Benjamin on Erlebnis and Erfahrung is that they don’t cut just 
one way. Point being, there is a side of Benjamin that is hostile 
to Erfahrung and that always sees Erlebnis as the radical, unruly, 
unaccountable eruption of the Real into every attempt to organ-
ize or synthesize experience as a whole. On the other hand, one 
of the problems with Modernity, as you’ve pointed out, is that 
it so pulverizes and fragments experience that Erfahrung never 
has a chance. Benjamin was constantly trying to hold both these 
ideas together without falling into a simplistic scenario where 
Erfahrung is good and Erlebnis bad or vice versa. Is the flaneur 
a triumphant figure in Benjamin or a figure to be criticized? Is 
the loss of aura a thing to be lamented or a genuine historical 
achievement? I would say that these are all poorly formulated 
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questions when it comes to Benjamin. A person who asks ques-
tions like this is going to get bad answers and write boring books. 
So, your notes on Erfahrung and Erlebnis as they relate to Deka-
log work well for me. Personally, I wouldn’t want to push them 
much further than that. 
I also want to say that I genuinely enjoy reading your break-
downs of the various films of Dekalog and anticipate that I will 
enjoy much if not all of what you have to say about the three 
sections of Dekalog 8. But may I also say that that kind of ex-
haustive, three-part analysis also sort of pre-fills me with a sense 
of exhaustion? Maybe this is similar to my resistance to the at-
tempts to over-theorize Benjamin’s so-called Philosophy of Ex-
perience. 
There is a wariness about saying too much. As I’ve gotten older 
and become, I suppose, more and more of a mystic myself I 
have a wariness of saying too much. That’s the fact of it. In my 
own writing, my writing that is closest to my own heart, I like to 
make less and less sense the more I penetrate into something, if 
you know what I mean. I like to circulate around things I can’t 
really say. I like to acknowledge that I start to sound ridiculous, 
that everyone starts to sound ridiculous the more they try to get 
hold of the core of something. It slips between the fingers. Ben-
jamin means something by the distinction between Erfahrung 
and Erlebnis and I think we can get the sense of what he means. 
But he had the good sense also to leave the contours fuzzy. There 
is an unsaid doctrine here that must remain unsaid. 
My instinct around Dekalog 8, which is, as you say, so big and 
overwhelming and heavy in what it takes on, is to peck and 
worry at the edges and the weird spots. That’s why I gravitate to-
ward the moment with the drunk and scenes like that. In some 
sense, I suppose, I don’t trust the bigness of Dekalog 8. I’m wary 
that this bigness contains traps and tricks. Likewise, if someone 
wrote a book titled, say, Benjamin and the Concept of Aura, I 
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would be absolutely sure not to read such a book. It would be 
irreligious to read such a book. A sin. 
So, honestly, I’m a little scared of your three-part breakdown of 
Dekalog 8. On the other hand, as I said before, I’m sure I’ll enjoy 
what you have to say. Also, I realize that what I’m saying here 
verges on the ridiculous. In the end, this doesn’t worry me. I’m 
fine with being ridiculous. My daimonion tells me to stay away 





July 8, 2020, 1:09 PM
Dear Morgan,
It’s so funny and heartening to me that we are such diametrical 
opposites in our temperaments. I’m somebody who needs the 
talking cure, words words word, blah blah blah, speaking end-
lessly and provisionally (and in error) around these questions 
we’re discussing in loops and circles. Thanks for listening.
I think you’ve identified why Benjamin always seems to speak to 
the present. It’s not in spite of but rather because of those “fuzzy 
contours” you describe in his writing. One thing I like about 
Hansen’s book is that she emphasizes his early work and its 
permeability to spiritual searching in general and Jewish mys-
ticism in particular. Another thing I appreciate about Hansen 
is her unfolding of Benjamin’s concept of the “optical uncon-
scious” and her exploration of the connective tissue between it 
and Kracauer’s own ideas about what he called “camera reality.” 
These are concepts in film theory that attempt to get around the 
dichotomies of subjectivity and objectivity that you were criti-
cizing before. Hansen wishes to rejoin elements in Benjamin’s 
thinking with Kracauer’s more “positive” critical stance regard-
ing the liberating potential in modern popular culture (and 
cinema in particular), which obviously exists in tension with 
Adorno’s dour viewpoint on the Culture Industry.
Hansen writes of Kracauer:
Much as the film — and, to different degrees, any film — seeks 
to direct our attention, it simultaneously allows the viewer to 
get sidetracked by details or wander to the margins and cor-
ners of the screen, or to commit to memory transient, con-
tingent images. For Kracauer, this spectatorial mobility is the 
condition for a centrifugal movement in yet another direc-
tion: away from the film, into the labyrinths of the viewer’s 
imagination, memories, and dreams, that is, “the film in the 
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viewer’s head.” This process takes the viewer into a dimen-
sion beyond, or below, the illusory depth and diegetic space, 
beyond/below the “intersubjective protocols” and particular 
kinds of knowledge that govern our understanding of narra-
tives, into the at once singular and historical-collective realm 
of experience, the striated, heterogeneously aggregated, part-
ly frozen, partly fluid Lebenswelt. It is in Kracauer’s insistence 
on the possibility of such openings that we can hear an echo, 
albeit muted, of his earlier vision of cinema as an alternative 
public sphere, a sensory and collective horizon for people 
trying to live a life in the interstices of modernity. 
This “Lebenswelt,” then, is related to “camera reality.” Somewhat 
like Benjamin’s “optical unconscious,” it proposes a “dimension” 
of cinema as a medium that is not limited by the intentions of 
filmmakers, the commercial imperatives of the exhibition and 
distribution apparatus, the critical reception of viewers and 
critics, or even the personal experiences of individual cinema-
goers, for that matter. It’s a way to view films (and “Film,” as a 
modern artform) apart from their (its) storylines, genre conven-
tions, or characters, meditating instead on how cinema allows 
us to project the world differently, in modes of collective dream-
ing, by focusing on marginal elements of moving pictures. By 
this means, we also discard an individualistic view of cinematic 
art and moviegoing, in a move that is inevitably political in the 
sense of being public.
This also allows us access to an experience elicited by cinema 
that, by implication, might be radically different from the ex-
pressed ideology of a given movie. Kracauer uses the examples of 
D.W. Griffith and Sergei Eisenstein. Griffith’s worth, for Kracau-
er, lies in how he films Mae Marsh’s hands in Intolerance (1916), 
in order to ask what a hand is or means. Eisenstein, similarly, 
films fog and waves in the funeral section of Battleship Potemkin 
(1925) in such a way that allows for an “allusive indeterminacy” 
to emerge, a “suggestive rendering of physical events.” Extrapo-
lating from this, it seems that we aren’t tied solely to Eisenstein’s 
268
wonder, horror, mystery
Leninist program, Griffiths’s revisionist propaganda, or even 
to the direct action of the plot, for that matter, by the medium 
of film itself. This critical concept arguably gives the viewer a 
place to shelter from the battering rams of reductive political 
discourse promoted in the films. Something like this theory is 
needed to help explain cinema’s impact in total because the in-
terest of films cannot be limited to auteurist notions of artis-
tic intentions or to the industrial imperative of most movies, 
which often involve retrograde ideologies and sensationalistic 
approaches to audience manipulation. But is that all there is?
Kracauer’s camera-reality does not simplify the film into a uni-
fied artwork that carries a message inside of it to be cracked. It’s 
not that the viewer can do whatever they want with a film, either, 
but rather that the medium-specific elements of the form itself 
allow for an alternate space in which our collective ideas and 
image-banks (about hands, mist, waves, faces, and so forth) may 
be rethought by the viewer. So, for Hansen, this is all about cine-
ma’s role in finding less maladaptive yet still thoroughly modern 
ways to live that draw on visual culture and that do not reject 
modernity itself wholesale in favor of reactionary nostalgia (nor 
do they accept the ruthlessly exploitative system of capitalism 
as how things are or must be). An optical unconscious, to shift 
from Kracauer’s critical concept to Benjamin’s, parallels the col-
lective unconscious and the political unconscious, but exists in a 
logically distinctive, if overlapping, zone. It’s here that we might 
assemble an archive of moving images (and images that move 
us) that might help to envision a more livable future.
All this by way of agreeing with you that it’s the “edges and 
weird spots” of the Dekalog that seem to draw our attention. 
I relate this to Hansen’s talk of “margins and corners of the 
screen.” I’m thinking here, again, of that repeated image of the 
old lady struggling to place a glass bottle into a street recycling 
bin that recurs throughout Three Colors. In Blue, Julie sits at a 
cafe, oblivious to the elderly woman’s struggles, while in Red, 
Valentine rushes over to help her complete this banal task. In a 
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way these episodes are extraneous to both stories and in another 
sense they contain the essential poetry of how the stories are 
connected with one another. These are the moments that Mark 
Cousins, in his 2011 documentary The Story of Film, refers to as 
a modern use of cinema as “an empathy machine,” a problem-
atic but useful phrasing. This idea challenges the commercial 
view of cinema as a thrill ride. (Cousins claims that film is about 
“ideas, not money.”) 
Another way to think about these moments in Kieślowski is 
through your felicitous idea of a “radical, unruly, unaccountable 
eruption of the Real into every attempt to organize or synthe-
size experience as a whole.” Perhaps in the concept of the optical 
unconscious there might be some as yet undreamed synthesis 
or interplay between elements that seem antithetical. Or maybe 
not. That’s the hope I hear encoded in your capitalization of the 
letter “R” in “Real.” Such moments in the pictures pull us, as 
viewers, away from the plotlines of the film we’re watching in 
order to confront us with fragmentary outbursts of life, while at 
the same time adding images to an archive of collective dream-
ing by which we might arrange our hopes for a more cohesive 
life-journey through this crazy, mixed-up world.
You mention your reluctance to speak of certain things, matters 
of the spirit. Fair enough. I find your drift well encapsulated in 
that capitalization of the word “Real.” Yes, there are these mo-
ments or experiences or encounters or ways of seeing when 
and where reality seems to contain two levels simultaneously, 
the ultra-local and the super-mundane, on one hand, and the 
spiritual or potentially transcendent realm, on the other. There’s 
a poetic sensibility here similarly structured to a well-written 
haiku, as a way of encountering the world which reveals both 
a common detail of existence and a poetic iteration of Buddha-
nature. Doesn’t Tarkovsky compare the cinematic image with 
the haiku somewhere in Sculpting in Time? In Buddhism this 
Buddha-nature is said to exist in all things as an expression of 
emptiness and transience that also challenges the materialism of 
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a “dead” world and suggests something… more. And this can-
not be limited to something that’s “all in our minds,” to be sure. 
It arises in the encounter with the world, with others, and per-
haps with art. 
Here I am once again reminded of Benjamin’s experience of 
aura under the influence of hashish in 1930, in which he de-
scribed aura as a property inherent to or discernable “in all 
things, not just in certain things, as people imagine.” There are 
key differences between these mystical insights from divergent 
traditions and texts, of course, but I wonder if they largely occur 
in non-dualistic experiences where language tends to be a very 
blunt and clumsy instrument for describing what happens. That 
brings me back to your comments about preferring to speak less 
and less. I would not have dared to write the word “real” with 
a capital “R,” but that is a pretty good resting-point for describ-
ing the differences between our views. Both the lower case and 
the capital letter are needed, I think. For the Huayan Buddhists, 
the realms of ultimate divine reality and mundane emptiness are 
said to interpenetrate in a total sense, allowing one to examine 
them conceptually as two but to experience them (ideally) as 
one. Sounds nice.
The entrance of the drunken student and the encounter with 
the contortionist in Dekalog 8 provide somewhat similar mo-
ments of simultaneous “lower case-ness” and “capitalization” 
throughout the series. From the strange alien texts created by 
the green screen of the computer in Dekalog 1 to the bee in 
Dekalog 2, the skateboarding railway employee in Dekalog 3, the 
water fights between father and daughter in Dekalog 4, the girls 
at the cafe window who play innocently with the murderer Ja-
cek in Dekalog 5, Tomek’s postal office and milk delivery jobs in 
Dekalog 6, the pile of teddy bears in Dekalog 7, the record store 
listening posts and the music of the fictional composer, Van den 
Budenmayer, in Dekalog 9, all the way to that very ordinary set 
of postage stamps that closes Dekalog 10 and the series… . All 
these moments have an analogous resonance with each other 
 271
mystery
and with the images of the woman with her recycling in Three 
Colors, no? And, of course, there is the tower block apartment 
complex itself. We are every one of us separate, isolated, apart, 
and liable to the disconnected experiences of modern life. And 
yet we’re also somehow related to one another, if not as a family 
then in more nebulous and loosely joined-up ways, yearning to 
follow threads that link us with others, like a great cat’s cradle 
of lives trailing those invisible strands or strings that might con-
nect us, like the ones described in the novels of Virginia Woolf.
I’m risking repeating myself here because these are the basic 
structures of the questions posed by the Dekalog. But I also think 
there’s a sense in which this dynamic reflects a fundamental ten-
sion between the ideas of Kieślowski and Piesiewicz. Maybe this 
is too tidy a summary of such a complicated and long-lived ar-
tistic partnership, but I see Piesiewicz as a writer who wishes to 
project an idea of order about the world (and people’s lives) and 
Kieślowski as a director who manages to work a paradox into 
every corner of the picture, introducing double-sided or con-
tradictory aspects into each of his writer’s stories. Premise: The 
reason why the ambiguity in the series is so delicious and finely 
balanced on so many levels is related to the fact that the Dekalog 
has these two main authors. Their worldviews overlap but also 
clash and contradict at key points.
I will close this overly lengthy detour into film theory (and be-
yond!) with a personal note. I think I’m writing more and more 
notes on these episodes not in an attempt to exhaust or bore 
you, but instead because I don’t want our exchange of letters 
to finish just yet. I can foresee the completion of our project 
looming closer each week and I think I want to put it off a lit-
tle while longer. One way to do that is to slow down the pace 
and introduce great blocks of philosophical texts, replete with 
the most difficult concepts from film theory that I can find. :) I 
kid, of course, but, also, maybe not. This entire process and our 
agreeable disagreements have been a source of solace amidst the 
chaos, violence, and mass death that marks this year of our Lord 
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2020 and our era’s attempt to pulverize the sustained attention 
span required for (and by) art. Thank you, my friend. I take your 
“Yes” as a green light to continue with these notes. But I also get 
your drift about the problem of verbiage when confronted with 
mysteries one would like to leave intact. I also applaud your ap-
proach as a savvy strategy — rope-a-dope! Yes, let me wear out 
my jaw while you observe me flailing and tilting at windmills, 
with a bemusement that is not unkind.
One of the reasons why the narrative of Dekalog 8 is so rich 
and complex is partly because it is a story about stories, and 
about storytelling. In the section of the episode that transpires 
in Zofia’s classroom, we’re first introduced to a retelling of the 
storyline from Dekalog 2, about the doctor forced to advise a 
woman having an affair about whether or not to keep her un-
born child or have an abortion, at a moment when her husband 
appears to be terminally ill. As the series nears its completion, 
Dekalog continues to gather up its own threads into new pat-
terns — that cat’s cradle effect that forms new shapes as its mul-
tiple points of contact shift. 
This self-referential facet of the series also offers another in-
stance in which realism and elements of something akin to 
metafiction overlap, insofar as we, the audience, are watching 
a storyteller tell a story — one that we’ve already watched! As 
the classroom scene unfolds and shifts to another philosophical 
problem, we also get some reaction shots of the Artur Barciś 
character, now a student in the university, as he responds to the 
stories being told in Zofia’s classroom. More and more stories 
within stories — yet without breaking the spell.
Then things take an unexpected turn for Zofia in her classroom. 
The consideration of life or death as it relates to the story of a 
child, in the first philosophy problem, provides Elżbieta with an 
opening to tell her own story in front of Zofia’s students. Elżbieta 
has returned to Poland from New York in order to talk to the 
people involved with her wartime trauma as a Jewish refugee 
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who narrowly escaped the nazis. But she initially treats her story 
as a philosophical problem — as a story, in other words — repre-
senting what Zofia has called “ethical hell” in her own rendition 
of the decision of the doctor from Dekalog 2. Elżbieta asks Zofia 
about another such impossible dilemma, in which a Jewish child 
turns up after the nazi-imposed curfew, seeking shelter for the 
night at the home of a Catholic couple who have agreed to be 
her godparents. But the couple turns her away. As Elżbieta tells 
the story, treating it as hypothetical — fiction — Zofia realizes 
what Elżbieta tactfully has hidden from the class. Her story is 
about what really happened when Elżbieta was taken to Zofia’s 
house during the war some forty years earlier, in 1943.
Zofia was, without question, on the wrong side of history that 
night, and she knows it. But Elżbieta hasn’t wasted her time re-
turning to Warsaw for the superficial satisfaction of outing Zofia 
for her actions during the war, or trying to get her fired from 
her post as a professor. Instead of wishing to dominate her or 
take the paltry satisfaction of revenge, she wants to know why 
Zofia did what she did. She is therefore much more than a vic-
tim, she’s a survivor-detective in a mystery involving history’s 
darkest hour. Dekalog 8 has the courage to treat all of this non-
revenge as strength not weakness on Elżbieta’s part. And it links 
this act of courage directly to her faith. Elżbieta wears a necklace 
ornamented with both Jewish and Christian symbols, the for-
mer representing her family heritage and the latter symbolizing 
acquired beliefs, presumably. 
Perhaps like the doctor in Dekalog 2, Elżbieta worships what he 
had called, in the earlier episode, “a private god,” or, at least, a 
syncretic one? In a moment of deep tenderness later on in the 
episode, one that avoids any hint of mawkishness or false piety, 
Zofia witnesses Elżbieta praying before bedtime. Although we 
cannot know what she’s praying for — or to what  — we might 
gather that Zofia remains in her thoughts. Somehow, she has 
maintained her faith in Zofia all these years as a person of 
more complexity and goodness than the action she herself had 
274
wonder, horror, mystery
witnessed as a child. This faith is seemingly baseless but it is 
proved correct in a way that challenges materialism and secu-
lar rationality. There’s a more ennobling understanding of fate 
being unfolded here, one which the series has earned at great 
cost. Ultimately, Dekalog sides with the believers. Kieślowski, 
too, believes in something — in people and in forces beyond our 
ken — and he understands that this requires faith of some kind, 
even if the form of that faith is, well, pretty damned mysterious.
Elżbieta’s reasons for proceeding in this manner are important. 
Her goal is to understand Zofia’s actions — to try to come to terms 
with something that seems incomprehensible and evil — rather 
than trying to make herself feel better by condemning Zofia or 
attempting to destroy her. In this humane quest to understand 
what is seemingly impossible to comprehend, Elżbieta may well 
be the strongest possible contender for a stand-in for the film-
makers of the Dekalog. (Even more so than Barciś, perhaps, who 
remains in his own zone of the uncanny — or the angelic other-
worldly — in his silent witnessing. In fact, all the characters in 
their way are stand-ins for the filmmakers, in the specific sense 
that Flaubert invoked when he said something along the lines of 
“I am Emma Bovary” or “Madame Bovary is me.”)
This gentle approach pursued by Elżbieta, this softness that is 
strength, in turn, gives Zofia the chance to be understood, and 
she seizes that opportunity with all gratitude. They spend the 
day and the evening together. Zofia insists on offering her a 
room for the night, pointedly hoping to reverse the irreversible 
crime which she committed in the past. Their reconciliation in 
Warsaw, while it appears to replay the trauma of the past sym-
bolically in a more therapeutic or reparative setting, does not 
alter the past, of course. Instead it offers a way to live with the 
nightmare of history without succumbing to its powerful spell 
of despair and without denying one’s own personal and collec-
tive complicity in its horrors.
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With your patience, I’d like to take a step back and unfold that 
scene in Zofia’s classroom in more detail. “It’s 1943,” the story 
goes. February. Winter. The main character of this story within 
the story is a six-year-old Jewish girl. Her father is in the Warsaw 
ghetto. Refuge is sought for the girl, to get her out of harm’s way. 
New guardians are sought to take in the child, but as Catholics, 
they demand a certificate for baptism. The girl is brought to this 
young couple who’ve agreed to be godparents at the baptism, 
but this baptism has not yet occurred, it would seem. So this 
couple, the potential godparents for this baptism, have to “go 
back on their promise” to save the child. Why? “They’ve decided 
they cannot lie before the God in whom they believe… .” The 
Eighth Commandment. No false witness.
And it is precisely at this point in the episode that the Barciś 
character, in his new guise as a student in the lecture hall, seems, 
for an instant, to confront the viewer of the film directly, by do-
ing what’s forbidden in a realistic film. He looks into the camera 
directly, or appears to. The shots and editing plan move swiftly 
to reassert realism by implying that he also might be staring at 
Zofia. But it’s too late. We realize that we are implicated in this 
story, especially if “we” are the original Polish audience for this 
film that transmits a powerful national guilt about those who 
looked away during WWII. 
The classroom story goes on to describe “a God who, it is true, 
enjoins acts of mercy…but also forbids bearing false witness.” 
The professor’s eyes close sadly here. Back to Artur Barciś — he’s 
looking at her/us. She is “us,” the human family that sends its 
children out to die in the night at the hands of evil men. The 
discussion turns to an investigation of the motives of such a 
harsh decision. In essence, this involves an old philosophical 
problem, the idea of lying in order to save someone’s life. The 
lie here would be that the child is baptized when she’s not. The 
Catholic godparents turn her away, it’s claimed in the classroom 
version of the story, because it would be a lie to call themselves 
her godparents before she’s baptized.
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I’m indebted to our friend, the philosopher Steven Levine, for 
pointing out that Kant outlines a very similar situation in his 
essay “On a Supposed Right to Lie” (1797). Kant writes:
For example, if by telling a lie you have in fact hindered 
someone who was even now planning a murder, then you are 
legally responsible for all the consequences that might result 
therefrom. But if you have adhered strictly to the truth, then 
public justice cannot lay a hand on you, whatever the unfore-
seen consequences might be. It is indeed possible that after 
you have honestly answered Yes to the murderer’s question as 
to whether the intended victim is in the house, the latter went 
out unobserved and thus eluded the murderer, so that the 
deed would not have come about. However, if you told a lie 
and said that the intended victim was not in the house, and 
he has actually (though unbeknownst to you) gone out, with 
the result that by so doing he has been met by the murderer 
and thus the deed has been perpetrated, then in this case you 
may be justly accused as having caused his death. Therefore, 
whoever tells a lie, regardless of how good his intentions 
may be, must answer for the consequences resulting there-
from even before a civil tribunal and must pay the penalty 
for them, regardless of how unforeseen those consequences 
were. This is because truthfulness is a duty that must be re-
garded as the basis of all duties founded on contract, and the 
laws of such duties would be rendered uncertain and useless 
if even the slightest exception were admitted.
To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is, therefore, a sa-
cred and unconditionally commanding law of reason that 
admits of no expediency whatsoever. 
What’s interesting to note, vis-à-vis Kieślowski and Dekalog 8, is 
that Kant’s position regarding the “sacred and absolutely com-
manding decree” of the Eighth Commandment, as ascribed to 
the Catholic couple in the classroom story, is immediately found 
wanting. Kieślowski is criticizing the Kantian modern faith in 
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reason as well as the incorporation of the modern faith in rea-
son into faith itself, since the Catholic couple is seen to be ren-
dering the letter of the Kantian law rather than the spirit of the 
religious impulses toward charity and compassion for the child. 
So then perhaps it is not religion per se that is being questioned 
so much as a modern interpretation of religious ethics that feels 
so rigidly untrue to its ancient sources. After all, Jesus had a 
strong tendency towards rule-breaking by healing on the Sab-
bath and so forth.
Maybe there is a subtle argument here that religion has been 
overly modernized and Kant-ified. When Zofia, on her run 
through the forest later on in the episode, witnesses the contor-
tionist doing his thing, he encourages her to try out being more 
flexible. As we watch her trying to twist a little, we cannot escape 
the feeling that it was the Catholic couple’s lack of flexibility that 
got them into such an “ethical hell” in 1943. But how far can we 
contort ourselves without bending totally out of shape? A “Pol-
ish” question that is also a question for all of us.
In the classroom discussion, the students search for “other mo-
tives” for the couple’s actions in turning away the Jewish child, 
but they are left grasping at straws. Nobody takes up Kant’s un-
persuasive viewpoint itself. Instead, the Catholic couple’s appar-
ent hewing to Kantian lines is seen as so implausible that an 
alternative explanation of their actions must be sought. “What 
other motives could there have been?” asks Elżbieta, in her “un-
dercover” role as a visiting scholar from America to Zofia’s class. 
“I don’t understand. I can’t think of a motive justifying this de-
cision.” One male student answers: “Fear.” The situation is not 
resolved in class, and that is because it cannot be resolved in 
class. Zofia closes with an assignment: “I want each of you to 
prepare your own account of the ethical issues involved here.” 
A Philosophy 101 assignment, perhaps, but one from which any 
viewer of the Dekalog can benefit.
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All this, however, is merely a prelude for what comes next in 
the episode. Any objections or further wrinkles to discuss be-
fore I launch myself deeper into the complexities and patterns 
of Dekalog 8? Or am I on the wrong path here? Would you prefer 
to lead a different kind of sortie altogether into the narrative?
Notes from your friend JMT
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July 15, 2020, 12:18 PM
Josh,
I liked your little “confession” about adding as much film theo-
ry as humanly possible just to keep the discussion going. Very 
sweet actually. I sometimes wonder if all the complexity of the-
ory in general is just a way to keep some kind of conversation 
going, a way to keep talking. 
As to the questions you ask at the end of your letter, I’m fine to 
let you complete your lecture here, professor. :) I mean, you’ve 
already set it all up. I’m not really sure, to be honest, that I 
should be writing anything to you right now. This is your show 
at the moment. And, of course, the thing that needs to be said 
next is that this whole moral quandary is going to be given an-
other massive twist so that the so-called Kantian dilemma that 
seemed to frame Dekalog 8 becomes something else entirely. But 
I don’t want to steal your thunder, since you’ve done so much 
good work preparing for the next moment in the film. 
One little thing I would, perhaps, insert into the discussion, and 
you do touch on it obliquely here and there, is the importance of 
history. This is an especially Polish relationship to history. His-
tory as a heavy thing. History as an actual physical weight. The 
Church as a repository of history and a place that preserves his-
tory in the face of all the forces that would cancel it. The Church 
also as an oppressive monolith of history that doesn’t allow real 
life any space to breathe. History as catastrophe, as the possi-
bility of almost total annihilation or, in fact, total annihilation. 
History as a refuge. History as hope. History as context. History 
as fate in both the good and bad sense. I sometimes get the feel-
ing that Polish history, and the agonizing struggle that Polish 
artists, theologians, political thinkers, have with their own his-
tory, that all of this is a kind of special laboratory in one corner 
of the cauldron of Modernity. 
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One of the things you tend to do, Josh, is to pose the central 
problem of Modernity as a struggle between reactionary nos-
talgia on the one side and, I don’t know, the predations of com-
mercial capitalism on the other. This is a real problem, of course. 
But how does this thing “history” fit into that story? This thing 
“history” which is both utterly real and completely perspectival 
at the same time. This thing that, it turns out, can be very close 
to cancelled, as Poland discovered in the incredible traumas it 
endured for most of the 20th century. What actually is Moderni-
ty’s relationship with history? I mean, this is an absurd question, 
since there is neither such a thing as Modernity and also no such 
thing as history. So, two things that don’t exist combine to create 
nothing. On the other hand, there is a problem here, even if it 
threatens to be so abstract and over-generalized as to dissolve 
into a wisp. One of the things that I’ve noticed you doing, some-
times, is to present the past of pre-modernity, whenever that is 
exactly, as a place that can be more or less described as without 
plumbing or antibiotics, thereby rendering whatever else it has 
to offer moot. Old school conservatives, by contrast, render the 
past as that place where everything made sense, in contrast to 
the present. Both of these approaches are a way of avoiding the 
problem, I would say, of real history, which is a messy, demand-
ing, real thing. The weirdness of real history makes false opposi-
tions like Modern versus Anti-Modern collapse into the false 
antinomies that they always were.
As just a tiny aside here I keep getting pulled back, in recent 
years, to Bruno Latour’s book We Have Never Been Modern. 
And now I get to throw a block of quoted text at you! 
‘in potencia’ the modern world is a total and irreversible 
invention that breaks with the past, just as ‘in potencia’ the 
French or Bolshevik Revolutions were midwives at the birth 
of a new world. Seen as networks, however, the modern 
world, like revolutions, permits scarcely anything more than 
small extensions of practices, slight accelerations in the cir-
culation of knowledge, a tiny extension of societies, minis-
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cule increases in the number of actors, small modifications of 
old beliefs. When we see them as networks, Western innova-
tions remain recognizable and important, but they no longer 
suffice as the stuff of saga, a vast saga of radical rupture, fatal 
destiny, irreversible good or bad fortune. 
The antimoderns, like the postmoderns, have accepted their 
adversaries’ playing field. Another field — much broader, 
much less polemical — has opened up before us: the field 
of nonmodern worlds. It is the Middle Kingdom, as vast as 
China and as little known.
I guess I am suggesting that Dekalog 8, in particular, situates Po-
land and Polish history as occupying a strange space in the story 
of Western Modernity, so strange that the normal oppositions 
don’t quite apply. Because Poland never quite fit into the stand-
ard story of Western modern history, because it got smashed 
and smooshed and absorbed in early state formation and then 
clung to some counter history in its long suffering commitment 
to the Catholic Church, because it got kicked out of one track 
of history and into another by the Third Reich and then the So-
viet Empire, because it is a place fiercely holding onto several 
versions of itself, none of which quite hold together and all of 
which challenge the straightforward history of Modernity, be-
cause of all these things the problem of being Polish becomes a 
big problem for what we mean by “modern” at all. And this also 
I think is a big part of what we are being shown in Dekalog 8. 




July 17, 2020, 2:04 PM
Dear Morgan,
Your good humor is a welcome tonic. And your intervention 
about Polish history arrives right on time, both in terms of our 
exchange of letters and the grim political news this week from 
Poland about the reelection of Duda, the leader who signed 
the law forbidding accusations that the “Polish nation” was 
“responsible or complicit in the nazi crimes.” Which brings us 
right back to Dekalog 8. Kieślowski, had he released the episode 
today, probably would not have been prosecuted even under 
the original wording of the law, it would seem, since exceptions 
were made for artists and scientists. This was an odd loophole, 
however, one that seems inadvertently revealing of anxiety in 
officialdom about the slippage and evasion in the law itself 
concerning individual, collective, and national identity and 
responsibility. Now the law has been decriminalized, yet re-
mains designed to cause a chilling effect. I’m not convinced that 
Kieślowski would have found more favor broadcasting Dekalog 
8 today than under communism in the late 1980s. We’re going 
backwards.
One might ask how the Shoah, specifically as it unfolded in 
Poland, is to be treated in a work of art. Few would deny that 
the extermination sites in Treblinka and Sobibor, where the as-
sembly line of nazi mass murder reached its ultimate nightmare, 
involved complicity that cannot exclude or be limited to one na-
tion or people. One can choose to live in a state of disavowal, 
as in the vision of this Polish law. Another path available is the 
one Kieślowski offers his characters in this episode. In Jewish 
terms that would be recognized by Elżbieta, and surely by Zofia 
as well, this approach could be termed tikkun olam, the “repair 
of the world” associated with the idea that individuals are re-
sponsible for the betterment of the world, not just their own 
small sphere of daily life. 
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There’s something built into that phrase that can mean the fixing 
of the world, or, alternatively, the establishment of a world, one 
that bends toward the good. (In religious terms, the establish-
ment of a world that is the Kingdom of God.) But how can such 
events as those that transpired in Poland in the 1940s ever be 
repaired, and is this even a meaningful question, or a question 
that is permitted to be posed at all? And who has the right (or 
the responsibility) to ask it? Obviously, these crimes cannot ever 
be repaired, and, yet, equally obviously, we must continue with 
the work of repair. I’m using “we” language here deliberately, de-
spite some trepidation, simply to indicate my own view that the 
story of Elżbieta and Zofia resonates across local, national, and 
global boundaries, suggesting our universal complicity. We are 
all attempting, as James Joyce wrote in a different context, the 
impossible, necessary, modern, and eternal task of awakening 
from the nightmare of history. I think this remains true, by the 
way, whether one is inclined towards Hansen’s posture of view-
ing modernity as radical rupture, or Latour’s idea of networked 
continuity in historical processes.
I might invoke Benjamin’s well-known 1940 passage about the 
“angel of history” here:
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is 
turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, 
he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage 
upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel 
would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what 
has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it 
has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel 
can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him 
into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of 
debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call 
progress.
This delicately balanced tension between past and future, re-
membrance and what Benjamin later calls the “narrow gate” to 
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some more humane alternative, seems to lie somewhere near 
the heart of Dekalog 8. What’s clear is that we cannot go back, 
that those who claim that we can go back are lying to us, and 
that those who think that the future will be markedly different 
and better are also almost certainly lying to us. What other al-
ternatives remain open?
By sharing their memories of their bleakest hours in 1943 (which 
might also be Poland’s, Europe’s, the world’s, modernity’s, or 
history’s bleakest hours), Elżbieta and Zofia somehow find that 
narrow gate. It’s a miracle, almost. After their initial discussion 
at the university, Elżbieta and Zofia spend the rest of the day 
and the night and the next day getting to know each other more 
deeply. What takes most of the rest of the episode to unfold is 
the revelation that Zofia did, in fact, have a different motive for 
turning away Elżbieta as a child during the war. That motive was 
that the man who had brought her to her house was suspected 
of being a Gestapo informant. 
The discussion of their story in the classroom, which the profes-
sor afterwards dismisses as “superficially Catholic reasoning,” 
has given way to a very different, far more complicated ethical 
hell. The real choice in that historical moment — as opposed to 
the choices presented in the hypothetical dilemma four decades 
later — was not a choice about an abstract notion of bearing 
false witness, after all, at least not in the sense intended in the 
classroom discussion. Instead it was a choice about betraying 
an entire network of the resistance to a man she thought was 
an informer. This is a true abyss. If the man who brought her 
the child really was an informer, then, of course, had the couple 
taken her in, neither the child nor they would have been saved, 
and the resistance would have been compromised as well in the 
process. Nobody would have been spared.
And these complications only deepen further as new aspects 
of the real story emerge throughout the episode. This is true to 
Kieślowski’s humanist vision of his characters as people who be-
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come more and more complex and ambiguous the more one 
learns about them. As it happens, the man who brought the 
child to the couple was not a nazi stooge. He himself, in other 
words, was the victim of false witness. The classroom dynamic 
has been reversed — one takeaway from Dekalog 8 might be this: 
Get out of academia! Zofia was not the overly zealous enforcer 
of the Eighth Commandment after all. She was a violator of it, 
having believed the lie. 
And, as Zofia makes clear later on in the episode, even if this 
man had been an informer, she has come to feel over the years, 
it was still wrong to turn away the child. This is tricky territory, 
though. Her reasoning since the war has shifted. During the 
war, her ethical hell involved the strong probability of causing a 
child’s death in order to protect a larger group dedicated to top-
pling nazi tyranny. After the war, Zofia changes her mind. Now, 
she believes that her ethical duty to the child was paramount. 
This is somewhat confusing, however, insofar as she did not 
know whether or not the man was an informant, and, therefore, 
she did not truly know what her choice actually entailed. She 
should have rolled the dice, she seems to imply. Would that have 
been wise? Would it have saved the child?
All this might suggest a more general point of view that the 
sanctity of individual life might outweigh collective political 
solidarity. Alternatively, it might involve a retrospective histori-
cal claim that, since the Polish resistance did not ultimately suc-
ceed in overthrowing the nazi occupation on its own, its seem-
ingly paramount value over all other concerns during the war 
might be questioned in light of the subsequent outcomes. This 
is actually a deeply disturbing idea that the episode does not 
explore in much depth. Perhaps, however, there is an even more 
basic assertion here being made, that the life of a child is al-
ways more important than the life or even lives of those who 
have had their chance to live and who are already prepared to 
die for their cause in any event, regardless of history or politics 
writ large, even as they related to World War II. This is uncom-
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fortable at best. “I left you all alone,” Zofia tells Elżbieta. “I sent 
you… to almost certain death. And I knew what I was doing.” 
But “there’s no cause that could be more important than the life 
of a child.” This is obviously not true, and yet it is also obviously 
true. Means and ends? Ethical hell.
Elżbieta’s role in the episode, and the role of faith in her life, 
adds additional layers of nuance to this picture. Elżbieta, Zo-
fia says, has “lived with that certainty for 40 years.” This “cer-
tainty,” presumably, is a (false?) certainty about Zofia’s character, 
the state of her soul, one might say. Through all these decades, 
Elżbieta has, somehow, not lost her faith, either in God or, more 
remarkably, in Zofia. How is this impossibility made possible?
The answer here is shocking, and twofold. First, Elżbieta has be-
come a follower of Zofia’s work as a philosopher and writer. She 
had made it her business to translate Zofia’s work for English 
audiences, and, as we discover, she actually has met Zofia before 
as an adult, in New York, at an academic conference, and, at 
that time, drove her around the city. (She could not bring herself 
to confess her true identity at that time.) She has also studied 
Zofia’s biography and learned that, despite having turned her 
away in 1943, Zofia went on to save many other Jews during the 
war. She has investigated Zofia’s “case file,” seeking understand-
ing rather than revenge. It’s her faith that allows this miracle 
of compassion to occur. Secular calculation or modern reason 
cannot bring human beings to such heights of humane wisdom, 
the film suggests. Prior to her visit to Warsaw, Elżbieta could 
not have known that there was another explanation for Zofia’s 
actions that fateful night in 1943, involving the potential pres-
ence of the Gestapo informant. But her faith allows her to keep 
open the possibility in her heart and mind that there might 
be — must be — was — is — another explanation. This is what al-
lows Elżbieta to seek out Zofia from a perspective that does not 
automatically assume that Zofia is her enemy.
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I can think of no better cinematic depiction of the inherent 
value of faith, can you? Kieślowski offers Elżbieta as one of the 
moral pinnacles of his films, and as a potential model, perhaps, 
for the artist’s notion of what a modern form of heroism might 
look like. This is also, in a very real sense, a theory of narra-
tive cinema that departs from the childish emphasis placed on 
suspense, sensation, and Manichean moralism by commercial 
cinema, and that provides a grown-up “Chekhovian” transition 
to another way of compelling the audience’s attention. This tran-
spires primarily through Kieślowski’s depiction of such a char-
acter as Elżbieta, one who seeks and searches for what she does 
not know, who locates human mysteries without solutions, and 
who refuses to give up on people.
It’s always dangerous to view characters as stand-ins for art-
ists, but perhaps Elżbieta is the kind of person Kieślowski ad-
mires most, rather than someone who most accurately reflects 
his view of himself. (I think I was wrong about that!) She is, 
perhaps, among the least lost of all the lost souls whose lives 
we’ve seen dramatized so far. As I’ve indicated, however, I do not 
think that Kieślowski thinks that he is like Elżbieta afrter all, and 
this bears repeating. I feel it’s more in tune with Kieślowskian 
sensibilities to suggest that the character of Elżbieta (like Julie 
[Binoche] in Blue and the Irène Jacob characters in The Double 
Life of Veronique and Red), gathers together and romanticizes 
the filmmaker’s ideals of what might be most good in people. 
What coheres here in Kieślowski’s films, among other things, is 
a remarkable set of modern heroines whose heroism involves 
the capacity to love.
Zofia is another kind of figure altogether, an older and wiser per-
son, the flawed and contorted person. Is this, then, Kieślowski? 
I think the analogy is tempting (the answer might be “yes”), but 
unnecessary. Again like Chekhov in this regard, Kieślowski is 
all of these people and none of them. Zofia adheres to a kind of 
personal, private faith, regarding which she, the writer and lec-
turer, seems virtually incapacitated to describe. This feels honest 
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and true to your own concerns, by the way, about expressing 
your mysticism in words that inevitably feel inadequate, feeble, 
or broken. 
Zofia believes in something: “Goodness. It exists. I believe it’s 
there in every human being.” She knows that the night in 1943 
did not bring out the goodness in her. But was that self-knowl-
edge helpful to her in changing her ways and determining to 
continue her work in the resistance to nazism and saving Jews 
from the Holocaust? Elżbieta presses Zofia to explain how one 
decides who is good, or whether it is even true that goodness 
resides in all of us. “And who’s the judge of that?” Elżbieta asks, 
requiring Zofia to make a statement about this faith she is so 
reluctant to discuss openly. 
Zofia answers that question in this remarkable exchange:
“The one who lives inside of each one of us.” 
“I’ve never read anything in your works about God.” 
“I don’t attend church. I don’t use the word ‘God.’ But one can 
believe without having to use words.”
People can set God “aside,” Zofia continues. “And what takes his 
place?” Elżbieta asks. “Here, on Earth, solitude,” Zofia replies, 
“And there — Try and think it through. If there is nothing, if 
there really is nothing… in that case — ” Elżbieta completes this 
unspoken thought (one which has several branches or possible 
conclusions): “Yes.” 
Here, in these ellipses, the Dekalog comes very near the heart 
of the matter we’ve been discussing all along in our letters. “If 
there is nothing, if there really is nothing… .” Then what? (And, 
conversely, if there is “something”? What then?) Zofia, again 
like the doctor character in Dekalog 2, is almost superstitious, 
one might say, about not discussing her faith. This refusal to 
speak is itself intriguing. As for Elżbieta, Kieślowski’s exemplar 
of faith is syncretic, blending Jewish and Christian symbols on 
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her necklace, as I mentioned before. What this mutual accord 
between Elżbieta and Zofia, their shared approach to religion 
(their “yes”), offers, in their antidotes to rigid thinking about 
ethics, might be difficult to describe, but it is also indispensable 
for keeping a humane outlook, especially when the world turns 
nightmarish.
But this film is not through with us. One final drama remains 
to be explored, and, for me, it is the most astonishing encounter 
of them all. Having offered her the spare room (vacated, as it 
happens, by a child on bad terms with her mother), the next day 
Zofia brings Elżbieta to that little tailor’s shop across the river in 
Warsaw, so that she can meet the person or people who actually 
did save her life during the war.
What Elżbieta finds there stuns her. At first, the tailor (Tadeusz 
Łomnicki) seems not to know her, or perhaps pretends not to 
know her. When she reminds him of his courageous act from 
the war years, he refuses to discuss it. Instead, he offers to make 
her a dress. “I don’t want to talk about what happened during 
the war,” he says. “I don’t want to talk about what happened after 
the war. I don’t want to talk about now.”
Elżbieta is taken aback. She tries another sortie, and is rebuffed:
“You were going to hide me. I wanted to thank you.”
“Do you have your own material?”
You really won’t talk to me?”
“Really.”
“What a strange country.”
Then our hearts break anew as we watch the tailor watching 
Elżbieta fondly greet Zofia on the sidewalk outside his shop. 
Zofia has decided to avoid the whole encounter. Presumably 
this is because she’s never been on good terms with this man 
who knows her as the woman who turned away the child, or as 
the person who falsely believed he was a nazi collaborator. His 
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knowledge of her, in any event, is of the hypocritical wartime 
coward, who transformed herself into a comfortable profes-
sor with a checkered past, one who did wrong during the oc-
cupation and yet clearly thrived under communism afterwards, 
while he suffered invisibly all the while. This is crushing. Why 
are some chosen and others discarded? Divinity, if it is there, 
invokes its right to remain silent about the abyss of history.
Elżbieta herself could have just as easily taken the same view 
of Zofia as the tailor, and with very good reasons. We witness 
an extraordinary moment of anticlimax here, among the most 
profound in the cinema, in my view. How much is implied here 
about the potential for denial and the potential for healing after 
historical trauma? The tailor cannot join in this healing process, 
not because he is a bad person, but because he is too trauma-
tized to speak. He is unable to enter fully into an encounter with 
the past. This is understandable, and even more so when we be-
gin to imagine various reasons why he not only doesn’t want to 
talk about the war, but also doesn’t want to talk about what hap-
pened after the war, under communism. Or “now.”
Zofia, despite having played such a part in Elżbieta’s personal 
history, does have the potential to change, grow, and connect 
with the person she wronged. She wishes to understand and to 
be understood. That, in turn, requires conversation and con-
frontation (both with others and oneself). But these are the very 
things that the most morally upright person in this story — the 
tailor — cannot indulge or afford. (Speaking of those who fix 
or mend the world, he must of necessity be a tailor.) Zofia and 
Elżbieta have an affinity that forms a prelude to potential for-
giveness and possible friendship. The tailor, in his apparent ab-
solute goodness, is perhaps too remote, or his heart is frozen 
over too deeply with layers of pain. Gender, here, again, may 
play a role, I’m not sure. The women might become close, or 
closer, while the tailor has shut himself off. Elżbieta understands 
that the best she can do is buy the dress from the tailor and bring 
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a little bit of money to his shop. He cannot even afford new mag-
azines from which to create fashionable clothes for his patrons.
This whole predicament is deeply shocking and it feels as if 
Kieślowski has done the impossible by rendering it true to life. 
As the philosophers say, what else is worth forgiving except the 
unforgivable?
For me, this ending of Dekalog 8 is the place where Kieślowski 
attains the goal of his series. This is also the episode where some 
of the dialogue seems to reflect the concerns not only of this 
individual drama and this single episode, but also of the entire 
series and the filmmaker’s stance towards his own creation. He 
also allows his characters to speak in ways that seem to apply 
to their own situation as well as to the series of interconnected 
stories the viewer has been watching all along. The manner in 
which the stories of Dekalog intersect is one that provides new 
adventures for the viewer on each subsequent viewing of the 
series. Here, for example, we glimpse those German Zeppelin 
stamps that will help form the philately theme of Dekalog 10 and 
bookend the series. 
Meanwhile, that eternal apartment block which we’ve inhab-
ited for so long that it has entered into our lives and dreams is 
described here as an “interesting building.” Zofia shows all the 
cards when she comments, about her neighbors, “‘Everyone has 
a story to tell…’ and so on… .” Indeed.
Don’t you think that this notion of interconnectivity provides 
more depth or intrigue to the episode you criticized earlier, 
Dekalog 9? Or is it still bothering you?
Notes from your friend JMT
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July 29, 2020, 11:07 AM
Dear Josh,
The following thoughts may seem to be going off on a bit of 
a tangent. But hopefully you’ll see that there is some point to 
them. Basically, I want to muss up some of the connections 
you’ve tried to create here, not out of any kind of malicious-
ness or hostility to what you are saying. But out of a feeling that 
a much stranger, a much less contemporary sense of time and 
history and cosmos comes from some of the texts you are citing, 
especially in terms of the tikkun olam stuff and in Benjamin’s 
oft-cited, but, I think, rarely understood Theses on the Philoso-
phy of History. 
It is actually pretty strange and kind of eerie that you brought 
up tikkun olam since just before I read this latest message from 
you I was (I am not making this up) having a conversation with 
my dear friend Rafe Neis (who you met and became rather fast 
friends with during your visit to Detroit last year) about tikkun 
olam and how the concept tends to get used in contemporary 
Judaism and amongst those who would relate it to social justice 
issues. Rafe is an actual scholar on these issues and can explain 
the whole thing much better than I can. But suffice it to say 
that 1960s progressive Judaism did something of a number on 
the concept of tikkun olam as it actually exists in the Mishnah, 
where it is a pretty mundane concept, and then what later hap-
pens to it among the Kabbalists. The main point here for our 
purposes is that the Kabbalistic notion of tikkun olam doesn’t 
maybe fit so well into the idea that we “bend” history in this or 
that direction, which is a notion that fits well with modern ideas 
of history as something that goes this way or that. But from a 
Kabbalistic standpoint, history is just history. It is either in ac-
cord with the divine or not. The more you act in accordance 
with the divine will, the better, but this happens, in a sense, out-
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side of history. When tikkun olam happens it’s like bits of actual 
history are being lifted up into the divine. This happens in leaps 
and jumps and lightning flashes. It is not a process whereby his-
tory as a whole is going in this direction or that.
And that’s why there are all these strange ideas (strange for 
someone raised within the basic sense of history as it exists in 
Western secular Modernity) in Benjamin’s Theses. Benjamin 
says, for instance, that “The past can be seized only as an image 
which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is 
never seen again.” He loves words like “flashes” and “instants” 
and “leaps” and “jumps.” That’s because he isn’t interested in an 
idea of history as something that has a trajectory. The messianic 
potential embedded within history is always the possibility that 
history can be broken open, exploded, leapt outside of. Hope 
is not to be found in history in the sense of where it is going. 
Benjamin has no interest in the idea that the modern era is an 
“improvement” upon past eras or any such notion. But each mo-
ment in history is, nevertheless, imbued with special possibili-
ties. Each moment in history can be the sudden realization of 
the radically new and the completely redeemed. Each moment 
in history is a “state of emergency.” “History,” Benjamin writes, 
“is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogenous, 
empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now.” This has 
nothing to do with the idea of fighting the good fight over time, 
making the world better generation by generation, the continu-
ity of history over time. None of that. It is, instead, the idea that 
history is a sort of metaphysically inert thing, a piling up of a 
continuous disaster, as he puts it, that does not have the means 
or the content to create its own meaning. There is no point or 
purpose or direction to history when we think of it on history’s 
terms. It is simply a shit show. What is interesting to Benjamin 
is that embedded within this shit show are shards of redemp-




Okay, fine, I’ve said enough about this. I wonder, though, if the 
tailor at the end of Dekalog 8 can’t be seen in this Benjaminian 
light. He is the bit of history that does not fit. He is a trouble-
some spot of discontinuity. He is the sign of something wrong, 
an unredeemed leftover. As such, he is also the sign of the possi-
bility of redemption, again, not as something we work toward in 
a conscious process of slowly fixing history. No, he is the shard. 
This shard has the possibility of blowing up at any moment and 
therefore blowing a hole in the otherwise smooth story of con-
tinuity that human history likes to pretend is the case. Poland 
itself is kind of like the tailor, as I was suggesting before. Poland 
is the piece that does not fit, the historical loser. And Benjamin 
demands that historical materialists (i.e., secret theologians) be 
the ones to turn their backs on the historical victors, to deny 
that history has “accomplished” anything and to throw their 
weight in with the losers. That’s why we must approach history 
always with the great burden of sadness. Benjamin quotes Flau-
bert. “Few will be able to guess how sad one had to be in order to 
resuscitate Carthage.” Carthage, in this sense, has more to teach 
us than Rome. Or, from the perspective of Kieślowski, Poland 
has more to teach us than America. The very fact that Poland 
has such a shitty history is the very reason that it is so pregnant 
with messianic potential. You don’t look to a nation’s achieve-
ments to find its messianic potential, you look to its failures. 
Could that be what the culmination of Dekalog 8 is showing us?
As for Dekalog 9, I think my interest always flags in this one be-
cause the drama between the impotent doctor and his wife feels 
a bit contrived and overblown to me. I just don’t really respond 
to the main plot line. I am intrigued by the opera singer, though. 
I think her name is Ola. She has to have a heart operation in 
order to keep singing but is struggling with whether to do it. In 
some sense, of course, she is Weronika from the Double Life of 
Veronique. I don’t know, there is something profound here that 
also has to do with the question of messianic time and all the 
Benjamin stuff I’ve just been talking about. I’m still thinking it 
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through. Maybe you wanna get it going and I’ll see if I can sort 





July 31, 2020, 12:50 PM
Dear Morgan,
Yes, contemporary politics in Poland, a subject on which I’m 
certainly no expert, would seem to bolster your claim that no 
progress is guaranteed by history, whether we call ourselves 
modern, postmodern, nonmodern, or something else entirely. 
The attempt to repair the shattered world cannot be warranted 
by the course of events alone. Yet the breakthrough made by 
Elżbieta and Zofia in Dekalog 8 cannot be limited to a purely 
individual outcome. This story has implications for collective 
experience on some level, I am convinced, but, I agree, this is 
not a narrative of historical progress. It’s a flash and a jump, as 
you suggest. The past is not just history. The past has a future. 
The vision of tikkun olam, if we consider Rafe’s helpful inter-
vention, does not bend history in the right direction. That’s way 
too grandiose and also way too easy. (That said, I don’t see any 
reason why Elżbieta wouldn’t be exactly the right age of person 
to subscribe to the “new” understanding of tikkun olam as a call 
to social justice in the 1960s and beyond, a hermeneutic novelty 
that itself is by now decades old!)
Anyway, I think you are spot on, also, in identifying the tailor 
character as a figure who reveals how limited that breakthrough 
is between the two women. If this breakthrough is something 
more than an instant, it’s still not one that can be shared even 
between these three people whose lives converged one night 
in 1943. And, if not between these three, then who? You’re 
right — it’s the tailor who is more of a synecdoche for Polish na-
tional experience, whereas the outcome of the story of Elżbieta 
and Zofia represents an ideal that rarely if ever comes to pass. 
Their truth and reconciliation process has something of the fla-
vor of an impossibility that nevertheless happens.
I’m persuaded by Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of “liquid moder-
nity” (in his book of the same name) as a reasonable diagnosis 
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of an ongoing condition of ceaseless change, under the regime 
of instrumental rationality, and consumerist perceptions of our-
selves, and our relationships, as being liable to extreme altera-
tions by technology and mass culture. One thing I find hearten-
ing about our shared excursions here, into the little corner of 
the culture where religion and cinema overlap, is that this is a 
place from which society’s “ostensibly unquestionable premises 
of our way of life” (as Bauman puts it in another book, about 
globalization) can be questioned and subjected to stringent cri-
tique or narrative investigation. (It may be worth mentioning 
in passing, apropos of Dekalog 8, that Bauman lost his teaching 
post in Warsaw under pressure from the communist authorities, 
speaking of Polish professors.) 
What’s remarkable is that Kieślowski’s films continue to speak 
to “the way we live now” so many years after his untimely death. 
Kieślowski’s films gesture ahead of their time towards this post-
secular critique of modern disenchantment that we’ve been pur-
suing in these letters, as well as offering ways towards a sensi-
bility that was deeply alienating to the competing ideologies of 
the late 20th century. These aspects of his work allow us, retro-
spectively, to be suspicious of the triumphalist American rheto-
ric of “the end of history” surrounding the fall of the USSR, but 
without falling into Ostalgie for life under communism, whose 
purported rationality and instrumental exploitation turned out 
to be so brutal. 
On the other hand, I can appreciate the virtue of viewing 
Kieślowski as nonmodern, since, clearly, the entire drift of the 
Dekalog tends towards the implication that the scriptures have 
some real purchase on the present, an idea which suggests that 
modernity’s claim to be radically different from life in the past 
might be overblown. Kieślowski’s complexity and ambigu-
ity — specifically, his imposition of an ancient storytelling struc-
ture on tales of “contemporary” life that still feel relevant over 
thirty years on — allow for this double-lensed impression of his 
work. The fact that our viewpoints don’t fully merge and yet 
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both feel true to the work is not only fascinating but also a sign 
of Kieślowski’s durability, I think.
It’s Elżbieta’s syncretism that makes her contemporary (a “mod-
ern” person in the commonly understood sense of the word who 
chooses her own philosophical stance). But it is her willingness 
to be guided by her faith that makes her nonmodern in the best 
possible sense. We don’t know the backstory of her jewelry mix-
ing Jewish and Christian symbols, but that’s the kind of thing 
that marks her as having spent her life in the postwar West. Yet 
she’s also the character who takes the Eighth Commandment 
most seriously and allows the Law to shape her life. By refusing 
absolutely to bear false witness, she also refuses to evaluate Zofia 
until she has all the evidence she is able to gather. She is the tru-
est witness involved with Zofia’s “trial” in Dekalog 8.
Modernity is not the thing that provides Elżbieta with hope, 
her faith does, yet that faith could be viewed as quintessentially 
modern, or, alternatively, as critically nonmodern. Her faith is 
both pleasingly obsolete (involving Elżbieta’s “irrational” reli-
ance on prayer and forgiveness as well as her confidence in the 
Commandments as a coherent whole) and intriguingly newfan-
gled (in its post-1960s combination of religions, invoking what 
is elsewhere called a “private” — or modern? — ! — God). Mo-
dernity, assuming that it exists, operates here not as something 
to promote or condemn but simply as the condition in which 
these characters exist in late 1980s Poland. They are dealing with 
the aftermath of modernity’s worst horrors — the industrial-
scale genocide in the death camps — and the incipient collapse 
of the modern edifice of the Iron Curtain as an outgrowth of the 
failed revolution and botched global empire of the USSR. The 
contemporary political scene in Poland today, in which nostal-
gic traditionalism is rotting the country’s chances from the head 
down, provides a case study in how reactionaries instill tyranny 
by pretending that modernity can be overcome by a return to 
what they describe as religious values.
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But of course another sort of faith is possible. This faith of 
Elżbieta’s is redolent both of our postsecular era and of ancient 
texts, which, of course, means that it is thoroughly contempo-
rary. I think it might be viewed as a little bit New Age, in the 
more positive sense. It’s detached from any clearly defined con-
gregation or public worship. Yet its combination of Jewish and 
Christian symbols also seems true to the spirit of Early Christi-
anity (before the establishment of the Church), and to the teach-
ings of Jesus (in particular, to the Great Commandment to “love 
thy neighbor as thyself ”). Neighbors — that’s what the Dekalog 
is all about, the person who is hidden away in the next room 
suffering! What makes for a neighbor and for hospitality, in the 
deepest possible sense, becomes an insistent theme of the series, 
in general, and of the incidents from 1943 described by the char-
acters in Dekalog 8, in particular. And this Great Command-
ment is redolent of a specific moment in history when Jewish 
thinkers like Jesus, Paul, James, and Jude were reconsidering the 
meaning of the Law according to the Prophecies. In fact, be-
cause Dekalog 8 invokes the Shoah, I think it’s important to un-
derline something. The false claim often made in Christian anti-
Semitic rhetoric, that Judaism is “legalistic” and rule-following, 
has been undermined in contemporary scholarship on the New 
Testament. The earliest Christians were Jews, of course, and held 
to Jewish philosophy, with the Great Commandment repeatedly 
emphasized by Jesus not as a violation of the Decalogue but its 
fulfillment. Maybe Kieślowski wishes to portray Elżbieta as be-
ing truer to Jesus than some of the Catholics of 1943 by recover-
ing the Jewish roots of the Great Commandment.
Elżbieta’s combination of religious symbols accords well with 
her prayerful compassion and her deep well of forgiveness for 
Zofia. The symbols on her necklace don’t contradict one anoth-
er, or monotheism, if one takes Early Christianity seriously as a 
Jewish movement. Even if many of these texts lead the believer 
away from the doctrine of the Trinity or the damning sentence 
about extra Ecclesiam nulla salus — no salvation outside of the 
Church — they remain true to the spirit of much in the New 
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Testament. The Letter of James, for example, despised by Luther 
as a “letter of straw” in part because it recovers the historical 
sensibility of “Jewish Christianity” in the early days following 
the death of Jesus, announces that true religion is “to look after 
orphans and widows in their distress and to keep oneself from 
being polluted by the world” (1:27). The idea here, to keep on 
keeping on with good works that follow the Decalogue as one 
answer to how to live in the wake of Jesus’s death, chimes with 
Elżbieta’s distress in 1943 as a child in need of protection from a 
polluted world.
This is not the place to enter very deeply into the history of the 
Catholic Church, generally, or the Polish Catholic Church, spe-
cifically, during the Shoah. It is sufficient, I think, to note the 
historical accuracy in Dekalog 8 regarding the role of baptismal 
certificates that converted Jews to Christians before they were 
helped to hide from the nazis. On one hand, these certificates 
were deemed necessary by Catholic nuns, monks, and priests, 
all of whom risked death to save lives, giving their work a fig 
leaf of cover under which to operate. On the other hand, the 
certificates meant that survival depended on no longer being 
regarded as a Jewish person. Therefore they raise a question as 
to whether a Jewish person was “worth saving” in the eyes of 
Catholics because they were a person, or because they had con-
verted and were “no longer Jewish.” In some sense personhood 
and hospitality became symbolically connected. “Thy neighbor,” 
then, is not a neighbor to be recognized with love until they are 
baptized? 
From here there is a line of influence to be drawn all the way for-
ward to the present-day rhetoric of the Duda government, with 
its convoluted new laws freezing open discussion of Polish com-
plicity in the Shoah. The ascription of threats to the nation by 
“alien” forces (then, Jews, now, LGBTIQA+ persons) sounds like 
an echo of Polish Cardinal August Hlond’s old slander that “Pol-
ish Jews could not be assimilated into the country’s life, and that 
at worst, they poisoned it.” This is not a far cry from the rheto-
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ric concerning the bogus threat posed by George Soros and the 
Open Society foundation on the part of Hungary’s Viktor Or-
bán, or the anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant elements within 
the far-right here in the USA. And the obsessional nature of this 
focus on imaginary external threats, in each of these cases, is 
based on a traditionalist call to reject modern liberal secularism 
and to advocate for a return to “values.” But this picture is com-
plicated by the fact that, as Karen Armstrong’s book The Battle 
for God (2000) points out, contemporary fundamentalism is it-
self a thoroughly modern outgrowth of pseudo-scientific claims 
for religion based on ways of reading holy texts that are, in fact, 
far from traditional.
Elżbieta — and Kieślowski — remind us, if a reminder is needed, 
that another option is always possible. That is, very simply, to 
take religion seriously, unlike so many who loudly proclaim to 
be religious and believe that they will be saved by a God they 
insult daily by their words and actions. This alternative way of 
thinking through religion might involve some admittedly unor-
thodox versions of faith — or even various forms of syncretism, 
heresy, or blasphemy, perhaps including combinations of reli-
gions or private gods of whom it is better not to speak. 
What this doesn’t entail, for Kieślowski, however, is material-
ism. As I’ve mentioned previously, it is possible to position 
Kieślowski’s films at a very specific historical cusp delicately 
balancing between the influences of a number of variously 
conflicting regimes, including Polish communism and Catholi-
cism, the empire of America and its movie and television cul-
ture, and the emerging dimensions of a European Union into 
which Poland fits very awkwardly at the best of times. Here, in 
this strange space that you rightly point out seems endemic to 
Poland, Kieślowski developed his epic vision in the late 1980s 
and the early to mid-1990s. In doing so, he created an utterly as-
tonishing series of films that, taken together, seem to challenge 
many of the assumptions of the Cold War and the post-Cold 
War Third Way, as well as the smug and misplaced confidence 
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of the seemingly triumphant secular culture of liberal pluralism 
and the fundamentalist vision of returning to tradition. All in a 
day’s work, I guess.
In The Double Life of Veronique, Kieślowski specifically connects 
the fate of characters who live in an interstitial zone somewhere 
between France and Poland, invoking, as he does later in White, 
the sense of shared fate between these two countries, but also 
the yearning of Poland to be European, a love that, pointedly, is 
not returned or even acknowledged on some level. Here, as at 
many key moments in his films, Kieślowski’s characters become 
aware of forces that exist beyond the ken of rationality, which 
cannot be explained, which are portrayed as real, and which 
have a status that seems to me to be most similar to the stance of 
folklore rather than any official conception of worship. I think 
this element in his work — whether one calls it spiritualist, spir-
itual, or religious — is one of the reasons why Kieślowski’s films 
feel simultaneously timely and timeless, modern and nonmod-
ern, contemporary and classic.
Your critical comments about Dekalog 9 seem fair enough to 
me. I agree with you that its minor characters are more inter-
esting than its central ones. I suppose we could take comfort 
in the idea that Kieślowski has revealed himself to be merely 
human and leave it at that! But there’s another sense in which 
the episode acts as a kind of transit hub or telephone exchange 
for many of the ideas and storylines that the filmmaker would 
pursue afterwards. This, I think, makes Dekalog 9 more than a 
filmmaker’s notebook, and positions it instead as a kind of deep 
storage facility for the seeds that Kieślowski would use later to 
grow so many of his subsequent projects. (Have I mixed my 
metaphors sufficiently yet?) The episode becomes more and 
more interesting, I would argue, as one links it to other episodes 
in the Dekalog and to The Double Life of Veronique and Three 
Colors. So much so that I’m tempted to argue that Dekalog 9 
presents us as viewers with the possibility of attempting to con-
struct an ideal “film inside our heads” which comprises all of 
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Kieślowski’s work in one unified picture. But this temptation 
should be resisted, since the attempt to combine these movies 
into one seamless whole is bound to fail.
Nevertheless, Dekalog 9 is well-known to be a sort of gold mine 
from which Kieślowski draws a surprisingly large number of his 
characters, plot elements, themes, leitmotifs, and even some of 
the filmmaker’s “stock company” of actors in his later films. As 
you mention, the singer with the heart condition, Ola (Jolanta 
Piętek-Górecka), becomes Weronika/Veronique in The Double 
Life of Veronique. The uncanny choral music that seems to “kill” 
Weronika is that of the fictional composer Van den Budenmay-
er, who has another fan and listener in Julie, the protagonist of 
Blue. On a more subtle level, Dekalog 9’s play with music and 
telephone surveillance might find echoes in the mentoring re-
lationship between an older man and a younger woman in Red. 
The stresses caused by impotence in a marriage to a beautiful 
blonde, on the other hand, are reprised in White by the great 
actors Julie Delpy (as Dominique Vidal) and Zbigniew Zama-
chowski (playing Karol Karol). The latter also stars alongside 
Jerzy Stuhr (who is also wonderful as Jurek in White) in Dekalog 
10. Such is the intricate and delicate knitting between Dekalog 9 
and the rest of the films Kieślowski made afterwards. The name 
of a friend in Krakow mentioned casually in Dekalog 9, Mikołaj, 
turns up again in White. This time around, Mikołaj is a more 
major character, played by Janusz Gajos (from Dekalog 4), who, 
like Roman (aka Romek, played by Piotr Machalica) in Dekalog 
9, wishes to dispatch himself, but who, also like Roman/Romek, 
finds new reasons to live.
Kieślowski’s world is interconnected not only thematically but 
also in a sort of quasi-Faulknerian sense in which new films act 
as outgrowths from previous ones and characters seem to over-
lap and merge. Except that these overlaps are not quite seamless, 
which causes various disruptions in our ability to combine them 
into some totality or cinematic Gesamtkunstwerk. It might be 
more accurate to suggest that Kieślowski’s characters seem to 
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“double” and proliferate various “versions” of themselves from 
one production to the next. In one sense, the characters in the 
later films might be seen as having an uncanny relationship with 
their predecessors, continuing their symphony by adding new 
notes by another composer, so to speak, to use the central meta-
phor of Julie’s artistic method of finishing her dead husband’s 
composition in Blue. Somewhere near the center of these pat-
terns, I would argue, is Van den Budenmayer. He’s well-known 
to Kieślowskians as the fictional 18th-century Dutch composer 
invented by the filmmaker and brought to life gloriously by the 
composer Zbigniew Preisner in the “excerpts” from Van den 
Budenmayer we hear presented diegetically in the Dekalog, The 
Double Life of Veronique, and Three Colors. 
The singer Ola in Dekalog 9 and the singers Weronika/Vero-
nique in Double Life both have heart conditions, although they 
have different names and are played by different actors. They 
are both the same and different from one another. Within The 
Double Life of Veronique, Irène Jacob, the actor who portrays the 
French Veronique, a music teacher who listens with rapt atten-
tion to Van den Budenmayer, also portrays the Polish Weronika, 
the singer who while dies performing Van den Budenmayer’s 
choral work. They, too, are both the same and different — both 
the characters and, arguably, the actor herself. But that differ-
ence is different, insofar as the situation has shifted and we’re 
now seeing the same actor playing a double role. Jacob’s return 
in Red presents a further unfolding of these complexities and 
doublings. Again she listens to Van den Budenmayer, as if she 
has never heard it before, or as if we had never seen her encoun-
tering this music in her previous roles. Like the flute’s notes that 
complete the song for the “reunification of Europe” being as-
sembled in Blue, Jacob-as-Valentine joins the protagonists from 
these other films in the astonishing ending of Red. This finale, 
which also marks the end of Kieślowski’s filmmaking career, 
brings together the major characters from the trilogy and uni-
fies their stories. In this way, all of these local tales, set in France, 
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Switzerland, and Poland, form a European symphony that also 
includes the linked lives (and music) in The Double Life of Vero-
nique and the tower blocks of Warsaw in Dekalog.
We would like to see an artist’s work add up to some coherent 
whole, but this dream of one film can never be completed. It’s a 
tantalizing illusion but also a necessary fiction. In a somewhat 
similar fashion, the episodes of the Dekalog add up to some-
thing larger than the sum of their parts, with their individual 
dramas building into an interconnected set of stories that also 
stands as a singular work of art. To quote the hilarious and self-
referential line that culminates the tragicomedy portrayed in the 
last episode of the Dekalog, “It’s a series!”
If nothing else, the melodrama of Dekalog 9 serves to avoid a 
potentially jarring transition in tone between the deeply tragic 
seriousness of Dekalog 8 and the exuberant outburst of jokes in 
Dekalog 10. It simply would not have worked to go from Episode 
8 to Episode 10. Some insulation was required between these two 
rooms. Yet this interstitial material provides much of the wiring 
between Kieślowski’s phases and projects as he moved westward 
from Warsaw to Paris and back again to the windswept heights 
of Lake Geneva and finally out to sea in the English Channel as 
it is depicted at the end of Red. We’re left regretting that he never 
made a London film and a New York film and a Tokyo film and 
a Hong Kong film and a Delhi film and an Istanbul film and a 
Capetown film. But maybe it’s better that things turned out this 
way after all. There are other films to be made and other stories, 
for other artists who are closer to these places, to tell. Yes, this 
series is better viewed as an invitation to explore one’s own sur-
roundings rather than as an attempt to center a false universal-
ism in one location.
Notes from your friend JMT
P.S. Two images here of Kieślowski’s outcasts, juxtaposed so as to 





August 3, 2020, 11:43 AM
Dear Josh,
Not to quibble, and I’ll let this go in a second, but the Benjamin-
ian claim is not that “no progress is guaranteed by history,” but 
that progress has nothing to do with history at all even a little bit, 
nope, not even a smidgen. Nothing. Regress is also an irrelevant 
concept when dealing with history, by the way. Benjamin was 
working with a concept of history that has nothing to do with ei-
ther a progressive or a conservative idea. Benjamin, in that text, 
is interested in revolution and in messianism. He’s more or less 
convinced that the two go together, thus the “funny” story about 
the Turkish chess playing automaton. The automaton is likened 
to historical materialism. The reason that historical materialism 
(revolutionary Marxism) will win, according to Benjamin, is 
that it is secretly being guided by the theological dwarf hidden 
under the table. That’s to say, 20th-century revolutionary poli-
tics was simply a way for the messianic moment to rip history 
open and allow access to the divine. Like it or not, that’s what 
Benjamin was up to in his thinking and it is a point so baffling 
to many of the readers of Benjamin that they consistently twist 
themselves in knots trying to explain how he actually meant 
something else. But he didn’t.
Okay, that’s all I’ll say on that. I mean, the potential impact of 
this thought is so huge that we could talk about just this together 
for the rest of our lives. But maybe that is also why we should 
just let it go.
And maybe, funnily, this has something to do with why Deka-
log ends as it does. You’ve already said it, really. Dekalog 9 must 
exist, and must have its farcical moments, because Dekalog 10 
must exist and Dekalog 10 must be essentially a comedy and it 
must be a comedy that verges on the ridiculous or the shaggy 
dog. (Interesting maybe that one of the key comedic elements in 
Dekalog 10 is that massive and somehow highly amusing dog.) 
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Turning Dekalog 10 into an almost goofy shaggy dog story was 
a brave thing for Kieślowski to do, I would say, especially since 
I don’t get the feeling that he was a particularly funny guy. Not 
that there aren’t genuine moments of humor in White and in 
other spots throughout Dekalog and in other things Kieślowski 
directed. He wasn’t without humor. He could find the amusing 
moments and the little spots of the comedic. Still, he never actu-
ally directed a true comedy and taking Dekalog 10 on its own, 
as some kind of comedic statement in its own right, would be to 
say that obviously this is Kieślowski out of his element. Dekalog 
10 only works, insofar as it works, in relation to the rest of the 
films of Dekalog.
I think it is great because the sense we could get from the entire-
ty of Dekalog up to 10 is that life is essentially tragic. It has the es-
sential structure of tragedy, which is basically the problem of the 
individual, the particular, in the face of the larger structures and 
forces against which the individual has no chance. The prob-
lem of the individual, in tragedy, is the problem of navigating 
this territory of “no chance.” Either one is ground to dust in this 
confrontation or one learns to cancel one’s own individuality, in 
a sense. One bows to the gods. One way or another, in tragedy, 
one bows to the inevitability of the gods. This is the greatness of 
tragedy, and the greatest tragedies are the ones that convey the 
relentlessness and lack of pity or sentimentality through which 
this inevitability has its way.
Comedy is not the opposite of this, but it is an interesting twist. 
Because in comedy, the inescapable logic of tragedy is subverted 
ever so slightly by the leaps and jumps, the illogical, the silly, 
the unexpected. Laughter is not really an answer to the unstop-
pable force of tragedy. That force will always exert itself. But 
laughter is a pause. It is a hesitation in the midst of the grind. 
Comedy always tries to slip a banana peel under the iron feet 
of the tragic progression. This will fail, of course, which is it-
self pretty funny. Comedy is always about failure and is always 
a tribute to the beauty of failure. In fact, most comedies fail be-
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cause they don’t have the stomach to see the ridiculous failure 
all the way through to the end. They try to snatch a victory at the 
last moment. That’s when these pseudo-comedies become what 
comedy should never be, which is anti-tragedy. Comedy cannot 
defeat tragedy. That’s the point. Tragedy is correct, in this sense. 
Tragedy is the true state of affairs. But comedy, in accepting the 
state of affairs that is tragic, in affirming, in a sense, the situation 
in which the individual will always lose, preserves and redeems 
the beauty of that losing proposition. Comedy is the acceptance 
of the situation of losing and a celebration of the process by 
which that inevitable losing plays itself out.
I would say that Kieślowski stays quite close to this sense of 
comedy in Dekalog 10. The two brothers are never going to come 
out on top. They are going to bumble and fight. They are going 
to turn against one another. They are going to make stupid deci-
sions in their greed and in their attempts to make it rich from 
their father’s stamp collection. They are going to miss the point 
that it was obsession around the stamps that turned their father 
into a selfish and small person in the first place. And they are go-
ing to be outmaneuvered by the professionals who have always 
been two steps ahead of them from the very beginning. This is 
also the position of the individual vis-à-vis fate. And yet, it is in 
the final failure and the ultimate losing that the two brothers are 
able finally to see one another again. This is the true joy of come-
dy. It is the joy of seeing the true face of the other in the moment 
of defeat. This does not forestall the defeat. But it does change it. 
It does create a tiny space within which life can happen.
If I can make a bit of a jump here, I have a friend who is an Epis-
copal priest. He always likes to say that Christianity is for losers. 
This is a hard point for most Christians to hold onto. Everybody 
wants to flip it around at the last moment. Everybody wants to 
pretend that being a Christian means that you’re going to win in 
the end, somehow, by some trick of history or the afterlife. Eve-
rybody wants to slap a triumphant resurrection onto the story 
of the Cross. But what would it mean to see the figure of Christ 
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upon the Cross as one of the great moments of tragi-comedy? 
“Oh Shit,” Christ finally realizes, “this is where it all ends up.” 
That is a very funny moment, actually. That’s where Kieślowski 
wants to leave us, I think. We are presented with the full pano-
ramic scope of the tragedy that is life. And then this tragedy is 
embraced, utterly and completely, in the only way that it can be 
embraced, with a laugh.




August 6, 2020, 6:42 PM
Dear Morgan,
It’s melancholy-inducing for me to see this project of ours wind-
ing down. So the idea of discussing these things for life on a 
porch somewhere (literal or metaphorical) sounds most heart-
ening. I was just thinking of a whole series of serendipities in-
volving Benjamin’s “angel of history,” which fittingly haunts our 
correspondence right now. While itself based on Klee’s 1920 
painting, this figure recurs in cinema as well, most obviously 
influencing Wim Wenders in Wings of Desire, itself a film with 
a curious relationship to European history. The release of Wings 
of Desire in 1987 predated the broadcast of the Dekalog and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall by only a couple of years. Artur Barciś, 
while wing-less, takes up a somewhat similar observation post 
in Kieślowski’s series as Damiel (Bruno Ganz) does before his 
decision to become human in Wenders’s film. And this angel 
spreads its wings across the Atlantic, appearing in Laurie An-
derson’s song “The Dream Before” on her album Strange Angels, 
from 1989. Anderson’s song has a well-known lovely opening: 
“Hansel and Gretel are alive and well / And they’re living in Ber-
lin. / She is a cocktail waitress — he had a part in a Fassbinder 
film.” I thought at first that might be a gesture to Wenders. But 
Anderson had been making wonderfully strange films all along, 
including “What You Mean We?” which aired on PBS in 1986, 
before  the release of Wings of Desire, including a performance of 
“The Dream Before.” (There’s always a dream before. Anderson 
had been thinking of Benjamin and a poem by Howard Moss 
in Harper’s, according to the film’s credits. Klee, too, apparently 
used a print of a Cranach painting of Luther for mounting his 
own image, according to R.H. Quaytman, who created her own 
contemporary response.) “Can you imagine having wings?” one 
character asks in Anderson’s short television film.
I realize that Benjamin was writing under duress and persecu-
tion in an historical moment with extreme pressure building 
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intolerably towards what must have seemed at the time like 
absolute and binary choices. There’s something absurd, almost 
mad, in a way, about his ideas that cinema would turn out to be 
a liberating force, as you mentioned before, and that historical 
materialism could open up the realm of the religious, in the way 
you illuminate here. And yet… didn’t Kieślowski and Anderson 
eventually make something like this happen by broadcasting 
Dekalog and “What You Mean We?” to the millions on Polish 
and American television? In that most unlikely of places, hiding 
in plain sight — the box — we witness the loss of aura and see 
the infinite reproducibility of images that placed all these angels 
inside every home. The altarpiece has been brought to you and 
requires no pilgrimage.
To take up Dekalog 8 again, very briefly, if I may, the break-
through dramatized between Elżbieta and Zofia feels like it has 
something to do with history and something to do with reli-
gion, in the specific sense that it happens according to a vision 
of time not as nunc fluens but nunc stans. Their accord is an 
outburst of love, if not eternity, one might say, that does not 
and cannot alter the course of history “out there.” They are kin-
dred — adoptive family — neighbors in the sense commanded. 
History, in the larger political sense, is not Kieślowski’s main 
concern here. The arc of his career veers away from politics. Yet, 
at the same time, his characters’ movement towards friendship 
can be pinned with precision to a particular set of lives over-
lapping in certain places and times in the 20th century. That 
process of overlapping stories and interthreading fates, to some 
purpose that remains mysterious, seems to reside at the heart of 
the Dekalog, and of Kieślowski’s films more generally, if viewed 
as an interconnected “series.”
What you have to say about comedy gets right to the heart of 
things in Dekalog 10, since it raises the question about whether 
some divine force guides the warp and woof of this loom — or 
not. Dante’s vision of “comedy” is “divine” in this very precise 
manner. There is a narrow path that leads up from purgatory 
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to heaven, a chance to find oneself when lost, and to redeem 
all the horror one has witnessed or lived through. For all the 
reasons you describe so well — and I especially appreciate the 
notion of Christianity for “the losers” — all this hard living must 
be comedy, in Dante’s sense, in the last analysis, if God exists, 
and if we keep the faith. Or maybe not? Yes, I suppose it’s also 
pretty funny, in an absurdist, existential sense, if nothing is there 
after all except accelerating galaxy clusters and stuff. If we play 
the man in light of the vastness of the cosmos, the joke’s on us. 
That seems apropos of Chaplin’s Little Tramp character as an 
archetypal cinematic “beautiful loser,” subject to the accursed 
randomness of secular buffeting winds.
In some ways, aren’t we talking about how wisdom allows us to 
reframe our suffering and tell a different story about “what fools 
these mortals be,” including ourselves? The same set of tragic 
events can be viewed, in retrospect, as survivable, like the joyous 
outburst experienced by Mikołaj in White after he pays some-
one to kill him but then casts away his suicidal depression when 
he realizes that he gets to live after all. This might be my favorite 
scene in all of Kieślowski’s films, a parable of life as perfect as 
anything in Kafka, and I think it is characteristic of the general 
underrating of comedy that White is not considered the equal 
of the other films in Three Colors. Now, I show my cards. I am a 
believer in the religion of laughter.
Returning to the Dekalog, I think it’s worth noting that The 
Ninth and Tenth Commandments are closely linked together by 
the idea of covetousness, in the former case for spouses and in 
the latter case for possessions. These Commandments and the 
stories based on them in the series involve stealing or feeling one 
has been stolen from. It’s strange that they come at the end of the 
list of laws. Not an afterthought, however, but rather a summa-
tion of the whole business of who possesses what in some larger 
sense. Your notes have inspired me to wonder if Dekalog 9 and 
10 act as mirror images of one another. The crushing failure and 
impotence that drives Roman to attempt suicide gets replayed 
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in some sense by the failure of the brothers to win at the stamp 
collecting game, with the difference that they are able to accept 
their defeat and powerlessness, and laugh in the face of the abyss 
rather than being drawn down into a state of despair. 
Riffing on your comments, one might almost say that the broth-
ers have decided between themselves what’s happened to them. 
The loss of a fortune is not a tragedy, or rather that tragedy is 
not the end, not the final word, as you suggest. That is their 
story, and they are sticking to it. As you write (daringly) of the 
crucifixion, “This tragedy is embraced, utterly and completely, 
in the only way that it can be embraced, with a laugh.” There’s 
also something funny about the various apostles’ initial refus-
als to believe in (or inability to recognize) the appearances of 
Christ after his death, and the whole rigmarole that’s necessary 
to convince some of the disciples to believe. I keep thinking of 
that phrase misattributed to Tertullian, “I believe because it is 
absurd.” Begone, all you New Atheists and reason-toting theo-
logians, with your sad public debating points and clinically ob-
tuse YouTube videos. Welcome back to Malick, von Trier, and 
Kieślowski.
One significant difference between the last two episodes of the 
Dekalog is that Kieślowski has moved from considerations based 
on romantic love to those of brotherly love. This is actually an 
interesting reversal of the normal pattern of classic literary gen-
re storytelling, insofar as comedy generally involves thoughts of 
marriage, and tragedy often springs from sibling rivalry, at least 
in Shakespeare. In Dekalog 10, however, the rivalry and distance 
dissolves as the brothers share their burdens. Whereas in Deka-
log 9, the Tartuffe-like play with hidden observers and sexual 
indiscretions and so forth plays as melodrama rather than as 
farce. So, in Dekalog 9 adultery is not considered through the 
typical male lens of philandering, while in Dekalog 10 a story of 
philately becomes one about the notion of philadelphia, some 
city of brotherly love.
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We’ve really been talking all this time about love in its various 
forms — friendship, camaraderie, filial piety, brotherly affec-
tion, adoption, parenting, romance, eros, and religious agapē. 
All this time the law has been about love from the beginning, 
as in Jewish philosophy. While the Ninth Commandment about 
“thy neighbor’s wife” is under consideration in Dekalog 9, the 
episode might as easily have the same title as the feature film 
created from Dekalog 6, A Short Film About Love. And what is 
the Dekalog itself as a series except a Long Film about Love? Add 
in Three Colors, and it’s even longer… . 
Impotent Roman is useful to the singer Ola during her hospi-
tal stay, as she attempts to make a decision about whether or 
not to have surgery on her heart, an operation, however, that 
might negatively affect her singing career. Their friendship goes 
beyond the mechanistic sense of usefulness one would expect 
from a doctor-patient relationship, while also avoiding the ex-
ploitative use to which two disaffected people with time on their 
hands might put one another when thrown together after hours 
for a cigarette break in a movie. Instead, they form a bond based 
on their shared love of music. Roman is able to help, and to heal, 
precisely because he’s not at all interested in using the singer, 
but instead learns from her. His own sense of his own useless-
ness is also, therefore, totally misguided, because it is based on 
a false premise about sex being the sum of all fulfillment. But he 
doesn’t understand this clearly. Love and friendship have dura-
ble value, sex is unavoidable but volatile, important but liable to 
get twisted up in self-destructive impulses (of which we’ve seen 
plenty already in the series). Roman takes on the role of confes-
sor and advisor to Ola, but he doesn’t offer her his advice about 
her surgery until he learns more about her background and mo-
tives — her story as a person.
Love and friendship are particularly useful when people aren’t 
using one another (which isn’t love anyway), that is, when they 
are “useless.” This also entails a resistance against turning peo-
ple into things to be reified. What ultimately brings Roman 
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and his spouse, Hanka (Ewa Błaszczyk), back together involves 
their pledge to be honest to one another and not manipulate 
each other (her by lying, him by voyeuristically peeping on her 
sexual infidelities). People cannot be replaced, swapped out, or 
reduced to interchangeable parts. It’s actually interesting from a 
narrative perspective that their rapprochement takes place over 
the telephone, not in the type of melodramatic hospital bed 
scene one might expect. (Kieślowski disallows such nuisances 
and insists on such nuances, even to the point of resisting drama 
altogether here.) “You’re there,” she tells him on the phone, ap-
provingly, and assertively, indicating the depth of wonder she 
feels just at the mere fact of his existence. Isn’t it amazing that 
the people we love not only continue to exist but also continue 
to love us? They go to sleep, wake up, and still love us. Or they 
don’t. How mysterious!
There is only one Roman and one Hanka, they’ve found each 
other once again. They both are “there” in some ultimate sense. 
This love, and not just Roman’s impotence, is also a part of what 
allows him the leeway to develop a non-exploitative friendship 
with a much younger woman, who, in turn, is able to bring con-
solation into his life in the form of beautiful music. Here Deka-
log 9 recasts its Commandment, traveling away from nonsense 
about “thy neighbor’s wife” and towards the deeper waters in-
volving property and possessions. The all-important distinction 
between what we want and what we have is outlined by Ola for 
Roman. She describes the difference between what her mother 
wants for her in life — I think the word used here is “everything” 
or “all” of it — versus her own personal and artistic ambitions. 
To illustrate her point, Ola holds up her fingers and squeezes 
them to represent how little she wants in comparison with what 
her mother wants for her. Yet she’s obviously a brilliantly tal-
ented singer. “I have a voice,” she notes, nonchalantly, but not 
immodestly. I think Kieślowski’s ideal of what an artist might be 
is conveyed well in this line. Ola is the person who accepts that 
they have a voice but does not think of themselves as one of life’s 
winners. This isn’t about “success.”
 317
mystery
This scene counterpoints Roman’s own despair at wanting what 
he thinks he cannot have, which is sex with his wife. But of course 
it’s not the case that sex is off the menu for Roman and Hanka 
as a couple, it’s just that sex won’t involve what he considers its 
culmination, in mutual pleasure through penetration. Instead 
their sex, if it is to continue after the ending of this episode, will 
need to be different — he’ll find out if and how he can please 
her. The point is that she is less concerned with penetrative sex 
than he is (yet another example among many other subtle ges-
tures towards greater gender equality in Kieślowski’s films, I’d 
like to think). What Roman thinks Hanka thinks she wants is 
not quite the same as what she wants. When she tries to seduce 
him in bed early in the episode, she’s aware of his condition. 
It’s possible that she’s risking offending him by thinking she can 
cajole him into penetrative sex. But perhaps she already under-
stands what he does not yet grasp, which is that other pleasures 
remain for them, and that their love is not lost or reducible. Ro-
man needs to accept himself, since Hanka has already done so. 
This is beautiful. (And here, also, is another arrow shot into the 
“superficially Catholic” doctrine about the authentic purpose of 
sex being penetrative and related to procreation. It’s emphasized 
in the film that Roman and Hanka have deliberately decided not 
to have a child, and while this induces regret on their part, they 
realize that they can now adopt. Love continues in myriad forms 
and directions.) This is what drama can do when it frees itself 
from the conventional and generic ideas of Hollywood plotting 
and Los Angeles versions of plausible stories about relatable 
characters and so forth. Maybe we have underestimated this 
episode?
My mind keeps circling back to Kieślowski’s self-definition as 
“somebody who doesn’t know, somebody who’s searching.” We 
must nevertheless love one another, and we do seem to possess a 
goodness that is difficult to eradicate entirely. It’s our encounters 
with death and loss, and our struggles to form loving bonds, 
that bring out this capacity for good. I love how Dekalog 10 re-
capitulates all of these ideas, but conveys them in a comic tone 
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redolent of the absurdities of Polish life — or maybe just life in 
general. When we first meet Artur (Zbigniew Zamachowski) at 
the start of the episode, he’s spewing satanic nonsense from his 
platform as a punk rock singer. The lyrics of his song are as hi-
lariously ironic as the name of his band, City Death:
Kill! Kill! Kill and fornicate!
Fornicate and covet! All week long!
And on Sundays beat your father, mother and sister
Beat your juniors and steal.
Because everything around you is yours.
Everything is yours.
This not only provides a rather droll recap of the series, but also 
invokes the necessity of something like the Ten Commandments 
or some moral code insofar as the song highlights how unap-
pealing life would be without such things. Its satanism seems 
Baudelairean. In fact, as death and suffering reveal to us, given 
a long enough timeline, nothing is ours, and, therefore, we must 
do the opposite of what the song recommends, of course.
Artur, who later quits the band because of his growing obses-
sion with his father’s stamp collection, doesn’t really believe 
what he’s singing. It’s in the nature of some punk rock to sing 
what you do not believe. The satanic pose falls away on contact 
with the harsh reality of his father’s death, quicker than you can 
say “Lars von Trier.” But not at the funeral, it is important to 
note, where, at first, Artur shuts out the proceedings by listening 
to his Walkman, on which he seems to be playing a recording of 
his own song. Ha!
Things hit home for Artur when his estranged, middle-class 
brother, Jerzy (Jerzy Stuhr), talks about how their father ne-
glected them and their mother for the sake of his stamp col-
lection. Jerzy says it all in a kind of elliptical prose poem that’s 
much more interesting than the lyrics of City Death: “All our 
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misery… Mother’s wasted life… no decent food, no money… .” 
Artur replies with an equal sincerity that reveals the real person 
behind the mask: “What drives people to covet stuff, to possess 
something at any cost?” He knows what’s right and wrong. He 
wants to understand why we grasp at worldly possessions. 
Not bad for a light comic frosting on top of the series. The painful 
differences between love and possession seem to pervade many 
episodes of the Dekalog. This drift orients the series towards a 
reading of its Biblical source material as an extended medita-
tion on loving what we cannot possess, control, or fully grasp in 
its astonishing, beautiful, or frightening otherness, whether that 
love involves a parent or a child, a lover or a spouse, a sibling or 
a family, or something else that, if it is there at all, loves us and 
wants us to love each other… .








With his new film A Hidden Life set for release over the holidays: 
In A Hidden Life (2019), Malick tells the true-life story of Franz 
Jägerstätter (August Diehl), an Austrian farmer who refused to 
take the Hitler Oath and was executed by the Third Reich. Jäger-
stätter wrestles with the contradictions between his faith’s im-
peratives and the ties of his love for his wife Franziska (Valerie 
Pachner) and family, as well as the ostracism of his community 
in St. Radegund, and the moral abyss engulfing the clergy and 
the legal system. With its historical, political, and devotional 
resonances, Malick’s film centers on specific concerns of faith 
that, while present throughout his work, also seem clearly em-
bedded in The Tree of Life (2011) and To the Wonder (2012).
16
All of the attention of the Malick-crazed went to The Tree of Life: 
In The Tree of Life (2011), Malick follows middle-aged executive 
Jack O’Brien (Sean Penn) through an interconnected series of 
meditations. These include memories of growing up in postwar 
Waco, Texas, freewheeling reflections on the origins and devel-
opment of the cosmos and the evolution of life on Earth, images 
of the natural world, and imaginative renderings of the afterlife. 
The film’s depiction of Jack’s family — including his angry and 
financially unsuccessful father (Brad Pitt), his mother (Jessica 
Chastain), who embodies the Christian “way of grace,” and his 
brother, R.L. (Laramie Eppler), reported killed at age 19, pos-
sibly at war — is thought to have an autobiographical basis. The 
film initiates an intensive period of experimentation with film 
form in Malick’s work in the 2010s, and continues the director’s 
collaboration with cinematographer Emmanuel Lubezki, which 
began with The New World (2005).
To the Wonder feels warm, modest, troubled, mixed up, and 
unwieldy: In To the Wonder (2012), Malick tells the story of a 
failed marriage between Neil (Ben Affleck) and Marina (Olga 
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Kurylenko), who meet in Paris, travel to Le Mont-Saint-Michel, 
and eventually settle together in Oklahoma, where their rela-
tionship breaks down after multiple attempts to patch things up. 
During one hiatus, Neil woos Jane (Rachel McAdams), but later 
he seeks solace and meaning in the religious ministry of Father 
Quintana (Javier Bardem), who tends to the area’s downtrod-
den despite having lost his faith himself. Although very poorly 
received by both critics and audiences, the film continues Mal-
ick’s complex experiments in joining personal (or even auto-
biographical) material with Lubezki’s innovative digital cinema-
tography.
17
Kierkegaard’s Stages on Life’s Way springs to mind here: Søren 
Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way [1845], trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988). The prefatory note of “Hilarius Bookbinder,” the figure 
who has “Compiled, Forwarded to the Press, and Published” 
these three “Studies by Various Persons,” which reflect the aes-
thetic, the ethical, and the religious worldviews, respectively, 
describes how he “stitches together” their writings into a single 
volume in order to “benefit his fellowmen” (6, 517).
23
“I started from the imaginary and discovered reality; but behind 
reality, there is again imagination”: Jean-Luc Godard, “From 
Critic to Film-Maker” [1968], in Cahiers du Cinéma, 1960–1968: 
New Wave, New Cinema, Reevaluating Hollywood, ed. and trans. 
Jim Hillier (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 63.
Mundane perception “eats up things, clothes, furniture, your wife 
and the fear of war”: Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Device” (aka “Art 
as Technique”) [1917/1919], in Viktor Shklovsky: A Reader, trans. 




This exilic quality: Michel Chion presaged this element of To the 
Wonder, and noted the exilic themes of Badlands (1973), Days 
of Heaven (1978), and The Thin Red Line (1998) in his book on 
the latter film. “Why are we born into the world and part of the 
world, while at the same time feeling that we have been exiled 
from it?” Michel Chion, The Thin Red Line, trans. Trista Selous 
(London: British Film Institute/Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 7. 
Chion’s conclusion about this sense of “paradise lost” (29) in 
Malick’s films involves the inability of characters to commu-
nicate, including the “illusory fusion” (32) of relationships and 
various uncrossable “lines” (8) between people and cultures and 
boundaries between the human and natural worlds. Whether 
Malick’s emphasis changed in The New World, and whether 
there is more ambiguity and greater potential for mystical merg-
ing in his films than Chion allows, the critical links Chion traces 
between Malick’s films and the “emotion, universalism, and ex-
ile”(18) in Chaplin’s The Immigrant (1917) and Kazan’s America 
America (1963) can be applied to the characters’ peregrinations 
in To the Wonder. 
We share this “map of tenderness”: See Giuliana Bruno, Atlas of 
Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture, and Film (London: Ver-
so, 2007), 2. Bruno writes: “It seemed suitable that reimagining 
a map would be the next step in this cartographic trajectory of 
refiguring and relocating the moving image within a cultural 
history that engages with intimate geographies” (3).
26
Kracauer called something like this process “camera-reality”: 
Miriam Bratu Hansen marks distinctions between formalist 
defamiliarization and “camera-reality” as a critical concept in 
Kracauer’s writing. See Miriam Bratu Hansen, Cinema and Ex-
perience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. 




Berdyaev and his 1907 essay: Nikolai Berdyaev, “Decadentism 
and Mystical Realism,” in The Spiritual Crisis of The Intelligent-
sia [1907], trans. Fr S. Janos (Oxford: FRSJ Publications, 2015), 
http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1907_138_4.html.
34
Rembrandt’s bathing woman: For the image and a description of 
the painting, see “A Woman Bathing in a Stream,” at the web-
site of The National Gallery of Art, London, https://www.na-
tionalgallery.org.uk/paintings/rembrandt-a-woman-bathing-
in-a-stream-hendrickje-stoffels. This painting’s context may 
bear indirectly on some of Malick’s themes: “Although it’s not 
certain, this woman may be Hendrickje Stoffels, who came into 
Rembrandt’s household to look after his infant son after his first 
wife, Saskia, died. Hendrickje and Rembrandt became lovers 
but were unable to marry.”
“Why, this is hell, nor am I out of it”: Christopher Marlowe, The 
Tragical History of the Life and Death of Doctor Faustus [c. 1589–
1592], Scene III (Mineola: Dover Thrift Editions, 1994), 13.
37
The “endless maze” of folly: William Blake, “The Voice of the An-
cient Bard,” in Songs of Innocence and of Experience [facsimile 
of a coloured and gilded copy of the first edition] [1789/1794] 




Charles Taylor is getting at in his A Secular Age: Charles Taylor, 
A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007), passim, esp. 




Bardem interviewing the struggling residents in the community 
of Bartlesville, Oklahoma: Chris Wiley, “The Americans Who 
Confessed Their Pain to Javier Bardem,” The New Yorker, Febru-
ary 17, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/photo-booth/
the-americans-who-confessed-their-pain-to-javier-bardem.
44
“The Kingdom of God is near,” “shall come nigh,” and, most in-
triguing, “hath come nigh”: Robert Young, Young’s Literal Trans-




Lyotard’s petits récits or “little narratives” factor in here: “We no 
longer have recourse to the grand narratives.” Jean-François 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
[1979], trans. Brian Massumi and Geoffrey Bennington (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 60.
46
Cinema as a “redemption of physical reality”: See Siegfried Kra-
cauer, Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality [1960] 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), esp. “Revealing Func-
tions” (46–59), and Hansen’s commentary on Kracauer’s use of 
the term “redemption” in Cinema and Experience, 62–64 and 
286–87.
47
Pilgrimage as a process of “wandering”: “Thinking as a voyageuse 
can trigger a relation to dwelling that is much more transitive 
than the fixity of oikos, and a cartography that is errant,” Bruno 
writes. “Wandering defines this cartography, which is guided by 
a fundamental remapping of dwelling” (Atlas of Emotion, 86). 
She also links wandering with wondering through the connec-
tion of curiosity and travel: “It is not only implicated in the sen-
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sation of wonder, as is often noted, but located in the experience 
of wander” (156).
A place that has been lost but never forgotten: In her essay on 
Knight of Cups, Kristi McKim pinpoints the “futility” of a “long-
ing for stasis — whether a relationship, home, or faith,” an 
impossible yearning that is “never realizable.” Kristi McKim, 
“Moving Away and Circling Back: On Knight of Cups,” New Eng-
land Review 39, no. 2 (2018): 61.
Coleridge’s “secret ministry of frost”: Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
“Frost at Midnight” [1798], in The Poems of Samuel Taylor Col-
eridge, ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1921), 240–42, https://archive.org/details/poemsof-
samueltay1921cole/page/n23/mode/2up.
48
“One of the worst films I have seen”: See “All Audience” reviews, 
To the Wonder, Rotten Tomatoes, https://www.rottentomatoes.
com/m/to_the_wonder/reviews.
49
Experience is an “unwieldy” concept: “As for the concept of expe-
rience, it is most unwieldy here. Like all the notions I am using 
here, it belongs to the history of metaphysics and we can only 
use it under erasure [sous rature].” Jacques Derrida, Of Gram-
matology [1967/1976], trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 65.
50
The “tasks of religious art”: Berdyaev, “Decadentism and Mys-





Eliot’s Four Quartets and their proposed “raid on the inarticu-
late”: T.S. Eliot, “East Coker” [1940], in Four Quartets (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), 16.
55
Wordsworth’s “spots of time”: William Wordsworth, The Prelude 
[1805], XII, Lines 208–15, in Romantic Circles, eds. Paul Young-
quist and Orrin N.C. Wang (University of Colorado, Boulder), 
https://romantic-circles.org/editions/poets/texts/preludeXII.
html. For a comparison of the two “dark invisible workmanship” 
passages in The Prelude of 1805 and 1850, respectively, see The 
Poems of William Wordsworth, Collected Reading Texts from the 
Cornell Wordsworth Series, Volume 2, ed. Jared R. Curtis (Hu-
manities eBooks, 2009), 21, and The Prelude, Or, Growth of a 
Poet’s Mind (London: Edward Moxon, 1850), 17.
57
“Ecumenical hate”: Antonio Spadaro and Marcelo Figueroa, 
“Evangelical Fundamentalism and Catholic Integralism: A Sur-




Thanks to the good folks at Grasshopper Films: In Thy Kingdom 
Come (2018), Eugene Richards follows Javier Bardem, who is 
dressed in character as Father Quintana from To the Wonder, 
as the actor performs pastoral work in Bartlesville, Oklahoma. 
Some of this footage was incorporated into Malick’s film, while 
Richards, with the creative collaboration of Bardem, developed 
a 42-minute featurette from this so-called “third unit” (or addi-
tional second unit) shoot. Richards’ marginalized subjects were 
told that Bardem was an actor and many recognized him from 
his previous films. Nevertheless, they agreed to speak about 
their personal lives, stories, and problems, in locations ranging 




“Many of these Bob Jones and Oregon Extension alumni”: Grego-
ry Wolfe, “When Art Disrupts Religion: An Interview with Phil-




Brixen: IMDb lists Brixen and “surrounding areas” as film loca-
tions for A Hidden Life (https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5827916/
locations). Cinecittà’s Italian newswire service references the 




Storm, in his commentary on Stages on Life’s Way: D. Anthony 
Storm, “Second Period: Indirect Communication (1843–46), 
Stages On Life’s Way,” n.d., http://sorenkierkegaard.org/stages-
on-lifes-way.html.
Challenge to it and to “the sane society”: Fromm argues, vis-à-vis 
the era of nuclear war, and technological destruction in particu-
lar, that “many psychiatrists and psychologists refuse to enter-
tain the idea that society as a whole may be lacking in sanity. 
They hold that the problem of mental health in a society is only 
that of the number of ‘unadjusted’ individuals, and not that of a 
possible unadjustment of the culture itself.” Erich Fromm, The 
Sane Society [1955] (New York: Open Road, 2013), 12.
78
The generation of “failed seekers”: Hunter S. Thompson, Fear 






This is the story that Nietzsche dwells on: “As we can see, this 
book has loaded itself down with a whole sheaf of difficult ques-
tions — but it still remains for us to add the most difficult ques-
tion of all! Viewed through the optic of life, what is the meaning 
of — morality?” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy: Out 
of The Spirit of Music [1872], trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2000), 8.
86
A belief in the literal existence of the Devil: In The Exorcist 
(1973), William Friedkin depicts the demonic possession of a 
12-year-old girl, Regan MacNeil (Linda Blair), and the attempt 
of a priest, Father Damien Karras (Jason Miller), to exorcise the 
demon, which has been transported through an archeological 
artifact from the Middle East to Georgetown, Washington, DC. 
Mixing Friedkin’s signature style of realism with a story sup-
posedly based on an actual historical incident, the film became 
one the highest-grossing horror movies ever made. While The 
Exorcist was nominated for Best Picture, it also was the subject 
of several campaigns to protest, censor, or re-rate its outrageous 
content. 
One possible template for von Trier’s put-on Satanism: “Adoptive 
father of those ostracized / By God, and banished from his para-
dise, / Satan, take pity on my misery!” Charles Baudelaire, “Lita-
nies of Satan,” in Flowers of Evil [1857], trans. James McGowan 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 169–73.
The obsession with duality in Baudelaire: Françoise Meltzer, 
“Baudelaire, Maistre, and Original Sin,” Church Life Journal, A 
Journal of the McGrath Institute for Church Life, University of 





He makes the sign of the Cross and then flips his hand into dev-
il’s horns: In The Kingdom and The Kingdom II (1994–97), von 
Trier depicts a Copenhagen hospital built on the haunted site 
of an ancient fabric-bleaching facility. The hospital is liable to 
supernatural incursions of various kinds, eroding the beliefs of 
its Danish staff in the foundations of modern rationality. The 
television series blends horror and comedy, often in deliberately 
tasteless plotlines that showcase human perversity, absurdity, 
and depravity as well as hauntings, medical experiments, and 
the like. At the time of writing, a new and final season of the 
series was being planned for production.
“Lars von Trier Antichrist”: In Antichrist (2009), von Trier 
portrays a couple, “He” (Willem Dafoe) and “She” (Charlotte 
Gainsbourg), who retreat to a cabin (Eden) in the forests of the 
Pacific Northwest in the hopes of recuperating after the acci-
dental death of their son. “She” is a scholar of the persecution of 
witches, and suffers from severe depression and panic attacks, 
while “He” is a therapist who arrogantly believes he can treat 
his wife better than the psychiatric hospital. “She” suffers from a 
phobia of “nature,” one which proves to be well-founded insofar 
as dark supernatural forces surround them in “Eden,” emanat-
ing either from the woods or from their increasingly disordered 
minds. 
88
“The effect is breathtaking and compulsive, like a drug”: Joanna 
Bourke’s notes on the film formed part of an online roundtable 
discussion convened by Xan Brooks for Cannes 2009, “Anti-
christ: A Work of Genius or the Sickest Film in the History of 





Combining the impulses of laughing and screaming: James Nare-
more, An Invention Without a Future: Essays on Cinema (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 2014), 124.
92
Tarkovsky wrote something in his amazing book: Andrey Tarko-
vsky, Sculpting in Time: The Great Russian Filmmaker Discusses 
His Art, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1987), 182.
Melancholia explores what it looks like: Melancholia is a film di-
rected by Lars von Trier and released in 2011. The film focuses 
on two sisters, Justine (Kirsten Dunst) and Claire (Charlotte 
Gainsbourg). In the opening scene of the film, Justine is getting 
married. This doesn’t go well. Justine is wracked with severe de-
pression. Claire is helpful but also quite controlling. Soon, it is 
revealed that a rogue planet called Melancholia is entering the 
solar system. The fact that this heralds the apocalypse becomes 
increasingly clear. People become upset and do strange things. 
Justine, however, seems more and more at peace.
96
“Realism is a matter of being true to life”: Richard Rushton, The 
Reality of Film: Theories of Filmic Reality (Manchester: Man-
chester University Press, 2013), 73.
97
The domain of clinical reason: In her critical exchange with Rob 
White on the film, Nina Power argues that “Antichrist is a seri-
ous attempt to undermine the unthinking acceptance of modern 
rationality and the flat utility of technology.” White, emphasiz-
ing the film’s critique of Dafoe’s character as a would-be man of 
medicine, concurs: “Calling Antichrist ‘misogynist’ is an opt-out 
from serious engagement, a critical short cut which reduces the 
film to the schematics of unconscious desire that von Trier so 
artfully dismantles in order to reach out to more visceral, coun-
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terscientific casualties. Maybe a better way of approaching the 
film’s gender politics is to observe that She is much the more 
interesting of the film’s characters.” Nina Power and Rob White, 
“Antichrist: A Discussion,” Film Quarterly, December 1, 2009, 
https://filmquarterly.org/2009/12/01/antichrist-a-discussion/.
98
These characters are most often the women in his films: Eileen A. 
Joy writes of Breaking the Waves (1996) that “perhaps von Trier 
sought to locate his portrait of female sanctity outside the sym-
bolic realm of the patriarchal Word and Law [...] Nevertheless, 
the film never entirely escapes a certain traditional theology 
in which love, figured as the passive and feminized sacrifice of 
one’s own or someone else’s life, lies at the heart of Christian be-
lief.” Eileen A. Joy, “Like Two Autistic Moonbeams Entering the 
Window of my Asylum: Chaucer’s Griselda and Lars von Trier’s 
Bess McNeill,” postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural stud-
ies 2, no. 3 (December 2011): 323–24.
102
A “rationalized world stripped of all ‘mysterious incalculable 
forces’”: Jane Bennett, “Modernity and Its Critics,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Science, ed. Robert E. Goodin [2011] (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 127–40.
103
“I sensed an infinite scream passing through nature”: Munch’s 
statement is quoted in the podcast “Munch and The Scream,” 
In Our Time, BBC Radio4/BBC Sounds, March 18, 2010, https://
www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b00rbmrx.
104
A “great deceiver”: This thought experiment, usually called “the 
evil demon,” is associated with Descartes. See René Descartes, 
Meditations on First Philosophy [1641], trans. Donald A. Cress 




But his Dogme 95 period is, I think, crucially important: For some 
background on Dogme 95, see Ove Christensen, “Authentic Illu-
sions — The Aesthetics of Dogme 95,” P:O.V. 10 (December 2000), 
https://pov.imv.au.dk/Issue_10/section_4/artc2A.html. Also see 
Filmstruck, “‘Vow of Chastity’ – Films of Dogme 95,” YouTube, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwmjnG9WvXU&t=3s.
“Today a technological storm is raging”: Thomas Vinterberg and 




“My supreme goal is to force the truth out of my characters and 
settings”: Thomas Vinterberg and Lars von Trier, “The Dogma 
95 Manifesto and Vow of Chastity,” P:O.V. 10 (December 2000), 
https://pov.imv.au.dk/Issue_10/section_1/artc1A.html.
I think that this is exactly what von Trier is up to in ‘The Five 
Obstructions’: The Five Obstructions (2003) is a ‘documentary’ 
by Lars von Trier. It takes up a 1967 experimental short film by 
Danish filmmaker Jørgen Leth called The Perfect Human. Von 
Trier challenges Leth to remake the film five different times, 
imposing more and more difficult constraints on the film each 
time. The end of the film includes a scene in which Leth reads 
a rather self-excoriating letter from von Trier about the entire 
project.    
110
Von Trier’s most recent release: In The House That Jack Built 
(2018), Matt Dillon plays a serial killer whose frustrated at-
tempts to construct a house unfold in parallel with his murders, 
including one episode in which Jack plans a hunting expedition 
in which he shoots his partner and children for sport. While 
the police finally close in on his crimes, Jack retreats to a grim 
refrigeration facility in which he has arrayed his victims’ corpses 
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into a house-like structure. Attempting to escape, Jack discovers 
a secret passageway in the floor, through which a mysterious 
guide figure, Verge (Bruno Ganz), leads Jack down into Hell. 
Rather than emerging back from the Underworld into the light, 
however, Jack falls into the abyss.
113
“The more a person limits himself, the more resourceful he be-
comes”: Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or [1843], in Kierkegaard’s 
Writings, III, Part I, trans. Edna H. Hong and Howard V. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 292.
114
Realism in film: On this threefold conception of cinema, see 
Roy Armes, Film and Reality: An Historical Survey (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin/Pelican Books, 1974), 10–11.
121
“These children that you spit on”: David Bowie, “Changes,” on 
Hunky Dory (RCA, 1971).
127
“There looms, within abjection”: Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: 
An Essay on Abjection [1980], trans. Leon Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), 1.
132
I’ve always enjoyed the movie writing of Manny Farber: See Man-
ny Farber, Farber on Film: The Complete Film Writings of Manny 
Farber (New York: Library of America, 2016).
134
“Abjection accompanies all religious structurings”: Kristeva, Pow-
ers of Horror, 17.





Aristotle’s concepts of catharsis and performance in the ‘Poetics’: 
Tragedy arouses feelings of pity and fear in the audience that are 
held to have an effect of “purification.” Aristotle, Poetics [c. 335 
BC], trans. Malcolm Heath (London: Penguin, 1996), 10. Kris-
teva invokes and discusses the terms “catharsis” and “poetic pu-
rification” in Powers of Horror, 26–28.
“Platonic death”: Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 28.
Mystery
145
100,000 already dead from COVID-19 in America: At the time 
of completing these endnotes, the official death toll in the USA 
alone had risen to around 747,000 (and counting).
147
Dekalog is like a book of Chekhov stories: In Dekalog (1988/89), 
Kieślowski presents ten films, each approximately one hour 
in length, about the interconnected lives of the residents of a 
concrete tower-block housing estate, and environs, in Poland. 
Each episode is thought to link to each of the Ten Command-
ments, while the series as a whole (and significant threads that 
may be drawn between episodes) arguably reflects on various 
aspects and tensions between and within the structure of the 
Commandments and modern life. Co-written with Krzysztof 
Piesiewicz, Dekalog features a score by Zbigniew Preisner and 
the camerawork of leading Polish cinematographers, notably 
Sławomir Idziak and Piotr Sobociński. Artur Barciś plays an en-
igmatic figure who appears in various guises in eight of ten epi-
sodes, suggesting a mysterious presence that watches over these 
lives and stories. The series aired on Telewizja Polska starting in 
December, 1989. Kieślowski’s pair of feature films, A Short Film 
about Killing and A Short Film about Love, were released first, 
in March and October, 1988, respectively, with shorter versions 
appearing as Dekalog 5 and 6 in the broadcast series. This or-
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der of appearance in different versions may account for the dis-
crepancy between the release dates commonly listed for Deka-
log. Compare, e.g., “Dekalog (1989–1990) Release Info,” https://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0092337/releaseinfo?ref_=tt_dt_rdat 
and “Dekalog (1988) | The Criterion Collection,” https://www.
criterion.com/films/28661-dekalog. We have drawn on the fol-
lowing sources for the names (and spellings) of crew and casts 
in the Dekalog series throughout our letters: IMDb (https://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0092337/ and related pages), Wikipedia 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dekalog and related entries), 
Krzysztof Kieślowski and Krzysztof Piesiewicz, Decalogue: The 
Ten Commandments [1990], trans. Phil Cavendish and Susan-
nah Bluh (London: Faber, 1991), Paul Coates et al., Dekalog: Di-
rected by Krzysztof Kieślowski (The Criterion Collection, 2016), 
20 (“Credits”) and 21–23 (“Casts”), and the DVD credits at the 
end of each episode of the 2016 restored Dekalog boxed set from 
Criterion.
149
Double Lives, Second Chances is recapitulated and expanded in 
her interview with the Criterion Collection: This interview with 
Insdorf is contained within the featurette “Kieślowski’s Master-
ful Poetry,” Dekalog 10 (The Criterion Collection, DVD Supple-
ment).
150
My class in Richmond: The authors are deeply grateful to VCU-
arts, to the Cinema Program, and to the Grace Street Theater 
at Virginia Commonwealth University for the invitation, sup-
port, facilities, and permissions to screen all ten episodes of 
Kieślowski’s Dekalog in a single day and evening as part of the 
VCUarts Cinematheque series on October 14, 2017. Special 
thanks to the students who attended and contributed to our dis-




“Critical reaction to the film was largely enthusiastic”: Geoff 
Andrew, The ‘Three Colours’ Trilogy (London: BFI Publishing, 
1998), 19.
151
Kieślowski and Piesiewicz pierced his heart: Stanley Kubrick, 
“Foreword,” in Kieślowski and Piesiewicz, Decalogue, vii.
153
“Somebody who doesn’t know, somebody who’s searching”: 
Kieślowski quoted in Andrew, The ‘Three Colours’ Trilogy, 20.
And that stunning first episode of Dekalog: Dekalog 1 deals with 
the commandment, “I am the Lord your God. You shall have 
no other gods before me.” In Dekalog 1 we meet a university 
professor (Henryk Baranowski) and his 12-year-old son Paweł 
(Wojciech Klata). The father and son engage in various prob-
lem-solving games using early versions of personal computers. 
One day, father and son use the computer, which has oddly 
turned itself on, to calculate whether the ice in a nearby pond 
can hold Paweł’s weight. The computer confirms that it can. The 
next day, Paweł does not come home after school and his father 
searches for him. Later, Paweł’s body is fished from the pond. He 
drowned when the ice broke. In the final, and crushing scene of 
the film, the father, overcome with grief, upends a make-shift 
altar at a nearby site where a church is being built. One of the 
knocked-over candles drips wax onto the face of a Madonna 
icon, who now appears to be crying.
169
Sin as an all-encompassing explanation: See Robin Lane Fox, Pa-
gans and Christians [1986] (New York: Knopf, 2010), 327.
171
“Every other (one) is every (bit) other”: This phrase (tout autre 
est tout autre) is discussed in Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death 
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[1992], trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 68, 79. Richard Kearney’s critique of this Derridean 
concept involves his concern with “discernment” as a categori-
cal element of his theory of “anatheism.” “Not every stranger 
is divine,” and, therefore, we need to distinguish between the 
harmful and the holy, without opening ourselves to “just any 
kind of Other simply because they are other.” Richard Kearney, 
Anatheism: Returning to God after God (2009; New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2011), 45, 46. Derrida’s radically nondu-
alistic openness to alterity, however nerve-wracking, insists on 
an aporetic structure that Kearney’s concept of “discernment” 
attempts to break through. Kearney’s framework contains its 
own awareness of the more intractable ethical and political con-
cerns around such dead certainties (in reality, thorny problems) 
as knowing friend from foe.
173
Spinoza’s remarks about “god or nature”: Spinoza, The Ethics and 
Other Works [1677], ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 59, 116.
174
The Second Commandment: In Dekalog 2, a doctor (Aleksand-
er Bardini) is approached by his musician neighbor, Dorota 
(Krystyna Janda), with a problem. She’s pregnant with her lover’s 
baby while her husband, Andrzej (Olgierd Łukaszewicz), is seri-
ously ill with cancer. Dorota demands that the doctor swear to 
God that Andrzej’s case is hopeless and terminal; otherwise, she 
plans to abort the baby. The doctor finally complies, and Dorota 
keeps the baby, but Andrzej, against all medical expectations, 
stages a seemingly miraculous recovery. The doctor’s story is 
used as a philosophical problem of “ethical hell” in a university 
classroom in Dekalog 8, while the implied outcome, of an adult 
adopting, raising, or helping a child who is not their own, also 
resonates in different ways with the storylines of Dekalog 1, 4, 6, 




“A cinema of unknowing”: J.M. Tyree is grateful to The School 
of World Studies and the Religious Studies Program at Virginia 
Commonwealth University for their invitation to deliver the 
2018 Powell-Edwards Lecture on Religion and the Arts, “To-
wards a Cinema of Unknowing.” Beyond the cinematic consid-
erations discussed here, Kearney’s concept of “anatheism” charts 
similar ground in a related fashion by connecting the power of 
the arts to a religious “way of seeking and sounding the things 
we consider sacred but can never fully fathom or prove.” Rich-
ard Kearney, Anatheism, 3. Kearney deploys the Socratic notion 
of “not-knowing” to describe the “heart of spiritual experience” 
(55) and creative work that contains “the ‘holy insecurity’ of rad-
ical openness to the strange” (5). Kearney’s main assertion, that 
“a primary scene of religion” involves “the encounter with a rad-
ical Stranger who we choose, or don’t choose, to call God” (7), 
can be connected with Derrida’s questions about otherness and 
neighborliness, as well as with Kieślowski’s meditations on who 
is a stranger and who is a neighbor in the apartment buildings 
depicted in Dekalog. But while Kearney seeks out overlapping 
areas between religion and art as modes of approaching alterity 
in the form of “dispossessive bewilderment” (8), this strategy 
also attempts to synthesize distinctions between “the religious 
and the irreligious, the secular and the sacred” (9). Kieślowski’s 
series — and his artistic self-definition as someone who “doesn’t 
know” — might be seen as a grand symphony of “anatheism.” 
Alternatively, Kieślowski’s films also might be understood as an 
artistic challenge to any philosophical attempt to synthesize art, 
ethics, and religion. The fissures between these realms, especial-
ly when viewed through a more Kierkegaardian lens, resist any 
clear-cut convergence.
 God “can well be loved, but he cannot be thought”: This key pas-
sage is from Chapter 6 of The Cloud of Unknowing [14th cen-
tury]. See A.C. Spearing, “Introduction: Doctrine and History,” 
in The Cloud of Unknowing and Other Works (London: Penguin, 
2001), Kindle eBook location 294. William Johnston glosses this 
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passage in his own notes on The Cloud: “This is pretty stark. God 
can be loved but he cannot be thought. He can be grasped by 
love but never by concepts. So less thinking and more loving.” 
William Johnston, “Introduction,” in The Cloud of Unknowing 
and The Book of Privy Counseling [1996] (New York: Doubleday, 
1973), 7.
182
A modernized translation of The Cloud: The Cloud of Unknow-
ing: A New Translation, trans. Carmen Acevedo Butcher (Bos-
ton: Shambhala, 2009), 21.
A detour into Blue is in order: In Three Colors: Blue (1993), the 
first film in the trilogy, Kieślowski tells the story of Julie (Juliette 
Binoche), who loses her husband and her daughter in a car ac-
cident. Initially withdrawing from society, Julie gradually recog-
nizes a need for human connection, and eventually decides to 
complete her husband’s musical composition dedicated to the 
reunification of Europe. In addition to its chromatic leitmotif, 
Blue also considers various forms of love, from the carnal to the 
spiritual, and love’s complex relationship with freedom, in con-
versation with the symbolic meaning of the color in the French 
national flag.
183
“Hyper-analytical” knowledge or intellect: Butcher, trans., The 
Cloud of Unknowing, 17.
186
What he calls an “empathy machine”: Mark Cousins, The Story of 
Film – An Odyssey: Episode 1 – The Birth of the Cinema (Channel 
4/More4, 2011).
188
Your point of view on the Commandments seems well-suited to 
‘Dekalog 3’: Dekalog 3 deals with the commandment, “remember 
the Sabbath day, keep it holy.” In Dekalog 3 a taxi driver named 
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endnotes
Janusz (Daniel Olbrychski) sees an ex-lover named Ewa (Ma-
ria Pakulnis) at church on Christmas Eve. Ewa goes to Janusz’s 
house and asks him for help in finding her missing husband. 
Janusz agrees, even though this means abandoning his family on 
Christmas Eve. The pair searches throughout Warsaw all night. 
They go to hospitals, a drunk tank, and a train station. Finally, 
Ewa admits that her husband left her years ago and that she only 
asked for Janusz’s help as a kind of game. If Janusz helped her, 
she would go on living. If he did not, she planned to kill herself. 
At the end of the film, Janusz returns to his family and agrees 
never to see Ewa again. 
198
Dorota Stalińska: See the Credits section for “Decalogue 3 
(Dekalog III),” in Renata Bernard and Steven Woodward, eds., 
Krzysztof Kieślowski: Interviews (Oxford: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2016).
201
This faith gets another strange and interesting twist in Deka-
log 4: In Dekalog 4, The Fourth Commandment (“Honor thy 
father and thy mother,” in the Catholic rendition of the Deca-
logue) tests filial piety to the breaking point. Anka (Adrianna 
Biedrzyńska) lives with Michal (Janusz Gajos), whose wife, An-
ka’s mother, is long since deceased. The episode centers on the 
question of whether or not Michal is Anka’s biological father and 
how this knowledge might impact on their relationship. Anka’s 
mother has left behind a letter that might contain the answer, 
but Michal has sealed it inside another envelope, stating that 
it is only to be opened after his death. While this implies that 
Michal suspects the worst and doesn’t wish to know the truth, 
Anka, for her part, forges a letter in her mother’s handwriting 
claiming that another man is her father. While their relationship 
is dramatized in deeply uncomfortable scenes of quasi-Freudian 
tension, they ultimately follow an ethical path, in recognition of 
their familial roles in one another’s lives as father and daughter 
being more important than either genetic heritage or destruc-
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tive sexual drives. Understanding that the answer contained in 
the original letter is just a piece of information, they burn it, 
only viewing its startling first line. As with many of the other 
episodes, questions are raised here about what makes for a fam-
ily, and about the differences and boundaries between different 
categories of love as they relate to ethical imperatives. Despite 
its dramatic emphasis on the father, Dekalog 4 also reorients the 
Commandment towards the absent mother; this drift also con-
nects the episode with the missing mothers in Dekalog 1 and 7.
205
Red and Dekalog 4 probably only “work” in their most meaning-
ful ways within a Freudian context: In Three Colors: Red (1994), 
Kieślowski culminates the interwoven stories of his Three Colors 
trilogy with a story set in Geneva, Switzerland, about an un-
likely friendship between a student and fashion model, Valen-
tine (Irène Jacob), and a retired judge, Joseph Kern (Jean-Louis 
Trintignant). Kern is involved in the illegal wiretapping of his 
neighbors, including Karin (Frederique Feder), the girlfriend of 
Auguste (Jean-Pierre Lorit), who is Valentine’s neighbor. Kern, 
who may possess some form of second sight, encourages Valen-
tine to travel to England, taking a ferry on which Auguste also 
will be traveling in order to recover from his breakup with Ka-
rin. The boat sinks but Valentine and Auguste survive together, 
along with the protagonists of the first two films in the Trilogy, 
Blue and White. As the characters from all three films merge in 
the final sequence of the last film, so too do Kieślowski’s pre-
occupations throughout with chance, fate, and interconnected 
lives and stories.
208
“There is an invisible but fallible authority presiding over the world 
within the film”: Georgina Evans, “Red: A Fraternity of Stran-





But I did want to check in and gauge your own response to Deka-
log 5: Dekalog 5 deals with the commandment “thou shalt not 
kill.” In Dekalog 5, a young man named Jacek Łazar (Mirosław 
Baka) takes a taxi driven by Waldemar Rekowski (Jan Tesarz). 
Jacek directs Waldemar to a forlorn spot outside of the city. 
There, he strangles Waldemar with a rope he has been carry-
ing all day. Waldemar is not killed by the strangulation and the 
excruciating scene finally concludes with Jacek finishing Wal-
demar off with a large stone. The rest of the film concerns the 
trial and sentencing of Jacek, who is defended by an idealistic 
lawyer named Piotr Balicki (Krzysztof Globisz). Piotr learns 
much about Jacek’s life during his attempted defense, including 
the fact that Jacek’s young sister was killed in a drunk driving ac-
cident. Jacek is, nevertheless, condemned to the death penalty. 
Piotr is present in the final moment as Jacek is, in a brutal and 
unforgettable scene, hanged by the state. Piotr is deeply shaken 
by this experience and mutters the line, “I abhor it,” in the last 
scene of the film.
219
Dekalog 5 and A Short Film about Killing: Kieślowski developed 
two linked feature films, A Short Film about Killing and A Short 
Film about Love, from the footage filmed for Dekalog 5 and 6, 
respectively. The features were released in 1988 in advance of the 
television broadcast of Dekalog, and they differ in length and 
sometimes in narrative structure or scene order from the epi-
sodes. The extraordinary cinematography by Sławomir Idziak, 
with its green-filtered world, also forms much of the visual basis 
for Idziak’s dream-like camerawork on The Double Life of Vero-
nique (1991).
There’s a visual rhyme apparent: See Mark Cousins, The Story of 





Magda confronts Tomek’s gaze: In Dekalog 6 and A Short Film 
about Love (1988), Tomek (Olaf Lubaszenko) steals a telescope 
in order to spy on his neighbor, Magda (Grażyna Szapołowska). 
Although he’s caught and beaten up for being a peeping tom, 
he makes a point of not watching Magda’s sexual encounters. 
Magda catches Tomek at her door, inviting him inside only to 
sexually humiliate him. Tomek attempts suicide, while Magda 
reconsiders whether Tomek’s feelings have more depth than she 
recognized. As Madga learns more about Tomek, including that 
he was raised in an orphanage, she develops protective feelings 
for him that also upend her own sense of self. Having previously 
rejected Tomek’s professions of love, and claiming that love is 
only another word for sex, Magda begins to believe that love 
exists.
222
Sexualizing the women onscreen and identifying with the quest of 
the male protagonist: Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narra-
tive Cinema,” Screen 16, no. 3 (Autumn 1975): 6–18.
223
“Epistemological quests”: Tomasulo compares the “epistemologi-
cal quests for certainty in an ambiguous world” of Hitchcock’s 
Jeffries (Jimmy Stewart) and Antonioni’s Thomas (David Hem-
mings). Frank P. Tomasulo, “‘You’re Tellin’ Me You Didn’t See’: 
Hitchcock’s Rear Window and Antonioni’s Blow-Up,” in After 
Hitchcock: Influence, Imitation, and Intertextuality, eds. David 
Boyd and R. Barton Palmer (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2006), 147. Tomasulo quotes Antonioni’s remark that “Hitch-
cock’s films are completely false, especially the endings […]. Life 
is inconclusive” (165).
232
“The idea of order”: Wallace Stevens, “The Idea of Order at Key 
West” [1934], in Ideas of Order (New York: Alcestis Press, 1935), 
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available online via The Poetry Foundation: https://www.poet-
ryfoundation.org/poems/43431/the-idea-of-order-at-key-west.
235
The bleak picture of Dekalog 7: Dekalog 7 deals with the com-
mandment “thou shalt not steal.” The film revolves around the 
story of a young woman, Majka (Maja Barelkowska), living with 
her parents and her little sister Ania (Katarzyna Piwowarczyk). 
But as we learn during the course of the film, the little sister 
is actually Majka’s daughter, born after an affair with a teacher 
named Wojtek (Bogusław Linda). Majka’s mother, Ewa (Anna 
Polony), has been pretending to be Ania’s mother when she is, in 
fact, her grandmother. Majka cannot abide this ruse and ‘steals’ 
her daughter Ania in an attempt to force Ewa to allow moth-
er and daughter to emigrate to Canada. In the course of their 
flight, Majka and Ania end up at the house of Wojtek, Ania’s 
father. Wojtek is torn between helping Ania and staying true to 
his deal with Ewa, a deal which kept him from serious repercus-
sions due to his seduction of the sixteen-year-old Majka. At the 
end of the film, Majka gives Ania back to Ewa at a train station, 
but boards a train alone and to a fate unknown.
242
No End turns the conventionally religious idea of eternity on its 
head: In No End (1985), as in Blind Chance (1987), Kieślowski 
bridges his early emphasis on social problems and political dis-
sidence in communist Poland with his later reflections on the 
uncanny and the metaphysical. Ulla (Grażyna Szapołowska) 
is a translator whose husband, Antek (Jerzy Radziwiłowicz), 
haunts her after his death. Meanwhile, Derek (Artur Barciś), 
who has been jailed for his role in the Solidarity movement un-
der Poland’s period of martial law (1981–1983), also encounters 
Antek from beyond the grave. The lives of Ulla and Derek link 
the realms of the personal and the political. Ulla decides to join 
Antek in the afterlife by suicide. Critics regard No End with par-
ticular importance as Kieślowski’s first collaboration with both 
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Piesiewicz and Preisner, while the appearance of Barciś presages 
his performance in Dekalog.
247
The devastating experience of Dekalog 8: In Dekalog 8, Elżbieta 
(Teresa Marczewska), who, as a Jewish girl, was saved from death 
during the nazi occupation, returns to Poland to confront her 
past. She visits the classroom of Zofia (Maria Kościałkowska), 
a professor whose life and work has long intrigued her. Zofia, 
in turn, had been a member of the Resistance during the war, 
but had turned away Elżbieta from her door one night when 
the girl needed shelter and disguise from the nazi authorities. 
As Elżbieta and Zofia learn more about one another, Zofia re-
veals not only that her reason for turning away Elżbieta was her 
belief that a Gestapo informer was in their midst, but also that 
she lived to deeply regret her decision. Zofia invites Elżbieta to 
spend the night in her home, and then takes her to see a tailor 
(Tadeusz Łomnicki) who had helped to save Elżbieta’s life on 
that fateful night. While the tailor refuses to discuss anything 
with Elżbieta, Zofia forms a bond of friendship with the younger 
woman during her visit, based upon an honest reckoning with 
the past. According to an interview (The Criterion Collection, 
DVD Supplement), the episode is partly based on the childhood 
experiences of the Jewish Polish writer Hanna Krall. The Eighth 
Commandment, forbidding false witness, expands here into a 
larger meditation on truth and faith as they span the personal, 
the ethical, the philosophical, the historical, and the political.
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Stanley Hauerwas often quotes a Jewish theologian friend of his: 
This idea can be found in many books, essays, and interviews 
by Stanley Hauerwas. It’s a core touchpoint in his argument 
about law as actually meaning something to our daily lives. 
Stanley Hauerwas, “Christian Practice and the Practice of Law 
in a World without Foundations,” Mercer Law Review 44, no. 





“Films cannot be said to offer representations of the world or of 
some purportedly ‘real’ or ‘true’ world”: Rushton, The Reality of 
Film, 13.
256
“Ideological obfuscation or nostalgic (self-)deception”: Thomas El-
saesser argues that classical cinema might offer something “more 
complex” than this, but nevertheless maintains “Benjamin’s idea 
that cinema is Erlebnis, rather than Erfahrung.” Thomas Elsaess-
er, “Between Erlebnis and Erfahrung: Cinema Experience with 
Benjamin,” Paragraph 32, no. 3 (November 2009): 296.
“historic decline with the proliferation of Erlebnis”: Hansen, Cin-
ema and Experience, 15.
257
““to experience” [Erleben] without spirit is comfortable”: Walter 
Benjamin, “Experience” [1913], in Selected Writings: 1913–1926, 
Volume 1, edited by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 5.
“The yet unnamable glimmer beyond the closure”: Jacques Der-
rida, Of Grammatology [1967/1976], trans. Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 14.
“The film in the viewer’s head”: Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 
301.
260
Dekalog 9 links exercise with suicide: Dekalog 9 deals with the 
commandment “thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife.” In 
Dekalog 9, a doctor named Roman Nycz (Piotr Machalica) 
finds out that he is impotent. He informs his wife Hanka (Ewa 
Błaszczyk) of this fact and also tells her that she should look 
for other lovers. Hanka is offended by this idea but eventually 
does initiate an affair with a young man named Mariusz (Jan 
350
wonder, horror, mystery
Jankowski). Roman finds out about the affair just as Hanka is 
trying to end it. Through a series of unfounded suspicions and 
misunderstandings, Roman comes to believe that Hanka is leav-
ing him for Mariusz and attempts to kill himself by riding his 
bicycle, pathetically, off of a bridge. The attempt fails. Roman 
and Hanka are reunited.
267
“Allusive indeterminacy”: Kracauer, quoted in Hansen, Cinema 
and Experience, 300.
269
“Ideas, not money”: Cousins, The Story of Film – Episode 1.
Doesn’t Tarkovsky compare the cinematic image with the haiku?: 
“The image as a precise observation of life takes us straight back 
to Japanese poetry.” Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, 106. Tarko-
vsky recalls Eistenstein’s interest in haiku for its “observation of 
life —pure, subtle, one with its subject” (66).
270
Benjamin’s experience of aura under the influence of hashish: 
“Genuine aura appears in all things, not just in certain things, 
as people imagine.” Walter Benjamin, quoted in Hansen, Cin-
ema and Experience, 129. The phrase is drawn from the essay 
“Hashish, Beginning of March 1930.” Cf. Walter Benjamin: Se-
lected Writings, Volume 2, 1927–1934, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
et al., eds. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1999), 328, and On Hashish, trans. Howard Eiland et al. (Cam-
bridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 
58.
271
Those invisible strands or strings that might connect us: See Vir-
ginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway [1925], ed. David Bradshaw (Oxford: 




“For example, if by telling a lie you have in fact hindered some-
one who was even now planning a murder”: Immanuel Kant, “On 
A Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns” 
[1797], in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 3rd edn., 
trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 
1992), 105–6. Steven Levine recommended and helped to inter-
pret this and other philosophical texts.
282
Individual, collective, and national identity and responsibility: 
For a concise journalistic overview of the law, see Brigit Katz, 
“Poland’s President Signs Highly Controversial Holocaust Bill 
into Law,” Smithsonian Magazine, January 29, 2018 [updated, 




The “angel of history”: “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (or 
“On the Concept of History”) [1940], translated by Harry Zohn, 
in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2019), 201.
297
An ongoing condition of ceaseless change: “What was some time 
ago dubbed (erroneously) ‘post-modernity,’ and what I’ve cho-
sen to call, more to the point, ‘liquid modernity,’ is the growing 
conviction that change is the only permanence, and uncertainty 
the only certainty.” Bauman, “Foreword to the 2012 Edition,” 
Kindle eBook location, 256. Bauman’s original formulation 
suggested that ours is an “individualized, privatized version of 
modernity, with the burden of pattern-weaving and the respon-
sibility for failure falling primarily on the individual’s shoulders. 
It is the patterns of dependency and interaction whose turn to 
be liquefied has now come. They are now malleable to an extent 
unexperienced by, and unimaginable for, past generations; but 
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like all fluids they do not keep their shape for long.” Bauman, 
Liquid Modernity, 8.
297
“Ostensibly unquestionable premises of our way of life”: Zygmunt 
Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), 5.
300
Cardinal August Hlond’s belief: Michael Phayer, The Catholic 
Church and the Holocaust, 1930–1965 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), 14. Phayer relates Hlond’s “indiffer-
ence” to the postwar Kielce massacre, a 1946 pogrom based on 
antisemitic “blood libel” accusations of child kidnapping (265). 
More generally, Phayer argues, the anti-Jewish nazi laws of 1941 
raised Vatican concerns “for the rights of Jewish converts” be-
cause they elevated race over religion, and, therefore, interfered 
with conversions that resulted from weddings, for example (14).
301
Contemporary fundamentalism is itself a thoroughly modern 
outgrowth of pseudo-scientific claims for religion: “After Dayton 
[Tennessee, the site of the 1925 Scopes Trial in which the state’s 
ban on teaching evolution in schools was overturned], funda-
mentalists closed their minds even more, and Creationism and 
an unswerving biblical literalism became central to the funda-
mentalist mindset. They also drifted to the far right of the politi-
cal spectrum.” Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God (New York: 
Knopf, 2000), 178.
Roman/Romek: In Dekalog 9, Hanka usually (but not always) 
calls her husband Roman “Romek,” using the Polish diminutive. 
(Her given name is “Hanna” but she is also nicknamed “Hanka” 
and “Hania.”) Somewhat confusingly, the pamphlet accompa-
nying the Criterion Collection boxed DVD set of Dekalog films 
lists this character, played by Piotr Machalica (who also appears 
briefly in Dekalog 6), as both “Roman” (Dekalog 6 cast list) and 
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“Romek” (Dekalog 9 cast list). See Paul Coates et al., Dekalog: Di-
rected by Krzysztof Kieślowski (The Criterion Collection, 2016), 
22, 23. It’s notable that Roman appears very briefly in Tomek’s 
story in Dekalog 6. Both characters suffer from episodes of sexu-
al dysfunction that turn into suicide attempts, drawing a thread 
here between their lives related to their conventional/dysfunc-
tional ideas about manhood (which also applies to Karol Karol’s 
impotence in White). Some interesting freeplay in the chronol-
ogy of the episodes seems to be at work here. In Dekalog 6, Ro-
man is glimpsed leaving his apartment building on his bicycle. 
Roman’s workout sweatshirt makes clear that this is not the 
same day on which he attempted to kill himself (on that fate-
ful day, he’s wearing his leather jacket). It does seem significant, 
however, that this bicycle is the means by which he attempts sui-
cide in Dekalog 9, falling from what appears to be an incomplete 
bridge. The series provides some tempting clues about when 
various events might have happened by using cues related to 
seasons and weather. Dekalog 6 features green leaves and light 
jackets. A Short Film about Love adds the detail, not included 
in the television version, of Tomek breaking ice off the roof of 
his building to put on his face. Dekalog 9 portrays the mountain 
ski resort of Zakopane, on the border of present-day Slovakia, 
as being open, while heavy downpours are taking place back in 
the city. This suggests a gradual movement towards thaws, literal 
and poetic, in the series, which begins with the deadly winter 
ice of Dekalog 1 and proceeds to the nearly fatal Christmas dark-
ness of Dekalog 3. All of this suggests that both Dekalog 6 and 9 
might take place around the same point in the Spring (perhaps 
in April, that cruelest month?), but the chronology here may not 
add up definitively. Tomek might be seeing Roman before or 
after Roman’s suicide attempt, in other words, but these events 
seem adjacent in time, and Tomek’s own suicide attempt occurs 
shortly afterwards. Another thing that binds together Dekalog 6 
and 9 involves these episodes’ shared theme of love’s potential 
beyond the physical realm of sexual eros. Hanka specifically em-
phasizes this point to Roman after his diagnosis of impotence, 
while Magda eventually accepts Tomek’s belief in something of 
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the same kind. (Following a different thread, Roman glimps-
es Majka’s daughter Ania, from Dekalog 7, playing outside his 
building, perhaps in a nod to both episodes’ theme of adop-
tion, while Tomek is an orphan who lives with his godmother.) 
Intertextuality in the Dekalog series is complex, tightly woven, 
and thematically resonant between these parallel lives, not only 
building bridges but also revealing lacunae between episodes 
and heartrending gaps between characters. Might Tomek and 
Roman have helped one another? Even this single detail, regard-
ing their passing encounter in Dekalog 6, which comprises only 
a few seconds of film, illuminates larger questions of chance and 
fate while questioning the notion of providence.
303
The name of a friend in Krakow mentioned casually in Deka-
log 9, Mikołaj: In Three Colors: White (1994), the second (and 
least well-received) film in the Trilogy, Kieślowski portrays the 
relationship between the Polish Karol Karol (Zbigniew Zama-
chowski) and the French Dominique Vidal (Julie Delpy). After 
finding himself unable to consummate their marriage, Karol is 
divorced by an angry Dominique, who also steals his money and 
burns down his hair salon. Karol returns to Poland. Taking on 
various odd jobs, he finds himself in the pay of Mikołaj (Janusz 
Gajos), who tries to get Karol to kill him, although Mikołaj is 
grateful to be alive when this strange “suicide-by-contract-mur-
der” ploy fails. Karol involves himself in various schemes to get 
rich, eventually succeeding. Finally, he fakes his own death so 
that he can observe Dominique’s mourning and, subsequently, 
have her arrested for his own “murder.” While White ends with 
Karol watching Dominique in her prison cell, the ending of the 
Trilogy in Red implies that the couple somehow eventually re-
turn to one another’s orbit. They survive the ferry disaster along 




The actor who portrays the French Veronique: In The Double Life 
of Veronique (1991), Irène Jacob plays a double role as Weronika, 
a Polish singer, and Véronique, a French music teacher. These 
characters’ lives are mysteriously connected. Weronika dies 
while singing a choral piece by Van den Budenmayer. Mean-
while, Véronique appears to be teaching her students to play the 
same piece of music. After a disturbing encounter with a pup-
peteer, Alexandre Fabbri (Philippe Volter), Véronique discovers 
that he plans to write a book about a woman born with a double. 
She leaves him and returns home to visit her father, rescuing 
herself from an Orphic Underworld of sorts, on a larger quest 
to find herself.
309
Kieślowski stays quite close to this sense of comedy in ‘Dekalog 10’: 
In Dekalog 10, two brothers, Artur (Zbigniew Zamachowski) 
and Jerzy (Jerzy Stuhr), mourn the death of their father, in the 
process discovering their dad’s extensive (and, as is eventually 
revealed) incredibly valuable stamp collection. While the broth-
ers are estranged — Jerzy is straight-laced, while Artur sings for 
a rock band called City Death — their increasing obsession with 
the stamp collection brings them together. In their attempt to 
complete their father’s quest to acquire an elusive third stamp in 
an ultra-rare series, the brothers enter into a deal with a shady 
dealer who demands that Jerzy donate his kidney to his sick 
daughter in exchange for the stamp. Drawn to the hospital dur-
ing the organ harvesting surgery by brotherly love, Artur leaves 
their father’s stamp collection in the protection of a guard-dog, 
and behind metal bars he has installed on the windows. But the 
dog turns out to be extremely friendly to the thieves who break 
in and steal the fortune. Initially the brothers turn on one an-
other during the investigation of the crime, each believing the 
other is behind the theft, but they finally recognize they’ve been 
swindled, and, eventually, reconcile, sharing a laugh of brotherly 
love over the fact that they have both been to the post office, and 
chosen the same new common stamps to start building a new 
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collection, for fun more than profit. The images of and jokes 
about the stamps as a series reflect on the Dekalog itself as a 
television series, while the plot extends the Tenth Command-
ment (“Thou shall not covet”) from literal to more metaphori-
cal territory. The postal service (Episode 6), postmen characters 
(2, 6), stamps (8, 10), postcards (9), and letters (4) are threaded 
throughout the Dekalog, suggesting the series and/or its film-
makers as a metaphorical postal-like organization that connects 
the characters and homes of the community whose addresses 
we’ve been exploring.
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Klee, too, apparently used a print of a Cranach painting of Lu-
ther for mounting his own image: For the connections between 
Benjamin, Klee, and Quaytman, see Holland Cotter, “R.H. 
Quaytman’s Variations on Klee’s Angel,” The New York Times, 
November 5, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/arts/
design/rh-quaytmans-variations-on-klees-angel.html. A brief 
description of the PBS series, Alive from Off Center, and Laurie 
Anderson’s film, “What You Mean We?” are available from WG-
BH’s Open Vault online resource, https://openvault.wgbh.org/
catalog/V_F879015D656D4D78A5D7ED987E79E25E. It’s also 
described by David Pescovitz in “Watch Laurie Anderson’s fan-
tastic ‘What You Mean We?’” (1986) from PBS’s “Alive from Off 
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